Inference to the most probable cause

Nancy Cartwright shares with Van Fraassen pessimism about the role of Inference to the Best Explanation. But she thinks that there are two distinct kinds of explanation. Some summarise phenomena by deriving them from general laws. Others cite causes. Cartwright argues that whilst the former need not be a guide to truth, the latter require that causes really exist. But is her distinction a genuine one?

- Cartwright, N. (1983) How The Laws of Physics Lie chapters 4 and 5, ‘The reality of causes in a world of instrumental laws’ (reprinted in Boyd, R., Gasker, P. and Trout, J.D. (eds) (1999) The Philosophy of Science, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press pp379-386) and 'When explanation leads to inference'

Secondary and background reading:

- Bird, A. (1998) Philosophy of Science London: UCL Press pp141-161
- Ladyman, J (2002) Understanding Philosophy of Science, London: Routledge chapters 6 & 7

This session's slides are here.

Remarks on Inference to the most probable cause

Previous session.