Simple falsificationism
Popper argued that the problem of induction can be solved (or perhaps more accurately side-stepped) by saying that science should aim at conjecture (forming a hypothesis or perhaps just a guess) and refutation (trying to prove it wrong) since whilst it seems impossible to prove through enumeration that all swans are white, a single black swan refutes that hypothesis. But how straight-forward is refutation? And what kind of positive explanation does Falsificationism permit? Popper, K. ‘Conjectural knowledge: my solution to the problem of induction’ in his Objective Knowledge, Oxford: OUP chapter 1 pp1-17
Secondary and background reading:
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003) Theory and Reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press chapter 4
Bird, A. (1998) Philosophy of Science London: UCL Press chapter 3
Chalmers, A.F. (1999) What is this thing called Science? 3rd Edition, Milton Keynes: Open University Press chapters 5&6
Ladyman, J (2002) Understanding Philosophy of Science, London: Routledge chapter 3
O’Hear, A. (1989) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press chapter 3
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Some brief remarks about the session are here.
