John McDowell develops a picture of how it is possible to have knowledge of other minds by criticising a standard view of criteria: the semi-technical term used by Wittgenstein and his followers. Realising that it was impossible to offer a plausible inductive argument for the nature and even existence of other minds on the basis of observed behaviour (the problem of other minds), Wittgensteinians argued that there was instead a kind of logical link between behaviour and mental states (thus encouraging the view that Wittgenstein was some kind of behaviourist) labelled 'criteria'. On this view, all other things being equal, it is a priori that such and such behaviour implies such and such mental state. 'All other things being equal' because the criteria are defeasible. If the person so behaving is pretending, an actor on stage, then that fact can defeat the criterial link between behaviour and mental state. The behavioural criterion can be satisfied in the absence of the mental state.That, then, is the Wittgensteinians' (not Wittgensteinian!) account. But, McDowell objects, if that is the case then when we experience the satisfaction of the criterion (when we see / hear that it is satisfied by seeing and hearing other peoples' behaviour) that fact alone is not sufficient for the other person to have the mental state for which the criterion is a criterion. And if that is the case, our experience always stops short of the fact that other people have mental states. All we can experience is that the behavioural criteria are satisfied but whether, additionally, they are not then defeated and thus whether the other perspon actually has the relevant mental state is a matter of luck. But if so, we can never have knowledge of other minds.
McDowell thus suggests a different account of the role of criteria, justification and luck. The key idea is this. Rather than assuming that, in the case of pretence, the criteria for mental states are satisfied but are also defeated - by the fact that it is a case of pretence - one can instead construe this as a case of the criteria only appearing to be satisfied. This is a rejection of the idea that criteria are defeasible types of situation. Instead, McDowell presses the idea that, when criteria are satisfied, one’s experience itself (what makes it the experience it is) does not fall short of the facts. So there cannot be cases where the criteria are satisfied without the fact for which they give criterial support also holding.
This flouts an idea we are prone to find natural, that a basis for a judgement must be something on which we have firmer cognitive purchase than we do on the judgement itself; but although the idea can seem natural, it is an illusion to suppose it is compulsory. [McDowell 1982: 471; 1998a: 385]
This really is a radical idea. Our knowledge of another person's behaviour is no firmer than our knowledge of their mental states. Or, our knowledge of their mental states is no weaker than our knowledge of their behaviour. We can, non-inferentially, experience their (direct expression of their) mental states.
In thinking about this idea, think also about this analogy between 1 and 2 below.
On a fairly natural picture (for philosophers, at least), mental states are hidden behind a veil of mere behaviour. All we can directly experience is the behaviour and thus we need an argument or inference to get safely from the behaviour to the mental states. Scepticism about other minds argues that no such argument or inference can work. All our experience of the behaviour could be as it is whether or not there were mental states 'behind' it. So if there are, that is mere luck. So we cannot have knowledge of other minds even if our beliefs are, by luck, true.
On a fairly natural picture (for philosophers, at least), the external world is hidden behind a veil of mere experiences or sense data. All we can directly experience are the sense data and thus we need an argument or inference to get safely from the sense data to the external world. Scepticism about the external world argues that no such argument or inference can work. All our experience of the sense data could be as it is whether or not there was an external world 'behind' it. So if there is, that is mere luck. So we cannot have knowledge of the external world even if our beliefs are, by luck, true.
If McDowell's argument works for 1 it might also work for 2. Does it?
Essential reading
McDowell, J. (2010) 'Criteria, defeasibility and knowledge' in Sosa et al (eds) Epistemology: an anthology, Oxford Blackwell
Further reading
Thornton, T. (2004) John McDowell Chesham: Acumen chapter 5 pp177-207
Glendinning, S. and de Gaynesford, M. (1998) ‘John McDowell on Experience: Open to the Sceptic?’, Metaphilosophy 29
McDowell, J. (2011) Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge, Milwaukee:Marquette University Press pp39-44
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