Materialism etc

Materialism belongs to the class of monist ontology, and is thus different from ontological theories based on dualism or pluralism. For singular explanations of the phenomenal reality, materialism would be in contrast to idealism, neutral monism, and spiritualism. It can also contrast with phenomenalism, vitalism, and dual-aspect monism. Its materiality can, in some ways, be linked to the concept of determinism, as espoused by Enlightenment thinkers.^{[citation needed]}

Despite the large number of philosophical schools and subtle nuances between many,^[1][2][3] all philosophies are said to fall into one of two primary categories, defined in contrast to each other: idealism and materialism.^[a] The basic proposition of these two categories pertains to the nature of reality—the primary distinction between them is the way they answer two fundamental questions: "what does reality consist of?" and "how does it originate?" To idealists, spirit or mind or the objects of mind (ideas) are primary, and matter secondary. To materialists, matter is primary, and mind or spirit or ideas are secondary—the product of matter acting upon matter.^[3]

The materialist view is perhaps best understood in its opposition to the doctrines of immaterial substance applied to the mind historically by René Descartes; however, by itself materialism says nothing about how material substance should be characterized. In practice, it is frequently assimilated to one variety of physicalism or another.

...

"Physicalist" vs "materialist"

In philosophy, physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical,^[1] or that everything supervenes on the physical.^[2] Physicalism is a form of ontological monism—a "one substance" view of the nature of reality as opposed to a "two-substance" (dualism) or "many-substance" (pluralism) view. Both the definition of "physical" and the meaning of physicalism have been debated.

Physicalism is closely related to materialism. Physicalism grew out of materialism with advancements of the physical sciences in explaining observed phenomena. The terms are often used interchangeably, although they are sometimes distinguished, for example on the basis of physics describing more than just matter (including energy and physical law).

According to a 2009 survey, physicalism is the majority view among philosophers,^[3] but there remains significant opposition to physicalism. Neuroplasticity is one such evidence that is used in support of a non-physicalist view.^[4] The philosophical zombie argument^[5] is another attempt to challenge physicalism.

Wiki "naive realism"

In philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, naïve realism (also known as direct realism, perceptual realism, or common sense realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are.^[1] When referred to as direct realism, naïve realism is often contrasted with indirect realism.^[2]

According to the naïve realist, the objects of perception are not merely representations of external objects, but are in fact those external objects themselves. The naïve realist is typically also a metaphysical realist, holding that these objects continue to obey the laws of physics and retain all of their properties regardless of whether or not there is anyone to observe them.^[3] They are composed of matter, occupy space, and have properties, such as size, shape, texture, smell, taste and colour, that are usually perceived correctly. The indirect realist, by contrast, holds that the objects of perception are simply representations of reality based on sensory inputs, and thus adheres to the primary/secondary quality distinction in ascribing properties to external objects.^[1]

In addition to indirect realism, naïve realism can also be contrasted with some forms of idealism, which claim that no world exists apart from mind-dependent ideas, and some forms of philosophical skepticism, which say that we cannot trust our senses or prove that we are not radically deceived in our beliefs;^[4] that our conscious experience is not of the real world but of an internal representation of the world.

The naïve realist is generally committed to the following views:^[5]

• Metaphysical realism: There exists a world of material objects, which exist independently of being perceived, and which have properties such as shape, size, color, mass, and so on independently of being perceived

• Empiricism: Some statements about these objects can be known to be true through sensory experience

• Naïve realism: By means of our senses, we perceive the world directly, and pretty much as it is, meaning that our claims to have knowledge of it are justified

Among contemporary analytic philosophers who defended direct realism one might refer to, for example, Hilary Putnam,^[6] John McDowell,^[7][8] Galen Strawson,^[9] John R. Searle,^[10] and John L. Pollock.^[11]

Searle, for instance, disputes the popular assumption that "we can only directly perceive our own subjective experiences, but never objects and states of affairs in the world themselves".^[12] According to Searle, it has influenced many thinkers to reject direct realism. But Searle contends that the rejection of direct realism is based on a bad argument: the argument from illusion, which in turn relies on vague assumptions on the nature or existence of "sense data". Various sense data theories were deconstructed in 1962 by the British philosopher J. L. Austin in a book titled Sense and Sensibilia.^[13]

END OF WIKI DEFINITIONS

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The survey is NOT meant to be about what physicists feel is an opinion or 'position' (as eg for philosophers in the interesting 'philpapers' survey) but rather about what they as scientists feel they can state as fact.

For the sake of brevity I will use the terms "dualist" (including also the idealist) and "materialist" (or perhaps "physicalist" or "naturalist") as follows without attempting philosophical rigor (see brief excerpts from Wikipedia below regarding these terms):

§ The "dualist" states:

a) "There is a phenomena people call "awareness" [Note: For brevity we won't stress the difference between awareness and self-awareness] which is qualitatively 'other than' the material - I'll state it this way:

Everything that exists = awareness + "the material" ,

where:

"the material" = everything else

= that which materialists/naturalists say is all that exists (including electrons and planets and human brains and spacetime matter-energy).

b) Only awareness can be known directly to exist without proof or possibility of being fooled" ["I know it to exist 'intrinsically, by the fact that I am aware"].

§ The "materialist" (or 'physicalist') states:

a) "all is material, the idea of awareness as espoused by the dualist is a chimera, "illusion".

(Of course there is a different type of 'self-awareness', as exhibited by animals using a mirror to investigating otherwise-visually-inaccessible parts of their body).

b) In any case nothing can be directly known to exist, intrinsically, as dualists claim is the case for their supposed "awareness".

Respondents for the survey: The survey is meant to identify confirmed dulaists & materialists as in the above, rather than for example those who might say eg "Awareness is a mystery but I think it will eventually be explained in a way which maintains materialism".

Terminology in the survey: Since the essence here is re the existence of (self-)awareness as highlighted above, we are not distinguishing between dualist and idealists etc, nor are we distinguishing between 'materialists' and 'physicalists' (& "naive realists"?).

Question to survey respondents: Do you feel that in this context it makes sense to ignore these distinctions between the members of each of the two groupings above, since the relevant claims of the two groupings are qualitatively different in ways that the claims of the members of each grouping are not?

[AR: Motivation for this quesiton: Perhaps this lumping together of different types into two distinct "camps" only seems reasonable to one of the two types.]

Questions to survey-respondents:

A) Lets assume neuroscientists will learn to exactly correlate all thoughts of a human brain with the measured electrical pattern in the brain; eg as later self-reported by that brain, ie they say "what I was thinking while you were measuring was this: "x,y,z", so that later - then eventually the technology can precisely predict what the brain will say was being thought of when the measurements were taken. Imagine now that you look at the output of some brain as it is thinking, and are being given a complete rendition of what they are thinking. Of course every word in one brain comes with different memories and associations etc than the same word in the other brain due to their past experiences, but we will ignore that very important difference here, and consider the output you receive to be 'complete'.

Which of these seems more correct to you:

• I am thereby capturing all that is occuring 'in that brain', there is nothing fundamental missing, all is captured this way;

• There's something 'fundamental' - eg the sense of "I", the "self-awareness itself" - which cannot be caught in this way (ie there is an essential element missing, that which is called 'consciousness').

B) There is an alleged conundrum: If two computers are connected, all the contents of one hard drive can be transferred to the other, and there is essentially now no difference between the two drives (lets assume their specs and formatting etc are identical).

However if my awareness was directly connected to that of another person, I would only be able to experience what they are experiencing, and not be able to experience their awareness, since my awareness is that via which all is experienced including their awareness; in the end I am only really experiencing my own awareness, albeit "my awareness experiencing their awareness".

And if I truly experience their awareness without this intermediary of my own awareness, than I AM their awareness, and there is no spearate "me" experiencing "someone else's awareness.

Without getting too caught up in trying to precisely formulate this alleged conumdrum, which statement(s) below seems more true to you than the others:

• a) There is no conundrum, human brains are qualitatively the same as computers/hard drives, so there is no real difference between two brains connected and two hard drives connected.

• b) The conundrum makes sense in that there is indeed a phenomenon of awareness which would behave this way in a human brain but presumeably not in a present-day computer/hard drive.

• c) This alleged conundrum is typical of the confused language and thinking of proponens of 'consciousness'.

• d) This conundrum goes to the essence of what 'consiousness is' and how it is different than 'brain'.

........

INTRODUCTION TO THE QUOTES from (the) physicists who developed quantum theory

In the following sections, ideas and quotes will be presented, not because this paper is intended as a discussion of the topics mentioned in the quotes, or to convince respondents of any particular intepretation or attitude, nor to make the point that one must accept the point made in the quote since the person quoted was so prominent, but rather in order to help clearly define what is being asked in the survey questions.

Terms are used in the quotes and the questions following them which might have different meanings to different respondents, however when reading the quotes, try to get a sense of what they mean, and whether it makes sense to you, or not, rather than trying to find some way that you can re-interpret what they say to make sense to you. The purpose is to determine whether you are of the 'type' which feels the same way they seem to, or the other type.

Also, since the survey is about physics and what physicists feel can be said from the perspective of science - not from a "religious" or "spiritual" perspective but rather what even as a scientist they feel they can say about the universe and our reality, even if only speculatively.

Defining the terms used in the survey questions:

Notoriously, physics presentations can be intensely annoying to a didactic mathematician

[see Feynman "The Character of Physical Law" "The mathematical rigor of great precision is not very useful in physics." Fr more on this topic see eg "On the Tension Between Physics and Mathematics" Miklós Rédei Journal for General Philosophy of Science volume 51, pages 411–425 (2020)"], which brings: Landau, L., & Lifshitz, E. (1938). Statistical physics. London: Oxford University Press. ‘No attempt has been made at mathematical rigor in the treatment, since this is anyhow illusory in theoretical physics […]’” (Jaffee and Quinn 1993, 5).

Similarly, this article is written by a physicist for physicists,and is not attempting to be philosophical nor is the author trained in philosophy and so the terminology is as rough as one finds in general in physics, and so my apologies for any frustrations on the part of philosophy-trained readers.

For example, we won;t bother to define 'self-awareness, just to say tha tis NOT what behavioral scientists mean by it.eg When an animal peers at itself in a mirror and moves about to investigate parts of its body it cannot otherwise see, some will call this "awareness of self" or "self-awareness", but this is NOT what we mean here by this term - we mean it in the sense used in the quotes below, ie in the sense in which "mind" is not the same as "brain"; of course one "type" or repondent will consider such type of "mind" to be non-existent. This type of "mind" is obviously not at all relevant or necessary in order for a brain (animal or machine) to deduce that was is being seen is its own body, and so the type of 'self-awareness' of an animal using a mirror to investigate parts of its own body that it cannot otherwise see is NOT what we are talking about. Rather than define the type of "mind" or (se;lf-)awareness we ARE talking about, we present quotes from physicisits who are speaking of mind in that meaning.

When we refer to the claims of those quoted below, we will speak interchangeably of 'awareness' , 'consciousness' or 'mind', and we mean by these terms what YOU think it means to those quoted below - for example perhaps what they are saying seems to you to imply that they are referring to an alleged phenomeon a) which is qualitatively "other" than the material, b) which is known directly, c) which is that via which all else is known including the very notion of an external universe.

There is no attempt to try to convince you the reader - presumably a prospective survey-respondent - to have the same opinions as those expressed in the quotes below. On the contrary, the purpose of presenting the quotes, and of the survey, is to establish whether your experience of reality is similar or different to that of those who made these statements, and this is accomplished in the only way we know how - by comparing your self-desciption of your own reality to the descriptions provided by these physicists.

The title of each section of quotes, in bold-font, is what it seems is the intent of physicist being quoted, followed by the quote itself, and then questions posed to you based on your reaction to the quote.

A) Survey Question: Do the below quotes seem to imply these claims: a) Mind is qualitatively 'other', it is not material; b) it is sui generis? Y/N

Werner Heisenberg[6]: "There can be no doubt that "consciousness" does not occur in physics and chemistry, and I cannot see how it could possibly result from quantum mechanics. Yet any science that deals with living organisms must needs cover the phenomenon of consciousness because consciousness, too, is part of reality."

Hermann Weyl[1]: "Between the physical processes which are released in the terminal organ of the nervous conductors in the central brain and the image which thereupon appears to the perceiving subject, there gapes a hiatus, an abyss which no realistic conception of the world can span. It is the transition from the world of being to the world of the appearing image or of consciousness." .

Schroedinger: "The physical world picture lacks all the sensual qualities that go to make up the Subject of Cognizance. The model is colourless and soundless and unpalpable. In the same way and for the same reason the world of science lacks, or is deprived of, everything that has a meaning only in relation to the consciously contemplating, perceiving and feeling subject. I mean in the first place the ethical and aesthetical values, any values of any kind, everything related to the meaning and scope of the whole display. All this is not only absent but it cannot, from the purely scientific point of view, be inserted organically."

Niels Bohr:[7]:"The real problem is: How can that part of reality which begins with consciousness be combined with those parts that are treated in physics and chemistry?. . . Here we obviously have a genuine case of complementarity. . "

These quotes imply something like the following: "Software can be explained by physics, but 'mind' can't be explained by physics etc" so that they are differing from the materialists, or those speaking of 'mind as software' etc.

Question to respondents:

• Do you agree that these quotes indicate that those physicists making the quotes feel that consciousness is not explainable in the way that materialists propose ? Y/N.

• Do the points or attitudes expressed in the quotes above make sense to you? Y/N.

B) Survey Question: Do the below quotes seem to you to imply these claims: a) mind is known directly, on its own; b) via mind all else is known; c) mind is the most fundamental phenomenon: (AR: some of these quotes may even tend towards idealism/solipsism) Y/N

Erwin Schrodinger (1958):"The world is a construct of our sensations, perceptions, memories. It is convenient to regard it as existing objectively on its own. But certainly it does not become manifest by its mere existence. Its becoming manifest is conditional on very special goings on in very special parts of this very world, namely, on certain events that happen in a brain."

AR: This also implies that mind is known directly, on its own (one can perhaps assume that this implies that even if some one else denies it exists, nevertheless it is known on its own and so one can legitimately state that it exists without having to prove it (though the one who states it doesn't exist will of course disagree).

Eugene Wigner (1964): "There are two kinds of reality or existence - the existence of my consciousness and the reality or existence of everything else. The latter reality is not absolute but only relative. Excepting immediate sensations, the content of my consciousness, everything is a construct."

Wolfgang Pauli[8]:". . . the only acceptable point of view appears to be the one that recognizes both sides of reality--the quantitative and the qualitative, the physical and the psychical--as compatible with each other, and can embrace them simultaneously. . . .It would be most satisfactory of all if physics and psyche could be seen as complementary aspects of the same reality."

Sir Arthur Eddington[3]: "The material universe itself is an interpretation of certain symbols presented to consciousness. When we speak of the existence of the material universe we are presupposing consciousness. It is meaningless to speak of the existence of anything except as forming part of the web of our consciousness."

Sir James Jeans[4]:"I incline to the idealistic theory that consciousness is fundamental, and that the material universe is derivative from consciousness, not consciousness from the material universe."]

Survey Questions based on the above quotes

Of course a scientist has every right to express religious or political personal views that are stated not in their role as "a scientist talking about scientific fact" but rather in their capacity as a human being like everyone else, as "private opinions off the scientific record". :

I feel the attidude of the physicists quoted above, as implied by their words or the context of their quote, seems to be meant by them to be taken as pronouncements: choose one:

• of a scientist, speaking about what they know as fact: Y

• as "private opinions off the scientific record": Y

Irrespective of what I think THEY intended, I feel that:

• the statements are NOT correct as fact and should be considered in the category of religious or political statements. Y/N

• The statements are correct as fact and should be considered in the category of scientific-type statements. Y/N

• Should these statements be of interest to science, not just to philosophy and psychology or the antropology of physicists). Y/N

• If yes: Does this imply that consciousness as a phenomenon should be of importance to science in the way that all known existent fundamental phenomena are?.

Questions based on the notions that: mind is known directly on its own; it cannot be proven but requires no proof; it is sui generis:

• Is it unique in being "known directly on its own"? Y/N (if N: ie there are others, please list examples)

• is everything which is known as part of physics necessarily provable? YES/No(There are others: here are examples

• if mind "cannot be proven but requires no proof", does that place it in a different category than that which is known as part of physics? YES/No, there are others: please list examples

Quote: Eugence P. Wigner, when accepting the Nobel Prize for physics in 1963, stated [2]:

"Physics does not endeavor to explain nature. In fact, the great success of physics is due to a restriction of its objectives: it only endeavors to explain the regularities in the behavior of objects. This renunciation of the broader aim, and the specification of the domain for which an explanation can be sought, now appears to us an obvious necessity. . . ."The regularities in the phenomena which physical science endeavors to uncover are called the laws of nature. The name is actually very appropriate. Just as legal laws regulate actions and behavior under certain conditions but do not try to regulate all action and behavior, the laws of physics also determine the behavior of its objects of interest under certain well-defined conditions but leave much freedom otherwise."

Survey Questions:

• Is physics meant to describe all of reality (at least according to the reductionist viewpoint) or only some, since certain aspects of reality are inaccessible to physics ALL/SOME

• To those who answered yes to quesiton A above...: If consciousness is fundamental, and sui generis, and is known directly etc, but is NOT considered part of physics, does this disqualify physics from being "the study of the most fundamental natural phenomena":

Explanation: eg reality = the material (physics)+ x,

where x = consciousness (though perhaps free will is separate, or it is part of consciousness, or it simply desn;t exist):

Y/N

...........

The unique/dubious status of the dualist claim Consciousness of the type assumed by dualists has a unique/dubious status scientifically in that it is claimed by some to be known for sure to exist, even though it is not believed by them to be provably existent (ie provable to others), and its existence is thought not to be even possible according to many physicists, who however agree that its existence cannot be disproved either.

Conundrum: How can one deal with the subject of consciousness in physics if as a result of its unique/dubious status (as described above) it is not agreed upon by all physicists that this topic belongs in a physics discussion?

The proposal here is to come up with a consensual way of dealing with that.

I believe that it is important for there to be a way for it to be discussed, even if only in order to dismiss the discussion for consensual reasons, rather than ignoring the topic and pretending thereby that by consensus it isn't worthy of being part of science, when it clearly is, to many physicists.

The consensus can be that since it cannot be proven to exist and since many physicists claim it does NOT exist, that it simply does not qualify for physics discussion, ie we will by consensus agree to include in physics only that which is probable to others. But then there ought to be some legitimation for its discussion by physicists within some other rubric where it is recognized that the topic IS considered 'scientific' (in that it deals with what is KNOWN to exist) by (some of) those participating in the discussion.

...

Clarifying the truly central issue:

That consciousness is made of the most fundamental stuff is not the issue since the issue is whether we can know someting directly that one cannot prove. If yes, then consciousness is at a deeper level than physics.

Explanation ofwhy what it is made of is not the problem: Eg: electron is a concept so it is mindstuff, but that doesnt solve the problem it is like a reverse naive realism, but the problem is that conscionusness is the only existent I can directly know, the only phenomenon I know that i can;t prove, and it is unique sui generis, and totally fundamental in that it is only via consciousness that i know everyhting else, this is the issue, not the quesiotn of whether consciousness is 'material' or material is mindstuff etc,

..

Survey questions:

• · Awareness is sui generis… is qualitatively different than all else, which is firmly in the category of spacetime matter-energy, and we only know anything since it is presented via our awareness… so it is at least the type of phenomenon which has the qualifications to be that which is relevant to "the measurement problem". Y/N

• · The measurement problem is semantics not physics: Y/N

• · 'consciousness' in the sense meant by those who propose it as a resolution of the measurement problem is a chimera, does not/cannot exist. Y/N

· Physicists generally agree on the parameters of what can in theory exist, so it is interesting to me that there can be a debate between physicists about the very possibility of the existence of that phenomenon ('awareness') proposed by some as a solution to a known 'physics problem'.

some considerations

The possible uniqueness of claims regarding 'awareness' vs those for Infinity, Platonic Truths, Meaning, Purpose, Moral Responsibility, Free Will: to be established via a survey

Note: Each statement below is actually a conjecture, to be established via the proposed survey, which would be a prelude to the brain experiment.

Those who speak of awareness in the sense of the dualist or idealist etc, mean that via which all the rest of these is known, and so it is sui generis in the above list.

[1] Certainly there might be a disparity in the degree of certainty expressed by those on the two 'sides', which itself would be an interesting result.

[2] What is meant is not the brain's realization of self often detected via reactions to mirrors, which is a purely-physical process not requiring 'awareness'.

..

• Have you often been in discussions with physics colleagues on this topic, evenif only in your 'off-time'?

• Do you consider this topic to be relevant to an understanding of our reality, or of "the universe"

• Do you think it is reasonable that this topic is discussed/not much discussed among physicists, even if only in their 'off time'?

• Do you feel that many physicists have never really given much thought to this issue?

• Do you feel that there is a correlation between being in the profession of physics and being materialist/naturalist?

• Do you feel there is an overly harsh rejection of discussion on such topics by those who are of the opposite 'type' (ie materialist/naturalists vs dualist/idealist) to you?

• Do you feel the topic is so carefully avoided in professional discussions that you never were really exposed to the topic, at least among fellow-physicists?

• Do you feel that the 'mind' issue is irrevocably bound with the 'soul' quesiotn, so that you and other physicists avoid discussing it since it is related to 'religion'?

...

The shortest presentation would be the following, but I think it would be seen as too contentious, and is a statement of my belief and therefore not neutral:

"I believe

• awareness (or qualia/Mind/awareness/consciousness etc) exists,

• it is known directly,

• its existence cannot be proven to another but nevetheless its existence requires no proof,

• it is qualitatively other than any other existent in that it is not made up of physical constituents (eg particles, fields etc, is not "located in a particular place" [somewhat remiscent of quantum uncertainty especially for an elementary particle whose momentum is precisely known ); it is that via which all else is known;

• there is the experience of the passage of time, a phenomenon not recognized by relativistic physics.

Since what we know to exist consists of "that which is known to physics(even if not understood)+awareness", i consider awareness to be sui-generis in a sense which should be of relevance to physicists who are not materialists.

[AR note; awareness has peculiar apsects related to space (not located at a particular place), and to time (experiences the passage of itme), and the quantum measurement problem is such only because of our awareness that only one of the infinitely many possibilities is actualized. A universe lacking any such awareness would not be inconsistent with multiple possibilities simultanously.]

I cannot understand how an aware being who is intelligent could deny the existence of awareness in the above sense, or who think that stating it is "an illusion" or "software of the brain" in some way resolves the issue in a manner consistent with materialism(/naturalism).

Since [as Eccles (and perhaps others) pointed out], if awareness is unphysical then it would not respond to evolutionary pressure and so could not be said to the result of evolution, and yet exists,it seems reasonable to postulate that there is no scientific necessity for postulating that biological humans of today are 'aware', and so if someone intelligent declares awareness to be an illusion, and is an avowed materialist, a possible and even plausible explanation for their stance is that they do not in fact possess awareness.

Since awareness seems to exist in association with human (and perhaps other) brains, but is assumed to not exist in non-biological matter, and not to exist or to exist only in far lesser degree is lesser-developed brains, it is a reasonable conjecture that it is associated with a certain degree of complexity of brain-wiring or sophistication of structure etc. Therefore, despite being unphysical, it is reasonable to conjecture that there can be some structure or wiring in the human brain which will correlate to the presence of awareness.

Coupled with the previous statement "if someone intelligent declares awareness to be an illusion, and is an avowed materialist, a possible and even plausible explanation for their stance is that they do not in fact possess awareness" it makes sense to attempt to find differences between the brain structure/wiring of materialists and idealists.

A way to establish who is on which side of the divide could be via a survey regarding the existence of awareness, and which would determine the degree of certitude of their reply.

The experiment would analyze the brains of physicists who expressed their response as a factual statement rather than opinion, to attempt to discover a difference which correlates to the difference in their survey-response".

.........

Survey Questions based on quotes expressing more extreme approaches:

I) Active idealism; II) "Mind" rather than just "mind"

Consciousness & 'the measurement problem':

Of course there are various explanations/solutions, regarding decoherence and 'many worlds' etc but there is no attempt here to list the proposed resolution or even to discuss the "problem"; nor is there any intent to convince anyone that "consciousness collapses". The purpose of including quotes regarding "collapse via consciousness" or referring to the prominent physicists who proposed it is simply to provide a context allowing materialists and dualists to agree on what those physicists meant by consciousness.

In addition, after achieving that, we can then pose survey questions about the respondents views about that type of consciousness - ie whether or not they believe that that type of consciousness can bring about 'collapse'; that is, we can pose questions referencing "consciousness of the type which is claimed by those proposing it as a means of collapse", rather than asking "can consciuusness cause collapse".

The assumption here is that those proposing collapse via consciousness are necessarily dualists/idealist rather than naturalists/materialists, and furthermore that those who reject the very possibility of collapse via consciousness do so because they are materialist/naturalist rather than because they belive that the type of consciusness proposed by dualists could not bring about collapse.

That is, we would expect that dualists would at least consider it not theoretically impossible that consciousness can bring about collapse, whereas materialists will not consider it even at all as a possiblity. In other words we would like to present the disagreement between those who say it is impossible even in theory and those who do not rule it out completely (whether or not they actually accept it as the solution to the 'measurmeent problem') as between the materialists and dualist conceptions of consciousness.

I believe that recognition of this point can potentially provide greater clarity to the discussions and arguments, perhaps removing some extraneous aspects or 'red herrings'.

I) Active-idealism (mind brings existence into reality) as part of physics:

Examples

• The von Neumann–Wigner interpretation of QM "collapse": (Eugene) Wigner wrote: It follows that the quantum description of objects is influenced by impressions entering my consciousness….It follows that the being with a consciousness must have a different role in quantum mechanics than the inanimate measuring device."

• John Wheeler has taken this one step further: his notion of "the participatory universe" proposes the possibility that the entire universe can emerge into true physical existence only via the observation of a consciousness:

"[Perhaps] no universe at all could come into being unless it were guaranteed to produce life, consciousness and observership somewhere and for some little length of time in its history-to-be?…[T]he observer is as essential to the creation of the universe as the universe is to the creation of the observer….[T]he universe would be nothing without observership, as surely as a motor would be dead without electricity…[I]s observership the “electricity” that powers genesis?" “[O]bservership” allows and enforces a transcendence of the usual order in time…."

Thus, according to “quantum metaphysics, a consciousness is indispensable to the universe if it is to emerge into reality. Physical reality can be said to exist only as a result of our presence within it or, more precisely, as a result of our perception of it.

Wheeler has constructed a fascinating (now [in]famous) diagram to illustrate this concept. Explaining the diagram, he writes: “Beginning with the big bang, the universe expands and cools. After eons of dynamic development it gives rise to observership. Acts of observer-participancy in turn give tangible reality to the universe not only now but back to the beginning.”

• Sir Arthur Eddington: "Not once in the dim past, but continuously by conscious mind is the miracle of the Creation wrought. All through the physical world runs that unknown content, which must surely be the stuff of our consciousness. . . . Where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature. We have found a strange foot-print on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the foot-print. And Lo! it is our own."
  McCabe[5] reports regarding Eddington's idealistic beliefs: "Pressed to say whether this meant that he rejected the common scientific teaching that a material universe really existed before life and mind appeared on this planet, he made fun of the word "really," and even said: "I do not think we understand what we mean by existence."

