Penrose

Penrose seems to oscillate between embracing a full-fledged non-material consciousness, and considering it as a phenomenon which is describable by physics, even if not quite yet, in contrast to Witten and Linde who state clearly that it is non-material in contrast to all that is studied by physics. 

Eddington also clearly embraces non-materiality of consciousness, however he seems to overstep what is known and goes off into speculation which sometimes seem to be presented as a scientific view, see critique below.

Ed Witten: 

Conversation I had with Ed Witten in Dec '93:  I spoke of free will, he said he thinks the mystery is consciousness. He said he didn’t see how consciousness could be included in physics. He had conversations with Wigner about this. Even if we found some new phenomenon, we couldn't know this was in fact 'consciousness {?)

If consciousness COULD affect the universe, eg via free will, then it IS part of the physical universe.   

…

 He was interviewed about this: see  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hUW7n_h7MvQ

"I think consciousness will remain a mystery......I can't conceive it not remaining mystery  Perhaps it won't remain a mystery if there is a modification in the laws of physics as they apply to the brain...[as suggested by]Penrose... I think that's very unlikely. I am skeptical that it's going to be a part of physics.  ..I'm not going to try to define consciousness and in a way that's conencted with the fact that  don't beleive it will become part of physics...I'll leave it as an undefined term...

..

Andre Linde:

But let us remember that our knowledge of the world begins not with matter but with perceptions. I know for sure that my pain exists, my ‘green’ exists, and my ‘sweet’ exists. I do not need any proof of their existence, because these events are a part of me; everything else is a theory. Later we find out that our perceptions obey some laws, which can be most conveniently formulated if we assume that there is some underlying reality beyond our perceptions. This model of material world obeying laws of physics is so successful that soon we forget about our starting point and say that matter is the only reality, and perceptions are nothing but a useful tool for the description of matter. This assumption is almost as natural (and maybe as false) as our previous assumption that space is only a mathematical tool for the description of matter. We are substituting reality of our feelings by the successfully working theory of an independently existing material world. And the theory is so successful that we almost never think about its possible limitations.

In contrast, what we are referring to in this paper is specifically and exclusively a non-physical type of phenomenon which therefore many people - "materialists" - categorically reject as impossibile. The reader of this paper should keep in mind (no pun intended) that if they have a model which could physically explain the consciousness we are referring to , then they are not understanding what we are referring to. We are programmatically consistently referring only to the impossible. The physically possible from the material viewpoint is uninteresting in the context of this paper.

The proponents of strong AI aim for an algorithmic creation which will possess aspects of that which the human brain possesses. Of course it may be that what enables the human brain to be associated to non-physical dualist-type consciousness is the sophistication of its algorithmic aspects, and so it may well be that the running of a sufficiently sophisticated AI algorithm will indeed endow it with dualist-type consciousness, but running an algorithm is not by itself the consciousness we speak of - again, if what is induced by the running of the algorithm is physically explainable in the usual sense then it is categorically NOT what we are referring to.

Non-material rather than “Material but with peculiar properties” or “material but irreducible”

One day perhaps humans will understand nmc and the mind-body relationship, and come up with a set of 'laws' governing all of reality, so it is not a claim here than nmc can never conceivably be incorporated into some new type of understanding - however that will not be physics as we think of it, and I would expect that the 'understanding' will itself involve our use of nmc as opposed to the understanding of physics which involves only intelligence etc not nmc. 

My concern however is not with terminology regarding what physics is and what science is, but rather the denial that my consciousness is qualitatively other than the subject matter studied by physics as we understand it to  be (that which I and many others call 'the material universe'), and thus the denial that reality is more than just that which is studied by physics.

Also, by 'qualitatively other' I do not mean "possesses peculiar properties which can be explained by present-day extrapolated sophisticated physics", but rather "inexplicable by - or inaccessible to - physics as we understand it to be". Physics involves reducible laws/processes, though some might perhaps involve incomputability as speculated by Penrose, and if irreducible means emergent properties and laws, then physics needs to incorporate these and propose a initial state of the universe which can eventually produce emergent properties, and perhaps re-define time and causal chains etc. At some point if it gets sufficiently sophisticated perhaps physics might morph into what we call nmc, but that would certainly not be what we mean by physics today.  

