Explanation by covering law
So far we have assumed that science has something to do with fitting particular events to general theoretical patterns and then worried about how general theories can be established. But what, exactly, is the 'fitting'. The most obvious idea is that it is explanation. One influential model of that - the Deductive Nomological model - says that it is a matter of inferring the event to be explained from general laws in logical arguments. (Hence fitting an event into a lawlike pattern.) Hempel is the philosopher who most developed this model. But is subject to a number of standard counter examples (the flagpole, the barometer, syphilis and paresis) which you can exctract from the reading from Van Fraassen (who goes on to suggest some further positive ideas about explanation). Hempel, C.G. (1965) Aspects of Scientific Explanation London:Free Press chapter 10
Van Fraassen ‘The Pragmatics of Explanation’ in Ruben, D-H. (ed) Explanation, Oxford: OUP or Van Fraassen, B. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: OUP pp97-112
Secondary and background reading:
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003) Theory and Reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press chapter 13
Bird, A. (1998) Philosophy of Science London: UCL Press chapter 2
Ladyman, J (2002) Understanding Philosophy of Science, London: Routledge sections 7.1-7.2
This session's slides are here.
Remarks on explanation by covering law.