Questions for the survey:

Do you feel that the views above:

• are at all possibly correct? YES NO

• are clearly absurd in any sense other than as poetry or a religious belief etc? YES NO

• go beyond the acceptable boundaries of what a physicist can teach as a scientist, ie they should be considered "private religious philosophical views" rather than a view presented as one of 'physics'? NO YES.

.........

Questions for the survey:

• Is the difference between naturalism and dualism so radical, and the views so irreconcilable, that alternate brain structure or wiring is a plausible explanation? Y/N

• There should be universal agreement that the brains of naturalists and dualists are wired to experience reality in a qualitatively different way; namely, either dualist's brains perceive a level of existence inaccessible to naturalists, or their wiring is faulty, leading to a delusional belief in that which is impossible. Y/N

• Of course even materialists will say "(self-)awareness exists" eg like animals looking in a mirror and acting in a way which shows they know it is their body they see. Dualists will say they mean by '(self-)awareness' something entirely different than this'. Irrespective of which of these describe you: Is the reality of your awareness - and specifically as "a phenomenon qualitatively different than any other" so clearly factually known to you directly, that it is implausible that any intelligent person with consciousness could claim that consciousness as you describe it doesn't exist? YES: NO: If someone denies the existence of the type of consciousness you feel, do you find it plausible that perhaps they do not possess consciousness? YES: NO.

• If there is a phenomenon which cannot be proven to exist, can it be possible that one can nevertheless know it to exist directly intrinsically? YES: NO: If not, is it plausible that a brain-malfunction or improper wiring is the cause of the claim by dualists and others that they have "consciousness" which is known to them directly but cannot be proven to exist? YES: NO.

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Two extremes?: Naive realism vs Idealism

Is there any way to know whether the naive relaist is actually a materialist, without consciousness, and does not understand what everyone else means by qualia and idealism/dualims/awareness and thinks they have provied an answer, that qualia are really out there, but only say this bcause they don;t understand what dualists mean by qualia? Or are they dualists of sorts but an externalized dualsim where qualia are of the same level of existence as thematerial, so it is really a type of idealism?

Can one construct questions which would elicit different responses depending on which of these two is correct?

For the survey:

Which statement would you agree to?

• Statement 1: Consciousness is sui generis, fundamental, and its existence is part of what we know about our reality, or about "the universe", (and we know of the universe "via our consciousness") and so it should be part of some category similar to "science"or "physics" or "logic". eg "what we know = physics(or 'science') + consciousness".

• Statement 2 = statement 1 above + a caveat[caveat: however, since it is not provable to others, and there are those who deny its existence, it is not in the same category as other scientific facts, and so statement 1 should not be part of a "science curricullum"].

• Statement 3 = statement 1 above (+ maybe 2) + "investigating consciousness is most likely a waste of time for a physics researcher". [Physics has come a long way by eliminating consciousness from phenomena (eg "an object falls to wards the Earth because it wants to return to its natural place", and anthropomorphism and teleology in general), and those who have investigated consciousness have not produced significant physics insight.]

• Statement 4 = statement 1 + "the general public, and students, should be made aware of the truths enumerated in 1, along with the caveats in 2 & 3".

• Statement 5 = Consciousness is not more fundamental than other phenomena, or qualitatively different than all other phenomena, and whatever we know about it is codified in verifiably true statements, and so is part of ordinary science.

• Statement 6 = " As part of their general education - and perhaps as a prelude to their science education - students should be made aware of the two sides, ie those who enfranchise 1) (along with the caveats in 2 & 3), and those who enfranchise 5. "

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The "flow of time"

Survey Question: Do you feel that the "flow of time" presents a problem for physics? (ie the survey will be able to determine based on your answers to the other quesiotn whehter there is a correlation between belief that there is/isn't a problem with being naturalist vs idealist etc.)

Do you feel these are legitimate statements?:

• In relativistic physics, space and time are on an equal footing, and just as space exists without 'flowing', so too all of time can be thought of as existing simultaneously without 'flowing' - in physics in general there is no indication that time 'flows'. The 'flow of time' is an element of our experiance which is not reflected in physical theory, and therefore it can be concluded that the experience of time flow is subjective.

• Indeed, if we do not make the assumption of the reality of moments of which we are not directly conscious, a simplification of many philosophical and physical problems is arrived at.

• If one rejects what is not directly known, in this case the assumption that there is a flow of time, or that time exists at all, all the scientific and philosophical difficulties associated with time disappear[169]. Science then becomes a method of ordering our perceptions and our memory of prior perceptions, rather than a description of an external physical universe possessing a history.

• This is not to imply that we accept that the universe exists only for an instant or that solipsism is an accurate reflection of the 'underlying reality'. Instead, what is being suggested is that since science is a relation between elements of consciousness, excess fundamental assumptions going beyond what is directly known to consciousness can introduce contradictions or paradoxes. There is no way we can scientifically or philosophically know of the actual nature of 'the underlying reality', and any such elements introduced into scientific discourse - such as the assumption of an external universe, the existence of other minds, the existence of more than just one moment of time or that the universe necessarily emerged into existence at some specific point - may well lead to inconsistency in scientific theory or philosophical discourse.

• The scientific solipsistic position proposed here is however one of epistemology rather than ontology: rather than making statements about what the universe is really like, one speaks about what one can know of the universe, and concludes that there is no way to distinguish between a 'real' universe and a solipsistic one, and that therefore the distinction between the two is meaningless. More importantly, one concludes that any statement which relies on the assumption that the universe is 'real' as opposed to solipsistic is potentially misleading or simply incorrect.

Conclusion

Is there any particular meaning to the statement: "I exist, I am conscious"

Is the statement "there is a universe external to my brain's conception of it" provable?

Is a belief in an "external universe" necessary for the construction of science?

The conviction that we are free willed is one of the most basic feelings [170], however it cannot be proven - at least at this juncture. Indeed, from some perspectives it is difficult to see how free will an exist if there exists a physical universe outside our minds.

Survey Questions:

• Is the postulation of the existence of an external universe as much of a speculative assumption as the postulation of the existence of free will, or is the former more well-based than the latter?

• Whether or not you accept the truth of the Biblical perspective, and irrespective of whether or not you believe there is a God etc or that the universe or humanity was 'created', do you feel that the following statement has some meaning, ie that it can be either true or not true, or that it is more of a string of meaningless phrases: "There exists a spiritual realm separate from the physical: God is in some sense 'outside' of the universe, 'beyond' spacetime, perhaps beyond the concepts of human thought. God is a spiritual entity which originated the physical universe of matter-energy-spacetime, and is outside of it yet intimately connected, active all the while in directing historical events. In a similar manner, each human is imbued with a soul, infused in them "by the breath of God", a soul which is spiritual yet interacts with the body in some way. Similarly, humanity is created 'in the image of God' and possesses a free will, independent of the causal workings of the physical universe, a self-causative phenomenon reflective of the original creative act, which is both beyong causality and physicality, yet nevertheless is intimately involved in human physical activity."

• Is the question of the actual physical existence of the universe decideable by science?

• Is this question relevant to the pursuit of science or is it instead more correctly considered an issue of 'metaphysics'.

• Do you agree with this statement: "Whatever the actual nature of existence, the introduction of assumptions about it which are not provable may lead to paradoxes."

• If the statement "there exists "an external universe"" is not provable , is it an "assumption"?

• If yes, would this statement "the introduction of assumptions about it which are not provable may lead to paradoxes." be relevant to that issue?

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REFORMULATE THESE STATEMENTS AS questions which would be meaningful to both materialists and idealists, and would be considered by both sides to be even-handed .

Idealism, Materialism and Dualism:

Is there really an external universe? are there othe rminds than our own?

It is possible to consistently classify all entities in the universe into two categories: the mental and the physical. Emotions, thoughts, sensations, "mind" and so on are mental, while atoms and tables and brains are physical. The relationship between the two categories has historically been seen in three different ways: the idealistic, the materialistic, and the dualistic.

The idealist considers an "atom" to be a concept invented by the human mind in order to easily categorize and summarize certain ideas and conclusions obtained after much thought; "table" is a word used to signify a certain set of sensations; and so on. To the idealist, only the mental exists - the "physical" is a collection of concepts within the mind.

Since one is conscious only of one's own consciousness, it is impossible to prove to another the existence of one's consciousness, and thus one has no conclusive proof that anyone else exists other than as one's conscious experience of them. This is called "the problem of other minds".

The idealist position which does not accept the existence of other minds is called solipsism, so that the solipsist position is essentially that all that exists is 'my consciousness'.

At the other extreme, the materialist considers the "mental" to be a physical aspect of the physical universe - no less physical than atoms, tables, and brains. "Mind" is physical in the same way that a computer program is physical. However, most people find it impossible to understand how mind can be matter.

To the dualist, both mental and physical exist, and they interact in some as yet not understood manner. How it can be that they interact is the essence of the 'mind body problem' of philosophy, one of the most intractable of difficulties, which has puzzled thousands of philosophers and scientists for thousands of years.

Occam's Razor and the Exernal Physical Universe

One of the most useful of principles guiding the development of physical theory is that of simplicity and economy ("Occam's razor"). Assumptions which cannot be proven, and are not needed to explain facts, are excised from physical theory.

Some of the greatest problems of philosophy and science derive from a number of basic assumptions which are unprovable. Without these assumptions, these problems do not exist, and this may be sufficient reason to disgard these assumptions. However, the assumptions are assumed to be so evidently true by most people that very few are willing to relinquish them, even at the cost of incurring so many intractable problems in philosophy and physics.

The problems we are referring to are the 'problem of other minds' and the 'mind body problem' in philosophy, while in regard to physics, they are the problems of the nature and origin of consciousness and of its interaction with the physical universe (and 'the measurement problem' involving the 'collapse of the wave function' in quantum physics). The assumptions we speak of are that there is an 'outside physical universe', and that there are consciousnesses other than our own.

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hierarchy

• that I exist

• my sensations

• the regularity of how things happen (physics), an ordering of my sesaitons

• the external universe exists

• that other minds exist

• common ground with ther mnds

• The which we know as 'fact;: accepted physics

• passage of time

....

However it seems that many in fact DO deny this.

Is the very fact that physicists can differ about this itself a matter of scientific interest?

Is it of interest only in the sense that since we rely on physicists to tell us about what exists, that we need to understand how they make this determination,.... or is it important because it tells us something about the nature of our reality? Or about the brains of some physicists?

Add question on survey: would you be willing to be part of the brain experiemnt?

Survey Question: Do you think of the question of the existence of a "soul" as being different than re the existence of "mind"?

Do you accord them the same status in terms of knowing of their existence? Or is mind known and soul only felt or beleived etc? or v.v.? Is there any other such phenomenon (ie that like mind and soul are claimed by some physicists to definitley exists, known to exist, yet they admit cannot be proven to others to exist??

re "God", and Mind? are they the same...

Do you feel the self-awareness of Mind-type IS in fact provable? [If they claim it can be proven, it is less interesting perhaps...]

Eccles clearly implies the consciousness he is speaking of is not part of the causal chain in the physical natural world. Is this at all possible?

So among those who agree that they know their own existence there ought to be a erm which denotes "physics + my existence" as the set of known truths (where "physics" has already been defined bove).

his would have bene a part of the universally agreed upon public knowledge except fo rthe fac tthat some set sof sensations calling themselves "another human" "say" that they do NOT know their own existence directly, and call themselves "naturalists/materialisists".

Survey question: would you support the idea of allocating scientific research finding for such an experiement? Do you think it was justified in being used to find this survey?

..

what is the scientific stats of a claim to know a phenomenon which one cannot prove?

If many scientists claim it as a fact does this give it status?

Is the denial of the fact of equal status? eg we know that some people see and some do not and the claim of vision is stronger than the claim that it does not exist, but perhaps only because sighted people can perform tasks unsighted ones cannot , consistent with their claim, and so can provide adequate proof even to the nonsighted... but does one have to construct an experiment which convinces the non-sighted in order for a claim by a nons gihted scinetists that sight is impossible is invalidated of ignored?

Presumeably those who say there is Mind will be interested in this experiemnt bec...whereas those who say there isn;t will be interested because...

On who is it incumbent to prove their side in order for you to be interested in this issue..

....

One cannot simply assume that naturalists do not have self-awareness. Perhpas they do, but feel it is somehow misleading them, they feel perhaps that their brain is corrupted, and they philosophically cannot believe they know something without being able to prove it and so prefer to deny it etc. However to proponents of Mind, to whom this known more fundamentally than any other known, it may seem as though anyone who denies its existence as they seem to must not possess it. But this should be a quetsion on the survey:

Survey Questions:

1) Do you sympathize with following statement: "The self-knowledge on my own awareness is so fundamental and self-evident that any intelligent being who denies the existence of awareness must not possess it."

Maybe there is simply a matter of defitions and naturalists mean "what can be proven" not "what I know to exist on its own". One needs to ascertain first, via the survey, and even so, it is interesting to find if there are brain (wiring) differences between these who feel so strongly that one must deny the possibility of direct knowledge.

2) Which describes your attitude:

• I feel something that corresponds to what people call (self-)awareness, it is mysterious, and troubling to me since it seems as though i know of its existence and yet cannot prove it exists, and so since i reject the possibility that one can know that which one cannot prove, I attempt to "explain away" this self-awareness, and tend towards materialism/naturalism or an agnosticism;

• It is clear to me that nothing can be known by itself, and so talk of "awareness which is known to exist" is nonsense, and I would tend to define myself more as a natrualist/materiast than a dualist or idealist etc.

• In communicating with others, eg when filling this form or talking or writing, I limit myself to that which i know I can prove, and so since self-awareness is not provable to others, I would not address the issue of whether it can exist or whether I possess it.

• I am (self-)aware and that is a fact which is not dependent on whether I can prove it to others or not.

....

• The self-knowledge of my own awareness is so fundamental and self-evident that any intelligent being who denies the existence of (self-)awareness must not possess it

• The self-knowledge of my own awareness is so fundamental and self-evident that I feel that it is possible that any intelligent being who denies the existence of (self-)awareness does not possess it.

• It is impossible that any human does not possess (self-)awareness.

• I do not possess this so-called mind-based self-awareness and noone else does either, it is all a matter of confused thinking and terminology]

• I do not possess this so-called mind-based self-awareness but I can conceive of the possibility that others do, but it is not so important a topic, and is more a matter for the field of psychology.

• I do not possess this so-called mind-based self-awareness but I can conceive of the possibility that others do, and if so, this is highly significant, and presents a different picture of reality than that which is associated to a universe in which self-awarneess does not or cannot exist.

3) Which best fits your attitude:

• self-awarenss in the sense of Mind does not exist

• (self-)awareness in the sense of Mind is a fact, it exists, and is fundamental to our reality, and to the extent that science studies existing phenomena,and physics looks to get at the most fundamental level of existents, the notion that awareness exists is a scientific statement, and perhaps one that even belongs in some sort of schema like: What is known factually to exist is encompassed by awareness + physics or awareness + science.

• self awareness exists but it is not known as fact in the same way that we know of that which is studed by science

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Mini-essay as introduction to a survey question: What if is there is an external universe but only I have mind?!

Would I be able to know that I am the only one? Or at least guess? We can't know this, maybe indeed it is so and we dont know it...

I have mind and know which aspects of my experience derive from it, and I also know what of that-which-i-say is due to having these experiences. So when I hear others in the alleged external universe speaking the same way, I am willing to assume they have minds. But when I hear materialists speak i don't feel that way. Not a matter of proof, but of my mindset of being willing to assume they do or do not have what I have.

Would someone without mind naturally (ie without prompting) come to express what is written above? Of course it is possible but it is not plausible they would on their own do so. So when they do, and others do not, it seems to me as an indication that some possess mind and some do not.

Survey Question:

Does the above rumination make any sense to you - ie not whether you agree with the philosophy but whether it makes sense at all? YES/NO.

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If no-one in the world seemed to understand what i was saying and i felt that they were all mindless, i would perhaps tend towards thinking I am a solitary mutant, or that indeed solipsism is the correct interpretation of reality.

....

If consciousness is not provable, not detectable, what is the giveaway of a mindless person? Answer: they talk like materialists.

...

So why is consciousness distinguished from the situaiotn re color?

Answer: Consciousness is that via which x is known and so perhaps it is too fundamental to be detected by x, as opposed to the case of color, which (is experienced via consciousness and) can be detected...

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Bridgman's eye-opening list of "meaningless questions".. including re color comparison...

Also meaningless in that Bridgman sense is this statement: can my mind ever experience what it is to be like you, or experience your awareness....

So how could we ever not only know another mind, but how could we verify that the other has a mind?

How could we know that when the other speaks of color it is not sound? answer: maybe by their reaciton to it?

How can we know that they exerience anyhting at all? By their reaction?

so maybe when a mindless person says x there is no way to know whether they mean by it what the indfu l do..

And if someone says x (eg proposes materilaism) how do we know whether they are saying it because they lack mind?

How do we set up communication with others withouth being able to verify that the other also experiences what we experience?

The answer is Eddington/Bridgmans operaitonlism, but only if we have confidence in the immutaility and uiversality or objectivity of public experiemnt etc, but even the solipsist has experience which makes their actions identical to those of the materialist.

....

Some prominent physicists, by claiming that they know of the existence of "consousness" which is not physical and therefore not experiemntally-detectable, seem to violate the 'convention' that physics includes only that which can be 'proven' to exist in some sense. What should be made of this by other physicists, who do not accept the existence of that which cannot be proven to exist? And v.v., if some physicists accept as obvious that x exists what should they make of the fact that peers deny this is the case. How can there be such a fundamental difference between physicist peers as to whether or not something can be said to exist, as a fact, if its existence cannot be proven (ie cannot have its existence known as a fact by other physicists).

The claim that its existence is known 'directly' and requires no proof would seem to be sufficient grounds for excluding the claimant from the august league of physicists - except that they are well-aware that this alleged "consciousness" is not provable and therefore they leave it out of all discussions in the technical papers they write.

. ,

Several prominent physicists from Einstein to Penrose and ... seem quite unequivocally to believe that there exists something non-provable, namely one's Mind or awareness or consciousness. There is in philosophy the well-known "problem of other minds" regarding the impossiblity of one knowing the existence of anyone else's Mind. However, what this acknowledges is that one cannot also prove the existence of one's own alleged mind to anyone else, and so it is an alleged entity or phenomenon whose existence is without proof.

This would seem to be sufficient grounds for excluding Mind-propoennts from the august league of phsycists except that they are well-aware that this alleged "Mind" is not provable and therefore they leave it out of all discussions in the technical papers they write.

The sticking point is that those who claim .... eg whether it is a table in front of us, or an electron in the table, there is a clear presecriptio of which experiemtn to perform and which result of tht of the experiemnt wil be considered proof of its existence (the experiemtn can unclude relying on ones eye and brain as the equipment) ...

There does not seem to be anything else in this category.

Some physicists are religious and believe in the existenc eof a soul or of God but do not claim this as fact, yet the same physicists will clainm the existence of their 'consiousness' as something non-physical which cannot be detected except by them and cannot even be proven to exist!

..

Penrose tried to give theoretical underpinning... but it seems he leans towards thinking of the phenomenon as not qualitatively different than quantum ..

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QUANTUM ISSUES

Certain assumptions seem very reasonable and some correlations are expected, but it is wise in a scientific investigation to examine whether these assumptions are warranted. For example, Is it the case that all physicists would agree that we cannot distinguish between a 'real external universe' and the 'brain in a jar' scenario? What about solipsism?

Re "consciousness causing collapse of the wave function": is it the case that all materialist physicists categorically reject the very possibility, and all those who consider it all a possibility are idealists/dualists?

The below is meant to establish this.

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The 'measurement problem':

Usually those mentioning consciousness as the cause of collapse do not open their statement with a declaration "I am a materialist.." or "I am a dualist" or "I believe consciousness is not physical in the usual sense, and is not part of the usual causal chain, and is sui generis etc". So how do we know whether they are materialists or dualists?

And how can we ask survey questions about the type of consciousness they are assuming if they don't explicitly mention it?

The answer is that the quotes make it rather clear via implication that they are not talking of consciousness as being what materialists would say it is, because if it were that it would not be sui generis, not special in any way that would lead a physicists to speculate that it could be the agent causing collapse; ie it seems very reasonable to assume that if they believed that consciousness were as propounded by materialists, then they would not think of it as having the property to be able to achieve something that a machine cannot do, eg to cause 'collapse'.

So we can seemingly assume that the 'consciousness' they are speaking of as a mechanism of collapse is a phenomenon or property that they themselves possess, as known to them directly, which they cannot prove to others to exist, and which is of the type that it seems reasonable to them that it can be "beyond" quantum mechanics in that can bring about collapse, ie that it is qualitatively "other" than any other phenomenon (they do not claim that water can cause collapse, or explosions, or strong light or poetry or whatever, only consciousness).

This discussion of the measurement problem is not intended to convince anyone that any specific interpretation of quantum physcs or 'resolution of the measurement problem' is correct, but rather simply to help clarify what proponents of "collapse via consciousness" meant or did not mean by "consciousness", ie in some sense the purpose of the quotes is to 'qualitatively-define' the term consciousness as it is meant by them (as opposed to using the quote to try to make a point in favor of the views in the quote).

Now that we have 'qualitatively defined' what proponents of "collapse via consciousness" mean by "consciousness", we can ask you questions regarding your own view in relation to theirs.

Questions;

• Do you agree that those presenting consciousness as the means of 'collapse' consider consciousness to be very different than the way it is viewed by materialists? Y/N

• Do you think that this type of consciousness exists? Y/N

• Would you agree that if a physicist is absolutely certain that consciousness cannot possibly be a causer of collapse, it is fundamentally because they do not believe the dulaist/idealist type of consciousness exists? Y/N

• Whether or not you believe this type of consciousness does or even could exist, and if you agree that physics cannot absolutely prove that it cannot exist, would you agree that to a physicist who feels it does exist it would seem possible or even plausible that it has the properties needed to be that which causes 'collapse'? Y?N

• Do you feel that it is "legitimate physics" for a physicist to present this type of alleged 'consciousness' as a cause of collapse? Y/N

• Can one accept the 'collapse via consciousness' claim as part of physics if it is accompanied by a disclaimer that consciousness of the type assumed by the claimant is not believed to exist or to be even possible according to many physicists (though its existence cannot be disproved either).? Y/N

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MESH INTO THE ABOVE: eliminate duplication

A subtle argument re the Quantum Quarrel:

Why is it that some very clever prominent physicists proposed that consciousness is a factor in quantum measurement, while others equally prominent dismissed this as nonsense? How is it that there is such a sharp divide, as opposed to the more usual reasoned debate?

Wheeler once speculated that the entire universe can emerge into true physical existence only via the observation of a consciousness. He wrote:

[Perhaps] no universe at all could come into being unless it were guaranteed to produce life, consciousness and observership somewhere and for some little length of time in its history-to-be?…

..the observer is as essential to the creation of the universe as the universe is to the creation of the observer….

…the universe would be nothing without observership, as surely as a motor would be dead without electricity….

…is observership the “electricity” that powers genesis?…

“….observership” allows and enforces a transcendence of the usual order in time….

Thus, according to this “quantum metaphysics,”

Wheeler has constructed a fascinating diagram to illustrate this concept (see Figure 7-1). Explaining the diagram, he writes: “Beginning with the big bang, the universe expands and cools. After eons of dynamic development it gives rise to observership. Acts of observer-participancy in turn give tangible reality to the universe not only now but back to the beginning.”

Why is it that in this case there did not seem to be an experiment which could decide between the approaches?

How is that some were certain it could in theory be the resolution and some equally certain it could NOT be, when this was supposedly a scientific question?

In my opinion, all this is an indication that those who proposed it had an inner sense which the others did not possess.

And furthermore, that it was a sense about the existence of that which is of the right type to be a catalyst of the measurement-jump from many possibilities to the one that is actually observed.

And that suitably enough, it is about what we know but that is not incorporated in physics: awareness's existence is known but cannot be proven, analogous to the situaiotn discussed by measurement problem itself, where physics does not incorporate that which is known, the individual measurement-result.

And so, the argument between the sides is futile, there is no way to bridge the divide.

Perhaps if a brain-correlate is discovered, there will at least be a way to both predict who will be on which side, and also a reason to accept that this split in opinion about the possible relevance of awareness to the quantum measurement issue is inevitable.

...

The same is also the case with the philosophical argument:

I feel it would be interesting from the point of view of "categorization of philosophical discussions and arguments" to analyze whether the differences among philosophers regarding Mind, and about the existence of Absolutes and Direct Knowledge etc is of a different category than those regarding other types of issues; perhaps for example one could observe more of a heated debate, or different types of language or of argumentation.... - my own claim would be that where there is claim on one side that the issue is KNOWN to be one way, then it is likely that this is a reflection of the proponents' sense of direct knowledge rather than an ordinary opinion, and the other side will react as would be expected if they did NOT possess this direct knowledge.

In this way, one could use the type or tone of disagreement as an indication of when what is involved is not in itself subject to detection.

ie one's awareness is indetectable to others, but the existence of awareness can be detected in an argument about the existence of awareness between one who does and another whose not posses it! And the same regarding the possible relevance of awareness to the quantum question (not whether it is or not but whether it is even possibly relevant).

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II) Mind rather than just "mind": (what is meant by this can be understood from these quotes)

1) Eddington: “The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds.... It is difficult for the matter-of-fact physicist to accept the view that the substratum of everything is of mental character. But no one can deny that mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience, and all else is remote inference.” Arthur Stanley Eddington, The Nature Of The Physical World]

in speaking of "mindstuff": choose one below:

• he is not saying it is anything contradictory to the position of the naturalist/materialist

• he seems to be implying that it is qualitatively other than everything else - ie other than what is covered by physics, different than that which the materialist/naturalist says is all that is existent.

AR: Replace the following with a quote from Eddington/Bridgman etc: When we see instrument readings in a physics lab we say "an electron (or some other particle) travelled from here to there and caused this to happen" but we never see an electron, so an electron (or any fundamental particle) is really a set of conceptions...and it is described by probability waves, and so to Eddington a fundamental particle is made of "mindstuff", and so anyhting made of fundamental particles, ie everything, is made of "mindstuff".

a) Question: Does this make any sense to you: Y/N

As such, there is no fundamental difference between our minds and the entities we think of as material objects. This in a way solves the dualist Cartesian problem (and this conception can also be a pathway to a fully-idealist view), but it still does not remove consciousness from its unique role as that via which all else is known, and therefore still leaves consciousness as sui generis, and perhaps therefore an fundamental aspect of our reality, and therefore perhaps worthy of being inlcluded in the subject matter of an area of study devoted to "what we know there is", a category which includes physics within it.

b) Question: Does this make any sense to you? Y/N

2) Einstein:

Essay: "What I believe" : [AR: Need to see the original,,maybe it was in German and the meaning of the term conscious life as used here; but] it seems he is referring to what we know as consciousness and considering it a mystery, I think it is clear that he was not a naturalist and considered that he KNEW of the existence of mind which is NOT part of phsyics in the way he 'mind' of the naturlaist is.

• “It is enough for me to contemplate the mystery of conscious life [perpetuating itself through all eternity, to reflect upon the marvelous structure of the universe which we dimly perceive, and to try humbly to comprehend an infinitesimal part of the intelligence manifested in nature.”]