....

In order to make my critique of Penrose clear, I insert the abstract of my paper, in which I make a central point/cpnjecture which will figure prominwntly in what I write later.

Excerpt from the abstract of my paper: 

Both Materialist & non-Materialist are correct - about themselves: 

A brain’s self-identification as "Materialist" or “Non-Materialist” (dualist, panpsychist, idealist etc) as reflecting the absence or presence of an associated real non-material awareness/consciousness, rather than merely as a statement of a philosophical stance. 

A survey will identify relevant candidates of both types for a proposed brain-experiment to determine a possible correlation to the brain’s deep structure/neural wiring.

Avi I. Rabinowitz

The Jan 17, 2023 version of this paper is now available at: https://philarchive.org/rec/RABBMC

[An earlier version of this paper is at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/19980/]

Abstract/Introduction:

We contest the unsubstantiated assumption of both materialists and non-materialist that the ontological status they propose applies to all humans and that the competing claim is false for all - ie we reject both the claim of non-materialists that all humans share the same fundamental aspect of having a "non-material consciousness" (nmc), as well as the contrasting claim of materialists that none do (being fully material as according to eliminative materialists/reductive physicalists etc). Instead, the basic proposition of this paper, our ‘ontological conecture’ (OC) - an updated version of our 1998 website article “Mindless Materialists” - is that the central tenets of proponents on both sides are true, but only regarding themselves. 

A signature feature of nmc is that brains associated to it are capable of knowing of its existence directly, and as a corollary we would propose that if a sophisticated brain does not know it is associated to nmc then most likely this is because it is in fact not so associated. Thus, in accordance with our OC we will consider a brain’s statements on this issue (that it does or does not possess nmc) as not merely its ‘philosophical position’ but as an authoritative statement, a reflection of an ontological fact.

Furthermore, we propose that only those who possess nmc are capable of understanding what it is, so that although they are well-qualified to know directly that they themselves possess it, in contrast those who lack nmc and possess only  material consciousness (mc) cannot even comprehend what non-materiality means - they will understandably tend to consider it a non-existent absurdity, which contention would be quite correct in a purely-material reality, such as they effectively inhabit.

END OF EXCERPT/Abstract

Terminology reflecting ontological status: 

Since according to our OC those brains which categorize themselves as non-materialists are presumed to indeed be associated to nmc, for usefulness in phraseology we’ll refer to people whose brain is so associated as being nmc’s (not merely “espousing nmc”). 

Materialists say they are conscious but that theirs is a material consciousness (abbrev: “mc”) , and since according to our OC we accept this self-determination we will refer to them as being “mc’s” or being materialist (not merely “espousing materialism”).  

My OC proposes that all this complicated arguing with materialists derives very simply from their lack of ability to conceive of what nmc's mean when they speak of consciousness. My proposal therefore is that when nmc's engage in a discussion with mc's, or read the writings of mc's, they should keep in mind that the materialist side of the argument is being presented by an entity lacking nmc (or lacking the awareness that they possess nmc, and lacking the intuitive understanding of nmc which other nmc's possess as a result of their possession of nmc) and I believe that the discussion will make far more sense to the nmc in this light.

Abstracting out the effect of our nmc in order to understand - and agree with - the mc position: Let's take the materialist position that deep insight, compassion, wisdom, love, ethics, meaning etc are emergent properties of a big bang - ie of the matter-energy space-time plus laws of physics at some purely-material 'initial' stage. We might say: even if this is true, so what? The essential point is not whether they (the list mentioned above 'deep insight...meaning etc) emerged from a big bang but that these are considered 'higher level' than what they emerged from - which is after all partly what is meant when using the term 'emerged from', which means to the nmc that they cannot arise directly via the already-known laws of material physics. 

