Constructive empiricism
So now it seems that causal information is key to science, that laws may play an important role in charting genuine causal relations and that evidence, although ‘infected’ by theory, is still key. But this package of ideas still comes under threat. Since evidence is, by definition, observable but since the observable evidence is consistent with an infinite number of different theories about the unobservables, it is irrational to be other than agnostic about whole tracts of the world. Van Fraassen, B.C. (1980) The Scientific Image, Oxford: OUP chapter 2 'Arguments concerning scientific realism' but only pp6-25
Secondary and background reading:
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2003) Theory and Reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science, Chicago: University of Chicago Press chapter 12
Chalmers, A.F. (1999) What is this thing called Science? 3rd Edition, Milton Keynes: Open University Press chapter 15
Hacking, I. (1983) Representing and Intervening, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press chapter 3
Ladyman, J (2002) Understanding Philosophy of Science, London: Routledge chapters 6 & 7
This session's slides are here.
Remarks on constructive empiricism.