• "The most beautiful thing we can experience is the mysterious. It is the source of all true art and science. He to whom the emotion is a stranger, who can no longer pause to wonder and stand wrapped in awe, is as good as dead; his eyes are closed. The insight into the mystery of life, coupled though it be with fear, has also given rise to religion. To know what is impenetrable to us really exists, manifesting itself as the highest wisdom and the most radiant beauty, which our dull faculties can comprehend only in their most primitive forms-this knowledge, this feeling is at the center of true religiousness."

• Scientific research can reduce superstition by encouraging people to think and view things in terms of cause and effect. Certain it is that a conviction, akin to religious feeling, of the rationality and intelligibility of the world lies behind all scientific work of a higher order. [...] This firm belief, a belief bound up with a deep feeling, in a superior mind that reveals itself in the world of experience, represents my conception of God. In common parlance this may be described as "pantheistic" (Spinoza).^[

• My religiosity consists in a humble admiration of the infinitely superior spirit that reveals itself in the little that we, with our weak and transitory understanding, can comprehend of reality

• Einstein believed naïve realism was "relatively simple" to disprove. He agreed with Bertrand Russell that humans observe the effects objects have on them (greenness, coldness, hardness, etc.) and not the actual objects themselves.^[75]

• Einstein declared that he was no positivist,^[90] and maintained that we use with a certain right concepts to which there is no access from the materials of sensory experience.^[91]

• In his 1934 book The World as I See It, Einstein expanded on his religiosity, "A knowledge of the existence of something we cannot penetrate, of the manifestations of the profoundest reason and the most radiant beauty, which are only accessible to our reason in their most elementary forms — it is this knowledge and this emotion that constitute the truly religious attitude; in this sense, and in this alone, I am a deeply religious man."^[38]

• In 1936 Einstein received a letter from a schoolirl asking if scientists pray. Einstein replied"Scientific research is based on the idea that everything that takes place is determined by laws of nature, and therefore this holds for the actions of people. For this reason, a research scientist will hardly be inclined to believe that events could be influenced by a prayer, i.e. by a wish addressed to a supernatural being. However, it must be admitted that our actual knowledge of these laws is only imperfect and fragmentary, so that, actually, the belief in the existence of basic all-embracing laws in nature also rests on a sort of faith. All the same this faith has been largely justified so far by the success of scientific research. But, on the other hand, everyone who is seriously involved in the pursuit of science becomes convinced that a spirit is manifest in the laws of the universe—a spirit vastly superior to that of man, and one in the face of which we with our modest powers must feel humble. In this way the pursuit of science leads to a religious feeling of a special sort, which is indeed quite different from the religiosity of someone more naive.”^[39]

...

Jeans (English physicist, astronomer and mathematician): "The stream of knowledge is heading towards a non-mechanical reality; the Universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine. Mind no longer appears to be an accidental intruder into the realm of matter... we ought rather hail it as the creator and governor of the realm of matter." [James Jeans in The Mysterious Universe, ^[14]]

In an interview published in The Observer (London), when asked the question "Do you believe that life on this planet is the result of some sort of accident, or do you believe that it is a part of some great scheme?", he replied:

I incline to the idealistic theory that consciousness is fundamental, and that the material universe is derivative from consciousness, not consciousness from the material universe... In general the universe seems to me to be nearer to a great thought than to a great machine. It may well be, it seems to me, that each individual consciousness ought to be compared to a brain-cell in a universal mind.

What remains is in any case very different from the full-blooded matter and the forbidding materialism of the Victorian scientist. His objective and material universe is proved to consist of little more than constructs of our own minds. To this extent, then, modern physics has moved in the direction of philosophic idealism. Mind and matter, if not proved to be of similar nature, are at least found to be ingredients of one single system. There is no longer room for the kind of dualism which has haunted philosophy since the days of Descartes.

— James Jeans, addressing the British Association in 1934, recorded in Physics and Philosophy, ^[15]

Finite picture whose dimensions are a certain amount of space and a certain amount of time; the protons and electrons are the streaks of paint which define the picture against its space-time background. Traveling as far back in time as we can, brings us not to the creation of the picture, but to its edge; the creation of the picture lies as much outside the picture as the artist is outside his canvas. On this view, discussing the creation of the universe in terms of time and space is like trying to discover the artist and the action of painting, by going to the edge of the canvas. This brings us very near to those philosophical systems which regard the universe as a thought in the mind of its Creator, thereby reducing all discussion of material creation to futility.

— James Jeans in The Universe Around Us, ^[16]

Survey questions based on the above quotes:

1) The concept of idealism or Mind as expressed above is:

• the product of a delusional or insane mind

• demonstrably incorrect.

• theoretically possible, or "not impossible".

• reasonable, or plausible, or likely true.

2) Those expressing the views above meant them to be taken as being expressed:

• in their private capacity

• as statements of a scientist about what is known regarding 'our reality' or 'the universe'.

..........................................................

Some methodological aspects of the proposed brain experiment: There has long been a speculation that though awareness is not linked causally to brain processes, it would correlate to some degree of sophistication of the brain structure/wiring so that one does not expect to find awareness in creatures with rudimentary brains or neural interconnectedness (though as in "the ant fugue" argument it may be that they are individually neurons in a higher-level mind). Within this paradigm it would be difficult to detect the brain-correlate of awareness by comparing the brains of a human and other species, however by comparing the brains of peers in a philosophy math or physics department – who answered differently on the survey - any such difference might be expected to stand out more clearly. And a correlation to dna would presumably be more evident, as well as to the evolutionary lineage (given the varied intermixed hominid lineage we now know humanity possesses).

...

Considering the possibility that a brain's structure (or wiring) determines whether it considers naturalism or dualism more correct

Conundrum re the experiment

• What is it that is to be detected? This is especially problematic since by definition it had been claimed that awareness cannot be measured/detected. The resolution: look for the physical aspect which enables awareness to be present, ie a special organ or interconnectivity/wiring, as opposed to looking for the awareness itself.

• If awareness cannot be detected, how can one perform a relevant brain experiment? Answer: Perhaps how one talks or writes about awareness is an indicator of whether one possesses it! And so via a survey one can create two populations, and test the brains for a correlation.

• There is of course an assumption here that awareness correlates to sophistication of interconnectivity or to a specific dedicated aspect of brain structure

• Is it worth performing the experiment only if a hard-wiring correlate is considered 'plausible' or even if it is just 'possible'?

....

Analyzing the data from the survey and from the experiment

Use of deep learning (deep Convolutional Neural Networks https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/computer-science/deep-convolutional-neural-networks) techiniques to find correlations between the responses on the survey and then to the brains of proponents of the two points of view.

(Participants would be chosen based on their survey responses, with the extended survey responses fed in for correlation).

What better use of neural networks than to analyze neural networks, and how better to use AI than to try to detect where AI potentially differs (perhaps? so far?) from the human version.

If our brain is the means by which we know of the universe and our brain is the organ which originates our picture f reality and then enables us to create the model we call physics, then certianly it is imortant for us to understand those aspects of the brain which are relevant to this construction of reality, and given the claim by these prominent physicists of the role of a phenomenon which is the most fundamental known, and via which all else is known, and which is that which can be known on its own, it would certainly behoove us to know whether there is a difference in brain structure or neural wiring between those who make this claim and those who consider it meaningless or invalid.

Examples:

• An approach that decodes words and sentences directly from the cerebral cortical activity of such patients may represent an advancement over existing methods for assisted communication. New England J of Med July 15, 2021 https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMoa2027540?query=featured_home

• A Deep Learning–based Model for Detecting Abnormalities on Brain MR Images for Triaging: Preliminary Results from a Multisite Experience april 21 2021 https://pubs.rsna.org/doi/full/10.1148/ryai.2021200184

• Wiki https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brain%E2%80%93computer_interface: A brain–computer interface (BCI), sometimes called a neural control interface (NCI), mind–machine interface (MMI), direct neural interface (DNI), or brain–machine interface (BMI), is a direct communication pathway between an enhanced or wired brain and an external device. BCIs are often directed at researching, mapping, assisting, augmenting, or repairing human cognitive or sensory-motor functions.

What would be the significance of a positive result of the brain experiment? The unique status of the argument between the two camps implies that a positive result would be of great interest, without it however directly impacting the truth claims of either side.

To those who say awareness does not exist, it would be interesting from a psychological and neuroscience perspective, perhaps to genetics and evolutionary biology perhaps sociobiology as well, and to philosophers it would be intriguing in various ways.

However to those who state that awareness exists, it may be considered significant scientifically in that perhaps it indicates indeed a relation between brain wiring and awareness as has been proposed and is often assumed, as well as providing some possible indication that there is some more 'objective' validity to their claim even if only in the sense that they are indeed detecting something that does exist, even if perhaps it is not a proof to others of the existence of awareness in that they do not then become 'aware', which according to the way it is described is really the only way awareness can be known.

Those proposing the existence of awareness though might tend to see it as some sort of validation of a phenomenon which could have potential significance in some eventual future theory to physics, cosmology and evolutionary biology.

As a result, the significance a reviewer might accord to such an experiment could be expected to correlate to the side of the divide they are on.

.....

Issues to be determined via responses to a survey:

Do both sides present their view as knowledge or does only one side do so while the other side expresses it as an assumption or belief etc? eg does the naturalist know that all is natural, there is no mind?!

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Survey question: Which reflects your view:

• A scientist as anyone else of course has the freedom to believe in a religion or a philosophy, however in my opinion (or "my feeling is that") a physicist should understand the unsuitability of making the following statement irrespective of what is filled in for x: "I know for a fact that x exists despite my knowledge that the existence of x cannot be proven or demonstrated; and I know the existence of x to the same degree or more as my knowledge of the fact of the existence of the physical universe".

• I can see myself agreeing with the above sentiment (pretty much or somewhat or completely), but definitely not if "x" is "my awareness" in the sense that I mean this.

• I agree with the above sentiment (pretty much or somewhat or completely) without exceptions

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Terminology: Physicists generally agree as to what can be known, and deal professionally only with that which can be proved. Nevertheless, as judged from their writings - their books but not in their research papers - prominent physicists such as Einstein and Eddington clearly believed in the existence of what perhaps we can colloquially call "Mind" even though they certainly did not give any evidence that they felt it was possible to prove its existence, certainly not using the tools of science. It seems clear that they also felt that humans possess a 'mind' which is somehow in synch with, or of the same nature as, 'Mind'. And moreso, that they did not express this as some sort of private religous belief, but as what they felt to be fact. Nevertheless, presumably in recognition of the fact that this could not be proven nor equaitons written for it, nor experiments proposed to prove its existence,although they expressed it openly unabashedly as the words of a physicist, they did not write of these ideas in their published scientific papers. I would propose however that this was not a reflection of their lack of certainty but rather of a recognition that physics deals not with that which is known, however fundamental, but rather only with that which can be proven to exist, ie made known to another.

The term awareness and consciousness are used in psychology and neuroscience in a very pedestrain sense for example an animal is said to possess self-awareness if its actions indicate that it recognizes that what it sees in a mirror is its own body. One can create machines today which can do this, and those proposing the existence of mind which is of the same type as Mind state that this type of awareness or self-awareness is not what is meant by them when they refer to 'mind'.. However, since proponents of mind admit that they cannot prove it exists, their claim that they know it to exist - as self-evident fact - makes no impression on those who say that it is impossible for a phenomenon to be known "by itself" and that therefore those claiming it to exist are operating under some illusion or confusion or are mistaking linguistics for phenomenology.

In this article I will use the term 'mind' in the above sense, and also awareness or consciousness in this sense. I will not be overly-concenred with distinguishing between self-awareness and awareness and other subtleties except where it is germane to the discussion.

So there is this rather anomalous phenomenon of some physicists claiming they know there is a phenomenon, that it is known directly, and that its existence cannot be proven, and others claiming this is imposiible (ie for a phenomenon to be known directly) and that a statement like this does not behoove a physicist speaking as a scientist rather than when making statements of personal belief (ie it is acceptable for a scientist speaking of their personal philosophy or religion to claim they know as a fact the existence of a phenomenon which does not require proof of its existence but not when [stating 'facts' and] wearing their mantle of 'scientist'.)

Whether this paper is published in Nature or not, if there is any debate among reviewers and editors which reflects the difference between the two sides, it would be interesting to have some (redacted) record of that inasmuch as may shed further light on the divide dealt with in this paper.

Introduction

I believe that there is an issue of primary scientific importance lying in plain sight which we however are not recognizing as such.

It seems that there is a general assumption among proponents of "mind" that it is a feature of all biological humanity, but I think this assumption needs to be checked, and is perhaps unwarranted.

The problem with this determination is that those who propose that it exists and that they possess it, agree that they cannot prove they have it, and so of course it cannot be determined that someone else does not. And those who claim it does NOT exist, cannot prove the non-existence of something they do not believe exists and which others who claim it exists agree that it cannot be proven to exist.

I believe that the two sides do not realize they are fundamentally different and think incorrectly that it is all a matter only of definition, or of a philosophical view, or a psychological issue.

These and other challenges underlay the preparation of this paper.

what I want to study is not brains but what brains study, specifically I want to study the universe, or 'our reality', as studied by the brains of physicists, so I do not see neuroscientists as the relevant experts just because they study brains, since it is the brains themselves which they study.

I don;t think that because neuroscuientists are experts on brains that they are therefore experts on what brains study or can conceive, [I would have said "especially if they are adamant about one side or another of the divide and so have a predetermined outlook." but on\f course if they have MY outlook tha tis ok ! :)

...

Ask on survey: do you not include mind in science not because it is nonexistent and not because it is merely a semantic confusion, or not fundamental, but exactly the opposit, because it is fundamental and of a nature such that the tools of science have not proved appropriate and it has a waste of time at this point.

Towards a clarification of the psychological and biological correlates of this basic disagreement among about the nature of our reality, among scientists It would also be interesting to cross cultural boundaries by surveying people in Japan and China, and for example to determine whether this divide manifests among those in Buddhist and Hindu cultures, or in which way it manifest, and whether there is a difference in this between Buddhists/Hindu religious leaders vs scientists in that society (who are perhaps more influenced by 'Western ways of thinking'). Perhaps at first the survey would be limited to academics, then to professional mathematicians, engineers, scientists and philosophers, and then those in the social sciences, humanities, arts etc, and then some in the general public, though more work on definitions might be needed if perhaps the notions of brain vs mind may be differently understood in those without a scientific background.

…....

What constitutes a successful result of the experiment?

The survey: The survey is an inherent aspect of the experiment in that it will identify potential candidates for the experiment, and may perhaps also intrigue them sufficiently to convert them to volunteer as participants.

In addition, the clarification potentially provided by the answers to the survey are an inherent and important aspect of the 'experiment' in that it can clarify some of the underlying assumptions of the author and of others researching this field.

The brain experiment: Any correlation will of course be of great interest and finding such will constitute a success. Of course interpreting the result will be an entirely different enterprise. Perhaps in the course of the experiment there will arise hints of how to progress further, and other directions to explore, and certainly publication of the result could generate discussions which could produce suggested avenues to explore.

The timing: It would seem that we are at the beginning of the epoch in which this type of investigation is possible, given recent advances in brain research, genetics, evolutionary science, data storage & processing and analysis via AI (ML etc). Future developments in these and other fields would likely enhance relevant capabilities further.

How the wording of the paper is meant to reflect the above considerations

I tried to carefully word everything so that:

• it doesn't take a position;

• it can be presented as more physics than philosophy (or psychology /anthropology of "physicists")

• it presents in a neutral way the hypothesis that the reason for the divide is that materialists are as unaware as they claim we all are

Want it to sound neutral, though I have a particular view, and trying not to prejudge any aspects of what is meant to be a scientific investigation

want it to be seen as a scientific not philosophical or psychological, though perhaps only one side of the two will see it that way, and so my very suggestion that it is scientific takes a side?

Is consciousness necessarily qualitatively "other"? To the naturalist, by definition no, but to the dualist the consciousness spoken of by the naturalists is not what the dualist means, so their view is not relevant to this question.

To the idealist there is no problem, all is of the same qualitative type, to the dualist it is fundamentally other and so there is the classic Caretsian problem of their interaction.

To Eddington who considered the electorn to be ultimately composed of "mindstuff" and to Einstein who saw Mind behind everything at its most fundamental level, perhaps there is no issue to begin with.

In this paper, there is no distinction made between the idealist, solipsist, dualist and Mind-believer, all these are in a combined grouping contrasting with the naturalist/materialist - who it is proposed - take that view due to their lack of consciousness.

Naive realists seem to get around the problem, but in a way which makes one suspect they too do not possess consciousness.

...

Add: perhaps there are more than two types, or hybrids

Add: If some correlative structure is found: if some structure/wiring is correlated, of interest to determine the genetic basis for this, or even the environmental influences on the wiring, including cultural etc, as well as when it arises as a stage of embryonic development or even perhaps post-birth.

GIven the differences in evolutionary ancestry we are today aware of, it would be relevant to investigate brains of various population groups, and to trace any possible influences of brain differences on cultural and technological manifestations in ancient populations (art, tools etc) and today, and perhaps even linguistic, religious and other influences.

Forensic use: It coud be of interest to determine using AI techniques whether a writer is likely to be of one or the other type (or perhaps there are more than two types, or hybrids), or to use writings on one subject to 'predict' the tone of the writings in other subjects.

Also: to detemrine whether thereis a correlation to interest in certian types of topics or us eof certain linguistic structures; and also how the brains react to certain words or subjects etc...

Writings of antiquity: apply the above methods to ancient literature...

Therefore what I propose is to conduct a correlative survey-experiment (of academics at first) asking to what degree they belived in these: atheism, materialism, 'mind' as distinct from 'brain', human significance (possibly including some species such as dolphins and elephants etc), moral relativism vs the possibility of some sort of absolute morality, a truly-free will, whether they consider "intelligent design" to be at all a possibility, whether they believe there is any validity to some form of 'spirituality', some form of 'religion', whether they often experience existential angst, deep compassion, overwhelming wonder....

After collecting the responses I could determine the correlations between the beliefs.

I suspect that the findings will be illuminating, and will make it possible to understand why there is such a disconnect between the two camps of the Minded and the Mindless.

Choosing the survey quesitons:

Various characteristics could be added to the list, to disguise the intent of the survey, as well as to create the possibility of a statistical analysis (a la ML) of finding unexpected correlations (eg re the importance of music in their lives, the degree to which they experience passion or compassion, or etc).

For example the survey could also question literary tastes, favorite genre of music and movies, socio-political leanings (eg conservative vs liberal on a scale of 1-10), whether they are pro or anti vaccine, belief that aliens visited us vs not, degree of trust in government from 1-10, whether they are optimistic or pessimistic, adventurous or very prudent, whether art or music moves them deeply etc. (And those conducting the survey would not be apprised of the true purpose, so that one could create a sort of 'double-blind' situation.)

..

I welcome a discussion around the idea of a survey, including which questions to include or exclude.

Also: suggestions as to who might support the research, and where the results could be published.

So my proposal is to present this as a physics experiemnt, [or maybe as a purely-sociological psychological issue,?!]

deserving of two types of experiment: a survey and brain-measurements to try to detect unexpected correlations: ie towards a clarification of the psychological and biological correlates of this basic disagreement among about the nature of our reality, among scientists and among academics and intellectuals in general, where one side believes in the existence of a realm which is known to exist directly, and the other believes this to be a delusion.

The survey can be seen as an experiment to try to detect correlations in two ways:

1) it is certainly interesting scientifically (sociologically) to discover via direct questioning any possible correlations between which side one is on regarding 'mind' and how one feels about other issues;

2) it is certainly interesting scientifically (neurobiologically) to try to determine differences in genetics or brain wiring etc which correlate to this.

One can claim that ony statements provable to oneself can be true.

Also that only statements provably true to another can be legitimately termed 'true'.

• Can one prove the laws of logic? If not, are these laws accepted by 'convention' since all those in the conversation agree to acept it, whereas if there were some who claimed it was not true this would not be possible (anyway, physics would not be possible, so once people accept physics and create a discussion group about physics, then they already have accepted this convention...)

• Do you feel/claim the truth of any statements you know you cannot prove?

• Does measurement or observation by one's eye-brain etc constitute proof? Or only that which one can prove to another constitutes truth?

• Do you feel that only operational truths are meaningful, so that if a statement includes terms which cannot be specifid via consensual measurement then it is not meaningful?

• Does the statement "consciousness is known directly and cannot be proven to exist to another" by definition therefore have no meaning?

• Is there an exception made for 'conventions' (especially for physics conventions haha)? eg though solipsism is unimpeachable, one acts as though there is an external universe and so too in speaking with physicists who are allegedly exernal to oneself (as would presumeably be the case at a [non-virtual] physics convention haha) one also - by 'convention' - speaks in terms of an objectively-existent external universe (and laws of nature etc).

AR: Procedural issue: I would want to know the correlation of the answers to the above quesiotns to the respondent's status of materialist or dualist, so should I ask this directly, or indirectly as wheter materialists feel x, or rely on the answers ot the rest of the survey for this determination, or ask a clever question which indicates the answer by association?

.......

VIP: If one accepts the views of both materilaist and dualaist as being correct in relation to themselves, then one can formulate statetments about experience and about the universe and re physics in ways which take this into account, resulting in interesting subtle phaseology.

For exmple, one can say that the materialist is correct in stting that phsics describes all phenomenon associated to them, and the dualist is equally correct in claiming that it does not explain describe all processes related to THEM. etc.

Also: In the spirit of the conjecture underlying this paper, when refering to "materialists" and "dualists" we are actually often intending to refer to differences in the reality they experience not simply differences in their philosophical positions (where the latter results from the former), and concommitantly to differences in their brain structure not just in their opinions (where the latter is a reflection of the former).

Questions for survey respondents:

• Were you sure of your position on the materialist/dualist isse?

• Did you ever have discussions on this topic with colleagues? If so, have you or they ever changed their own or others' basic view from one side to the other?

• If not, do you find that this itself is an interesting phenomenon in a community of scientists open to debate?

• Would you consider the possibility of brain-difference as a theoretically plausible explanation for this adamance of position?

....................................

Categorizing the survey

Why it is meant to be about physics rather than about psychology (or about the anthropology of physicists):

Since even among the physicists who express dualist leanings, many are skeptical of the active-dualist approach as expressed above by Eddington and Wheeler and are not proponents of the Mind approach of Eddington and Einstein, we will restrict ourselves here to idealism/dualism rather than those more extreme approaches.

As noted earlier, the survey would target physicists who are not just "dualists" and "materialists" philosophically, but rather those who are quite certain of its scientific truth or factual status, thus making it a survey that is in this sense about science not about philosophy.

Survey Questions (see the "discussion" further below to clarify the intent behind these questions):

1) When speaking about contested aspects of reality or nature, usually physicists readily admit there is some possibility they are wrong, and that what they are expressing is at most strongly-held opinion, or an intuition. However, it seems to me that on this topic there are many who speak with certitude, insisting that they are stating fact rather than opinion, which is I believe unusual for scientists - perhaps it is in fact unique to this topic: Y/N

2) The existence among scientists of such distinct certitudes about our reality and about what can be known, is to me in itself an interesting scientific phenomenon. Y/N

3) The disagreement between "dualists" and "materialists" is not just unique as pointed out above, it is in addition about the nature of our reality, and about what can or cannot be known etc, and so this disagreement is very fundamental. This makes it all the more interesting from the scientific perspective. Y/N

"Discussion"to clarify the intent behind the questions above

§ The dualist: "This phenomenon that is under dispute (consciousness) more correctly should be categorized as in the realm of a fundamental science and so a dispute about it by scientisits is scientifically interesting".

§ The materialist:"The disagreement is a psychological phenomenon (with source perhaps in evolutionary sociobiology)"

§ The dualist: "some people can know directly something about the universe, ie that awareness exists, and so this statement about the existence of awareness is more in the category of physics rather than psychology, and the fact that it can be known directly is sui generis and therefore of considerable importance to physics";

§ The materialist: "The statement of the dualist is an indication of faulty wiring in their brain, so study of "the belief in Mind" belongs firmly in whatever category the study of other delusions belong, not physics".

§ The dualist: A logically-possible explanation for why you are so sure awareness does not exist is that you do not possess it.

§ The materialist: though I agree that if there existed a property or phenomenon which could be known to exist on its own (as you claim for awareness) and they didn't posses it, then yes indeed they would deny it existed, and v.v. But this of course does not imply that indeed such a phenomenon exists (and perhaps I hold that in principle it is impossible for phenomenon to be known to exist on its own).

Survey Question:

re The survey and experiment:

• They are potentially interesting to all scientists irrespective of whether they are "dualist" or "materialist". Y/N

• I think though "dualist" or "materialist will likely disagree on its fundamental significance. Y/N

re the brain-experiment finding the sought-for correlation, using today's technology or some future tech:

• there cannot possibly be a correlation;

• even if there is a correlation, given the phenomenon involved no technology will ever exist enabling it to be found;

• it is likely a correlation will be found;

• it is plausible a correlaiton will be found;

• it is not impossible that the experiemnt will find a correlation;

........

Survey quesiton based on an attempt to create a consensual "introduction to science" enfranchising the difference between dualists and materialists:

Many physicists will say that physics is the most fundamental of the sciences, and many are 'reductionist' in feeling that all other sciences can eventually be reduced to physics. So it is interesting or significant if there is some fundamental aspect of reality or of the universe which even physicists who believe in reductionism of this sort believe is NOT part of physics or not amenable to reductionist description by physics. As seen from the quotes above, the physicists who made those quotes believed consciousness was not amnable to reducitonist descritpion by physics so that they would have to say somethign like:

"the totality of all that exists = all that can be reduced to physics + consciousness",

thus granting consciousness a unique and priveleged status. Therefore, to these physicists, even if they were otherwise-reductonist, the study of "the totality of all that exists" would need to include more than just physics. For those who feel physics is the most fundamental study of what we know exists, this statement is very significant one indeed. Hoever, according to the materialist who is reducitonist, there is NO other existent than those which can be studeid by physics.

There is of course no entity in the universe towards which we can point and say "that is what we call 'physics'". Instead, let's assume that "physics" is by definition about some shared notions among people we will call "physicists".

However the group of people called 'physicists', like anyone else can roughly be divided into two subgroups: "people whose brains percieve reality in ways described by dualism" + "people whose brains perceive reality in ways described by materialism", and the according to the materialist .

Of course to the materialist this division is not so significant, it is like dividing physicists into "those who are above 5'7' " + "those who are 5"7' and below" or "those whose favorite food is chocolate" + "those whose favorite food is not chocolate or have no favorite food", ie the distinction is irrelevant to physics. However, to the dualist, the existence of consciousness is important as an aspect of what we know about the nature of reality, and what we know about the nature of reality necessarily needs to include not just physics but also the existence of consciousness.

Survey questions:

As can be seen from the quotes above, to many physicists consciousness is an important issue when speaking of "what there is" and when dealing with what is most fundamental, yet it is not an agreed upon part of science since not all agree that it is indeed fundamental and sui generis etc. So how does one deal with the topic sensibly? My suggestion is to create a consensual statement for use in the beginning of an introduciton to science class, where one presents what are the topics which are included in science.