Since they (in the list above) are considered qualitatively different from a big bang, we would need some new 'law of the emergence from the material of a qualitatively-higher-level', however of course this is already not material-type physics. However the materialist probably would not agree with us that there is a qualitative difference and that a qualitatively-new type of physics is needed. 

The explanation for this divergence is that the nmc speaks - in some sense unconsciously - from the perspective of nmc when referring to  "insight, compassion, wisdom, love, ethics, meaning", and it is that nmc-aspect feeding into the nmc's associated material brain which motivates the nmc's brain to insist that these are at a qualitatively-higher level and would require a qualitatively-new physics. The materialist however does not possess nmc and speaks of these in their purely-brain-correlate sense, as a list of brain-states, which indeed as Descartes pointed out, mysteriously is parallel to the nmc-experience states.

So the nmc is really not agreeing with the materialist that all in the list can emerge from an initial stage ('big bang'), since whereas the materialist is speaking of purely-material brain-states the nmc is effectively stipulating that this list is of nmc-associated brain states, and so the initial stage must somehow include nmc or 'the-potential-for-nmc' (and it is a far more interesting and sophisticated 'nothing' from which a big bang emerges if it produces these than if it didn't). 

On the one hand it is circular and disingenuous for the nmc to agree that what was enumerated in the list above can emerge from a big bang when what the nmc means by a big bang includes the nmc that the materialist states does not and cannot exist; on the other hand  the materialist is missing the point if they think that they can succeed via all sorts of arguments to enable the nmc-associated version of the brain-state list to be naturalistically produced from (not 'emerge from') the purely-material initial state the materialist means when they speak of the big bang.

Conclusion: For an nmc to understand the materialist position that a material big bang can produce 'deep insight, compassion, wisdom, love, ethics, meaning etc', they need to somehow remove the somewhat unconscious nmc-added ingredient in their brains when hearing the elements in this list, and if they do, they will find they can agree that the essence-removed purely-brain-aspect of these can indeed arise from a purely material initial state via known-physics-type laws, in line with Descartes' proposition that the two are parallel equivalents. 

Eddington-type ‘level-confusion’

Various pioneers of quantum physics seem to have felt that there was some link between quantum physics and nmc, and Eddington seems to have felt it mirrors or could possibly model nmc (see extensive quotes and discussions of nmc from the physics and physicist point of view in the accompanying paper “Why Consensus..”).

However, in fact quantum physics deals with physical measurables not the “non-material”. The confusion arose perhaps because when a brain contemplates the quantum-theory-based seeming-insubstantiality of substance (eg as per Eddington’s table example) or various esoteric quantum phenomena such as issues of (non)locality, it is struck by various subtleties and wonders, and to nmc’s the theory may somehow seem ‘mind-like’. However it is critical to recognize the two levels involved: 

i. a mind contemplating phenomena of the material universe and the laws describing/governing them; 

ii. the feelings generated as a result (in that mind). 

That quantum processes and laws ‘seem mind-like” is a mind-feeling of some nmc’s, and a mind-feeling is not the phenomenon under discussion (quantum physics) - it is ‘level-confusion’ to think that since quantum processes ‘seem mind-like’ to an nmc, that therefore quantum theory models nmc. 

However it is definitely interesting to attempt to unravel all this and understand more clearly what indeed might be implied by this feeling.

Between the physicalist who denies nmc and the proponents of nms are Eccles, Penrose and others who finding reasons to consider it eg as a quantum gravity phenomenon. They are in a middle ground since it is not clear whether their approach satisfies the non-materialist claim of it being qualitatively other than the material. Eddington wrote long ago about the mind-like quality associated to quantum physics, but it may be more correct to say not that there are mind-like qualities to elementary particles but rather to the theory and model which describes them. Furthermore, of course those theories and models exist in our minds and so rather than considering the natural quantum entities and processes to themselves have mind-like qualities, we would say  that an nmc contemplating quantum physics may feel that its characteristics are somehow reminiscent more of ‘mindstuff’ than of ‘material things’.   

levels:

a) materialism*

b) Eccles, Penrose/Hameroff etc

c) the type of non-material consciousness ("nmc") which Ed Witten and Andre Linde refer to - and which those like Dennet deny exists 

d) the nmc+ "Mind" which Eddington and Einstein spoke of but is never mentioned in physics departments?  

