Knowing how
Gilbert Ryle argues for the irreducibility of practical knowledge (knowledge-how) to theoretical knowledge (knowledge-that). He does this via a regress argument which undermines the idea that practical knowledge can be explained in general as the result of prior acts of contemplating propositions. Practical knowledge is not in general dependent on theoretical knowledge. ‘Intelligent practice is not a step-child of theory’ [Ryle 1949:27].
Ryle’s argument can be found both in a paper called ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’ and in chapter two of his Concept of Mind:
If a deed, to be intelligent, has to be guided by the consideration of a regulative proposition, the gap between that consideration and the practical application of the regulation has to be bridged by some go-between process which cannot by the pre-supposed definition itself be an exercise of intelligence and cannot, by definition, be the resultant deed. This go-between application- process has somehow to marry observance of a contemplated maxim with the enforcement of behaviour. So it has to unite in itself the allegedly incompatible properties of being kith to theory and kin to practice, else it could not be the applying of the one in the other. For, unlike theory, it must be able to influence action, and, unlike impulses, it must be amenable to regulative propositions. Consistency requires, therefore, that this schizophrenic broker must again be subdivided into one bit which contemplates but does not execute, one which executes but does not contemplate and a third which reconciles these irreconcilables. And so on for ever. [Ryle 1945: 2]
The crucial objection to the intellectualist legend is this. The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle. [Ryle 1949: 31]
What is the form of the argument? Is it plausible? If one wished to defend the ‘intellectualism’, how might one criticise it?
Reading
Ryle, G. (1945) ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 46: 1-16.
Ryle, G. (1949) The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson pp25-61.
Further reading
Snowdon, P. (2004) ‘Knowing how and knowing that: a distinction reconsidered’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 1-29
Reflections on Ryle.