Survey questions:

1) ""To the extent that physics is an activity of physicists it is therefore necessarily limited to the consensual. As such neither materialism nor dualism can be (said to be) 'proven true' by physics." The statement in " " is: Consensually true/Not consensually true Neither materialism nor dualism are 'proven true' by physics." The statement in " " is Consensually true/Not consensually true

2) "To the extent that physics is an activity of physicists it is therefore necessarily limited to the consensual. As such, it does not behoove physicists to say - as a 'physics pronouncement' rather than in 'private' speech - "consciousness as spoken of by dualists is definitely existent/nonexistent" because this statement is not consensual." The statmeent in " " is: Consensually true/Not consensually true

3) To be correct, a physicist can say eg this combination of three statements: Y/N

• "my brain is of the type which experiences reality in the way consistent with the [existence/non-existence] of consciousness as spoken of by [dualists/materilaists]".

• "One can prove neither the existence nor nonexistence of consiousness (as spoken of by dualists), and so the topic is not part of the common parlance of physicists and so therefore by definiton is not part of what we agree to call 'physics'".

• "To physicists who are [materialists/dualists], consciousness is the name associated to [a linguistic confusion in the brain/a fascinating phenomenon fundamental to reality]".

• "To physicists who are materialists/dualists the above set of statments is an important/inappropriate element in an introduction to physics class.

4) Do you think that the above should be part of an 'intro to physics' class?

5) Would it be best if that section of the class includes or concludes with "and so you won't hear of 'consciousness' anymore in this physics course". Y/N

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The basic Conundrum in creating this survey

Imagine that only one person in the world sees color, everyone else thinks they are crazy. Is that like the situation of consciousness where some deny it exists? No.

That unique individual can indicate via experiment that they can distinguish different materials if they have different color, etc. They create an array of differenty colored pens or crayons or paint and have others label them and tape it over, and though to the others the crayons are exactly identical one with color vision can identify each exacly. Also, the color-sighted person can distinguish the boundaries of differently-colored sections of a random brush-stroke painting that the others do not even perceive as having any boundaries. This is proof; albeit not of the claimed senation, but at least of the claim that they have an ability the others do not.

But this is not possible with consciousness, even the person who states they posses it agrees there is no way they can prove this is true!

Survey question:

This is an indication of:

a) how uniquely special consciousness is;

b) how absurd is the claim about consciousness.

Could it be at all possible that there is a verifiable likely correlate differentiating between people who are with and without conciousness, namely perhaps: those without consciosness would not write these kinds of discourses? [Is it symmetrical, ie can the mindless do something that is specific to them? If so, what is the giveaway?]

Paraphrasing Eccles: Mind is a non physical phenomenn unrelated to the physical causal chain, so it could not evolve in the usual manner.

Question: Does this itself place the burden of proof on those who claim it exists? Or is it suficient that there is a group of scientists who say they know it to exist and that is all that is needed?

If someone claims one can know something on its own without the type of proof that other physics requires, does this in some sense disqualify them from being a spokesperson for physics, or from benig your 'profesisonal peer?

....

Question on the survey: "If awareness and the realization that one is aware[2] is unphysical and cannot therefore be produced or developed due to evolutionary pressure, would it be possible that some of the humans who evolved due to physical constraints would not possess awareness, or would possess it but not know they possess it? If there are educated intelligent humans who state that awareness does not exist, and that nothing can exist that is known on its own and cannot be proven to exist to others, would you consider it possible that they lack either awareness or the knowledge that they possess it?

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"We hold these Truths to be self-evident": Are there any truly self-evident truths, or do we need to prove a statement in order for it to be considered scientifically true?

.... .................

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Proposal:

A scientific fact-finding survey & related brain-experiment to determine whether the fundamental divide between 'materialists'/'physicalists' vs dualists/idealists etc is correlated to brain-structure/wiring.

The survey – initially among physicists - would investigate the degree to which respondents claim their stance is based on knowledge about the universe/reality in comparison to consensual scientific knowledge. The subjects of the experiment would be volunteers from among those respondents who indicate the highest degree of surety that their answers on the survey represent fact rather than opinion.

Underlying the motivation for this survey is the notion of a possible correlation between how a subject speaks about awareness and the type or degree of awareness they do or do not possess.

* Possibly it will be interesting to have the participants during the brain-measurement enter into a discussion on the topic or attempt to think deeply about the issue, etc.

Physicists and the topic of mind

Although physicists allow themselves political opinions, religious beliefs and personal tastes, generally speaking they are careful to separate these from their science. For example, Einstein's technical works on relativity contain no hint of his mystic musings freely expressed in various lectures and collected into articles and books.

Caeat/clarification: Though famously he made assumptions in cosmology (that the universe is static) and quantum physics (against randomness) which were actually based on philosophical positions, and led to his greatest errors, this was not a violation of the above-mentioned separation between philosophizing and physics since to some degree it is not always possible to distinguish philosophical assumptions from 'science' when charting a new course.

Descartes helped pioneer a process whereby what we would today term metaphysics or more specifically "mind-type considerations was pared from science, leading to remarkable success in predictive modeling by "laws of nature". Descartes' position was essentially that 'mind' exists but operates in a parallel sense, unconnected causally to the operation of the 'nature' whose laws were being formulated. However there are those who insist that no 'mind' exists at all, among them physicists and philosophers (who may term themselves or be termed by others 'naturalists' or various shades of 'materialists').

[Question: Did Lucretius believe in what present-day materialists believe, or was the assumption of the existence of mind so entrenched in those times that he didn't need to even reference its existence and so he was able to make statements about nature which sound like today's materialism but is not?]

Many physicists and mathematicians state that mind – or 'awareness, or 'self-awareness' – exists, and that it is qualitatively other than 'the material', in some variation or other of what Descartes taught. From my personal conversations with colleagues on the subject, and in books by well-known scientist/mathematicians I understand them to be stating this as a fact, no less known to them than the facts commonly accepted in physics, and not in the same category as the political or religious opinions they express, or matters of taste.

Although as a result it would seem that one cannot place 'the existence of awareness' in the category of "just an opinion", nevertheless it is not in the category of "science" since it is impossible to prove.

Those who state that it exists say it requires no proof, that it is known intrinsically, and others state that it does not exists, and perhaps also state that nothing can be known on its own, and perhaps add a statement whose import is basically 'only that exists which can be proven to exist'.

Indeed, many who state that awareness exists will claim that it is more 'fundamental' than any other existent, especially in that it is that via which all else is known. And they will likely agree – in line with the philosophical 'problem of other minds' - that its existence cannot be proven, ie to someone else.

It is similar but not identical to the situation regarding other contested statements such as whether or not 'Platonic Absolutes' exist, and whether there is "truly free will'; generally speaking those who propose that these exist do not claim they know this but rather than they deduce it or feel it to be true, or believe it, rather than knowing it is an incontrovertible fact in the way they know incontrovertibly that awareness exists.

From my point of view as a physicist all this places 'awareness (self-awareness)' in a unique category.

One can of course limit 'physics' to include only that which is consensual among physicists (though the definition of physicist is of course to some degree inevitably subjective/arbitrary, especially as some who are not accepted by faculty in academic physics department might claim this title for themselves), but as a physicist I am very interested in the nature of our reality and studying what exists, and certainly the quest to understand that which is most fundamental in our reality is to me not to be dismissed even if I agree that for reason of lack of consensus it is by consensus not to be included in 'physics'.

It seems to me to be an interesting feature of the universe that the existence of that which many physicists consider to be its most fundamental feature is of disputed existence, and similarly regarding that which many would consider to be "that via which all that is known to physics is known", and that the very notion of whether one can know anything on its own without proof is disputed among physicists who are those who professionally seek to discover, catalogue, describe (perhaps via 'laws') all that can be known to exist (at least in the reductionist sense in which physicists will assume that the laws of physics underlie all else).

It seems to me to be an issue of scientific importance or significance to attempt to discover as much as possible why there is such a fundamental divide between those physicists who state as fact that mind exists and those who state equally forcefully that it does not and even cannot exist.

Limiting ourselves to ordinary forms of logic there are two possibilities to consider as part of an explanation for this phenomenon – that awareness exists and that it does not exists.

If awareness exists, and it is possible to possess knowledge directly, and specifically of one's awareness, but not all people possessed this ability, we would witness exactly what one sees in philosophy, a heated debate for centuries between those who claim it is fact an those who claim it is fiction and impossible. Therefore the lack of awareness on the part of materialists/naturalists would be a possible explanation for the debate between the camps variably defined as materialist/naturalist vs dualist/idealist etc. However, one's awareness cannot be proven to another, and so the existence of awareness cannot be proven to one who does not possess it, and so they will not agree that there is awareness just that they do not possess it.

If there is no awareness and it is impossible to possess knowledge directly, but some people claim they possess an ability to know of 'awareness' directly, we would still witness exactly what one sees in philosophy, a heated debate for centuries between those who claim it is fact and those who claim it is fiction and impossible, but those who possess awareness will not be able to agree since that it does not exist since their brains are in a state of "know they possess awareness".

Is the status of both sides equal? Or can it be that there is a fundamental difference - in the scenario of 'awareness exists" those who deny its existence would have to agree that it may be that the others possess a faculty they lack, whereas in the opposite scenario where awareness does not exist, those who claim it exists will not be able to agree it is possible that something they know to be true is not true?

Why the dispute over awareness among physicists is different in nature from other disputed aspects of physics

Those who state that it exists, also say it requires no proof, that it is known intrinsically. Indeed, many who state that awareness exists will claim that it is more 'fundamental' than any other existent, especially in that it is that via which all else is known. And they will likely agree – in line with the philosophical 'problem of other minds' - that its existence cannot be proven, ie to someone else.

The very fact that the awareness which dualists claim they know exists cannot be proven to exist is very significant in of itself, but it takes on an added significance since others state that it does not exists, and perhaps also state that nothing can be known on its own, and perhaps add a statement whose import is basically 'only that exists which can be proven to exist'.

This disputed situation is somewhat similar but not identical to the situation regarding other contested statements such as whether or not 'Platonic Absolutes' exist, and whether there is "truly free will'. The essential difference is that generally speaking those who propose that these exist do not claim they know this, but rather than they deduce it or feel it to be true, or believe it, which is a sharp contrast to the way they know incontrovertibly that awareness exists.

A Conundrum

Limiting ourselves to ordinary forms of logic there are two possibilities to consider as part of an explanation for this phenomenon – that awareness exists and that it does not exists.

If awareness exists: If it is possible to possess knowledge directly, and specifically of one's awareness, but not all people possessed this ability, we would witness exactly what one sees in philosophy, a heated debate for centuries between those who claim it is fact an those who claim it is fiction and impossible. Therefore the lack of awareness on the part of materialists/naturalists would be a possible explanation for the debate between the camps variably defined as materialist/naturalist vs dualist/idealist etc. However, one's awareness cannot be proven to another, and so the existence of awareness cannot be proven to one who does not possess it, and so they will not agree to the proposition "there is awareness just that you do not possess it".

If there is no awareness: If it is impossible to possess knowledge directly, but some people claim they possess an ability to know of 'awareness' directly, we would still witness exactly what one sees in philosophy, a heated debate for centuries between those who claim it is fact and those who claim it is fiction and impossible, but those who possess awareness will not be able to agree that it does not exist since their brains are in a state of "knowing I possess awareness", where there is no actual correlate to this delusional 'awareness'.

Is the status of both sides equal? Or can it be that there is a fundamental difference - in the scenario of 'awareness exists" those who deny its existence would have to agree that it may be that the others possess a faculty they lack, whereas in the opposite scenario where awareness does not exist, those who claim it exists will not be able to agree it is possible that something they know to be true is not true?

The real conundrum is that we cannot ALL OF US ever really KNOW as a consensus which side is correct, there is no external objective entity which can decide whether there is or is not. And the very nature of what dualists claim for awareness, that it is known directly, and that it by nature cannot be proved to exist nor does it require proof, is a diabolically-hatched claim, rendering impervious to counter-argument the brain which believes this

Perhaps brain-experiments on respondents to a survey about the existence of awareness – comparing the brain structure, wiring and activity of those who state it does and does not exist - can help in gaining insight regarding this conundrum.

……

Is this "mindless materialist" notion dangerous? politically incorrect?

If it is removed on internet postings, does that mean it is not publishable?

Although there is a potential social hazard in differentiating humanity into at least two populations, one whose brains are wired experience reality in line with idealism/dualism and others wired in synch with materialism/naturalism, nevertheless science must recognize truths however potentially uncomfortable. And this differentiation is no more uncomfortable a truth than those which arose during the Copernican revolution, and when the theory of evolution was proposed, and similarly regarding big bang theory.

Note that it was socially convenient that until recently science taught the same message of human origin as the Bible - that all descend from one lineage - whereas quite recently we have come to realize that we are descended from different mixtures of various genetically-distinct members of the humanoid family, and so we are not really "all the same" in this sense. There may be socially uncomfortable ramifications of this recognition, but science should not shy away from the subject in order to avoid this ("science" is of course neutral, but there is no such "entity" as science, there are scientists, and scientists can take upon themselves a duty to mitigate negative consequences of theories they propose.). Similalry regarding the possibility that we do not all have the same brain structure and therefore do not share the same perception of the fundamentals of our reality.

And of course there can be an interconnection between these two - the different genetic lineages of humanity and the different brain structures leading to materialists/naturalists and idealists/dualists....

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Compassion: The tricky question arises as to whether non-conscious entities such as insects actually 'experience' anything including pain and pleasure etc. Perhaps they are aware just not self-aware, but do have sensations of pain and pleasure.

However it would certainly be wrong to consider them not ‘truly human’, especially from the religious perspective which perhaps insists that all 'biological humans' should be considered to have souls. Can it be that perhaps even those with soul do not necessarily possess minds? Or is what is lacking only the awareness of having a mind, ie 'self-awareness'?

......

Of course the problem of other minds finds a resolution in solipsism, though even in this model we do not know the answers to ultimate questions such as "why does my awareness exist" or "why is it bound so strongly to the sensory impressions of this brain and the experiences of this body" etc, just as we would not know the answers to analogous ultimate questions in othe rmodels whether religious or atheistic idealist or materialist.

...

• even materialists would agree that if there existed a property or phenomenon which could be known to exist on its own and they didn't posses it, then they would deny it existed; and v.v.

• the difference between someone who says it doesn't exist - they are a materialist vs someone who says it is mystery, and i think i might be able to solve it (they are not necessarily a materialist)

...

Over the years I published a few articles on inflationary cosmology, and quite separately, in other journals, on the subject of awareness, and re free will, and the potential significance of the existence of free will to cosmology (the existence of a universe which is not eternal itself implies acausality, which is also at the root of what incompatibilists mean by free will; and the deep intelligence behind sophisticated laws on nature as we know them also correlates to the type of intelligence required for free willed choices which can bear moral responsibility).

In addition I wrote up an article about awareness and free will, with questions (a type of survey), which I sent to physicists (snail mail, some years before email), and received various responses eg from Paul Davies and David Finkelstein, and had conversations with various physicists and philosophers including Roger Penrose, Wheeler, Hawking, David Bohm, Art Komar, and others.

Later I wrote internet-posts, and articles on my website, relating my speculation regarding "mindless materialists", ie that they are quite correct, but only about themselves: see directly below. However, these posts were inevitably eventually deleted for one reason or another, and so despairing of internet-publication I am turning back to the irrevocability of "print", and formulating this as an article (for "Nature").

This article is new, and it has only circulated so far in limited form (see eg the response from David Chalmers).

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My ideas as mentioned in Wikipedia and Webster's online dictionary: see bold below (later removed from both entires by moderators).

From Wikipedia (2008?) : ''Access consciousness'' (A-consciousness) is the phenomenon whereby information in our minds is accessible for verbal report, reasoning, and the control of behavior. So, when we perception|perceive, information about what we perceive is often access conscious; when we introspect, information about our thoughts is access conscious; when we remember, information about the past (e.g., something that we learned) is often access conscious; and so on.

Chalmers thinks that access consciousness is less mysterious than phenomenal consciousness, so that it is held to pose one of the ''easy problems'' of consciousness. Dennett denies that there is a "hard problem", asserting that the totality of consciousness can be understood in terms of impact on behavior, as studied through heterophenomenology. There have been numerous approaches to the processes that act on conscious experience from instant to instant. Philosophers who have explored this problem include Gerald Edelman, Edmund Husser and Daniel Dennett.

Daniel Dennett (1988) suggests that what people think of as phenomenal consciousness, such as qualia, are judgements and consequent behaviour. He extends this analysis (Dennett, 1996) by arguing that phenomenal consciousness can be explained in terms of access consciousness, denying the existence of qualia, hence denying the existence of a "hard problem."

Eccles and others have pointed out the difficulty of explaining the evolution of qualia, or of 'minds' which experience them, given that all the processes governing evolution are physical and so have no direct access to them.

There is no guarantee that all people have minds, nor any way to verify whether one does or does not posses one. The possiblitly has indeed been proposed that those denying the existence of qualia, hence denying the existence of a "hard problem, do so since they do not posses this faculty.

<ref>Avi Rabinowitz [WAS: http://www.pages.nyu.edu/~air1/scirelig.htm NEW: https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/avi-rabinowitz/home/mindless-materialists Mindless Materialists: A Controversial Proposition]

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http://www.websters-online-dictionary.com/definition/consciousness

Daniel Dennett (1988) suggests that what people think of as phenomenal consciousness, such as qualia, are judgments and consequent behaviour. He extends this analysis (Dennett, 1996) by arguing that phenomenal consciousness can be explained in terms of access consciousness, denying the existence of qualia, hence denying the existence of a "hard problem." Chalmers, on the other hand, makes a strong case for the hard problem, and shows that all of Dennett's supposed explanatory processes merely address aspects of the easy problem, albeit disguised in obfuscating verbiage.

Eccles and others have pointed out the difficulty of explaining the evolution of qualia, or of 'minds' which experience them, given that all the processes governing evolution are physical and so have no direct access to them. There is no guarantee that all people have minds, nor any way to verify whether one does or does not possess one. The possibility has indeed been proposed that those denying the existence of qualia, hence denying the existence of a "hard problem," do so since they do not possess this faculty^[13]. 13 Avi Rabinowitz [WAS: http://www.pages.nyu.edu/~air1/scirelig.htm NEW: https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/avi-rabinowitz/home/mindless-materialists Mindless Materialists: A Controversial Proposition]

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• My Free Will article 1987 in BH, a peer reviewed journal, re universe's emergence, acausality of fw etc.

https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/avi-rabinowitz/science-and-religion/moral-responsibility-intuition-eden-wheeler-godel-bell/free-will-article-1987-b-ohr-hatorah

https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/avi-rabinowitz/creation-big-bang-evolution-the-retroactive-universe/andgodsaidlettherehavebeenabigbang

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, INTUITION & EDEN.WHEELER, GODEL & BELL , as well as in separate sections (see eg ACAUSALITY: THE ROOT OF TRUE FREE WILL AND OF UNIVERSAL EMERGENCE INTO EXISTENCE

There is a gulf between what we know and what we can prove to another.

We know only sensations and our awareness itself, though these are not 'provable'.

The need to prove them relies in some sense on the assumption that there are other minds, and or an external universe (ie independent of our mind), and so the need to prove what we know is in some sense based on circular reasoning.

Bridgman was a phenomenalist in that he knew that he knew only what was in his awareness and everything else was only assumed, and that one knows the meaning of what is in one's mind, but that science/physics if defined as being an activity 'in the public sphere' needs to be based on what one can prove, and that meanings in order to be accessible to others, to be public, need to be based on operations.

Eddington is of course well aware of all this but assumes that there are indeed other minds and that these minds understand intuitively or internally just as does his own mind and so he can talk of sensations and feelings and convey meanings by appealing to/utilizing that fundamental similarity.

What we know are sensations(or perhaps Whitehead's "processes" etc), the sensations can be of pointers on measurement machines as part of experiments which give rise to interpretations like 'an electron was just here" but we do not know electrons or machines we know sensations, the sensation we call "I see a machine", the sensation we call "I am contemplating the set of properties we associate to the notion of an electron" etc, rather than knowing "an electron" (which may or may not "exist).

Bridgman and Eddington

Two eminent physicists, contemporaries of Einstein, whose words take addiitonal weight since they were both keenly involved in experiment not only theory. Both lectured and wrote books about the fundamentals of the physical universe, one titled "The Nature of the Physical World" (Eddington, 1928), and the other, a few years later, very similarly titled "The Nature of Physical Theory" (Bridgman, 1935-6), following his ealier The Logic of Modern Physics, in1927.

Given their authors and the titles one understands that these are meant not as philosophical musings or metaphysics but rather to convey a physicists view of what we can know, though they both contain what others will conside rmetaphysics - and in this proposed study we are interested in exatly this divide, between those who feel that the topic does not belong under the category of "what we can know" but rather of "metaphysical speculations"..... [Eddington's book is based on hs Gifford lectures, which by definition have a religious or metaphysical slant, but he is presenting ideas that as a physicist he feels are based on what is known, not on his personal religious beliefs.]

One imagines Bridgman was familiar with the works of Eddington, especially as Eddington wrote the first book introducing Einstein's technical presentaiton of General Relativity to the wider physics community, and Bridgman was very influenced by Einstein's theories, and so the similarity of the titles may not be coincidence, and indeed Bridgman's work may have been a conscious effort to respond to Eddington's, though both titles are probably adapted from a rather prior work whose contents must have been know to both: "De rerum natura = "On the Nature of Things" a book on science (written as a poem) by the Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius more than 2,000 years ago (but only re-desicovered a few hundred years ago).

In both books one senses that physics is not so much "a description of the universe" as it is "a construction of the human brain" and so is inherently limited by what the brain can comprehend, what it perceives, how it organizes data, and is necessarily shaped by the brains capabilites and structure etc. As such, it is certainly necesary to understand the human brain in order to understand how the models it contructs of "reality" may or may not conform to "actual reality", or to use a more defined notion, to the reality as constructed by an alien brain of quite different structure and processing etc.

The proposed experiment, in that it attempts to discover some aspect of the brain related to our most basic knowledge of the universe, may have some relevance to this issue.

Excerpts from Eddington and Bridgman

Why I present the views of Eddington and Bridgman:

Percy Bridgman 1946 Nobel Prize in Physics, as the excerpt below indicates, had an exceptionally keen understanding of the difference between physically meaningful sentences and those that are not, and a professional obsession with carfully defining what can and cannot be known, and so cannot in any sense be dismissed as a sloppy thinker or wide-eyed naive speculator, despite all this, his words in the immediately-following paragraphs indicate that he clearly considers independent automatic self-knowledge of awareness to be not only possible but considers awareness to be the only known existent at its level.

The excerpt from Eddington indicates the same.

Percy Bridgman

"This position, which I suppose is the solipsist position, is often felt to be absurd and contrary to common sense. How it is asked, can there be agreement as to experience unless there are external things which both you and I perceive? Part of the hostility to the solipsist position is, I think, merely due to confusion of thinking, and there is a strong element of the pseudo-problem mixed up here. If I say that an external thing is merely part of my direct experience to which I find that you react in certain ways, what more is there to be said, or indeed what other operational meaning can be attached to the concept of an external thing? It seems to me that as I have stated it, the solipsist position, if this is indeed the solipsist position, is a simple statement of what direct observation gives me, and we have got to adjust our thinking so that it will not seem repugnant.

Bridgman is writing as a very careful experimentalist, trying to overcome the reasons which led pre-SR physicsits to make mistakes which were due to what seemed to be reasonable ways of doing things but which Einstein through careful consideration showed actually involved assumptions. So when he talks of solipsisn it is because it is the scenario with the fewest assumptions and therefore the most reasonable for an experimental physicist - he proceeds with great logical rigor, and so this type of consideration is purely physics not philosophy or metaphysics. It seems obvious to me that Bridgman's statement of solipsism seems to imply that he is taking the existence of mind as fact, and also espousing the views of the idealists in stating that it is only via mind that one knows anyhting else, and that indeed it is the existence of everything else which is not really known only assumed. Physics operated exactly in that realm of the "assumed to exist", and only because it is known to mind, and in the way it is known to mind, so tha tthe view of the careful operaitonalist is actually directly opposite to that of the naturalist physicist who knows only of that which is assumed to Bridgman and negates the possibility of the existence of that which is the only phenomenon known to Bridgman to exist.

Clearly this is a matter which should be of relevance to physicists, even if by consensus it is excluded from physics - excpt that most physicists ignore it, since dealing with it is a waste of time for a professional physicsit since either they are of those who know mind exists but also that it cannot be proven and no equaiotns or experiemtns proposed. or they know it cannot exist and so why bother with discussing it.

The Logic of Modern Physics is a 1927 philosophy of science book by American physicist and Nobel laureate Percy Williams Bridgman. The book was widely read by scholars in the social sciences, in which it had a huge influence in the 1930s and 1940s,^[1] and its major influence on the field of psychology in particular surpassed even that on methodology in physics, for which it was originally intended.^[2] The book is notable for explicitly identifying, analyzing, and explaining operationalism for the first time,^[3] and coining the term operational definition.

Operationalism can be considered a variation on the positivist theme, and, arguably, a very powerful and influential one.^[1] Sir Arthur Eddington^[4] had discussed notions similar to operationalization before Bridgman, and pragmatic philosophers^[5] had also advanced solutions to the related ontological problems. Bridgman's formulation, however, became the most influential.^[2]

See below an excerpt from his book "The Nature of Physical Theory":

"The Logic of Modern Physics"

Introduction: One of the most noteworthy movements in recent physics is a change of attitude toward what may be called the interpretative aspect of physics. It is being increasingly recognised, both in the writings and the conversation of physicists, that the world of experiment is not understandable without some examination of the purpose of physics and of the nature of its fundamental concepts. It is no new thing to attempt a more critical understanding of the nature of physics, but until recently all such attempts have been regarded with a certain suspicion or even sometimes contempt. The average physicist is likely to deprecate his own concern with such questions, and is inclined to dismiss the speculations of fellow physicists with the epithet "metaphysical." This attitude has no doubt had a certain justification in the utter unintelligibility to the physicist of many metaphysical speculations and the sterility of such speculations in yielding physical results. However, the growing reaction favouring a better understanding of the interpretative fundamentals of physics is not a pendulum swing of the fashion of thought toward metaphysics, originating in the upheaval of moral values produced by the great war, or anything of the sort, but is a reaction absolutely forced upon us by a rapidly increasing array of cold experimental facts.

This reaction, or rather new movement, was without doubt initiated by the restricted theory of relativity of Einstein.......

...that experiment compels a critique of much more than the concepts of space and time is made increasingly evident by all the new facts being discovered in the quantum realm.

..

Certain limitations will have to be set to our inquiry in order to keep it within manageable compass. It is of course the merest truism that all our experimental knowledge and our understanding of nature is impossible and non-existent apart from our own mental processes, so that strictly speaking no aspect of psychology or epistemology is without pertinence. Fortunately we shall be able to get along with a more or less naive attitude toward many of these matters. We shall accept as significant our common sense judgment that there is a world external to us, and shall limit as far as possible our inquiry to the behaviour and interpretation of this "external" world. We shall rule out inquiries into our states of consciousness as such. In spite, however, of the best intentions, we shall not be able to eliminate completely considerations savouring of the metaphysical, because it is evident that the nature of our thinking mechanism essentially colours any picture that we can form of nature, and we shall have to recognise that unavoidable characteristics of any outlook of ours are imposed in this way.

