Causal explanation

The criticisms of the DN model suggest that in many central cases, at least, explanation trades on causal information. So perhaps that can be used as a way to understand a key aspect of scientific understanding. Science looks to causes. David Lewis develops this line of thought and looks at instances of explanation (the principle of least time, the gas laws, intentional explanation) which appear to violate this causal approach.

Peter Lipton develops a model of explanation as causal explanation of a particular sort. One explain a fact in contrast to something else: a fact and a foil. This is contrastive explanation and he argues that it cannot be reduced to DN explanation.

• • Lewis, D. 'Causal explanation' in Ruben, D. (ed) Explanation, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress

  • Lipton, P. (2004) Inference to the Best Explanation, London: Routledge chapter 3

Secondary and background reading

• • Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003) Theory and Reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press chapter 13 section 3

  • Bird, A. (1998) Philosophy of Science London: UCL Press pp85-94

This session's slides are here.

Remarks on causal explanation.

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