The survey is in large part NOT meant to be about your opinion or philosophical 'position' but rather about what you feel you can state as fact.

The quotes from prominent physicists below are not meant to convince respondents, they are simply presented in order to be able to phrase survey-questions utilizing these quotes rather than attempting to define contentious concepts independently.

Solipsism

Discussion relevant to the quotes and questions re: Solipsism, "solipsism of the moment" & "the flow of time". See the form for the survey-questions about these topics.

Solipsism is the idea that only our own consciousness exists, or at least that there is no way to prove that anything else exists.

Descartes' doubt concerning our knowledge of the external world (ie as we have all experienced, the senses sometimes deceive, and in any case what we experience can all be a dream or an induced hallucination) leads to the possibility of solipsism, and its application regarding the past to "solipsism of the moment", and as regards other beings it leads to "the problem of other minds" (ie there is no way for us to know whether it is perhaps only ourselves who have a mind).

Nobel-Prize winning physicist P. W. Bridgman[1] wrote: (See more extensive quotation in the Appendix):

"This position, which I suppose is the solipsist position, is often felt to be absurd and contrary to common sense. How it is asked, can there be agreement as to experience unless there are external things which both you and I perceive? Part of the hostility to the solipsist position is, I think, merely due to confusion of thinking, and there is a strong element of the pseudo-problem mixed up here. If I say that an external thing is merely part of my direct experience to which I find that you react in certain ways, what more is there to be said, or indeed what other operational meaning can be attached to the concept of an external thing? It seems to me that as I have stated it, the solipsist position, if this is indeed the solipsist position, is a simple statement of what direct observation gives me, and we have got to adjust our thinking so that it will not seem repugnant."

The solipsist agrees with the materialist regarding what are the rules governing their sensory impressions ie they both feel don't control what "happens to them" and both experience pain as a result of the same 'circumstances', and so the solipsist agrees with the "voice" of the set of sensations in the solipsist's mind which "calls itself" "another human" on the set of rules they call the laws of nature, etc. This is what constitutes 'public discourse' or 'science' or ''physics'.

However in addition to this, many of these sets of sensation, ie "other minds" claim they know one other truth which is not "provable" in the way that the "law of nature" or "external entities" are, and that is "the fact of my own existence".

The various people in a dream-event seem to be independent, with individual consciousnesses, and we in our dream have no control over them - sometimes indeed we are victimized by them. Nevertheless, when we awake, it is clear to us that all these 'individuals' were elements of our own consciousness.

The solipsist position maintains that such is the case even when we are awake - only our own consciousness exists, and all other seemingly existent entities and beings are elements of our own consciousness, so that 'reality' is essentially an elaborate 'day dream'. However, one can also accept the logic of solipsism as a theory, without assuming that indeed it describes our reality.

Wikipedia "Boltzman brain": In 1896, the mathematician Ernst Zermelo advanced a theory that the second law of thermodynamics was absolute rather than statistical.^[3] Zermelo bolstered his theory by pointing out that the Poincaré recurrence theorem shows statistical entropy in a closed system must eventually be a periodic function; therefore, the Second Law, which is always observed to increase entropy, is unlikely to be statistical. To counter Zermelo's argument, the Austrian physicist Ludwig Boltzmann advanced two theories. The first theory, now believed to be the correct one, is that the Universe started for some unknown reason in a low-entropy state. The second and alternative theory, published in 1896 but attributed in 1895 to Boltzmann's assistant Ignaz Schütz, is the "Boltzmann universe" scenario. In this scenario, the Universe spends the vast majority of eternity in a featureless state of heat death; however, over enough eons, eventually a very rare thermal fluctuation will occur where atoms bounce off each other in exactly such a way as to form a substructure equivalent to our entire observable universe. Boltzmann argues that, while most of the universe is featureless, humans do not see those regions because they are devoid of intelligent life; to Boltzmann, it is unremarkable that humanity views solely the interior of its Boltzmann universe, as that is the only place where intelligent life lives. (This may be the first use in modern science of the anthropic principle).^[4][5]