.OPERATIONALISM: "To find the length of an object, we have to perform certain physical operations. The concept of length is therefore fixed when the operations by which length is measured are fixed: that is, the concept of length involves as much as and nothing more than the set of operations by which length is determined. In general, we mean by any concept nothing more than a set of operations; the concept is synonymous with a corresponding set of operations. "

SIR ARTHUR STANLEY EDDINGTON

Eddington, in "The Mathematical theory of Relativity" 1924" wrote (in the Introduction ) "“A physical quantity is defined by the series of operations and calculations of which it is the result.” This view was further developed by Bridgman into what is called "operationalism". One can assume Bridgman was very familiar with the writings of Eddington [see eg Mary Hesse: "Arthur Eddington, whose metaphysical musings about physics Bridgman took a strong exception to" quoted in https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/operationalism/].

The similar preoccupation with definition via operations, and the similarity in title of Bridgman's book to the one written by Eddington a few years earlier hints that perhaps Bridgman's is written in somewhat of an homage (and perhaps counter) to Eddington's.

And though to a mystically-inclined physicist the book of Bridgman might seem dry, to a naturalist perhaps Bridgman's book is mystical, viz his comment basically assuming the inevitable unshakeable truth behind solipsism (whether one acts in accordiance with its implications or not - if one takes into account the fact that we do not seem to be in control of what we exeperience then solipsism will not affect our choices of how to act). (see below) And in this Bridgmana and Eddington are united.

In my judgement they seem firmly on the same side in the context of this paper, ie opposite that of the naturalists. However, there is an assumption in my statement which I wish to check: since Eddington is openly enfranchising of the "mysterious" etc whereas Bridgman is completely not, it may be that even naturalists agree with Bridgman's idea of solipsism as the minimalistic truth about our reality; I do not wish to simply make the assumption that solipsism is incomprehensible to materilaists/naturalists and so I pose this as a quesiton in the survay.

Eddington also is very concerned with rigor, and his idea of the seaman's net ... shows his preoccupation with avoiding unwaranted assumptions, as does his championing of operationalism (a name given to these ideas only later), but he in some sense is also concerned with not jettisoning the deepest of truths as long as they are truths. I believe one an make the case even regarding his presentaitons of the notion of electrons as being composed of "mindstuff" that it is meant by him to be fully a physics conclusion rather than his personal metaphysics or religion, though of course he does not write of these subjects in his professional papers published in journals (nor presumeably would they have been published had he done so).

Still, all in all, it seems to me that consciousness and its role in the creation or perception of our reality is a subject physicists must discuss - as physicists - albeit as a prelude to engaging in physics, as Bridgman does, rather than as part of physics itself since it deals with that which cannot be proven to exist. However, perhaps not, since some physicists do NOT see consciousness in the same way. On the other hand, shouldn't students who are not aware of the entire complicated issue be exposed to it in pre-science class, so that those who are not naturalists/materialists (though they don't yet know these terms) can gain a deeper insight into the nature of their reality, and how science does or does not relate to it? And thereby to know what science can and cannot tell them about the fundamentals of their reality. And to gain an appreciation of the fact that there are different viewpoints (or different brain-wirings) on this issue, and a recognition of the differences betwen their relaity and that of fellow-students who are by nature materialists/naturalists.

Eddington clearly refers to something qualitatively other than what naturalists consider, and also assumes that everyone agrees it is known directly, though he seems to agree that its existence cannot be proven to another.

The existence of naturalists however means that it is NOT true that all agree that there is some phenomenon which is known directly and is qualitatively other than "matter".

Eddington: "THE NATURE OF THE PHYSICAL WORLD"

To put the conclusion crudely⎯the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. As is often the way with crude statements, I shall have to explain that by “mind” I do not here exactly mean mind and by “stuff” I do not at all mean stuff. Still this is about as near as we can get to the idea in a simple phrase. The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds; but we may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness.

The realistic matter and fields of force of former physical theory are altogether irrelevant⎯except in so far as the mind-stuff has itself spun these imaginings. The symbolic matter and fields of force of present-day theory are more relevant, but they bear to it the same relation that the bursar’s accounts bear to the activity of the college.

Having granted this, the mental activity of the part of the world constituting ourselves occasions no surprise; it is known to us by direct self-knowledge, and we do not explain it away as something other than we know it to be⎯or, rather, knows itself to be. It is the physical aspects of the world that we have to explain, presumably by some such method as that set forth in our discussion of world-building. Our bodies are more mysterious than our minds⎯at least they would be, only that we can set the mystery on one side by the device of the cyclic scheme of

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physics, which enables us to study their phenomenal behaviour without ever coming to grips with the underlying mystery. The mind-stuff is not spread out in space and time; these are part of the cyclic scheme ultimately derived out of it. But we must presume that in some other way or aspect it can be differentiated into parts.

Only here and there does it rise to the level of consciousness, but from such islands proceeds all knowledge. Besides the direct knowledge contained in each self-knowing unit, there is inferential knowledge. The latter includes our knowledge of the physical world. It is necessary to keep reminding ourselves that all knowledge of our environment from which the world of physics is constructed, has entered in the form of messages transmitted along the nerves to the seat of consciousness.

Obviously the messages travel in code. When messages relating to a table are traveling in the nerves, the nerve-disturbance does not in the least resemble either the external table that originates the mental impression or the conception of the table that arises in consciousness.* In the central clearing station the incoming messages are sorted and decoded, partly by instinctive image-building inherited from the experience of our ancestors, partly by scientific comparison and reasoning.

By this very indirect and hypothetical inference all our supposed acquaintance with and our theories of a world outside us have been built up. We are acquainted with an external world because its fibers run into our consciousness; it is only our own ends of the fibers that we know; from those ends we more or less successfully reconstruct the rest, as a paleontologist reconstructs an extinct monster from its footprint. * I mean, resemble in intrinsic nature.

It is true (as Bertrand Russell has emphasized) that the symbolic description of structure will be identical for the table in the external world and for the conception of the table in consciousness if the conception is scientifically correct. If the physicist does not attempt to penetrate beneath the structure he is indifferent as to which of the two we imagine ourselves to be discussing.

The mind-stuff is the aggregation of relations and relata which form the building material for the physical world. Our account of the building process shows, however, that much that is implied in the relations is dropped as unserviceable for the required building. Our view is practically that urged in 1875 by W. K. Clifford⎯ “The succession of feelings which constitutes a man’s consciousness is the reality which produces in our minds the perception of the motions of his brain.” That is to say, that which the man himself knows as a succession of feelings is the reality which when probed by the appliances of an outside investigator affects their redings in such a way that it is identified as a configuration of brain-matter. Again Bertrand Russell writes⎯* What the physiologist sees when he examines a brain is in the physiologist, not in the brain he is examining. What is in the brain by the time the physiologist examines it if it is dead, I do not profess to know; but while its owner was alive, part, at least, of the contents of his brain consisted of his percepts, thoughts, and feelings. Since his brain also consisted of electrons, we are compelled to conclude that an electron is a grouping of events, and that if the electron is in a human brain, some of the events composing it are likely to be some of the “mental states” of the man to whom the brain belongs. Or, at any rate, they are likely to be parts of such “mental states” ⎯for it must not be assumed that part of a mental state must be a mental state. I do not wish to

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discuss what is meant by a “mental state;” the main point for us is that the term must include percepts. Thus a percept is an event or a group of events, each of which belongs to one or more of the groups constituting the electrons of the brain. This, I think, is the most concrete statement that can be made about electrons; everything else that can be said is more or less abstract and mathematical. I quote this partly for the sake of the remark that it must not be assumed that part of a mental state must be a mental state. We can no doubt analyse the content of consciousness during a short interval of time into more or less elementary constituent feelings; but it is not suggested that this psychological analysis will reveal the elements out of whose measure-numbers the atoms or electrons are built. The brain-matter is a partial aspect of the whole mental state; but the analysis of the brain-matter by physical investigation does not run at all parallel with the analysis of the mental state by psychological investigation.

I assume that Russell meant to warn us that, in speaking of part of a mental state, he was not limiting himself to parts that would be recognized as such psychologically, and he was admitting a more abstract kind of dissection. This might give rise to some difficulty if we were postulating complete identity of mind-stuff with consciousness. But we know that in the mind there are memories not in consciousness at the moment but capable of being summoned into consciousness. We are vaguely aware that things we cannot recall are lying somewhere about and may come into the mind at any moment. Consciousness is not sharply defined, but fades into subconsciousness; and beyond that we must postulate something indefinite but yet continuous with our mental nature. This I take to be the world-stuff. We liken it to our conscious feeling because, now that we are convinced of the formal and symbolic character of the entities of physics, there is nothing else to liken it to.

It is sometimes urged that the basal stuff of the world should be called “neutral stuff” rather than “mind-stuff,” since it is to be such that both mind and matter originate from it. If this is intended to emphasize that only limited islands of it constitute actual minds, and that even in these islands that which is known mentally is not equivalent to a complete inventory of all that may be there, I agree. In fact I should suppose that the self-knowledge of consciousness is mainly or wholly a knowledge which eludes the inventory method of description. The term “mind-stuff” might well be amended; but neutral stuff seems to be the wrong kind of amendment. It implies that we have two avenues of approach to an understanding of its nature. We have only one approach, namely through our direct knowledge of mind. The supposed approach through the physical world leads only into the cycle of physics, where we run round and round like a kitten chasing its tail and never reach the world-stuff at all. I assume that we have left the illusion of substance so far behind that the word “stuff” will not cause any apprehension. I certainly do not intend to materialize or substantialize mind. Mind is⎯but you know what mind is like, so why should I say more about its nature? The word “stuff” has reference to the function it has to perform as a basis of world-building and does not imply any modified view of its nature. It is difficult for the matter-of-fact physicist to accept the view that the substratum of everything is of mental character. But no one can deny that mind is the first and most direct thing in our experience, and all else is remote inference⎯inference either intuitive or deliberate. Probably it would never have occurred to us (as a serious hypothesis) that the world could be based on anything else, had we not been under the impression that

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there was a rival stuff with a more comfortable kind of “concrete” reality⎯something too inert and stupid to be capable of forging an illusion. The rival turns out to be a schedule of pointer readings; and though a world of symbolic character can well be constructed from it, this is a mere shelving of the inquiry into the nature of the world of experience....

. The only subject presented to me for study is the content of my consciousness. You are able to communicate to me part of the content of your consciousness which thereby becomes accessible in my own. For reasons which are generally admitted, though I should not like to have to prove that they are conclusive, I grant your consciousness equal status with my own; and I use this secondhand part of my consciousness to “put myself in your place.” Accordingly my subject of study becomes differentiated into the contents of many consciousnesses, each content constituting a view-point. There then arises the problem of combining the view-points, and it is through this that the external world of physics arises. Much that is in any one consciousness is individual, much is apparently alterable by volition; but there is a stable element which is common to other consciousnesses. That common element we desire to study, to describe as fully and accurately as possible, and to discover the laws by which it combines now with one view-point, now with another. This common element cannot be placed in one man’s consciousness rather than in another’s; it must be in neutral ground⎯an external world. It is true that I have a strong impression of an external world apart from any communication with other conscious beings. But apart from such communication I should have no reason to trust the impression. Most of our common impressions of substance, world-wide instants, and so on, have turned out to be illusory, and the externality of the world might be equally untrustworthy. The impression of externality is equally strong in the world that comes to me in dreams; the dream-world is less rational, but that might be used as an argument in favor of its externality as showing its dissociation from the internal faculty of reason. So long as we have to deal with one consciousness alone, the hypothesis that there is an external world responsible for part of what appears in it is an idle one. All that can be asserted of this external world is a mere duplication of the knowledge that can be much more confidently asserted of the world appearing in the consciousness. The hypothesis only becomes useful when it is the means of bringing together the worlds of many consciousnesses occupying different view-points. The external world of physics is thus a symposium of the worlds presented to different view-points. There is general agreement as to the principles on which the symposium should be formed. Statements made about this external world, if they are unambiguous, must be either true or false. This has often been denied by philosophers. It is quite commonly said that scientific theories about the world are neither true nor false but merely convenient or inconvenient. A favorite phrase is that the gauge of value of a scientific theory is that it economizes thought. Certainly a simple statement is preferable to a circumlocutory one; and as regards any current scientific theory, it is much easier to show that it is convenient or that it economizes thought than that it is true. But whatever lower standards we may apply in practice we need not give up our ideals; and so long as there is a distinction between true and false theories our aim must be to eliminate the false. For my part I hold that the continual advance of science is not a mere utilitarian progress; it is progress towards ever purer truth. Only let it be understood that the truth we seek in science is the truth about an external world propounded as the theme of study,

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and is not bound up with any opinion as to the status of that world⎯whether or not it wears the halo of reality, whether or not it is deserving of “loud cheers.” Assuming that the symposium has been correctly carried out, the external world and all that appears in it are called real without further ado. When we (scientists) assert of anything in the external world that it is real and that it exist, we are expressing our belief that the rules of the symposium have been correctly applied⎯that it is not a false concept introduced by an error in the process of synthesis, or a hallucination belong to only one individual consciousness, or an incomplete representation which embraces certain view-points but conflicts with others. We refuse to contemplate the awful contingency that the external world, after all our care in arriving at it, might be disqualified by failing to exist; because we have no idea what the supposed qualification would consist in, or in what way the prestige of the world would be enhanced if it passed the implied test.

The external world is the world that confronts that experience which we have in common, and for us no other world could fill the same rôle, no matter how high honors it might take in the qualifying examination. This domestic definition of existence for scientific purposes follows the principle now adopted for all other definitions in science, namely, that a thing must be defined according to the way in which it is in practice recognized and not according to some ulterior significance that we imagine it to possess. Just as matter must shed its conception of substantiality, so existence must shed its halo, before we can admit it into physical science. But clearly if we are to assert or to question the existence of anything not comprised in the external world of physics, we must look beyond the physical definition. The mere questioning of the reality of the physical world implies some higher censorship than the scientific method itself can supply. The external world of physics has been formulated as an answer to a particular problem encountered in human experience. Officially the scientist regards it as a problem which he just happened across, as he might take up a cross-word problem encountered in a newspaper. His sole business is to see that the problem is correctly solved. But questions may be raised about a problem which play no part and need not be considered in connection with the solving of the problem. The extraneous question naturally raised about the problem of the external world is whether there is some higher justification for embarking on this world-solving competition rather than on other problems which our experience might suggest to us. Just what kind of justification the scientist would claim for his quest is not very clear, because it is not within the province of science to formulate such a claim. But certainly he makes claims which do not rest on the aesthetic perfection of the solution or on material benefits derived from scientific research. He would not allow his subject to be shoved aside in a symposium on truth. We can scarcely say anything more definite than that science claims a “halo” for its world. If we are to find for the atoms and electrons of the external world not merely a conventional reality but “reality (loud cheers)” we must look not to the end but to the beginning of the quest. It is at the beginning that we must find that sanction which raises these entities above the mere products of an arbitrary mental exercise. This involves some kind of assessment of the impulse which sets us forth on the voyage of discovery. How can we make such an assessment? Not by any reasoning that I know of. Reasoning would only tell us that the impulse must be judged by the success of the

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adventure⎯whether it leads in the end to things which really exist and wear the halo in their own right; it takes us to and fro like a shuttle along the chain of inference in vain search of the elusive halo. But, legitimately or not, the mind is confident that it can distinguish certain quests as sanctioned by indisputable authority. We may put it in different ways; the impulse to this quest is part of our very nature; it is the expression of a purpose which has possession of us. Is this precisely what we meant when we sought to affirm the reality of the external world? It goes some way towards giving it a meaning but is scarcely the full equivalent. I doubt if we really satisfy the conceptions behind that demand unless we make the bolder hypothesis that the quest and all that is reached by it are of worth in the eyes of an Absolute Valuer. Whatever justification at the source we accept to vindicate the reality of the external world, it can scarcely fail to admit on the same footing much that is outside physical science. Although no long chains of regularized inference depend form them we recognize that other fibers of our being extend in directions away from senseimpressions. I am not greatly concerned to borrow words like “existence” and “reality” to crown these other departments of the soul’s interest. I would rather put it that any raising of the question of reality in its transcendental sense (whether the question emanates from the world of physics or not) leads us to a perspective from which we see man not as a bundle of sensory expressions, but conscious of purpose and responsibilities to which the external world is subordinate.

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https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8246940/

Bridgeman A year later, Bridgman (1928) repeated this warning in a review of Norman Campbell's An Account of the Principles of Measurement and Calculation—a book that seems to defend an equally rigorous view about meaning. In his review, Bridgman (1928, p. 999) mentioned that he is “not in sympathy with the […] view […] that there are in nature things which may be defined with the complete logical precision which we have come to associate with the entities of the mathematician.”

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Bridgman's criterion allowed Johnson could appeal to methodological prescriptions developed by a world‐renowned physicist and formulate the even stronger objection that the notion of introspectional sensation is meaningless if it cannot be operationally defined.

AR: in communicating tosomeone else,perhaps, but I can know it directly

a method of criticism first formulated with respect to scientific concepts by Ernst Mach and perhaps better stated by Henri Poincaré. To the works of these men and to Bridgman's excellent application of the method to more modern concepts

One of Skinner's reasons for writing the book on epistemology, these notes show, was his dissatisfaction with the widespread influence of phenomenalism—the radical empiricist view that physical objects are nothing but constructions out of primary sense experiences (“phenomena”). In the early 1930s, phenomenalism was a popular view about the nature of our knowledge about the physical world, defended by epistemologists, psychologists, and influential physicists like Arthur Eddington and James Jeans. When Skinner started working on his Sketch, both Eddington (The Nature of the Physical World) and Jeans (The Mysterious Universe) had just published books that relied on strongly phenomenalist conceptions of science. Skinner, on the other hand, strongly objected to the growing popularity of phenomenalism. In one his notes in Sketch for an Epistemology, he described the situation as follows:

Recent trends are toward a solution of the dilemmas of physics in terms of a theory of knowledge. It would be a pity if physicists in turning to epistemology should take up an out‐moded scheme of mind, which presents as many difficulties in its own systematization as the physicist is trying to rid himself of in physics. Jeans and Eddington are already out of the frying pan into the fire. This movement cannot be traced to one source. On the one hand lies positivism, on the other Ernst Mach (HUGFP 60.50, box 3, folder 5, my transcription)

Skinner's reference to Mach seems surprising considering the fact that his work on the notion of “reflex” was modeled on the latter's The Science of Mechanics. Still, Skinner's early notes show that he strongly disagreed with Mach's The Analysis of Sensations, a book he read as a staunch defense of phenomenalism. According to Skinner, Mach had it exactly backward: we do not need a phenomenalistic analysis of science, we need a scientific analysis of “phenomena”:

Mach reduces the concepts of science to a subjective basis […] we can return to an objective expression by asking him for a definition of sensation. This can only be supplied […] in terms of Mach's behavior (as a scientist). Thus while Mach makes science personal (and therefore private), the definition of sensation makes it again public, i.e. a matter of human behavior (HUGFP 60.50, box 3, folder 5, my transcription)

Whereas epistemologists and mentalistic psychologists aimed to secure our scientific knowledge by reconstructing our fallible concepts and theories out of “indubitable” sense experiences, Skinner aimed to revert the picture: we should not aim to ground science in sensation, we should ground sensation in behavioral science.

It is no coincidence that Skinner demands a public definition of sensation in arguing against phenomenalism. Sketch for an Epistemology is written from what Skinner considered to be an operationist perspective. Skinner notes that we ought to try “the operational method on ‘knowledge,'” that knowledge should be “operationally defined,” and that historical advances in the sciences might be explained by the fact that scientists (unconsciously) relied on “a positivistic (Machian, Poincarean, Bridgmanian) philosophy of science” (HUGFP 60.50, Box 3, Folder 5). Skinner, in other words, argued against the phenomenalists' attempts to reduce science to sense experience by applying Bridgman's call for conceptual hygiene to notions like “knowledge,” “mind,” and “sensation”; the phenomenalists' proposals are simply meaningless if they do not provide an operational definition of “sense experience.” Skinner, of course, believed that the only viable definition of sense experience would be a behavioristic one.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phenomenalism

Phenomenalism is the view that physical objects cannot justifiably be said to exist in themselves, but only as perceptual phenomena or sensory stimuli (e.g. redness, hardness, softness, sweetness, etc.) situated in time and in space. In particular, some forms of phenomenalism reduce talk about physical objects in the external world to talk about bundles of sense-data.History[edit]

Phenomenalism is a radical form of empiricism. Its roots as an ontological view of the nature of existence can be traced back to George Berkeley and his subjective idealism, upon which David Hume further elaborated.^[1] John Stuart Mill had a theory of perception which is commonly referred to as classical phenomenalism. This differs from Berkeley's idealism in its account of how objects continue to exist when no one is perceiving them (this view is also known as "local realism"). Berkeley claimed that an omniscient God perceived all objects and that this was what kept them in existence, whereas Mill claimed that permanent possibilities of experience were sufficient for an object's existence. These permanent possibilities could be analysed into counterfactual conditionals, such as "if I were to have y-type sensations, then I would also have x-type sensations".

As an epistemological theory about the possibility of knowledge of objects in the external world, however, it is probable that the most easily understandable formulation of phenomenalism is to be found in the transcendental aesthetics of Immanuel Kant. According to Kant, space and time, which are the a priori forms and preconditions of all sensory experience, "refer to objects only to the extent that these are considered as phenomena, but do not represent the things in themselves". While Kant insisted that knowledge is limited to phenomena, he never denied or excluded the existence of objects which were not knowable by way of experience, the things-in-themselves or noumena, though he never proved them.

Kant's "epistemological phenomenalism", as it has been called, is therefore quite distinct from Berkeley's earlier ontological version. In Berkeley's view, the so-called "things-in-themselves" do not exist except as subjectively perceived bundles of sensations which are guaranteed consistency and permanence because they are constantly perceived by the mind of God. Hence, while Berkeley holds that objects are merely bundles of sensations (see bundle theory), Kant holds (unlike other bundle theorists) that objects do not cease to exist when they are no longer perceived by some merely human subject or mind.

In the late 19th century, an even more extreme form of phenomenalism was formulated by Ernst Mach, later developed and refined by Russell, Ayer and the logical positivists. Mach rejected the existence of God and also denied that phenomena were data experienced by the mind or consciousness of subjects. Instead, Mach held sensory phenomena to be "pure data" whose existence was to be considered anterior to any arbitrary distinction between mental and physical categories of phenomena. In this way, it was Mach who formulated the key thesis of phenomenalism, which separates it from bundle theories of objects: objects are logical constructions out of sense-data or ideas; whereas according to bundle theories, objects are made up of sets, or bundles, of actual ideas or perceptions.

That is, according to bundle theory, to say that the pear before me exists is simply to say that certain properties (greenness, hardness, etc.) are being perceived at this moment. When these characteristics are no longer perceived or experienced by anyone, then the object (pear, in this case) no longer exists. Phenomenalism as formulated by Mach, in contrast, is the view that objects are logical constructions out of perceptual properties. On this view, to say there is a table in the other room when there is no one in that room to perceive it, is to say that if there were someone in that room, then that person would perceive the table. It is not the actual perception that counts, but the conditional possibility of perceiving.

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https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/genrel-early/

A world geometry is not the physical theory of such a world but a framework or “graphical representation” within whose terms existing physical theory might be displayed, essentially through a purely formal identification of known tensors of the existing physical laws of gravitation and electromagnetism with those derived within the world geometry. Such a geometrical representation of physics cannot really be said to be right or wrong, for it only implements, if it can, current ideas governing the conception of objects and properties of an impersonal objective external world. But when existing physics, in particular, Einstein’s theory of gravitation, is set in the context of Eddington’s world geometry, it yields a surprising consequence: The Einstein law of gravitation appears as a definition! In the form Rμν = 0 it defines what in the “world geometry” appears to the mind as “vacuum” while in the form of the Einstein field equation noted above, it defines what is to be encountered by the mind as “matter”. This result is what is meant by his stated claim of throwing “new light on the origin of the fundamental laws of physics” (see Ryckman 2005: chapters 7 & 8). Eddington’s notoriously difficult and opaque later works (1936, 1946), took their inspiration from this argumentation in attempting to carry out a similar, algebraic not geometric, program of deriving fundamental physical laws, and the constants occurring in them, from a priori epistemological principles.

5.6 Meyerson on “Pangeometrism”

Within physics the idealist currents lying behind the world geometries of Weyl and Eddington were largely ignored, whereas within philosophy, with the notable exception of Émile Meyerson’s La Déduction Relativiste (1925). Meyerson, who had no doubt concerning the basic realist impetus of science, carefully distinguished Einstein’s “rational deduction of the physical world” from the speculative geometrical unifications of gravitation and electromagnetism of Weyl and Eddington. These theories, as affirmations of a complete panmathematicism, or rather of a pangeometrism (1925: §§ 157–58), were compared to the rationalist deductions of Hegel’s Logic. That general relativity succeeded in partly realizing Descartes’ program of reducing the physical to the spatial through geometric deduction, is due to the fact that Einstein “followed in the footsteps” of Descartes, not Hegel (1925: §133). But pan-geometrism is also capable of overreaching itself and this is the transgression committed by both Weyl and Eddington. Weyl in particular is singled out for criticism for seemingly to have reverted to Hegel’s monistic idealism, and so to be subject to its fatal flaw. In regarding nature as completely intelligible, Weyl had abolished the thing-in-itself and so promoted the identity of self and non-self, the great error of the Naturphilosophien.

Though he had “all due respect to the writings of such distinguished scientists” as Weyl and Eddington, Meyerson took their overt affirmations of idealism to be misguided attempts “to associate themselves with a philosophical point of view that is in fact quite foreign to the relativistic doctrine” (1925: §150). That “point of view” is in fact two distinct species of transcendental idealism. It is above all “foreign” to relativity theory because Meyerson cannot see how it is possible to “reintegrate the four-dimensional world of relativity theory into the self”. After all, Kant’s own argument for Transcendental Idealism proceeded “in a single step”, in establishing the subjectivity of the space and time of “our naïve intuition”. But this still leaves “the four dimensional universe of relativity independent of the self”. Any attempt to “reintegrate” four-dimensional spacetime into the self would have to proceed at a “second stage” where, additionally, there would be no “solid foundation” such as spatial and temporal intuition furnished Kant at the first stage. Perhaps, Meyerson allowed, there is indeed “another intuition, purely mathematical in nature”, lying behind spatial and temporal intuition, and capable of “imagining the four-dimensional universe, to which, in turn, it makes reality conform”. This would make intuition a “two-stage mechanism”. While all of this is not “inconceivable”, it does appear, nonetheless, “rather complex and difficult if one reflects upon it”. In any case, this is likely to be unnecessary, for considering the matter “with an open mind”,

one would seem to be led to the position of those who believe that relativity theory tends to destroy the concept of Kantian intuition. (1925: §§ 151–2)

Meyerson had come right up to the threshold of grasping the Weyl-Eddington geometric unification schemes in something like the sense in which they were intended. The stumbling block for him, and for others, is the conviction that transcendental idealism can be supported only from an argument about the nature of intuition, and intuitive representation. To be sure, the geometric framework for Weyl’s construction of the objective four-dimensional world of relativity is based upon the Evidenz available in “essential insight”, which is limited to the simple linear relations and mappings in what is basically the tangent vector space

T P TP at a point P in a manifold. Thus in Weyl’s differential geometry there is a fundamental divide between integrable and non-integrable relations of comparison. The latter are primitive and epistemologically privileged, but nonetheless not justified until it is shown how the infinitesimal homogeneous spaces, corresponding to the “essence of space as a form of intuition”, are compatible with the large-scale inhomogeneous spaces (spacetimes) of general relativity. And this required not a philosophical argument about the nature of intuition, but one formulated in group-theoretic conceptual form (Weyl 1923a,b). Eddington, on the other hand, without the cultural context of Husserlian phenomenology or indeed of philosophy generally, jettisoned the intuitional basis of transcendental idealism altogether, as if unaware of its prominence. Thus he sought a superior and completely general conceptual basis for the objective four-dimensional world of relativity theory by constituting that world within a geometry (its “world structure” (1923)) based upon a non-metrical affine (i.e., linear and symmetric) connection. He was then free to find his own way to the empirically confirmed integrable metric relations of Einstein’s theory without being hampered by the conflict of a “pure infinitesimal” metric with the observed facts about atomic spectra.