Note: Of course, even the old classical conception of a particle as a material ‘thing’ was a conception in a mind, as is ‘material’ and ‘thing’.

And so, nmc is not really encompassed in physics, but quantum physics perhaps provides a hint that the two are not as mutually exclusive as implied in the classical ‘mind-body’ divide. Certainly from the minimalist perspective implied by the non-disprovability of solipsism, if we only deal with what we know as fact, ie our own nmc, and treat physics as a way of ordering a specific category of mind-contents (what we consider as ‘sensory impressions’), then there is no contradiction between mind and matter, since matter is only a construct of mind, and the fact that even materialist physics is led to a theory reminiscent of mindstuff is perhaps heartening.

 Eddington Quotes:  Eddington writes, in statements we placed here in levels of increasing divergence from physics and further along the nmc+ path:

1."We have seen that the cyclic scheme of physics presupposes a background outside the scope of its investigations" 

and going further, he writes  

2."physical science has limited its scope so as to leave a background which we are at liberty to, or even invited to, fill".

Going yet further, he writes:

3. “Here”, says science, “I have left a domain in which I shall not interfere. I grant that you have some kind of avenue to it through the self-knowledge of consciousness". 

4. And, in a sentence which reveals his attitude to the relation between three key words in the title of this article: "reality" "science" and "consciousness": 

"... the insight of consciousness... the only avenue to what I have called intimate knowledge of the reality behind the symbols of science...." 

[where by 'symbols' he means both the items in physics equations and what they represent, and he says that they play a role relative to reality similar to that played by Plato's 'shadows' (ie physics provides a description of reality which is analogous to shadows inside a cave of unknown entities outside the cave - ie quantities in physics equations and their conceptual counterpart provide some sense - albeit very limited - of ‘true’ reality.]

Analysis & Critique of Eddington's statements above:

These statements are NOT accepted as true by all - indeed, materialists will say quite the opposite - and so statements of this type would not be useful if directed at a general audience of scientists. More specifically:

a. nmc physicists know there is more to reality than science contains, and so agree with Eddington, but a materialist can't know this, and this is the problem with this type of dialogue, it assumes that nmc and materialists agree on the basic facts, but they do NOT.

b. of course materialists completely disagree with and do not even understand Eddington's statement which not only claims that there is a realm inaccessible to science, but also that 'science' admits this.

c.  furthermore, materialists will not agree that we DO have an alternate method for accessing some knowledge about this realm (which they say does not exist).

d. the statement that it is our 'consciousness' which provides access to this ther realm is contention - mc’s say that consciousness is material and that there is no non-material realm; what remains therefore is the rather obvious or trivial statement that our material consciousness - ie our thinking - gives access to the material universe.

e. that it is a form of 'self-knowledge' is also contentious - materialists will not agree that self-knowledge has anything to do with this, and in any case self-knowledge is a material property not something exotic (ie there is some circuit in the brain which is able to ‘recognize ‘itself’, and this is not anything extra-scientific) .

So we can see that Eddington fits many contentious ideas into a set of sentences:

"We have seen that the cyclic scheme of physics presupposes a background outside the scope of its investigations.”

 "physical science has limited its scope so as to leave a background which we are at liberty to, or even invited to, fill".“Here”, says science, “I have left a domain in which I shall not interfere. I grant that you have some kind of avenue to it through the self-knowledge of consciousness"], based on the incorrect assumption that all readers/listeners are nmc. It would be preferable from this point on for physicists writing on this topic to clarify that they are speaking of nmc, and that not all people possess it and therefore not all will agree with these notions. Indeed not only will mc’s disagree with this, they will not even understand what is meant.