In 1931, astronomer Arthur Eddington pointed out that, because a large fluctuation is exponentially less probable than a small fluctuation, observers in Boltzmann universes will be vastly outnumbered by observers in smaller fluctuations. Physicist Richard Feynman published a similar counterargument within his widely read 1964 Feynman Lectures on Physics. By 2004, physicists had pushed Eddington's observation to its logical conclusion: the most numerous observers in an eternity of thermal fluctuations would be minimal "Boltzmann brains" popping up in an otherwise featureless universe.^[4][6]

Wikipedia: The simulation hypothesis is a proposal regarding the nature of existence. The proposal is that all the current existence that humans know, including the Earth and the rest of the universe, could in fact be an artificial simulation, such as a computer simulation. Some versions rely on the development of a simulated reality, a proposed technology that would be able to convince its inhabitants that the simulation was "real".

There is a long philosophical and scientific history to the underlying thesis that reality is an illusion. This skeptical hypothesis can be traced back to antiquity; for example, to the "Butterfly Dream" of Zhuangzi,^[3] or the Indian philosophy of Maya, or in Ancient Greek philosophy Anaxarchus and Monimus likened existing things to a scene-painting and supposed them to resemble the impressions experienced in sleep or madness.^[4]

Aztec philosophical texts theorised that the world was a painting or book written by the Teotl.^[5]

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Bridgman: implying solipsism: it appears to be concerned mostly with the character of our descriptive processes, and to say little about external nature. [What this means we leave to the metaphysician to decide.]

[re Bridgman solipsism - this indicates that he believes a brain cannot know whether it is in a jar or all is real? Or is it more, that he cannot know he even has a brain? is this at all logically a possibility? but does this indicate anything about mind? not really, it can be all about physics....]

Bridgman shows solipsism is the minimalist position. However he lived as though there are other minds and an external universe, without seeing any meaning in distinguishing whether there "really is" a universe out there or not, since there is no operational way to distinguish, by the very definition of the logic underlying solipsism!

Solipsism may be considered psychologically unappealing to many, but it is not only logically impeachable, it is in certain instances the simplest assumption which fits the facts, and therefore, by 'Occam's Razor', it should be the preferred explanation.

Brain in the jar & solipsism

Brain in a vat or jar, now in several flavors such as "uploaded brain" or "living in a simulation":

§ Does the 'brain in the jar argument' make sense to you?

§ Do you feel that you know as fact that the external universe exists?

§ Does solipsism - and russel's solipsism of the moment - make sense to you (eg as an obviously-true "statement of minimalistic assumtpions")

§ [does belief in the logical validity of solipsism automatically imply that one is not a naturalist? If not, then I can;t use Bridgman's idea as a sign he is on the same side as Eddington!

§ Does Bridgman's idea of public vs private science make sense to you?

"Solipsism of the Moment"

Other than the disagreement regarding whether we can know of the existence of the phenomenon of consciousness directly, on its own, is there anything else about what can be known on which physicists disagree?

Specifically, do physicists of all types (materialist, dualist etc) agree with these statements about what can and cannot be known?

One can know only the present - the past exists only in our memory, and as part of our interpretation of present situations, we assume that they 'developed' from some 'previous time'. So It is certainly not impossible that though the universe exists now as you read this, it did not exist any time in the past, so that although you have a memory of having read the previous paragraph, this never actually happened. Or that the universe exists only now, as you read this next sentence, and you never actually read the previous sentence, you only have a memory of having done so, or....

§ Bertrand Russel's "solipsism of the moment: "It is quite clear that I can have a recollection without the thing remembered having happened; as a matter of logical possibility, I might have begun to exist five minutes ago, complete with all the memories that I then had." Russel: "Human Knowledge": p194.