Solipsism

Solipsism is the idea that only our consciousness exists, or at least that there is no way to prove that anything else exists.

According to Nobel-Prize winning physicist P. W. Bridgman[1]:

"This position, which I suppose is the solipsist position, is often felt to be absurd and contrary to common sense. How it is asked, can there be agreement as to experience unless there are external things which both you and I perceive? Part of the hostility to the solipsist position is, I think, merely due to confusion of thinking, and there is a strong element of the pseudo-problem mixed up here. If I say that an external thing is merely part of my direct experience to which I find that you react in certain ways, what more is there to be said, or indeed what other operational meaning can be attached to the concept of an external thing? It seems to me that as I have stated it, the solipsist position, if this is indeed the solipsist position, is a simple statement of what direct observation gives me, and we have got to adjust our thinking so that it will not seem repugnant."

The solipsist agrees with the materialist regarding what are the rules governing their sensory impressions ie they both feel don't control what "happens to them" and both experience pain as a resuslt of the same 'circumstances', and so the solipsist agrees with the "voice" of the set of sensaions in the solipsist's mind whic "calls itself" "another human" on the set of rules they call the laws of nature,etc. This is what constitutes 'public discourse' or 'science' or ''physics'.

However in addition to this, many of these sets of sensation, ie "other minds" claim they know one other truth which is not "provable" in the way that the "law of nature" or "external entities" are, and that is "the fact of my own existence".

The various people in a dream-event seem to be independent, with individual consciousnesses, and we in our dream have no control over them - sometimes indeed we are victimized by them. Nevertheless, when we awake, it is clear to us that all these 'individuals' were elements of our own consciousness.

The solipsist position maintains that such is the case even when we are awake - only our own consciousness exists, and all other seemingly existent entities and beings are elements of our own consciousness, so that 'reality' is essentially an elaborate 'day dream'. However, one can also accept the logic of solipsism as a theory, without assuming that indeed it describes our relaity.

Survey Questions:

Do you agree that solipsism explains all consistently as opposed to dualism, avoids the "problem of othe rmionds", and that it cannot be disproven: Y/N

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Brain in the jar & solipsism

• Does the 'brain in the jar argument' make sense to you?

• Do you feel that you know as fact that the external universe exists?

• Does solipsism - and russel's solipsism of the moment - make sense to you (eg as an obviously-true "statement of minimalistic assumtpions")

• [does belief in the logical validity of solipsism automatically imply that one is not a naturaist? If not, then I can;t use Bridgman's idea as a sign he is on the same side as Eddington!

• Does Bridgman's idea of public vs private science make sense to you?

Bridgman: implying solipsism: it appears to be concerned mostly with the character of our descriptive processes, and to say little about external nature. [What this means we leave to the metaphysician to decide.]

[re Bridgman solipsism - this indicates that he believes a brain cannot know whether it is in a jar or all is real? Or is it more, that he cannot know he even has a brain? is this at all logically a possibility? but does this indicate anyhting about mind? not really, it can be all about physics....]

Bridgman shows solipsism is the minimalist position. However he lived as though there are other minds and an external universe, without seeing any meaning in distinguishing whether there :really is" a universe out there or not., since there is no operational way to distinguish, by the very defitinoin of the logic underlying solipsism!

Solipsism may be considered psychologically unappealing to many, but it is not only logically impeachable, it is in certain instances the simplest assumption which fits the facts, and therefore, by 'Occam's Razor', it should be the preferred explanation.

"Solipsism of the Moment"

Other than the disagreement regarding whether we can know of the existence of the phenomenon of consciousness directly, on its own, is there anything else about what can be known on which physicists disagree?

Specifically, do physicists of all types (materialist, dualist etc) agree with these statements about what can and cannot be known?

• As Hawking stated: "One could still imagine that God created the universe at the instant of the big bang, or even afterwards in just such a way as to make it look as though there had been a big bang.." In other words that there is no experiment which could distinguish between a universe specially created "at a late stage" or as detailed in the creation account in Genesis or any of the many creation accounts in various religions or in any random manner, as long as it is later placed in a state identical to one which would emerge from a big bang.

Of course Hawking did not intend to be expressing support for the existence of a God, or Creator nor for Gensis or for religion ingeneral but was rather making a statement about what logic, science and physics say about what we can know, or about which types of meaningful statements or distinctions we can make.

• Bertrand Russel's "solipsism of the moment: "It is quite clear that I can have a recollection without the thing remembered having happened; as a matter of logical possibility, I might have begun to exist five minutes ago, complete with all the memories that I then had." Russel: "Human Knowledge": p194.

• John Wheeler: "The past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present". Wheeler: "Beyond the Black Hole", p358; "Strangeness", p375, note #99.

Survey Question: Do you agree with these statements by Hawking, Russel and Wheeler about what it is that we can and cannot know, or do you feel that there is an essential difference between the scenarios which it is theoretically possible (using some future technology) to distinguish via experiment.

ANSWER: No way to distinguish/There is (in theory) an experimentally-distinguishable difference.

The "Flow of Time"

A great source of philosophical and scientific puzzlement derives from our conception of time - for example how time can originate or end, and why the 'passage of time' does not exist in physics; not only the sense of the passage of time, but also the inevitability of time-passage (ie that we cannot make time stand still) is not encompassed within physics, which deals only with time intervals and a frozen spaceitme worldline rather than ‘time passing’.

Of course physics can talk of causality and the past present and future of any spacetime point, but it does not speak of the actual ‘flow’ of time. Although physics of course stresses dynamics, this is due to our own preoccupation with time passage. And physics of course can parametrize a worldline, and create functions of time, however this simply labels the phenomena occurring as time passes in our awareness, whereas time-passage itself is not considered a physical phenomenon, and the flow of time or the change in phenomena as a function of the flow of time is never indicated in a physics formula.

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QUESTION FOR SURVEY:

If one accepts only what is directly known, and rejects assumptions (that which is not verifiable), then it is clear that there is no need to postulate the independent existence of an outside physical universe, or of other consciousnesses - it is impossible to prove that there exists a universe 'out there', it is impossible for anyone to prove to us that they are conscious, and no fact of our experience is rendered inexplicable if we leave out these assumptions. Since these are unnecessary assumptions (not needed to explain observed facts), and they are unprovable, and they complicate matters by introducing complex and perhaps unresolvable paradoxes, it is far simpler to reject these assumptions.

Not all problems can be solved in this way, but the problems which remain are present also in the usual model as well, so that the idealistic solipsistic approach does lead to less problematics, even if it is not a perfect system. The great mystery that remains is how our consciousness came to exist, and why it operates as it does, but this is the same mystery we encounter in the ordinary model of reality, the question of how our universe came to exist, and why it operates as it does.

However, even if we accept that only our own consciousness exists, we seem not to be masters of our own fate. This fact need not be taken as an indication that we are not the only existent entity, since it might be that by sufficient development of self we can decide what our experience will be - as many mystics claim. Furthermore, the question of why we seem to feel that we exist in a physical body in a physical universe, and why we experience what we do, is essentially the question of why the univere is as it is, which is unresolved in the ordinary model as well.

Survey Questions re Free Will:

Explanation of the questions follows each question:

1) Do you think it is intellectual honest for a physicist qua scientist - ie rather than in their private life as a person who is perhaps religious or spiritual etc - to claim the possible existence of "true free will" of the type which involves a clear violation of logic and physcs?

• definitely not

• definitely yes

• true free will of this type is impossible and does not exist, but I do not wish to impugn scinetists who think differently than me on this issue

Explanation of the above quesiton:

As Bridgman points out, one could not within the scope of rational physics imagine how it could be possible to prove the counterfactual statement "this person could have made a different choice in this circumtance" and so talking about free will of this sort is meaningless in the scientific context. And this non-sensical type is exacly what we will be referencing in the following quesitons, the type of free will which cannot be encompassed within science and logic.

There are several levels of what is called free will; here we will NOT be referring to any of these:

• the sensation of free will;

• non-predicatability of our thought processes;

• emergent physical laws governing complex systems like brains;

• some sort of non-reductionism

Instead, as mentioned above, we are refering to the logically and scientifically impossible type of free will.

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How the concepts of free will, absolute morality and moral responsibility help define each other

A familiar example for those raised within the Western cultural tradition is the free will implied in the Biblical creation/Eden story, where a being which creates the universe including all laws of nature, randomness, spacetime, brains and humanity can nevertheless legitimately hold these beings responsible for their choices (the justification as expressed there is that they were created in the divine image, possesing free will [the theological quesiton of omnsicience and predetermination vs freedom of choice is a separate less-interesting issue, and many religious people feel it is resolved to their satisfaction by understanding the creator of time to transcend it; in any case we are not concerned here with theology but rather with science]).

The concept of free will referenced here does not require the exitence of a God, creator, nor the veracity of the biblical account, we are merely introducing a useful paradigm for what is meant here by "free will" - namely it is defined as this type, ie a free will which involves not randomness or natural causes even if they are governed by emergent or quantum-level processes but rather intelligent deliberate choice, where though as Bridgman points out this could not be proved to be so, nevertheless it is the case that a different choice could have been made.

As is the case regarding consciousness, where it is known to exist but cannot be proven to exist, and where its nature is a mystery there is a distinction between claiming free will exists and claiming one could prove it exists or that its nature is understood or even makes sense logically. And similarly to the case of consciousness where paradoxically (as pointed out by Descartes) the states are correlated to brain states though consciousness is not part of the causal chain of events, similarly with free will it is recognized a la Bridgman that the premise "could have chosen differently" makes no physicla logical provable-sense.

The issue of free will is different than with consciousnes, where the claim is made that one KNOWS it to exist; proponents of free will generally state that it is only FELT to exist, or Believed to exist, not KNOWN to exist. And they generally agree that this could be an illusion, but the question we are addressing is whether some physicists feel that it perhas indeed does exist. -

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Is it only the minded who would think of FW, or would consider it at all possible even though it is anti-logic? Maybe I can ask:

What do you think of the following quote: AR: Include quote from my FW article re emergence of universe into existence etc: from the article "Free Will", in BH a peer reviewed journal, 1987 URL: ...:

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Question 2:

a) If it is not causally-connected to the realm of matter, consciousness cannot affect the physical universe, certainly not in an intelligent manner as opposed to randomly, so a mind is a prisoner of the brain and can be aware of what occurs, but without being able to affect the chain of events. If it can effect the physical universe, then this is presumeable somewhat 'acausal' since ........

The way for mind to affect the universe of matter is via 'free will', ie a non-causal but nevertheless reasoned process - which is impossible acording to laws of physics and causality, and violates logic.

Free will can in some sense be considered the 'quintessential mind property' in that it enables mind to intelligently, with reason, affect the material unuiverse; for some scientists,.consciousness is so anomalous and yet so surely known to exist and so fundamental to the knowing of everything else including the very existence of the "material universe" that they are not loath to contemplate that it can affect the material universe, namely that there is free will.

This type of free will:

Answers:

• is completely absurd

• is intriguing

• is reasonable, perhaps it exists

• I believe it to exist

• I know it to exist

b) Imagine that solipsism is a correct model of reality, so that there is only one Mind existent and no physical universe, and the laws of nature and of logic are simply part of a program in the Mind. There can be several programs, and this "natural law and logic in an external physical universe" program is not a correct description of the reality of the Mind. Can it be that true free will is possible in this reality?

If solipsism is not a correct refelction of the actuality of our reality, but Mind exists , and is associated to brains which are part of an external physical universe governed by natural law and logic, can it nevertheless be that free will exists? For example, if Mind is more fundamental than the aspect of experiences in the category of "matter", then the laws of that matter are perhaps not applicable to mind, and so the impossiblity of understanding free will within the laws of nature and causality and logic are not necessarily reasons to preclude the existence of a 'free will' enabling mind to influence matter.

Answers:

• It is completely absurd

• It is intriguing

• It is reasonable

c) According to the big bang theory the universe has existed for a finite amount of time. There is an implication that it somehow 'emerged into existence' but not through a causal agency, since that would continue the chain of cause and effect back indefinitely, implying an eternally-existent universe. This would not be true in the steady-state senario, and perhaps not in Hawking's no boundary hypothesis In this sense. However in the big bang scenario we can somewhat colloquially say that "the universe's existence is "acausal".

Answers:

• It is completely absurd

• It is intriguing

• It is reasonable

d) If the universe's existence is acausal, and if we term the production of an ordered universe following 'laws' as is in some sense "an intelligent occurence", can it be that acausality - and perhaps even intelligent acausality - is a feature of processes in the universe, for example the "free will" mentioned above? [As discussed in the author's article "Free Will" 1987 published in "B'Ohr HaTorah" journal]

Answers:

• This is completely absurd

• It is intriguing

• It is reasonable

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Sir John Eccles, Nobel Prize-winning physiologist, claims to have demonstrated in his lab work that pure conscious events, that is, mental events, not having any physical correlates can cause the activation of neurons in the brain. In his words: "How can the mental act of intention activate across the mind-brain frontier those particular SMA neurons in the appropriate code for activating the motor programs that bring about intended voluntary movements? The answer is that, despite the so-called "insuperable" difficulty of having a non-material mind act on a material brain, it has been demonstrated to occur by a mental intention -- no doubt to the great discomfiture of all materialists and physicalists.

.End of Section re FW

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Survey questions re Meaning & Purpose; Moral Responsibility, Free Will **

Correlations

One can postulate correlations between positions regarding these topics and whether one is an idealist or materialist.

• resumably, idealists are more likely to believe in the existence of an absolute morality. Is this in fact the case?

• What about attitudes of physicists toward the reality of Meaning & Purpose (in capitals since they are meant in the sense of 'existing in some sense extra-personally'), and re the significance of human life?

• And are there atheist physicists who will state that they KNOW there is no deity etc? Do religious physicists claim they know there IS a deity or just that they believe it to be true?

The questions in this section are designed to clarify the existence & extent, or parameters, of these correlations. The discussions ahead are meant to clarify the terms used in the quesiotns.

Ethical & Religious perspective re the nonMinded

Conjecture: brain-wiring for materialism as re an underlying reason for atheism: those whose brain wiring leads to materialism in various forms tend to atheism. Discussion by a dualist with them about religion or spirituality is misplaced since the materialist experiences reality so differnlty than does the dualist, some of whom - as a result of THEIR experience of reality - are open to the possibility of a spiritual realm, of religious belief, and conneciton to the 'transcendent' etc; similarly regarding the possibility of that which is 'self-evidently true'.

To the mindless, the claim for direct knowledge of the existence of the mental realm though its existence is unprovable scientifically, sounds exactly like the religious claim for the existence of a spiritual realm, or of a soul which grants a human direct awareness of the existence of the spiritual realm, or of "God" whose existence is unprovable scientifically.

Indeed the two claims are very similar, however certainly many who directly feel the existence of their awareness do not feel the existence of God; one would suppose that such a direct awareness-of-God necessitates yet another realm, which religion calls "the spiritual realm" (connecting via 'the soul') in contrast to "the mental realm" (connnecting via 'the mind'). And ironically many of the minded would mirror re claims for a spiritual realm the skepticism of the unminded about the mental realm.

"Absolute morality" and "moral responsibility";

Conjecture to be tested: Do you feel that all those who believe in "Absolute Morality" are almost certianly dualists/idealists: Y/N?

OR SHOULD THE QUESTION BE DIRECT? :eg: choose the relevant answer:

• I am a materialist/naturalist; there is/isn;t meaning to "absolute morality": Is/Isn't

• I am an idealist/dualist; there is/isn;t meaning to "absolute morality": Is/Isn't

Whitehead wrote re his view of the incompatibility of free will and 'mechanism':

"A scientific realism, based on mechanism, is conjoined with an unwavering belief in the world of men and of the higher animals as being composed of self-determining organisms. This radical inconsistency at the basis of modern thought accounts for much that is half-hearted and wavering in our civilisation".

PHRASE AS QUESTIONS: Naturalists tend towards mechanism, in contrast to those for whom their mind is 'beyond physics' and who do not necessarily feel uncomfortable associating to their mind properties which go beyond definability in logic and causality, eg "true free will" and "absolute morality" and therefore "moral responsibility", in a way which leads them to consider meaningless the "free will " and "moral reponsibility" spoken of by the naturalists who tend towards mechanism. as expressed by the following quote:

Do you feel that belief in a non-relativistic morality requires:

• a belief in some sort of "Transcendent" realm?

• a belief in a free will which is contrary to determinism & quantum randomness?

(AR: I would expect a correlation between dualism & belief in absolute morality)

Of course if mind exists, it does not necessarily imply the existence of free will. However a true objective morality and moral responsibility for one’s free actions (to whatever extent there is real freedom, however miniscule it may be), is possible only if there is a true free will. A true free will may or may not be sufficient to support the notion of true moral responsibility, which presupposes some Absolute standards.

An entirely different level is proposed by those who also believe in a ‘soul’, and/or a ground of being or source of existence, or Mind, and this leads to ‘religion’, however it may well be that most of what religions believe can be encompassed within – or explained by – a certain type of mind-infused universe.

It is likely that only those with a mind can even consider the possibility that there is a 'true free will', the bane of all mechanistic materialists. [See my website-article regarding cosmology, acausality & true free will in the context of 'objective morality'.]

True FreeWill makes no sense philsophically and logically and physically, so for the nonMinded for whom these latter are the standard, the former group of concepts are rejected; for the Minded, for whom physics/cosmology are limited in that they deliberatly exclude Mind and possible transcendence etc, the incompatibility is not a fatal flaw.

Question:

In general, being 'unscientific" is not a disqualification since the most fundamental truth about our existence, about 'the universe" (meaning "everything") is "unscientific". Does this statement have any meaning? Y/N

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Moral responsibility: What about higher animals? What about humans who do not possess Mind? Of course without Mind there cannot be 'experience', whether of color, or music, or of thoughts etc. Nor could the minded really consider them morally responsible for their actions since clearly there cannot be free willed choice without a physically-independent mind. This is problematic from an ethical perspective in both directions - the ethics of causing damage to an entity which does not experience pain, and conversely the ethics of considering them not morally responsible for their actions.

What about from the perspective not of fellow-humans but of the divine? True free will presumably can exist only when awareness exists, and thus for the creator of a being to consider it to have moral responsibility for its actions presumably that being must have a mind, and so if religion considers all biological humans to have moral responsibility for their actions, then all humans would need do possess at least some aspect of mind.

Those religions which believe in predetermination and no free will would not need to require that all or any humans possess mind.

Alternately, perhaps what is lacking is just the self-awareness of Mind.

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Mind and 'True Free Will': Mind is a level above physical nature, more like the level where 'laws' come from - it may have associated to it 'acausal' phenomena like:

§ the ‘measurement problem’ ('collapse of the wave function') in quantum physics;

§ the acausality of the emergence of the universe into existence;

§ perhaps even the ultimate acausality of true creativity, and of the true free will which enfranchises true moral responsibility.

Meaning, Purpose, Moral responsibility, free will: When some experience is said to be meaningful, it is a feeling in one's awareness, and even if there is a feeling that this is Transcendant, it is in the end only a feeling or conviction in one's brain and awareness; it seems to me that those claiming a Transcendent Meaning and Purpose will agree that in the end what they KNOW is awareness, and the rest is derivative.

Similarly for "Moral Responsibility" written in capitals.

So too, free will is either deduced in order to support the validity of an absolute Moral Responsibility, or is a feeling one has, and either way I believe that those who speak of Mind will agree that what they know is awareness and the res tis derivative.

An exception may be 'soul': it may be that there are those who will state that they also know the existence of a 'spiritual' aspect of reality separate from Mind. But it may be that those who state the existence of soul as a deep belief will not state it as a fact on the same level as the existence of awareness.

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"Self-evident truths";

• Do you believe or know that there are 'self-evident truths'? Y/N

• Is the concept of 'self-evident truth' an absurdity if taken literally rather than rhetorically? Y/N

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Survey Question: (See more questions further below.)

Does the below rumination make any sense to you - ie not whether you agree with the philosophy but whether it makes sense at all? YES/NO

Human Significance:

Two extremes meet, and diverge: The atheist materialist ('the former') can agree with the proponent of Cosmic Mind or believer in Biblical religion ('the latter') that if a particular human being feels their lives to have significance then this is a good thing, and that certainly physics is not a relevant discipline within which to even discuss the matter. However they will presumably differ in terms of whether the following sentence has any meaning: "Human life is significant". There is in the lexicon of the latter an "Outsider Perspective", trans-human, which gives meaning to the statement, whereas to the former there is no such Perspective and therefore no Meaning or Purpose, and therefore no meaning to the overly-objective sounding statement "life is significant".

Given the above for context, the scope will be narrowed to the materialist & dualist rather than to the Outsider pesepctive granted by a Cosmic Mind or Biblical Creator.

To the dualist, although physics used to be thought of by many as the arbiter of factual truth, this is no more the case when it becomes clear that physics does NOT encompass mind, which is the basis of all, the most fundamental existent; physics has no way to grapple with it, to even recognize its existence.

In any case, both the materialist and dualist agree that one cannot look to science (physics, biology, anthropology etc) for a conclusion about humanity's signficance or lack thereof, it is simply not the correct discipline to use in making such a judgement.

However this agremeent is deceptive, since the reason for the agreement is that the materialist considers it within the context of what happens in a human brain, how the brain correlates between the terms 'significant' and 'human life', and so this is not a matter for physics to be involved in. To the materialist the statement "physics is not relevant to the discussion about the significance of human life" is not a metaphysical judgement, and the dualist's reasoning for considering physics to be not relevant to the dicussion is wrong, incoherent, delusional and to a large degree meaningless. But the conclusion that physics is not relevant is agreed upon.

Similarly re the reverse claim of some that "human life is insignificant", or "the universe is uncaring", or even statments in the vein "astronomical knowledge availabe in modern times (eg since the Copernican revolution) shows the insignificance of humanity"?

Again the dualist and materialist will agree that this is not a factually correct statement - it is only a matter of the opinion or psychological feeling of the person expressing it, and will agree that the last statement involves an illegitimate usage of science, ie mixing fact and values.

SURVEY QUESTIONS

What do you think of these statements:

Significance: choose the relevant responses:

I)

a) Humans are significant in the sense that they think of themselves that way

b) Color is not a property of an entity, only of the sensation of a mind perceiving an entity (or dreaming etc). Similarly, 'significance' is a feeling in a brain and not a property of that which the brain contemplates, even if what is contemplated is its own life. ie contemplating its life , there arises in a brain the feeling "my life has signiicance", and this feeling is real, but it is a confsion of levels to say that therefore that life HAS significance as a property (even "the life"being consideed is simply a concept in the brain rather thana n entity in its own right.)

c) it is entirely different if there is mind and a mind considers the significanc eof its life vs a universe in which there is not any mind, and a brain contemplates the significance of its existence.

II) Scenario: a universe almost entirely without mind (stars, planets, rocks, animals without mind etc, vaccum, spacetime etc) , but having mind in one small pocket of the uinverse's vast expanse, eg in beings existing on one planet.

What do you think of this:

a) there is no more innate significance to a universe with or without such a planet with minded beings.

b) It is absurd to conclude that the minded being are without significance since they are a tiny fraction of the amount of matter in the universe, so that the vast

c) it is posible for a minded entity to not care about another being, or "to be uncaring", and a non-minded being can make a statmeent that it does not "care" about other entities, but a non-minded entity cannot be said to "be uncaring", and it is absurd to consider it a logical conclusion that "the universe is uncaring" simply because the great vast majority of it is without the capbility of caring. In fact,since the minded beings are capable of caring, or not caring, it is they alone who are relevant in contemplating the issue of "whether it is a caring universe or not".

The relevance to physics

From my point of view as a physicist all the above places 'awareness (self-awareness)' in a unique scientific category.

One can of course limit 'physics' to include only that which is consensual among physicists (though the definition of physicist is of course to some degree inevitably subjective/arbitrary, especially as some who are not accepted by faculty in academic physics department might claim this title for themselves), but as a physicist I am very interested in the nature of our reality and studying what exists, and certainly the quest to understand that which is most fundamental in our reality is to me not to be dismissed even if I agree that for reason of lack of consensus it is by consensus not to be included in 'physics'.

It seems to me to be an interesting feature of the universe that the existence of that which many physicists consider to be its most fundamental feature is of disputed existence, and similarly regarding that which many would consider to be "that via which all that is known to physics is known", and that the very notion of whether one can know anything on its own without proof is disputed among physicists who are those who professionally seek to discover, catalogue, describe (perhaps via 'laws') all that can be known to exist (at least in the reductionist sense in which physicists will assume that the laws of physics underlie all else).

It seems to me to be an issue of scientific importance or significance to attempt to discover as much as possible why there is such a fundamental divide between those physicists who state as fact that mind exists and those who state equally forcefully that it does not and even cannot exist.

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seems to me to be an issue of scientific importance or significance to attempt to discover as much as possible why there is such a fundamental divide between those physicists who state as fact that mind exists and those who state equally forcefully that it does not and even cannot exist.

"True Infinity", and "The Platonic Realm"

One can have the experience of "touching infinity" etc but this does not prove there is actual infinity, especially as our brains are finite, so what one has is an experience of one's awareness. The awareness though is said to be known as a fact.

One can mathematically define infinity, however conceiving of a physical infinity is more problematic. Of cours eone can create a matehmatical model of infinity for spacetime or for space and for time separately, but this is different than the claim that indeed "physical space and time" can indeed be infinite.

Of course the fact that our minds are conditioned to boggle at thenotion of infinity, does not mean that infinity is impossible, and conversely because we "understand" the math of infinity this does not mean that we can ineed "contemplate infinity".

However, if it is only our brains which are finite, whereas our minds are not bound by the same militations, it is conceivable that the feelingo f touching infinity

seems to me to be an issue of scientific importance or significance to attempt to discover as much as possible why there is such a fundamental divide between those physicists who state as fact that mind exists and those who state equally forcefully that it does not and even cannot exist.

The existence of Platonic Truths is in some sense a deduction: one feels the truth of certain statements, that they are not contingent or human-invented etc, and yet there doesn’t seem to be any way this can be unless there is some Absolute Realm etc, but one cannot know that one is experiencing this Realm directly – rather there is a sense of this realm in one's awareness, so it is conceivable that the illusion of a Realm exists, and the false notion that there is a logical necessity for this Realm, whereas actually what exists is only a notion in one's awareness. The awareness though is said to be known as a fact.