Penrose-type ‘level-confusion’: 

i. In Penrose’s writings there seems to be some sort of oscillation between different definitions of ‘consciousness’, sometimes it is nmc and sometimes mc-type, ie “being awake rather than dreaming or sleeping” or “having a component of the brain which monitors the rest of the brain’s operation”, but mc’s will not understand this issue of varied definitions.

ii. The aim of a theory of quantum gravity involving noncomputability is worthwhile, and it would be exciting to see noncomputability in the brain, however even if this would be a property of nmc it would not not address its nature, which is by definition “non-material”, but this point cannot be understood by mc’s.  

iii. In some of his attempts he repeats the above-mentioned level confusion between quantum phenomena and the feeling in an nmc that they give rise to, just that Penrose adapts it to quantum gravity.

.....

Excerpts from Penrose

The fundamentality of consciousness: On the last page of “The Emperor’s New Mind”: “Consciousness seems to me to be such an important phenomenon that I simply cannot believe that it is something just 'accidentally' conjured up by a complicated computation. It is the phenomenon whereby the universe's very existence is made known. One can argue that a universe governed by laws that do not allow consciousness is no universe at all. I would even say that all the mathematical descriptions of a universe that have been given so far must fail this criterion. It is only the phenomenon of consciousness that can conjure a putative 'theoretical' universe into actual existence!”

The following is included to indicate that Penrose contrasts consciousness with the material, thus clearly indicating that it itself is not material, and then states that it is not material, but supposed perhaps “consciousness is actually a scientifically describable ‘thing’” or wonders whether or not it is.

He seems to think that he has understood the hard AI approach, but this author would disagree, since the hard-AI supporters are presumably mc’s and mean by consciousness something that is in fact indeed entirely material, as opposed to the consciousness Penrose means.

In the final sentence it is quite obvious that the phenomenon Penrose is referring to is not at all ‘material’, and might not be encompassable by what we refer to today as ‘science’. 

Where Lies the Physics of Mind? Sir Roger Penrose, Martin Gardner  https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198519737.003.0018

 Pages 523–582  Published: October 1989

https://academic.oup.com/book/40643/chapter-abstract/348319333?redirectedFrom=fulltext

Abstract: In discussions of the mind-body problem, there are two separate issues on which attention is commonly focused: ‘How is it that a material object (a brain) can actually evoke consciousness?’; and, conversely; ‘How is it that a consciousness, by the action of its will, can actually influence the (apparently physically determined) motion of material objects?’ These are the passive and active aspects of the mind-body problem. It appears that we have, in ‘mind’ (or, rather, in ‘consciousness’), a non-material ‘thing’ that is, on the one hand, evoked by the material world and, on the other, can influence it. 

However, I shall prefer, in my preliminary discussions in this last chapter, to consider a somewhat different and perhaps more scientific question - which has relevance to both the active and passive problems - in the hope that our attempts at an answer may move us a little way towards an improved understanding of these age-old fundamental conundrums of philosophy. My question is: ‘What selective advantage does a consciousness confer on those who actually possess it?’ 

There are several implicit assumptions involved in phrasing the question in this way. First, there is the belief that consciousness is actually a scientifically describable ‘thing’. There is the assumption that this ‘thing’ actually ‘does something’ - and, moreover, that what it does is helpful to the creature possessing it, so that an otherwise equivalent creature, but without consciousness, would behave in some less effective way. 

On the other hand, one might believe that consciousness is merely a passive concomitant of the possession of a sufficiently elaborate control system and does not, in itself, actually ‘do’ anything. (This last would presumably be the view of the strong-AI supporters, for example.) 

Alternatively, perhaps there is some divine or mysterious purpose for the phenomenon of consciousness - possibly a teleological one not yet revealed to us - and any discussion of this phenomenon in terms merely of the ideas of natural selection would miss this ‘purpose’ completely.

………

…

Critique of Penrose

see sources here: https://docs.google.com/document/d/15_J-qzzzIl1VJdgecS3NBKKNZiq7iPuT134fjWJOPjw.

Penrose speaks of mind and consciousness separately, and states that he is excluding mind and soul from his discussion and it is not always clear when he refers to consciousness whether he is referring to what is meant there.

Though the title of "The Emperor's New Mind" utilizes the term "mind",.he also states that he wishes to avoid the tangled issue of consciousness....