§ John Wheeler: "The past has no existence except as it is recorded in the present". Wheeler: "Beyond the Black Hole", p358; "Strangeness", p375, note #99.

§ As Hawking stated: "One could still imagine that God created the universe at the instant of the big bang, or even afterwards in just such a way as to make it look as though there had been a big bang.." In other words that there is no experiment which could distinguish between a universe specially created "at a late stage" or as detailed in the creation account in Genesis or any of the many creation accounts in various religions or in any random manner, as long as it is later placed in a state identical to one which would emerge from a big bang.

Of course Hawking did not intend to be expressing support for the existence of a God, or Creator nor for Genesis or for religion in general but was rather making a statement about what logic, science and physics say about what we can know, or about which types of meaningful statements or distinctions we can make.

Now we will move on to the heart of the dualist/materialist difference

(Bishop) George Berkeley can perhaps be included as a physicist and mathematician: Wiki: "His earliest publication was on mathematics, but the first that brought him notice was his An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, first published in 1709. In the essay, Berkeley examines visual distance, magnitude, position and problems of sight and touch. While this work raised much controversy at the time, its conclusions are now accepted as an established part of the theory of optics."

However, he is of course now known more for his theory of subjective idealism (known previously as “immaterialism"): Sounding somewhat like some of the pioneering quantum physicists we quote elsewhere in this paper, he wrote, "esse is percipi" = to be is to be perceived, ie there are no mind-independent entities, or that the world, as represented by our senses depends for its existence on being perceived. "In Principles #3^[21]].

Re the infamous argument between Dr. Samuel Johnson and James Boswell over this notion:

"…we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that every thing in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, "I refute it thus."^[3] — James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson

Materialist & Dualist attitudes re "consciousness"

Below are two 'statements' which are meant to serve in lieu of rigorous definitions.

I) The statement of the house "dualist" (or idealist etc):

a) "There is a phenomenon colloquially known as "awareness" which is qualitatively 'other than' the material, so that:

Everything that exists = awareness + that which materialists say is all that exists" (including electrons and planets and human brains and spacetime matter-energy).

b) Only awareness can be known directly to exist without proof or possibility of being fooled" [to paraphrase Descartes: "My knowledge that it exists is 'intrinsic', by the very fact that I am aware"].

II) The statement of the house "materialist" (or 'physicalist' etc):

a) "all is material (which includes electrical activity in the brain etc), the idea of 'awareness' as espoused by the dualist is a chimera, "illusion".

The materialist adds: Of course there is a different type of 'self-awareness', as exhibited by animals using a mirror to investigating otherwise-visually-inaccessible parts of their body.

b) In any case nothing can be directly known to exist, intrinsically, as dualists claim is the case for their supposed "awareness".

Respondents for the survey: The participants in the brain experiment need to be selected from the respondents by the criterion of being (considered) confirmed dualists & materialists (as in the above) rather than for example those who might say eg "Awareness is a mystery but I think it will eventually be explained in a way which maintains materialism".

What might be found via the experiment: If there is some difference between the structures of the brains of convinced materialists and those convinced of the primacy of mind or the real difficulty of the mind body problem, its existence would require evolutionary-biological explanation – for example perhaps it conferred advantage, via some ability, but then one would wish to scientifically identify this ability. All this would modify the usual disconnect between mind and body as explicated by Descartes. In any case, no such discovery would on its own would provide a full understanding of consciousness, nor of how and why it emerged.

Terminology in the survey: Since the essence here is re the existence of (self-)awareness as highlighted above, we are not distinguishing between dualist and idealists etc, nor are we distinguishing between 'materialists' and 'physicalists' (& "naive realists"?).

