Knowledge can be personal – Polanyi

Whilst in the previous week, Bernard Williams outlined a view of the objectivity which he thinks is implicit in the very idea of knowledge, Michael Polanyi argues for the role of what he calls personal knowledge. This is connected to what is often called tacit knowledge, knowledge which in some sense or other, cannot be made explicit.Essential reading

Polanyi Michael. (1958) Personal Knowledge, Chicago: University of Chicago Press chapters 1 and 4. These are both on WebCT now.

These two chapters cover apparently quite different aspects of scientific knowledge. Chapter 1 concerns scientific theory; chapter 4 concerns tacit knowledge or skills. The connection is this: both exemplify what Polanyi calls personal knowledge. Both call for something which is not as objective as scientists (and others) tend to assume.

In chapter 1, do not get too bogged down with the details of the scientific changes described, look instead for the general moral Polanyi draws. The key idea, suggested, early on in the discussion of the Copernican revolution, is that what seems to be simply a move to a more objective view of the world - one which is less subjective in the sense of reflecting our local perspective - is not. Look at the final paragraph on the first page (p3) and onto the next: 'In a literal sense, therefore, the new Copernican system was as anthropocentric as the Ptolemaic view, the difference being merely that it preferred to satisfy a different human affection' [p4]. Still, Polanyi does think that there are some grounds for distinguishing between levels of objectivity so look for what these are. And how does his view of the lack on importance of the Michelson-Morley experiment for the development of Einstein's thought support his (mixed) views on objectivity in science.

In chapter 4, things are more straight forward. In it, Polanyi describes skills or forms of tacit knowledge that have to be taught by example rather than general rules. Does he give any reason for this? Is the difference one of principle? And how does it connect to chapter 1? Focus on sections 1, 3, 4 and 6.

You can find a link to a contemporary thinker Harry Collins who had a recent article in the New Scientist magazinel here (and my criticism of Collins, who is, nevertheless, someone I really admire). Collins talks about Polanyi. (You'll find lots of stuff about Collins and tacit knowledge on my blog as I'm writing a book on it.)

Other Reading

Accounts of tacit knowledge can be found in a number of places. Two good discussions are these (both on WebCT in secondary reading).

• • Kuhn, T (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press chapter 5

  • Collins, H. (1985) Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice, London: Sage chapter 3

A recent informal / popular book length discussion of skills is

• • Sennett, R. (2008) The Craftsman, London: penguin

But I didn’t think much of it.

There’s a summary of arguments for tacit knowledge in one of my own papers

• • Thornton, T. (2006) ‘Tacit knowledge as the unifying factor in EBM and clinical judgement’ Philosophy Ethics and Humanities of Medicine 1:2

which you can download here. But you will have to ignore the stuff about medicine.

Slides are here.

Reflections on Polanyi are here.