There is aso perhaps an element of level-confusion involved:

a. Confusing theories with phenomena;

b. Confusing

i) the way an nmc feels about a sophisticated theory, with

ii) a theory of nmc

Though quantum phenomena are so sophisticated that they are capable of providing sufficient complexity to the brain's operation that these phenomena certainly could be proposed as candidates for that which is the interaction-substructure serving as a substrate on which consciousness can reside, but this substructure and these interactions are not by themselves "consciousness". 

Though Godelian logic and non-algorithmic processing and Hofstadter's strange loops are so sophisticated in conception that they too are appropriate as statements in a substrate supporting consciousness, they are not in themselves consciousness. Consciousness is sui generis, qualia are irreducible to anything else, and the feeling "wow this is so sophisticated a concept that it can serve as the basis for consciousness" is a thought in a conscious mind - the sophisticated process is not the mind itself or its thoughts.

Rather, the consciousness we are referring to - perhaps present due to the sophistication of quantum gravity interactions in the brain - is that which contemplates, 'knows', is aware of,  all these ideas including being aware of the sophistication of quantum phenomena and descriptions. 

And if someone thinks they can explain to the author how it is that indeed all this could in fact BE consciousness, then they are certainly presenting an effectively materialist view and are not actually understanding what I am referring to. Again, what I refer to is specifically, categorically, by definition, is that which in the materialist conception is impossible and meaningless.

And that is why at least at present the subject of nmc is not  part of physics. There are two levels why it is not...firstly, it is not experimentally verifiable, and physics is the study of that which IS experimentally verifiable but secondly and no less importantly, is the fact that not all humans possess it, and indeed they do not believe it exists even in others (and those who possess it can't prove it), and so all this makes it not a fit subject for physics which is democratic, consensual, agreed upon by physicists in all countries of all persuasions.  It could perhaps have been a different situaiton had all humans possessed nmc, and all knew it and knew that it could not be proved to exist, but since all knew it exists maybe some would feel it need not be proven - though in such a case there might have still been a dispute about whether it is part of physics. However in our universe since there those who do not possess it and dispute its existence, then certainly nmc itself  cannot be part of physics (as opposed to the study of the physical substrate enabling it to manifest or to give rise to it etc which can be part of physics or another sciences).

CHAPTER 52310 Where Lies the Physics of Mind? Get access 

Sir Roger Penrose, Martin Gardner

https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198519737.003.0018

 Pages 523–582 Published: October 1989

Abstract

In discussions of the mind-body problem, there are two separate issues on which attention is commonly focused: ‘How is it that a material object (a brain) can actually evoke consciousness?’; and, conversely; ‘How is it that a consciousness, by the action of its will, can actually influence the (apparently physically determined) motion of material objects?’ These are the passive and active aspects of the mind-body problem. It appears that we have, in ‘mind’ (or, rather, in ‘consciousness’), a non-material ‘thing’ that is, on the one hand, evoked by the material world and, on the other, can influence it. However, I shall prefer, in my preliminary discussions in this last chapter, to consider a somewhat different and perhaps more scientific question - which has relevance to both the active and passive problems - in the hope that our attempts at an answer may move us a little way towards an improved understanding of these age-old fundamental conundrums of philosophy. My question is: ‘What selective advantage does a consciousness confer on those who actually possess it?’ There are several implicit assumptions involved in phrasing the question in this way. First, there is the belief that consciousness is actually a scientifically describable ‘thing’. There is the assumption that this ‘thing’ actually ‘does something’ - and, moreover, that what it does is helpful to the creature possessing it, so that an otherwise equivalent creature, but without consciousness, would behave in some less effective way. On the other hand, one might believe that consciousness is merely a passive concomitant of the possession of a sufficiently elaborate control system and does not, in itself, actually ‘do’ anything. (This last would presumably be the view of the strong-AI supporters, for example.) Alternatively, perhaps there is some divine or mysterious purpose for the phenomenon of consciousness - possibly a teleological one not yet revealed to us - and any discussion of this phenomenon in terms merely of the ideas of natural selection would miss this ‘purpose’ completely.