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Godel's views as a prelude to survey questions about them, regarding the existence of a 'consciousness' that is different than that which materialists subscribe to

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel-incompleteness/ Interestingly, Gödel himself also presented an anti-mechanist argument although it was more cautious and only published posthumously (in his Collected Works, Vol. III, in 1995). That is, in his 1951 Gibbs lecture, Gödel drew the following disjunctive conclusion from the incompleteness theorems:

either … the human mind (even within the realm of pure mathematics) infinitely surpasses the power of any finite machine, or else there exist absolutely unsolvable diophantine problems.

Gödel speaks about this statement as a “mathematically established fact” (Gödel 1951; for more discussion on Gödel’s disjunctive claim, see, e.g., Shapiro 1998). According to Gödel, the second alternative

seems to disprove the view that mathematics is only our own creation … that mathematical objects and facts … exist objectively and independently of our mental acts and decisions.

Gödel was nonetheless inclined to deny the possibility of absolutely unsolvable problems, and although he did believe in mathematical Platonism, his reasons for this conviction were different, and he did not maintain that the incompleteness theorems alone establish Platonism. Thus Gödel believed in the first disjunct, that the human mind infinitely surpasses the power of any finite machine. Still, this conclusion of Gödel follows, as Gödel himself clearly explains, only if one denies, as does Gödel, the possibility of humanly unsolvable problems. It is not a necessary consequence of incompleteness theorems.

AR: Irrespective of whether you agree with his conclusions or speculations, and whether or not they were later proved unsound, his conclusions seem to point to an innate sense he had that the human mind – or 'consciousness' - is somewhat not bound by the usual laws of logic and physics, rather than to someone who is a mechanist and is forced by his mathematical discoveries to adopt the opposite position (in fact, since some say je overstated the situation, this would be an indication that indeed he had a predisposition to Platonism etc which led him to these statements, rather than being led to them simply by the force of the math/logic itself).

..

In line with the famous Godelian statement re theorems which can be known by humans to be true without their truth being formally provable (ie so that machines cannot "know" they are true) we can consider the human brain as an instrument containing an algorithm which determines the truth of some mathematical and logic statements, or of "self-evident truths".

…

Quotes from (some of the) physicists who developed quantum theory, regarding consciousness, used as informal contextual-definitions of what we mean in this survey by "consciousness": Followed by survey-questions based on the quotes.

Introduction: In the following sections, ideas and quotes will be presented, not because this paper is intended as a discussion of the topics mentioned in the quotes, or to convince respondents of any particular interpretation or attitude, nor to make the point that one must accept the point made in the quote since the person quoted was so prominent, but rather in order to help clearly define what is being asked in the survey questions.

Terms are used in the quotes and the questions following them which might have different meanings to different respondents, however when reading the quotes, try to get a sense of what they mean, and whether it makes sense to you, or not, rather than trying to find some way that you can re-interpret what they say to make sense to you. The purpose is to determine whether you are of the 'type' which feels the same way they seem to, or the other type.

Also, since the survey is about physics and what physicists feel can be said from the perspective of science - not from a "religious" or "spiritual" perspective but rather what even as a scientist they feel they can say about the universe and our reality, even if only speculatively.

Defining the terms used in the survey questions:

Notoriously, physics presentations can be intensely annoying to a didactic mathematician

[see Feynman "The Character of Physical Law" "The mathematical rigor of great precision is not very useful in physics." Fr more on this topic see eg "On the Tension Between Physics and Mathematics" Miklós Rédei Journal for General Philosophy of Science volume 51, pages 411–425 (2020)"], which brings: Landau, L., & Lifshitz, E. (1938). Statistical physics. London: Oxford University Press. ‘No attempt has been made at mathematical rigor in the treatment, since this is anyhow illusory in theoretical physics […]’” (Jaffee and Quinn 1993, 5).

Similarly, this article is written by a physicist for physicists, and is not attempting to be philosophical nor is the author trained in philosophy and so the terminology is as rough as one finds in general in physics, and so my apologies for any frustrations on the part of philosophy-trained readers.