However, perhaps it is only our brains which are finite, and the awareness of the Platonic relam, are due to our possession of mind.

Correlations

Is there a strong correlation between: a) the belief among mathematicians/physicists in the necessary existence of a "Platonic Realm" and b) being an idealist/dualist etc?

Is it possible for a Platonist to be a naturalist/materialist? If so, is it a type of cosmic naive realism?

One can postulate correlations between positions regarding these topics and whether one is an idealist or materialist.

• presumably, idealists are more likely to believe in the existence of a Platonic Realm. Is this in fact the case?

• Does belief in the existence of a Platonic Realm due to the laws of nature, or mathematics, or logic etc automatically imply that person would self-identify as not being materialist/naturalist?

It may be that a philosopher will consider these incompatible positions, but it is interesting to ask physicists HOW THEY SEE THEMSELVES, so that one can make statments about their positions based on 'experiment'.

Cosmology, Genetics

The existence of Platonic Truths is in some sense a deduction: one feels the truth of certain statements, that they are not contingent or human-invented etc, and yet there doesn’t seem to be any way this can be unless there is some Absolute Realm etc, but one cannot know that one is experiencing this Realm directly – rather there is a sense of this realm in one's awareness, so it is conceivable that the illusion of a Realm exists, and the false notion that there is a logical necessity for this Realm, whereas actually what exists is only a notion in one's awareness. The awareness though is said to be known as a fact.

However, perhaps it is only our brains which are finite, and the awareness of the Platonic relam, are due to our possession of mind.

Is there a strong correlation between: a) the belief among mathematicians/physicists in the necessary existence of a "Platonic Realm" and b) being an idealist/dualist etc?

Is it possible for a Platonist to be a naturalist/materialist? If so, is it a type of cosmic naive realism?

It may be that a philosopher will consider these incompatible positions, but it is interesting to ask physicists HOW THEY SEE THEMSELVES, so that one can make statments about their positions based on 'experiment'.

Cosmology, Genetics

Cosmology, Genetics

§ If there can be in brain a physical structure associated to mind, perhaps the physical universe also has such structure.

§ Maybe the existence of laws of nature (see Hume, PCW Davies etc) is an indication of this? Or can one find a new level of structure to the universe given the postulate that it emerged in an acausal manner?Just as awareness is that which can be known in of itself requiring no proof, so too perhaps the universe is that which can (begin to) exist on its own requiring no physical cause?

§ If true free will (incompatibilist libertarian, acausal) exists in human brains, then perhaps the acausal aspect is that which can emerge on its own? Or it is present in the universe or is associated to that which enabled the universe to emerge into existence acausally?

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The relevance to a broadened version of cosmology

Cosmological implications: When brains are fully convinced about some fundamental aspect of our reality, but differ irreconcilably, is this a matter for science as a whole (ie not just neuroscience) to be interested in? ie might it be taken as indicating something of importance regarding the universe and not just about human brains? For example: Universes (or 'realities') which are correctly described by naturalism or by dualism are qualitatively different, so the fact that two brains can differ as to which is correct renders this 'dispute' sui generis.

Genetics

§ Do those without mind have something else instead? Maybe they also struggle to convey to the minded what they feel?

§ If there can be in brain a physical structure associated to mind: how did it arise? Is it coded in the genes?

§ If one removes that part of brain, does the person remember what it felt like?

§ Can one transplant it to a mindless person and transform them to minded?

§ Can one inject generic material to the brain to stimulate it to produce that structure, thus inducing mind?

Is it like seeing, where a blind from birth person receives the ability to see, and they need to orient their brain to interpret new signals? or would it be automatic?

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DNA matching to results of the proposed Neurophysiological Experiment: * Analysis of dna can be performed on volunteers, with investigation of any correlations (especially since we do know that we interbred with Denisovans and Neanderthals etc).

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Given the fact that scientists disagree so fundamentally on this, and given the possibility (to be established by a survey) that this disagreement is unique, and given the general assumption that awareness correlates to some aspect of the brain structure of the aware being:

* it would be interesting to investigate whether there is a corresponding brain-distinction, between the dualist and materialist to determine whether there is something observably different about them.

The genius of Descartes was the recognition that the Aristotelian indiscriminate homogeonous mix of mind+matter could be decomposed into a "naturalistic order" governed by "laws" which would include also the two realms formerly sacrosanct: the operation of a) human brains and b) of the universe as a whole. To this need be added a realm operating according to a different schema, the realm of mind. This realm could seamlessly be separated since it is not needed for the explanation of the physical realm and could not interact with it according to its type of laws. He then briliantly crafted theories of the 'natural universe' including cosmology to illustrate his point, that there is a physical universe which operated according to 'laws' and that this is all separate from the realm of mind.

This 'dualist' decomposition was incredibly successful, and led to the wealth of physics as we know it, as well as to mechanistic biology (and of course chemistry), and of course to highly successful modern origin-theories such as inflation/big bang and evolution (and more recently to advances in brain-research).

However this Cartesian revolution was later extended by the materialists to mind itself, and they gleefully offered theories indicating - to their satisfaction - that mind too was a part of the "naturalistic order".

Of course the dualist sees a basic flaw in this, for after all their consciousness is known to exist without requiring proof, and it is sui generis (and known to be so 'intrinsically' without need for proof). However, it is unfortunatey only nown to them secifically, and the materilaist of course might consider this type of delusion to be an as-yet-undiagnosed form of mental illness (ie corrupted brain-software). Espceially since to the materilaist the very claim of the existence of something indetectable to science, which is allegedly known to exist without needing proof, is an affront to science.

SO the great discovery upon which science is built is that one does not need mind at all "we have no need of that hypothesis" for most phenomena! And so it became possible for materialists to fully take part in scientific discovery. However, the minded understand that there is a natural realm where all is mechanistic (including the randomness of quantum effects).. and there is ALSO another realm, of mind, but the former does NOT need mind as explanation.

Of course it may be that only a universe underlaid by Mind could have 'laws' (apologies to Hume) and therefore seem as though it can exist independenlty of Mind!

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It is difficult for us today to pull ourselves out of the context into which we are deeply embedded, a mechanistic physics and biology, where Mind has to fight for a place, and is rejected as an 'illusion'. The ancients lived in the opposite conceptual environment: they thought in terms of stone 'wanting to return to its original place, the Earth" as explanation for falling.***

However this does NOT mean the ancients necessarily possessed mind! Even the mindless describe "wanting to do this or that" even though we minded know that via a vis a mindless entity there is no actual sentience wanting anything.

So it is not correct to assume that all were minded [of course one is reminded in this context of the thesis of The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind by Julian Jaynes] nor can we assume that Mind in the sense we mean it was the basis of Arsitotelian physics (though the mindless will perhaps say it is, but only because they have no idea what mind is!).

So in Aristotelian times the nonminded used mind terms to describe what even we minded folk would consider to be 'phenomena which do not require mind'

and the nonminded used mdlike terms since they did not recognize what it meant. it was only after Descartes etc separated them and showed how one could describe phenomena without mind-like notions, that the non-minded then decided oh that's what you mean by mind, ok, well it doesn't even exist at all!!!

Thus until the Cartesian split, there was no way for the Minded and nonMinded to even discover that they were different!

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Mind is primary: Mind is the means whereby we become aware of the 'physical'. The idealist position holds as a belief that in fact there is only mind, and anyone understanding mind-body duality agrees that this is possible, and that one cannot actually prove that the external universe 'exists' independently of one's mind. Indeed solipsim takes this to its logical undisprovable conclusion. As such, a philosophical disagreement about whether or not the physical universe indeed 'actually exists' is not an essential philosophical distinction, and so materilaist and dualist idealist and solipsist can agree on discussing "physics" as the laws of that which the materiailit is comfortable as considering the external objectively existent physical universe. However any self-conscious intelligent being even if not an idealist understands this vital distinction: mind incontrovertibly exists whereas the material universe is only supposed by the mind to exist.

Furthermore: Mind may well have been present always; it is not 'in space and time' as is matter, and could seemingly not have emerged from materialist stuff, so it may well be beyond natural law as presently understood. (eg evolution and cosmology as known so far deals with laws only of ordinary material entities.)

Can we consider mind real if it is not encompassed within science?: Mind exists on a level more like that at which universal emergence arises, and the level of the existence of order and 'laws', not at the 'lower' level of the matter-energy which the laws govern, and so the inability of these laws to explain mind, or the non-existence of laws which govern mind, are not valid reasons to discount mind. Indeed, I know that mind exists far more deeply than I know anything else, including the necessity of laws of nature.

Science and technology have adequately demonstrated (or convinced us) that machines can in theory reproduce all of human action, speech, cogitation; we therefore understand that the 'qualia', the mind-aspect of human experience, is not required to explain any phenomena associated to human activity (ie we understand that even if there is no consciouos feeling of pain there can be a mechanism of damage avoidance which employs the neural pathways which are involved in the processes which give rise to our experience of pai)n. Since mind is not required for the production of any of the neurologial processes we "experience", the existence of mind cannot be explained by evolutionary science - indeed, since Descartes science has indicated that mind is not within the realm of scientific law as we know it.

What physics includes and what it cannot

Physics describes the allegedly-external seemingly-material universe that presents itself to awareness. That which is directly accessible to our awareness, namely the knowledge of our own awareness (ie self-awareness) is not part of physics. It cannot be measured using only elements of the ‘external universe’.

Physics deals with that which is presented to our awareness, not with our awareness itself, nor with that which is known directly to our awareness without actual means of measurment ouside it. In the latter category is time-passage. Time-passage is a phenomenon within our awareness, but cannot be captured via measurement. Also, time passes inevitably, we cannot make it stand still. However, time-passage and also its inevitability is not necessary for the physics-based descripton of nature (it is is a phenomenon existing only within our awareness). Measurements made with our brain alone without factoring in awareness do not require time-passage; all physical measurements other than those made by our awareness itself, do not involve time-passage, only time and intervals of time. SR involves worldlines which are space and time frozen…

There is a concept of the light-cone, and events which can influence each other etc, so this gives a form of ordering of time-periods, but not actual time-passage.

In some sense the measurement problem of qp is the reverse. The universe as perceived by us is in specific states, not superpositions, but physics gives us only the probablilities of any specific state being the one we will perceive after any measurement. Physics does not seem to tell why we perceive only one state, but that is consistent with physics not dealing with that which is apparent only to awareness.

In addition, one of the most fundamental aspects of our awareness is of the passage of time, and this is not part of physics, as clearly indicated by special relativity. Physics contains only a 'frozen' spacetime of all time-moments rather than any 'flow' of time as we experience it*. Similalry for the insights of quantum physics. And so the most essential fundamental aspects of of our existence - mind, time-passage, and individual-states (rather than quantum superpositions) - are not encompassed within physics!

In sum, these most fundamental aspects of our existence, our awareness and the sense of time-passage (and its inevitability), are not encompassed within physics.

The fact that they are not part of physics of course does not weaken our knowledge that they exist, it only makes clear to us a fundamental limitation of physics.

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What is nature, what is science, what can be said about our reality that is in the spirit of what is known or thought to be possible at the deepest levels

It is appropriate that a journal titled "Nature", devoted to the study of nature, should include a discussion of nature in the broader context broached in these quotes by eminent physicists:

• Wigner on the occasion of his acceptance of the Nobel Prize for physics in 1963 [2]: " Physics does not endeavor to explain nature. In fact, the great success of physics is due to a restriction of its objectives: it only endeavors to explain the regularities in the behavior of objects. This renunciation of the broader aim, and the specification of the domain for which an explanation can be sought, now appears to us an obvious necessity. . . ."The regularities in the phenomena which physical science endeavors to uncover are called the laws of nature. The name is actually very appropriate. Just as legal laws regulate actions and behavior under certain conditions but do not try to regulate all action and behavior, the laws of physics also determine the behavior of its objects of interest under certain well-defined conditions but leave much freedom otherwise."

• Sir Arthur Eddington ""All through the physical world runs that unknown content, which must surely be the stuff of our consciousness. . . . Where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature."

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The mind perspective:

Given our understanding that physics is limited in the above sense, some have more confidence in identifying other aspects which we know of to be true (“we hold these truths to be self-evident”) and can claim to be valid without expecting - or feeling the need to find - validation from physics.

As a creation of the human mind,physics cannot describe mind itself. And as a tool of the mind in determining certain types of truth – those which are measurable in the ‘external material universe’ - physics will not be considered by mind to be the ultimate arbiter of what is true in general.

There are limits so far to what logic or physics can enlighten us about, wheter ultimate quesiotns such as in cosmology's quesiotn "why ther eis something rather than nothing" or "how the universe can emerge into existence wihout causal influence from something preceeding it" which is similar to the quesiotn of the 'origin of time' which is solve din some sense via a closed time but then the same equation as for the universe arises for itme, ie "why is there there time".

Of course one could reply that we are only bound to think in terms of causality due to our brain-wiring which is due to evolutionary pressures and the laws of nature and the facts of our environment etc, but if we discard the validity of our reasoning then perhaps all physics will be lost. Unless we accord a special status to these 'ultimate quesiotns'.

But then, should we do so also regarding 'awareness', which to those who state that they know it to exist has no less certain existence than the universe itself and is as 'fundamental' to our reality as the physical universe, or even moreso.

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Materialists as an Exception to Cartesian dualism: Though it may sound paradoxical, I consider correct both materialists who deny the reality of conscious awareness and Descartes who knew it does exist. I believe they are simply both reporting on the realities of their own existence, one without mind, the other with. So the Cartesian tells me “I think Descartes was right therefore I am self-aware” and what the materialist effectively tells me is: “I think materialism is correct therefore I am un-aware”.

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EDIT THIS: if it is explainable or one finds laws, does this necessarily mean it is NOT what Eddington, Eccles, thinks it is? Does Penrose disagree with them? Is he referring to some phenomenon or existent which he believes can be proven to exist (ie to someone else)?

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Overcoming a conundrum

Given the Cartesian dualistic disconnect between mind and body, a person without awareness will act and speak in the same way as one with awareness, This presents the dilemma of how to detect awareness. My proposal is to utilize an aspect of awareness - indeed of self-awareness, (basically a form of introspection). Since anyone who is aware will understand the Cartesian proposal, anyone who insists on materialism may well be unaware.

If an aware being can feel their awareness and remark on it, then this is itself an effect of the Mind on the realm of the body! However, if Cartesian dualism insists that the effect of consciousness is not possible in the realm of body, the very utterance of the phrase “I am aware” cannot be due to Mind! If it is nevertheless due to the existence of the mind of the one speaking, then this is itself a weakening of the Cartesian dualism for the case of self-reference.

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Why the mateilaist position is reasonable form the scientific perpective

How did awareness arise in an otherwise-material universe? If evolution can proceed without the existence of mind, there is no guarantee that mind would arise in all genetically-identical beings, ie not all humans need be aware simply because some are. And so it is not unreasonable for the mindful to suppose that if there are some humans who are not mindful, among them are those highly-intelligent philosophers who disbelieve in the existence of mind.

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Given that Mind is not physical, it cannot arise via evolutionary processes (as pointed out by Eccles), and so my conclusion is that it is not necessarily universally present in all biological humans. And so it is understandable that those who do not possess Mind are sceptical about it, indeed don't even understand what those who possess Mind are talking about, and think that they can disprove the existence of that which is uniquely self-evidently-existent. And indignantly deny the possibility of anything being self-evidently existent.

There is only mind, but any self-conscious intelligent being even if not an idealist understands this vital distinction: mind incontrovertibly exists whereas the material universe is only supposed by the mind to exist. Mind may well have been present always; it is not 'in space and time' as is matter, and could seemingly not have emerged from materialist stuff, so it may well be beyond natural law as presently understood. Evolution as known so far deals with laws of ordinary material entities.

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Formulate this as quesitons, and neutrally.

On the one hand I would then be led to propose that rather than pursuing endless futile debates about theories of mind, that one accept that some people posses it and those who completely deny its existence simply do not themselves possess it.

Of course anyone can claim they know anyhting and noone else knows it, and then all science and philosophy is rendered futile as an interpersonal endeavor and so one would need boundaries agreed upon, though of course the materialist/naturalist who denies the existenc eof mind whould place those boudaries where they are now - designed to exclue direct knoledge of one;s awareness.

What is the a resolution of this concundrum? That one catalgoue what indeed is claiemd to exist by pysicisits and philosophers and detemrine whether there is a hierarchy - that which is claimed to exist for sure eq awareness, that which is sensed but not fully 'known' to exist, eg freedon of the will, and that which is deduced rather than known eg the existence of Platonic Truths..'the soul'. etc, and to accept that our reality is not amenable to complete consensual descritpion and that debate is futile on those issues on whichthe difference is not due to a difference of logic or opinion

Although philosophical debate can clarify issues, it will not settle the issue of whether there is or is not awareness since it is a fact to those who possess it, and this factis inacessible to those who not possess it, but the notion tha thtis is fact is not porvable , and is denied by some who are accepted as peers in the philosophy or science category.

In this way the acceptance that there is a sui generis stuation involved does not necessarily ean the end of science and philosophy as an interperesonal endeavor.

Proposed survey, as a prelude to the experiment on some of the respondents:

§ I feel it is interesting to investigate via a survey whether indeed the fact-status accorded by scientists (limited to those with what others will call "strong opinions" on this issue) is indeed different in degree than as regarding other disagreements. The survey is meant to establish a fact - the degree of uniqueness of the disagreement on this issue among scientists - and so it is a scientific fact-determining survey.

§ It would also be interesting to survey various opinions and correlate to whether they categorize themselves as dualist or materialist.

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maybe I am better off writing it up as though I am on the other side, challenging those who believe in Mind...!!??

Completely different related topic/survey/experiemnt:

1) Pleasure which is all internally-originating vs the need for outside actual effect: When we have a pleasureable experience, whether from music or seeing a loved one, the stimulus is external but the pleasure is internal, and is caused most directly by some chemical etc in our brain, in a process which only originates with the external stimulus. Which types of pleasure are experiencable wihtout an external stimulus? What pleasure is experienced during a dream of a pleasureable experience - how do they compare? Can thispleasure be electrically-stimulated in someone who had never experienced the reality?

Eg, seeing somone's face generates good feeling, but that is my brain generating chemicals making me feel good, and I can perhaps feel the same in a dream etc. Pheremones perhaps are needed form an extenral source to induce some feelings or can these be recalled? Is it possible that there is some way another entity can directly affect my feeling!??

How can I discover all the ways in which my brain can induce feelings in my mind, without actually encountering the stimulus even once, eg someone who never heard music (perhas deaf) can they experience it internally without the electrical impulses connected to the ear etc? And can we get the entire range of feelings, like hitting all the keys of a piano is succession?

Would it help to have a genetic or brain map and ask all humans to tell us what gives them pleasure or annoys them etc, and measure correlations to their genetic and brain structure and then try to see whether others with the same structure will feel the same way even if they had never before been exposed to that stimulus? ie detrmine from their genetics or other features that they will absolutely love salsa dancing or rap music or watching ballet or playing ice-hockey or poker despite them never having heard of these activities before.

Also re exercising abilites: eg or knitting or sculpting,

Also re capabiliteis: they will be adept at carpentry or computer programming

Obviously the possibility of doing this would lead to various startups offering this as as a service to individuals, recruiters, salsa-teachers etc. And to services offering to stumalte a given brain to experience its greatest pleasures.

2) Other minds: Is it at all possible that there can be an effect of another mind which is NOT attirbutable to ne's own mind? like a continuaiton of 1) except for minds. ie a way for our mind to (feel that it knows) know that it is not the mnd gnerating these feelings? ie using mind rather than just brain is there a way that we can prove to ourselves that we are not a brain in a jar, ie to our satisfaciton, ie we will fee that it is a fact, or is this impossible even at mind-level?

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3) I had a thought the other day: try to reconstruct it: Was it something to do with facial expressions? And how we react to seeing these expressions is an indication/manifestation of a deep neuro programming., and so it adds a level otherwise inaccessible using today's technology...

What I am trying to achieve

I want to reformulate as questions the statements I usually make about 'mind' etc, and to do so in a way which would be meaningful to both materialists and idealists, and would be considered by both sides to be even-handed by both 'sides'.

To accomplish this, in the material on the linked site I am working to eliminate my specific point of view, ie to turn the statements into neutral-toned questions - where neutrality is sometimes achieved 'on the average' by presenting loaded questions with multiple-choice answers representing equally one-sided views.

The resulting list of quesiotns is meant to form the body of a survey, with physicists as respondents (and later, mathematicians and others). In addition to the intrinsic interest or even significance of the results of such a survey, importantly the respondents who indicate via their replies that they are firmly in one of the two opposing camps would be invited to participate in a brain experiment. The purpose of the experiment would be to determine whether there is a correlation between the differences in survey-responses to some aspect of hard-wiring of the brain (or even the presence of some additional section of the brain).

If there is, this structure or wiring would be the source or conduit of either:

• "the knowledge that I am/possess consciousness, which is sui-generis" etc, or:

• "the source of the brain-defect leading to the illusion or delusion that there is a significant phenomenon which those suffering from the delusion call 'consciousness'.

Which of the above is the correct interpretation is an entirely different kettle of fish.

The article - or the cover letter or the survey itself - explains why I feel a brain-correlate might be plausible.

If some wiring-distinction is discerned one can try to determine whether this difference is genetically-determined, and if so if it is correlated to our specific mix of hominid-ancestry, or is 'culturally-determined', and whether wiring to be on one or other of these sides occurs in the womb or in childhood etc.

I'm not a philosopher and this article/survey is meant to be written from the perspective of a physicist and geared towards physicist respondents, so there is no attempt at or pretence of (or need for) philosophical rigor or precise philosophical terminology. Instead, I hope to (cleverly?) circumvent the need for all that by utilizing the quotes I mentioned. (ie it is a survey of physicists' responses or reactions to quotes from prominent peers, not a philosophy paper).

Since the second stage is a brain-experiment, it would be best conducted on volunteers from among the respondents.

So I hope to publish this in a way that results in enough responses to be statistically-meaningful, and to form the reservoir from which willing participants reflective of the totality can be drawn.

For the COVER LETTER

My opinion, my journey, my feelings

There really ought to be a name for "what is known to exist", which would include that which is studied by physics and also anything else for example according to many one would include consciousness. And if the reason we don't have a name for it is because there is a dispute about whether anyhting else exists, this fact itself should be taught along wih hte science, ie that we do not all agree about what can be said to exist for sure.

When the word "the unverse' is used, it used to seem to me that it meant something like "the universal set" emcompassing everything, and I assumed that consciouness was included, and would somehow be addressed one way or antoher by physics, but eventually learned that this as not so - that physicisits dealt with the topic, but in separate works, not part of the physics literature....this is indeed appropriate since it is not provable etc, and especially as not all agree it exsits, but somehow when we are taught science as a way of understanding the univers,e there ought to be a caveat....but the survey can help in detemrining whather any such commonly-agreed upon caveat can be formulated. But if not, then this fact alone is interesting enough to be taught in science 001.

I feel almost as if there was a "bait and switch", when I thought physics would deal with all that is, all that is known, and heard great deep ideas about consciousness, speciltion albeit, and read Jeans and Eddington and Einstein and others, and then slowly came to realize that all ths were taboo subject snot to be mentioned in conversations with most physicists....of course it has been wasted time t investigate, we dont yet have a handle on consciousness, bu all this should be said a spart of introduction to science...

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Because of my interest in fundamentals, throughout my career i have been thinking about and writing articles on specific topics:

• my professional work has been in the field of general relativistic cosmology, specifically "topological inflation", re the emergence of the physical universe into its present state of existence (via tunneling or etc), and presently on a paper re the "braneland equivalence principle";

• the model upon which the creation account in Genesis is structured, paticularly in regards to the emergence of meaning from the "outsider perspective" (ie a God who creates the universe), or the interrelationship between the emergence in the universe of human (or other) consciousness, and of meaning, and about "Free Will" (see the article with that as title, and the article on the "Instant universe" in the context of when free will emerged within the evolutionary/big bang scenario);

• my internet articles re "mindless materialism", which led eventually to this article.

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Personally, after many years of such debates persona, my own conviction is that indeed hard-core naturalists are devoid of an ability I possess, to detect the existence of awareness, my awareness. Of course I don't expect anyone else to detect my own awareness- theis "the problem of other mnds" but I would have expected them to detect their own, and if they do not, then the lack thereof it is a possible - and to me plausible - explanation

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• AR: use this from Bridgman's Into to Logic Mod Phys, for my attitude re my paper: " On certain broad tendencies in present day physics, however, I have put my own interpretation, and it is more than likely that this interpretation will be unacceptable to many. But even if not acceptable, I hope that the stimulus of combating the ideas offered here may be of value. "

• Also: re whether this issue of the disagreement re consciousness bec it cannot be proven, if it is a quesiotnof interesto scinece, or to scientists: "To state that a certain question about nature is meaningless is to make a significant statement about nature itself, because the fundamental operations are determined by nature, and to state that nature cannot be described in terms of certain operations is a significant statement. "

Given the leanings of academics, especially in the sciences, I suppose no funding agency will authorize research which takes for granted that the Minded are right; indeed many committee members are likely to be of the Mindless themselves, and so it would be hopeless to apply for funding, or try to publish such speculations, or even the survey-findings and its analysis if presented in that way.

I want to utilize the survey results to help:

1) in identifying subjects for a brain experiement;

2) in developing clarity regarding that which divides physicists into what I propose are two types;

3) to develop appropriate terminology.

Part of the above goals include using the survey results to help achieve the following objectives:

• arrive at a word to describe "that which is known" "the study of that which is known" "topics which some physicisits assert definitely exist but others say it doesn ot"

• Categorize SCIENTIFICALLY the minimalistic description of reality, eg solipsism, even of the moment.

• Recognize the list of that which is real but not encompassed in physics, eg passage of itme and unique quantum result rather than superposition, and then to invent a term to encompass [physics + the rest of what we know].

• To do this either in a unified manner agreed upon by all or two separate statements or a statment incorporating acknowledgment of the divide

• define 'mind' as "a property associated to some brains, which gives rise to that which can be either knowledge of existence directly or an anti-rational glitch of incoherent nonsense"

• arrive at a word to describe "that which is known" "the study of that which is n\known" "topics which some physicisits assert definitely exist but others say it does not"

• Categorize SCIENTIFICALLY the minimalistic description of reality, eg solipsism, even of the moment.

• Recognize the list of that which is real but not encompassed in ophysics, eg passage of itme and unique quantum result rather than superposition, and then to invent a term to encompass [physics + the rest of what we know

• To do this either in a unified manner agreed upon by all or two separate statements or a statment incorporating acknowledgment of the divide

• Recognize that the ongoing endless debate between the minded and non minded (We need to recognize the fundamental divide) is futile because one side simply does not have what the other side has - either materialsits do not possess awareness and cannot therefore understand what the idealists are talking about, or the non-materialists have a glitch in their brain that is not possesed by the materilaists...but both sides are mistakenly assuming that there is mutual understanding just different view points - the difference is not in viewpoint it is in the possession vs non possession of this faculty/ property/ phenomenon/glitch "awareness" , and there is in fact no mutual understnaidng possible as a result.

This idea may sound disturbing, but science is about open debate and not about denial, and by ignorin this we are also denying the many millions who have awareness the recognition of this vital fact about our reality, that either physics is not - in its present form at least - even capable of dealing with what is seen by many physicists a being the most fundamental phenomenon in the universe, or many physicists have a glitch in their brain which leads them topostulate the impossible.

