Sophisticated methodological falsificationism

The arguments for the theory dependence of observation suggest that even the refutation or falsification of theories is not as logically clean as the simplest model of falsificationism suggests. Lakatos suggests a twofold modification. Falsification involves the comparison of larger scale research programmes (not just individual theories) and is extended in time. But do these modifications still leave a model of science that can help shed light on good science versus bad, or science versus non-science?

• • Lakatos, I. (1970) ‘Falsificationism and the methodology of scientific research programmes’ in I Lakatos and A Musgrave (eds) Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge: CUP pp91-138. The key bit of the text is pp116-122. So read that first and carefully. But then go back and look at the text as it builds up to that ie from the start. This is the only reading this week.

Secondary and background reading:

• • Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003) Theory and Reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press chapter 7 sections1-3

  • Chalmers, A.F. (1999) What is this thing called Science? 3^rd Edition, Milton Keynes: Open University Press chapters 5, 6 & 7

  • Ladyman, J (2002) Understanding Philosophy of Science, London: Routledge chapters 3 &6

  • Newton-Smith, P.H. (1981) The Rationality of Science, London: Routledge chapter 6

  • O’Hear, A. (1989) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press chapter 4

This session's slides are here.

Remarks on sophisticated methdolodical falsificationism.

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