For example, we won't bother to define '(self-)awareness, we mean it in the sense used in the quotes below, ie in the sense in which "mind" is not the same as "brain"; of course one "type" or respondent will consider such type of "mind" to be non-existent. This type of "mind" is obviously not at all relevant or necessary in order for a brain (animal or machine) to deduce that was is being seen is its own body, and so the type of 'self-awareness' of an animal using a mirror to investigate parts of its own body that it cannot otherwise see is NOT what we are talking about. So to circumvent all this, rather than define the type of "mind" or (self-)awareness we ARE talking about, we present quotes from physicists who are speaking of mind in that meaning, and rely on the respondent to discern the meaning, as they see it.

When we refer to the claims of those quoted below, we will speak interchangeably of 'awareness' , 'consciousness' or 'mind', and we mean by these terms what YOU think it means to those quoted below – we do not wish to assume that dualists and materialists will agree.

Do YOU think THEY are referring to an alleged phenomenon

a) which is qualitatively "other" than the material,

b) which is known directly,

c) which is that via which all else is known including the very notion of an external universe.

There is no attempt to try to convince you the reader - presumably a prospective survey-respondent - to have the same opinions as those expressed in the quotes below. On the contrary, the purpose of presenting the quotes, and of the survey, is to establish whether your experience of reality is similar or different to that of those who made these statements, and this is accomplished in the only way we know how - by comparing your self-desciption of your own reality to the descriptions provided by these physicists.

The title of each section of quotes, in bold-font, is what it seems is the intent of physicist being quoted, followed by the quote itself, and then questions posed to you based on your reaction to the quote.

A) Survey Question: Do the below quotes seem to imply these claims: a) Mind is qualitatively 'other', it is not material; b) it is sui generis? Y/N

Werner Heisenberg[6]: "There can be no doubt that "consciousness" does not occur in physics and chemistry, and I cannot see how it could possibly result from quantum mechanics. Yet any science that deals with living organisms must needs cover the phenomenon of consciousness because consciousness, too, is part of reality."

Hermann Weyl[1]: "Between the physical processes which are released in the terminal organ of the nervous conductors in the central brain and the image which thereupon appears to the perceiving subject, there gapes a hiatus, an abyss which no realistic conception of the world can span. It is the transition from the world of being to the world of the appearing image or of consciousness." .

Schroedinger: "The physical world picture lacks all the sensual qualities that go to make up the Subject of Cognizance. The model is colourless and soundless and unpalpable. In the same way and for the same reason the world of science lacks, or is deprived of, everything that has a meaning only in relation to the consciously contemplating, perceiving and feeling subject. I mean in the first place the ethical and aesthetical values, any values of any kind, everything related to the meaning and scope of the whole display. All this is not only absent but it cannot, from the purely scientific point of view, be inserted organically."

Niels Bohr:[7]:"The real problem is: How can that part of reality which begins with consciousness be combined with those parts that are treated in physics and chemistry?. . . Here we obviously have a genuine case of complementarity. . "

These quotes imply something like the following: "Software can be explained by physics, but 'mind' can't be explained by physics etc" so that they are differing from the materialists, or those speaking of 'mind as software' etc.

Question to respondents:

§ Do you agree that these quotes indicate that those physicists making the quotes feel that consciousness is not explainable in the way that materialists propose ? Y/N.

§ Do the points or attitudes expressed in the quotes above make sense to you? Y/N.

B) Survey Question: Do the below quotes seem to you to imply these claims: a) mind is known directly, on its own; b) via mind all else is known; c) mind is the most fundamental phenomenon: (AR: some of these quotes may even tend towards idealism/solipsism) Y/N

Erwin Schrodinger (1958):"The world is a construct of our sensations, perceptions, memories. It is convenient to regard it as existing objectively on its own. But certainly it does not become manifest by its mere existence. Its becoming manifest is conditional on very special goings on in very special parts of this very world, namely, on certain events that happen in a brain."

