Tacit Knowledge
The idea of tacit knowledge has become a familiar feature of the philosophy and sociology of science. It is found in discussion of clinical judgement and decision making in business studies. But it is less clear what tacit knowledge is, or, to put it more cautiously, what one might mean by ‘tacit knowledge’. But any model must face a central challenge. It must account for it being tacit and also knowledge. But accounting for its tacit status threatens its status as knowledge and vice versa.
To count as knowledge, tacit knowledge must have some content that can be known. But the obvious way of specifying it is via a 'that-clause', which threatens its tacit status.
This course of guided readings follows the idea that tacit knowledge is practical knowledge: knowledge how to do something. Hence it connects arguments about the limits of what can be made explicit with discussion of know-how. This places limits on the extent to which tacit knowledge is tacit. But it cannot be codified in situation-independent and theoretical terms.
Sessions
1. Polanyi
2. Ryle
3. Dreyfus
4. Wittgenstein
5. Collins
6. McDowell
(Reflections on each session will be added in a little while.)
There is also a practical training session (2 x 2 hour seminars) in approaching tacit knowledge management.
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