AR comments re Section 34.6: p1027-1033 "what is reality" and "the role of mentality in physical theory"

1) Many times P writes in a way that is pretty clear he means nmc (rather than material consciousness) but he keeps saying it is somethinn a future physics will encompass, so it is not exactly what I call nmc.

2) p1029: He replaces Platonic "the Good" with "morality". Also, he understands "Beauty" not as statues and the human body but math. So his Platonism is much closer to Biblical ideas than to ancient Greek.

3) He considers the Platonic realm the most fundamental, as opposed to what I usually say, that it is the 'mental' realm - but when I say this I mean a realm in which our own nmc resides, so it is not the same as his menatal realm which is the mental realm of human minds - in his diagram a small segment of physicality gives rise to all of mentality, whereas for me a smll part of mentality gives rise to human nmc, and that does NOT "arise from" any physicality.

..

4) Top of p1031-top p1032: I think he illegitemately mixes his own interpretation into that of others, so that his critique is invalid: 

He claims that  "amost all conveniotinal interpretations of qm depend on presence of a perceiving being" - if it were true then he is right that their interp is useless, but they would not agree that their approach requires a perceiving being...[so as I said, he illegitemately mixes his own qp interpretation which requires a conscious observer into that of others who do not require it, so that his critique of their view is invalid.]

5) middle p1032 (he is re-capping his earlier discussions on this topic): P says c does not cause collapse, it is q grav which does it, and q grav enables c

In a way he is placing q grav on a deeper level than c, but I don;t think so, because of the way he speaks of mind, Platonism etc..

I say it might be that it is not c which causes collapse, I cannot state unequivocally that it is c which causes that, just that c - with fw specifically - has exactly the relevant qualities associated to collapse (it is a causality-transcendent phenomenon which is a choice mechanism), so it could be that P is right, but my point is:

• firstly to stress that it is fw not c which is the important element, 

• and secondly that I believe it was the properties of c are which made it seem appropriate to Wigner as a collapse mechanism etc, not just as mc's think that it was for silly reasons, just I think fw is more appropriate for that.

Also: mc's may think wigner misunderstood qp bec it was early in the development of the theory, and so he thought one needs something to collapse the wavefunction and so he proposed c, ie mc's do not realize it was because of the properties of c, not because something was needed so he randmoly chose c which is not actually relevant.

And maybe mc's think nmc's speak of c as being mysterious bec it collapses the wavefuntion, but in fact P talks of the special properties of c even though it is NOT needed for collapse according to him, so this refutes the mc view (ie even if c is NOT needed for collapse it is considered sui generis, and the special properties of c are self-evident, not bec of suppositions related to qp).

....

6) middle p1033: re "epiphenomenon": My approach: P doesn't understand that the critics of the c as collapser idea are against it bec the critics are not speaking of c as P and I do, ie the epiphenomenon notion he mentions in quoting them is bec(ause) they don't undertand that nmc is fundamental, so the issue is not whether or not it is some epiphenomenon, it is that nmc is fundamental and it is qualitatively 'other', whether it is an epiphenonemon or not is irrelevant, and even whethe ror not it collapses the wavefunction is not relevant to its fundamentality to reality, more so than the physical universe.

....

7) p1033, last two sentences before section 34.8: P is against the dea of c emerging from matter as an epiphenomenon bec he says it has to be based on non-computable aspects of nature, so it is much more fundamental than an epip.

He argues against functionalsim bec it is comptational.\he invokes Turing and Godel.

He is against all this because he feels c depends on a qp theory which includes collapse ("OR"), and this will have to be non-computational.

Where I differ: I think he is correct in protesting against those appraoches, but for the wrong reason. Whether or not computability will play a crucial role, for me it is clear that c is nmc, and so is beyond any natural process even if it is non-computable. So the reason those othr approaches are inadequate is bec they are based on a lack of nmc, not because they lack incomputability. By not understanding the crucial aspect of nc they miss the point of c entirely.