AR: This also implies that mind is known directly, on its own (one can perhaps assume that this implies that even if some one else denies it exists, nevertheless it is known on its own and so one can legitimately state that it exists without having to prove it (though the one who states it doesn't exist will of course disagree).

Eugene Wigner (1964): "There are two kinds of reality or existence - the existence of my consciousness and the reality or existence of everything else. The latter reality is not absolute but only relative. Excepting immediate sensations, the content of my consciousness, everything is a construct."

Wolfgang Pauli[8]:". . . the only acceptable point of view appears to be the one that recognizes both sides of reality--the quantitative and the qualitative, the physical and the psychical--as compatible with each other, and can embrace them simultaneously. . . .It would be most satisfactory of all if physics and psyche could be seen as complementary aspects of the same reality."

Sir Arthur Eddington[3]: "The material universe itself is an interpretation of certain symbols presented to consciousness. When we speak of the existence of the material universe we are presupposing consciousness. It is meaningless to speak of the existence of anything except as forming part of the web of our consciousness."

Sir James Jeans[4]:"I incline to the idealistic theory that consciousness is fundamental, and that the material universe is derivative from consciousness, not consciousness from the material universe."]

Survey Questions based on the above quotes

Of course a scientist has every right to express religious or political personal views that are stated not in their role as "a scientist talking about scientific fact" but rather in their capacity as a human being like everyone else, as "private opinions off the scientific record". :

I feel the attidude of the physicists quoted above, as implied by their words or the context of their quote, seems to be meant by them to be taken as pronouncements: choose one:

§ of a scientist, speaking about what they know as fact: Y

§ as "private opinions off the scientific record": Y

Irrespective of what I think THEY intended, I feel that:

§ the statements are NOT correct as fact and should be considered in the category of religious or political statements. Y/N

§ The statements are correct as fact and should be considered in the category of scientific-type statements. Y/N

§ Should these statements be of interest to science, not just to philosophy and psychology or the anthropology of physicists). Y/N

§ If yes: Does this imply that consciousness as a phenomenon should be of importance to science in the way that all known existent fundamental phenomena are?.

Questions based on the notions that: mind is known directly on its own; it cannot be proven but requires no proof; it is sui generis:

§ Is it unique in being "known directly on its own"? Y/N (if N: ie there are others, please list examples)

§ is everything which is known as part of physics necessarily provable? YES/No(There are others: here are examples

§ if mind "cannot be proven but requires no proof", does that place it in a different category than that which is known as part of physics? YES/No, there are others: please list examples

Quote: Eugene P. Wigner, when accepting the Nobel Prize for physics in 1963, stated [2]:

"Physics does not endeavor to explain nature. In fact, the great success of physics is due to a restriction of its objectives: it only endeavors to explain the regularities in the behavior of objects. This renunciation of the broader aim, and the specification of the domain for which an explanation can be sought, now appears to us an obvious necessity. . . ."The regularities in the phenomena which physical science endeavors to uncover are called the laws of nature. The name is actually very appropriate. Just as legal laws regulate actions and behavior under certain conditions but do not try to regulate all action and behavior, the laws of physics also determine the behavior of its objects of interest under certain well-defined conditions but leave much freedom otherwise."

Survey Questions:

§ Is physics meant to describe all of reality (at least according to the reductionist viewpoint) or only some, since certain aspects of reality are inaccessible to physics ALL/SOME

§ To those who answered yes to question A above...: If consciousness is fundamental, and sui generis, and is known directly etc, but is NOT considered part of physics, does this disqualify physics from being "the study of the most fundamental natural phenomena":

Explanation: eg reality = the material (physics)+ x,

where x = consciousness (though perhaps free will is separate, or it is part of consciousness, or it simply desn;t exist):

Y/N

...........

The unique/dubious status of the dualist claim Consciousness of the type assumed by dualists has a unique/dubious status scientifically in that it is claimed by some to be known for sure to exist, even though it is not believed by them to be provably existent (ie provable to others), and its existence is thought not to be even possible according to many physicists, who however agree that its existence cannot be disproved either.