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after surveying physicists, do neuroscientists, and academic experimental psychologists, cognitive specialists

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Cover letter: This experiemtn is meant to overcome an inherent dilemma, and I want to word the article and survey in a way which neither reveals overtly my position nor prejudices that which is meant to be surveyed....

I want to hide my real belief: I believe mind is qualitatively other, and feel that the only explanation that materialists deny this is that they do not possess mind. However of course they would presumably deny this as a possiblitly and claim that those claiming mind exists are deluded, and that it is unsceintific to claim that somehting exists which cannot be proven, and it is uncollegial and against the spirit of science to simply claim another scinetist is blind because they don see what I see. Science should be about hat we all agree exists. And indeed I agree that physics is about that, but perhaps we cannot say that science is about all that exists, but only about what all agree exists. Or maybe in the scientific community - and in the public at large - we just need to recognize the fact that there are at least two positions among physicists regarding what exists, and therefore whether physics(science) is equipped to study all that exists.

Re the refereeing process, and the editorial view

Perhaps after reading the referee comments and editorial opinions, I would rephrase the questions, and change the tone? So I definitely welcome feedback

Dilemma: what if all the editorial board and the referees are all of one side? eg Perhaps they are all of the materialist side and (therefore) are unanimous in agreeing that the article does not belong in the category of science? Or perhaps they are all of the other view and take it for granted that there are no materialists so extreme that they would disagree with their view and so the survey and experiment are futile/(will be ineffective in achieving its goal and is in any case unnecessary)? So I would recommend that the referees be surveyed and a balance be found, and this would be a marvelous element of the experiment itself.

-----------

I find myself oscillating between being honest and admitting that I am a dulais tor idealist and most defnitely nto a naturalist/materialsit, and that i can consider the possibility that naturalists simly do not have minds and therefore do not understand the arguments we idealist/dualists etc make, like Eddingtin and Wigner Aand weyl and jeans and wheeler etc and Einstein.

Osciallting between that and pretending to neutrality in this issue, and to 'reciprocity' by suggesting that perhap i do not possess some aspect of brain that naturalists have...etc.

I am open to presenting the article either way.

But the survey is definitely best done in a neutral manner...

The challenge is in formulating the quesiotns in ways which overcome the fac that naturalist simply do not comperehnd what I and thes eother physicist mean, though they may think they do...

-----

My Own Journey

Though I grew up with a strong religious background, in my youth I felt that physics had all the answers, and religion had to conform with scientific findings. During my phd studies in physics (NYU) and afterwards, for many years I wrote articles and gave lectures in various venues trying to show how Biblical statements did not in fact contradict science. In many cases part of the resolutions I offered involved the Bible's fundamental concern with human free willed moral choice, and I felt that quantum physics blazed a path forward via its flirtation with consciousness. I was influenced by the books written by Eddington (and Jeans), as well as by Davies, Eccles, deChardin (and later Penrose, etc), and felt that science and religion were very much in synch and would refer to "the alleged science-religion conflict".

However, after many conversations with scientific colleagues, I began to realize that very few believed in the existence of conscious awareness or what I'll write here as "Mind" (in distinction to "brain" or "neural currents" etc), disparaged the notions of it being in any way related to quantum aspects of reality, and certainly did not believe in a meaningful form of free will.

To me however the most fundamental truth is that awareness exists, indeed this is the only statement that can be made without requiring any 'proof'.

I believe this is what Descartes meant, and that he is misinterpreted and misunderstood: "By the very fact that I am aware, I know that awareness exists, and this is the most fundamental existent, and it is the only existent whose existence is self-evident. Of course he also meant "Mind exists independently of brain and therefore of the physical senses, and so I can have a thought indpendent of the physicla external relaity, namely the thought "I exist", and so this thought is NOT dependent on whether there does inded exist an extrnal reality, ie I know I exist (ie that an awareness exits, the awarenss I call "I"), and that self-awareness is sufficient, there is no need of "proof" of that existence; after all, to whom will it proven, to me, but that already means I exist!

As a result of most physicists' complete blindness to this, I eventually understood that science not only did not have all the answers but indeed was totally missing the very essence of our reality - a realm explored instead by phiosophy, metaphysics, relgion etc - and ceased feeling that as a physicist I needed to be an apologist for the possibility that religion has any validity.

Today, years later, given the large inroads of atheism and post-religion culture, and due to the feeling among many in the scientific community as well as students that to be fully scientific involves a rejection of religion, in my opinion it is useful at this juncture to focus on what I see as the actual issue underlying most of the religion-atheism divide. Though it is a very non-politially-correct and controversial approach, I consider there to be a fundamental difference between two types of humans, those with non-physical Minds, and those without (perhaps they possess some other aspect we lack).

Many people are intimidated by the materialist declarations of those I suspect are the Mindless, leading to the belief that religion and spirituality are outdated or provably wrong or misguided, and that moral absolutism is a primitive untenable notion, and that individual responsibility for moral choices is impossible since logic and science cannot support it.

I believe that a renaissance of religion could follow if enough Minded people understood that the atheist materialism they are epxosed to is not the absolute truth it pretends to, and that in fact the most fundamental truths of our existence are deliberately excluded from science. Of course this exclusion led to great triumphs of physics and cosmology, but it is crucial that the Minded realize that there is yet another realm (inaccessible [as yet?] to science), a realm more fundamental, relevant and important to them than any scientific truths.

Over the decades I learned not to enter arguments/discussions when underlying the different point of view is a difference re the facts. When facts are ageed upon, and even perhaps interpretations of the facts, then one can perhaps usefully discuss or argue about policies - or even if policy is also agreed, argue about how to implement the policy or if strategy is agreed, ie argue about tactics. etc*.

The fate of my attempts at disseminating this idea

The proposal that humans are fundamentally different in this way would of course be considered highly controversial - especially because of certain ramifications, and it is not likely this notion can even be published (unless in an exceptionally-courageous journal).

After posting this idea online in various forums many years ago, it was eventually removed - presumeably censored - and when I myself included it on Wikipedia it appeared in various other online "encyclopedias", but then partially because it had not been a scholarly-published article and because these were entries of my own, it was eventually removed from Wikipedia (though it still appears here and there on the internet via reference to the notion, eg this comment referencing my older site (search for the word "mindless" on that page).

I feel that the idea deserves analysis, even if only among relatively limited circles, and even hope that some couragous publication will dare to publish it

-----

....

"Epiphanies"

Discussion of the subtle underpinings in the survey questions, meant to enable meeting the double-challenge of: a) identifying the Minded vs UnMinded and b) getting the results published.

Three epiphanies and how they are reflected in the idea for the proposed survey, and by its wording

The intent is NOT to survey a correlation between two personal beliefs: such a correlation would be not unexpected: rather the attempt is to correlate peoples' responses to queries about "what I know most fundamentally as a fact about the universe/reality/my existence", ie as opposed to 'opinion', and "my religious-type beliefs".

The nonMinded however will not recognize the validity of the "knowledge of fact" attested to by the Minded, and thus WILL consider both to be philosophical opinions.

------

For years when I wrote about science & religion I was frustrated and perplexed - I could not understand why so many physicist colleagues were so adamantly against the possible relevance of awareness to quantum physics. It eventually dawned on me that there was a more fundamental issue involved - I was astonished to discover that many highly intelligent people did not believe in Mind! And given my clear perception of its existence I was frustrated why my attempts to enlighten them about its self-evident existence were not getting across.

At some point however I had an epiphany - becoming convinced that the reason for their rejection of its existence was simply because they lacked it. Literally. The flip side of this first epiphany was that there is no way to prove the existence of mind nor to scientifically prove it is absent in someone.

Although this explained why it is futile to attempt to convince the Mindless that Mind exists, it also pointed to the impossibility of publishing this speculation in a scientific journal since it would be impossible to prove that anyone does or does not possess a Mind, and especially since many in the scientific community are of the Mindless.

[The lack of recognition in the physics community of the fundamentality of awareness had the psychological effect on me of eliminating my belief in the 'status' of physics as sufficient to describe reality, or as being the standard against which one must measure other theories, and with which religion had to seek accommodation.]

So even after realizing that a lack of awareness would be a simple reason why materialists cannot understand idealists, I was stymied as to how to prove this, or even publish this speculation - and then I had a second epiphany, that what I should do is create a survey and present the result, rather than making an unprovable claim.

To understand how a survey can attempt to resolve this impasse, let's think of what the survey could ask.

Let's consider a Minded individual experiencing deep compassion for some suffering entity. It could well be that a Mindless individual would be evolutionarily wired for altrusitic behavior, and that the neural currents induced by the sight of that suffering entity would be identical to those in the brain of the Minded individual, and perhaps lead to the same behavior in both, but the non-Minded individual does not understand what is meant by 'feeling' and will think that they should answer 'yes' when asked whether they felt deep compassion, so one cannot distinguish who is Minded and who is not by asking them whether they feel something or other.

So how could one distinguish a Minded and non-Minded individual via a survey?!

The essence of the second epiphany was the realization that the cluelessness of the non-minded regarding mind is a possible marker. ie that an intelligent philosophically well-read individual will know what is meant by "mind" vs brain, and if they have a Mind they will know it whereas if they do NOT believe in Mind it must be because they do not possess one, so to determine who does and does not possess Mind, although one cannot simply ask people whether they have feelings since all Mindless will presumably answer in the affirmative there is another path, to utilize an indication, a correlate of the presence of a Mind - one would simply ask them whether they believe in the existence of Mind and assume that those who are intelligent and educated and have read some philosophy and yet do not believe in it do not in fact possess one.

Third epiphany or realization: ??

Problem getting it published or authorize an experimetn since many on the board are non-minded and will oppose it as not relevant to science. So I should stress not the fact that some have no mind, or that the experiment is about mind, but rather the very existence of this difference of attitude among physicists about what exists or can exist, not.

Why publish it as a paper: It would be nice to be able to do the survey and report on it, but I don't think that enough physicists will respond to my request to take the survey. And the main part is the proposal for a brain-experiment, which I cannot do. If such a 'letter' gets published and there is interest, it could generate either offers to perform the survey & experiment, or justify a grant to help find qualified others to do it. The results can be reported.

It maybe that reviewers & readers will offer useful critique/suggestions

Reviewers:

I wrote to David Chalmers, he wrote back to me: "I'd be skeptical about whether one would find correlations with neurobiology, but it would be interesting to see." I would choose him as a reviewer.

Roger Penrose, or perhaps someone continuing his line of thought, would be a good reviewer and could perhaps suggest aspects of the experiment.

------...

I think the discussions between two camps of naturalists and dualists etc will not be fruitful until one bravely considers the poissibility that mind or non-physical consciousness is real, but is not universally associated to all human brains, leading those wihtout uit puzzled about the claims of those with it. And perhaps the opposit eis also true, that naturalists are speaking as they do as a reuslt of possesing some attribute not possessed by those who say the know there is consciousness of the non-materilist type.

.......

The human brain can be used as an instrument containing an algorithm which determines the truth of some mathematical and logic statements, viz the famous Godelian statement re theorems which can be known by humans to be true without them being able to prove their truth. So what is the place in science of a statement by some physicists in the spirit of "we hold these truths to be self-evident" - and what if they are NOT self-evident to all physicists?

Famously, pornography was 'defined' by a chief justice via "we know it when we see it".

Are these two examples fudges or genius, and can we find a way in which science can legitimately incorporate such 'truths' and 'definitions', along with the caveats of the nay-sayers?

Actually, there is no entity in the universe corresponding to "physics", rather there are physicists and brains of physicists, and these brains "have conceptions" which can be bundled together into the conception "physics". So we cannot really ask whether physics allows for this or that but rather whether physicists agree with this or that proposition, or whether they consider some proposition to be in line with their conception of "physics", etc. So we are very much concerned with physicists, the brains of physicists, and what thoughts are in that brain regarding certain concepts and "truths", and less so with "what physics says".

Physics is notoriously fuzzy compared to math, and we'll exploit this since we'll be surveying attitudes of physicists to quotes of statements made by physicists; in order to not have to define our terms, we leave it to the brain of any given survey-respondent to understand the meaning of the terms in the quote, and then accept this as the meaning - for them - of the same terms when used in our questions.

Step 1: Survey to determine whether there is a fundamental divide among physicists as to whether physics is capable of studying all the basic fundamental aspects of our reality.

a) Many physicists classically felt that all sciences could reduce to physics - reductionism vs wholism: do YOU feel this is substantially valid?

b) there may be a difference among physicists regarding "awareness" - whether it is encompassable within physics as known today or even any physics.Do you feel strongly that awareness as a phenomenon which is non-encompassable within physics is real, and it is sui generis (see explanation below) and that in fact all physics and knowledge of the universe flows via our awareness so it is actually the only known? Should this be acknowledged in the physics community? Ought it be communicated to the wider population of scientists and those interested in science.

The difficulty in investigating this topic is two-fold: those physicists who say it is a non-existent phenomenon will not think it is necessary to speak of it at all or to enfranchise the views of those physicists who espouse it, anymore than one needs to speak of their political or religious beliefs or taste in film, whereas on the other hand those who deeply know it is the most fundamental feature of our reality also acknowledge that although its existence ies self evident, it is ONLY self-evident, ie ion;s awareness CANNOT proven to exist to anyone ELSE and so one cannot convince a denier of awareness that it exits, and certainly not that it i fundamental or that it is relevant to a discussion of what science pr physics is about.

The every exisence of such a dillemma cannot be assumed, especialy if one is speaking of science; this assumption must be tested, demonstrated - and hence the survey.

Step 2: if it is indeed found to be a sharp divide, as a second step to determine whether many physicists believe it is significant to physics.

Step 3: if it is indeed found to be a sharp divide, and many physicists believe it is significant to physics, then it becomes relevant to perform an exeperiment on the brains of those on both sides.

The result would be of interest to PHYSICS not only to neuroscience, ie it is of course of relevance to how physics is created by brains of physicits, but it may also be of relevance more fundamentally to "the knowlegde of what exists", a type of scientific 'metaphysics' in the sense of "about physics".

-----

Title?: identifying, detecting, the detector of consciousness... in the brain, the instrument which states "I exist", "there is a universe out there"

TOC

• Why I believe this experiment should be performed on the brains of physicists, rather than on those of philiosophers (or metaphysicians), or psychologists.

• Why the result of the experiment may have bearing also on physics rather than only on psychology or philosophy etc:

• The technical advances making it possible to not just perform this experiment but also to intepret the results

• Difficulties in presenting the goal of the experiment in neutral terms

• Why the goal of the experiment is not "determining whether phenomenon x exists" but rather "determining whether the belief that phenomeon x exists is correlated to (the existence/operation of) a specific physical structure or neural interconnectedness in the brain":

Thanks very much,

Avi (Dr Avi Rabinowitz)

air1@nyu.edu

If there was no consciousness in the universe, but intelligence evolved, eg computer-type-brains operating acording to the naturalist's scheme of things, would they think of solipsism , and consider it a rational possibility, indeed to maybe be the real minimalistic assumption? Or is only those with minds who think soliosism is rational and the minimalistic assumption scenario?

But how do I find this out without revealing the bias I have or wanring quesitoners of a trap regadring those iwhtout minds?

I can simply ask if the respondent thinks if solipsism is reasonable, and see if there is a corelation.

I can also ask: is it possible that the notion of solipsism would not arise or not seem reasonable if humans were indeed purely-mechanisitic? [and the minded would say yes and the non mided woulld say no, sinc the fact is that there human who claim solipsism is reasonable and yet they are mechanistic!.]

.........

I need to cleanly associate a specific quote from prominent physicists which indicates their belief in these specific points, and then ask respondents to the survey what they think of the ideas expressed in these quotes:

..-----

Can't make assumption as to which statment would be agreed upon universally vs which is only for the dualist type etc, so I need to ask this of physicists on the survey. eg "does solipsism seem reasonable as a logical possiblitly" ie I cannot know what another scientific brain would feel is true about our reality without fininding out from them.

I can write the above in the cover letter.

So I should ask on the survey about each idea whether it is all physically/logically possible, whether it is rued out by logic or by something your brian knows or by physics/science, not whether it is plausible or you believe it ec

.....

Reformulate these as quesitons: life is not a scientific concept etc, soul does not exist to many scientists, and to those for whom mind is a meaningful concept they don't expect it to be include in scientific theory, same for soul..., and some are materialists naturalists and claim only that which is describable by scinece exists and so the type of awareness that doesn't fit into science doesn't exist, and certainly not the soul or etc that religious people speak of does not exist.

So it makes no sense to object to the evo theory due to its not encompassing mind, life, soul ,, since it is not designed to do so. The scientific claim of evo theory should be 1) it provides a paradigm within which one could see how in a universe operating solely according to laws of nature non life produces life which then reaches higher orders of organization, and 2) based on that model one can make predictions which are then verified, rather than a) mind and soul do not exist since they are not encompassed within scientific theory or b) since the scientific model theories give accurate prediction about the body, it means that there is no soul or mind.

Those who propose the existence of mind which is not material might want to determine when it arose or how it became a property of humans, what it is et, but can accept two facts:

1) the physical universe including our bodies operate according to natural law and evolved via bb and evo

2) in addition there is a mind, and maybe soul

----check submission process to nature, if my ORCID now appears

..

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........END OF PAGE........

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL, not for article or survey

NEED TO EDIT OUT REPETITION WITH THE MATEIRL ABOVE, and eliminate a specific point of view, ie turn the statements into quesiotns

Science deals with that which can be tested, with phenomena which can be verified by scientists in various countries independently of their beliefs or their culture or language. This is not to say that scientists consider all else uninteresting or insignificant. Rather, science limits itself to certain types of phenomena, and makes no judgement or indeed reference to matters outside its purview.

Erwin Schroedinger,

Wigner

there is no way that we can prove that we are not actually disembodied brains. Indeed, we cannot even prove that there exists a physical universe at all - we may be purely mental beings who are experiencing a dream/hallucination [ for example that we are physical brains in a jar, or physical beings possessing a physical brain].

Nevertheless, we generally make the assumption that indeed we do exist within a physical universe. We postulate that there exists a universe ''outside us''.

In the words of Erwin Schrodinger (1958):

"The world is a construct of our sensations, perceptions, memories. It is convenient to regard it as existing objectively on its own. But certainly it does not become manifest by its mere existence. Its becoming manifest is conditional on very special goings on in very special parts of this very world, namely, on certain events that happen in a brain."

All that we experience can be classified as either sensory impressions, emotions, beliefs, thoughts, or acts of will. Of these, we assume that the sensory impressions are responses of our body to actual events in the postulated outside universe. The others are purely mental events. They may arise in response to events in the outside universe, but they are not correlates of events there (they could however be correlates of events in our physical brain. ).

Science is the study of regularities in the events of the outside universe. That is, science is actually the study of regularities in our sensory impressions. Further, science is not something that is fed to us by the sensory impressions themselves. Rather science is a construct of our minds based on our intellectual interpretation of the regularities of the sensory impressions. Or equivalently, science is constructed from our interpretation of the regularities of the alleged events of the postulated outside universe supposedly causing these impressions. In the words of Nobel physicist

Eugene Wigner (1964):

"There are two kinds of reality or existence - the existence of my consciousness and the reality or existence of everything else. The latter reality is not absolute but only relative. Excepting immediate sensations, the content of my consciousness, everything is a construct."

The great astrophysicist and General Relativist Sir Arthur Eddington expressed this almost poetically:

"Not once in the dim past, but continuously by conscious mind is the miracle of the Creation wrought.

"All through the physical world runs that unknown content, which must surely be the stuff of our consciousness. . . . Where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature.

"We have found a strange foot-print on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the foot-print. And Lo! it is our own."

Science can seemingly not deal with the mind itself which is experiencing these ''events", nor with the mental processes which led to the very construction of science. Further, exact science does not deal with those mental events such as emotions, beliefs, and thoughts which are not correlates of physical events. In Schroedinger's words:

"The physical world picture lacks all the sensual qualities that go to make up the Subject of Cognizance. The model is colourless and soundless and unpalpable. In the same way and for the same reason the world of science lacks, or is deprived of, everything that has a meaning only in relation to the consciously contemplating, perceiving and feeling subject. I mean in the first place the ethical and aesthetical values, any values of any kind, everything related to the meaning and scope of the whole display. All this is not only absent but it cannot, from the purely scientific point of view, be inserted organically."

According to Hermann Weyl[1]:

"Between the physical processes which are released in the terminal organ of the nervous conductors in the central brain and the image which thereupon appears to the perceiving subject, there gapes a hiatus, an abyss which no realistic conception of the world can span. It is the transition from the world of being to the world of the appearing image or of consciousness."

In the words of Eugence P. Wigner on the occasion of his acceptance of the Nobel Prize for physics in 1963 [2]:

" Physics does not endeavor to explain nature. In fact, the great success of physics is due to a restriction of its objectives: it only endeavors to explain the regularities in the behavior of objects. This renunciation of the broader aim, and the specification of the domain for which an explanation can be sought, now appears to us an obvious necessity. . . .

"The regularities in the phenomena which physical science endeavors to uncover are called the laws of nature. The name is actually very appropriate. Just as legal laws regulate actions and behavior under certain conditions but do not try to regulate all action and behavior, the laws of physics also determine the behavior of its objects of interest under certain well-defined conditions but leave much freedom otherwise."

The domain of validity of science is limited to the analysis of regularities of our sensory perceptions

It is possible to consistently classify all entities in the universe into two categories: the mental and the physcial. Emotions, thoughts, sensations, "mind" and so on are mental, while atoms and tables and brains are physical. The relationship between the two categories has historically been seen in three different ways: the idealistic, the materialistic, and the dualistic.

The idealist considers an "atom" to be a concept invented by the human mind in order to easily categorize and summarize certain ideas and conclusions obtained after much thought; "table" is a word used to signify a certain set of sensations; and so on. To the idealist, only the mental exists -- the "physical" is a collection of concepts within the mind.

According to Sir Arthur Eddington[3]:

"The material universe itself is an interpretation of certain symbols presented to consciousness. When we speak of the existence of the material universe we are presupposing consciousness. It is meaningless to speak of the existence of anything except as forming part of the web of our consciousness."

And, according to Sir James Jeans[4]:

"I incline to the idealistic theory that consciousness is fundamental, and that the material universe is derivative from consciousness, not consciousness from the material universe."

On the other hand, the materialist considers the "mental" to be a physical aspect of the physical universe -- no less physical than atoms, tables, and brains. "Mind" is physical in the same way that a computer program is physical.

To the dualist, both mental and physical exist, and they interact in some as yet not understood manner.

The Evolution of Consciousness

For the idealist, the evolution of consciousness is very significant, since the entire physical universe can only be said to exist inasmuch as it is perceived by mind. Indeed, McCabe[5] reports regarding Eddington's idealistic beliefs:

"Pressed to say whether this meant that he rejected the common scientific teaching that a material universe really existed before life and mind appeared on this planet, he made fun of the word "really," and even said: "I do not think we understand what we mean by existence." "

To the materialist however, the evolution of consciousness is no more relevant than the evolution of mushrooms or even less so. All "conscious events" are actually physical events in the brain, and the "mental aspect" of these events is merely an alternate means of description of these physical events, in the same way that the operation of a computer can be described via its software operation (programs) or its hardware description (the atoms, electronic components, etc.). Consciousness is therefore not a separate entity or phenomenon, and cannot independently affect the universe. Thus, the universe itself is in no way different after the evolution of consciousness: that is, the evolution of physical events which can be described "on the software level".

To the dualist, the evolution of consciousness is of great relevance if it can affect the physical universe. However, the means by which it might be able to do so is still unknown -- this is the classical and unsolved "mind-body problem". However, Sir John Eccles, Nobel Prize-winning physiologist, claims to have demonstrated in his lab work that pure conscious events, that is, mental events, not having any physical correlates can cause the activation of neurons in the brain. In his words:

"How can the mental act of intention activate across the mind-brain frontier those particular SMA neurons in the appropriate code for activating the motor programs that bring about intended voluntary movements? The answer is that, despite the so-called "insuperable" difficulty of having a non-material mind act on a material brain, it has been demonstrated to occur by a mental intention -- no doubt to the great discomfiture of all materialists and physicalists."

According to Werner Heisenberg[6]:

"There can be no doubt that "consciousness" does not occur in physics and chemistry, and I cannot see how it could possibly result from quantum mechanics. Yet any science that deals with living organisms must needs cover the phenomenon of consciousness because consciousness, too, is part of reality."

Another founding father of modern physics, Nobel Prize winner Niels Bohr said[7]:

"The real problem is: How can that part of reality which begins with consciousness be combined with those parts that are treated in physics and chemistry?. . . Here we obviously have a genuine case of complementarity. . "

Wolfgang Pauli, another Nobel Prize-winning physicist, who was a founder of quantum physics, stated[8]:

". . . the only acceptable point of view appears to be the one that recognizes both sides of reality--the quantitative and the qualitative, the physical and the psychical--as compatible with each other, and can embrace them simultaneously. . . .It would be most satisfactory of all if physics and psyche could be seen as complementary aspects of the same reality."

Evolution and Consciousness

According to Eccles, the theory of evolution is 'defective' in that it ignores the phenomenon of consciousness. Furthermore Eccles states that no purely materialist theory will be able to account for consciousness. In Eccles' words:

p96`

"The Wonder of Being Human" p17, 19, 25, 37

Eccles then shows why no purely materialistic theory will be able to encompass the phenomenon of consciousness.

postulate of a dualist-interactionist theory. (last words of p.37 quote)

{Eccles here reports the conclusions of his research in this area.]

Eccles defines his position in his book "The Human Mystery":[See Appendix ].

Wheeler, perhaps only a free-willed consciousness can bring reality-retroactively-to the universe, (See Wheeler.) ^[7]

[1]p47 bottom,p48 top, "Ideas & Opinions"; p28 "Out of My Later Years"

[2] "My Worldview", (on p40 of "Ideas & Opinions").

[3]Essay: "Religion and Science". p39, line 5:

[4] See the author's article "The Instant Universe" which develops an understanding of the creation and Eden accounts and their relation to the big bang and evolution theory based on this perspective.

[5] Not that physics would necessarily assume it does not or cannot exist, just that within physics, 'intuition' is not sufficient reason to assume its existence until there is some sort of experimental evidence for it.

[6] All this is from the 'incompatibilist' perspective which sees mind and matter as essentially different from each other..

[7] Indeed, there is perhaps a very close connection between the onset of free-willed consciousness and the origin of the universe. See Wheeler. See also my article “And God Said: ‘Let There Have Been a Big Bang’ ” and “Halacha and Quantum Physics”.

[8] Of course there are others than these three, but these represent clear & distinct scenarios pertinent to the discussion here.

[1] "Mind and Nature", pp. 19-20.

[2] Source

[3] Observation in the course of an interview with Mr. Sullivan, published in the Observer

for December 21st, 1930: quoted by McCabe, "The Existence of Gd".

[4] Observation in the course of an interview, published in the Observer of January 4th, 1931: quoted by McCabe.

[5] McCabe pX

[6] Heisenberg: "Physics and Beyond" p114.

[7] Heisenberg: "Physics and Beyond" p114.

[8] "The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Themes of Kepler" in C.G. Jung and W. Pauli [p. 210?).