Conundrum: How can one deal with the subject of consciousness in physics if as a result of its unique/dubious status (as described above) it is not agreed upon by all physicists that this topic belongs in a physics discussion?

The proposal here is to come up with a consensual way of dealing with that.

One way of presenting scientific theories to religious fundamentalists is to explain that "science is a programmatic attempt to find naturalistic explanations for objectively observable phenomena" (https://sites.google.com/a/nyu.edu/avi-rabinowitz/science-and-religion). As such, it does not encompass explanations relying on the existence of non-objectively observable phenomena such as the existence of a deity, indeed science programmatically searches for naturalistic explanations. Accepting that a naturalistic explanation could in theory account for some phenomena, such as the emergence of life and of humanity (or for certain central elements of it) does not imply that necessarily that is the actual explanation or that a deity does not exist, and so one can study the proffered naturalistic explanation without it being considered some sort of contradiction to one's religious beliefs. Nor does science deal with claimed phenomena which are not objectively observable, such as miraculous occurrences, the soul, or the existence of God, and so accepting science and the scientific method as "a programmatic attempt to find naturalistic explanations for objectively observable phenomena" does not in any way involve a contradiction to religious claims.

Can one formulate an analogous statement regarding the alleged non-material dualist-type consciousness? I believe that it is important for there to be a way for "consciousness" to be discussed, even if only in order to dismiss the discussion for consensual reasons, rather than ignoring the topic and pretending thereby that by consensus it isn't worthy of being part of science, when it clearly is, to many physicists.

The consensus can be that since it cannot be proven to exist and since many physicists claim it does NOT exist, that it simply does not qualify for physics discussion, ie we will by consensus agree to include in physics only that which is probable to others. But then there ought to be some legitimation for its discussion by physicists within some other rubric where it is recognized that the topic IS considered 'scientific' (in that it deals with what is KNOWN to exist) by (some of) those participating in the discussion.

...

Clarifying the truly central issue:

That consciousness is made of the most fundamental stuff is not the issue since the issue is whether we can know something directly that one cannot prove. If yes, then consciousness is at a deeper level than physics.

Explanation of why what it is made of is not the problem: Eg: electron is a concept so it is mindstuff, but that doesnt solve the problem it is like a reverse naive realism, but the problem is that conscionusness is the only existent I can directly know, the only phenomenon I know that i can;t prove, and it is unique sui generis, and totally fundamental in that it is only via consciousness that i know everything else, this is the issue, not the quesiotn of whether consciousness is 'material' or material is mindstuff etc,

..

Given the different ways that idealists and materialists understand certain words or expressions, one can imagine a conversation between them which seems to be cogent but in fact is not since they are not speaking the same phenomenon.

A trivial example of such a conversation would be:

Dualist: Do you believe in the existence of consciousness.

Materialsit: Of course. (Thinking: Obviously. I have even made a simple AI which answers like humans and so is by definition conscious).

Dualist: But are YOU conscious?

Materialist: Well of course (Thinking: I have a brain, I'm speaking to you aren’t I? SO of course by definition I am conscious.)

Dualist:

………..

· Do you KNOW that 'consciousness' as understood by dualists/idealists does NOT exist?

· Do they KNOW that it is impossible to know of something directly, that whatever one feels one knows but agrees cannot be proven to another, in fact does NOT exist, or is it a "just my philosophical position"?

· Do you KNOW something else about reality/the universe that is not known to non-materialists (analogous to the way in which consciousness is known directly to dualists/idealists)? ESSAY REPLY

· If a physicist colleague insists that they possess a "consciousness" which is not material and which they cannot prove they exist, I tolerate this aberrant non-scientific belief of theirs.

· It is disappointing when I encounter a physicist colleague who insists that they possess a "consciousness" which is not material and which they cannot prove they exist.

· The existence of my own non-material type of consciousness is sufficiently self-evident that I am certain I possess it, and if an intelligent colleague denies the very possibility of its existence it seems plausible that a reason for their vigorous denial is that they lack it.

· Discussion between the two sides is futile.

· It is plausible that underlying this is a brain-difference causing us to experience reality differently, and it is reasonable to suppose that this underlies many of the (never-ending) arguments between the two camps, including why - though dialogue and clarification is often useful – the two sides (almost?) never convince the other to accept their 'viewpoint'.

..

Indistinguishability as a clue

Physics has shown how symmetry and conservation laws are intertwined, and indistinguishability gives rise to symmetry. That uniform motion at all speeds are indistinguishable and indistinguishable from 'stationary', is the fundamental truth of Galilean relativity, and its extension to free fall leads to general relativity. Indistinguishability of particles, their 'identity', leads to the Pauli exclusion principle underlying how macro structure arises from quantum considerations.

Is it significant physically that there is no way to distinguish between a reality conforming to the solipsist view and the 'conventional reality' which includes an external universe Can it be that the fact that solipsism is consistent and even can be considered the minimalistic science tell us something very fundamental about the universe, a deep clue to some meta-level understanding of our universe/reality? Y/N

We don't yet know what it tells us, and contemplation of this can be a sterile path to pursue since very little has resulted from endless speculations on the topic, but perhaps it should be considered a legitimate and foundational scientific realization, to be stated and then left aside for some future super genius to explore. Y/N

For the dualist it can seem significant that there is no way to distinguish the material aspect of the reality they posit from the one the materialist describes.

Perhaps there is some aspect of meta-physics which has a more solid foundation and can be considered "meta-physics of the scientific kind". For example: There have of course been speculations about:

· the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics"

· whether the very existence of laws of nature are indications of something fundamental

· whether the fact that our brains are capable of formulating laws of nature despite having been evolved via selection for survival in rather more mundane situations etc is indicative of some extra property of brains,

· a "Platonic realm" which many mathematicians propose when they encounter deep aspects of mathematics

Perhaps some of this "scientific meta-physics" is legitimate as a subject to be discussed once in an introduction to physics class and then dropped, but not before a reference to the literature on such topics, or to the location of the philosophy building on that campus. Y/N

Should physics recognize the fact – even if it is not a subject to explore yet - that many sober-minded physicists state as fact that there exists a phenomenon ("consciousness") which is 'nonphysical', and 'beyond space and time' and possibly 'non-causal' in some sense. Y/N

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Question: Can we consider mind real if it is not encompassed within science?

Replies:

· It is distressing or confounding and frustrating that reputable physicists continue to spout this nonsense about dualist-type consciousness.

· Had the above-quoted scientists been active today, they would not have felt the need to make such statements, due to advances in physics including the invention of alternate "interpretations" of quantum physics, as well as advances in neuroscience etc.

· Physics is the ultimate arbiter of what is real, and though our understanding changes and deepens with time, it is evident that the dualist type of consciousness is simply impossible

· Mind exists on a level more like that at which universal emergence arises, not at the level of the matter-energy which laws govern, and so the inability of laws to explain mind or which govern it are not valid reasons to discount mind.

· My knowledge that mind exists is far more certain than my knowledge of the existence of anything else.

· I am more certain of the existence of mind than I am that the laws of nature are valid.

· I feel that the belief in materialism is a physical phenomenon which requires an explanation. As Descartes pointed out, what I know most fundamentally and incontrovertibly is that i am conscious, so how is it that others who are very intelligent and sophisticated and highly educated, scientists and philosophers, deny its existence? The answer must be that they are as mindless as they claim we all are. This is possible since no scientific result has ever been considered to require consciousness, there is no contradiction between their functioning (including expressions of pain and pleasure or sensory perceptions ) which necessitates assuming they are conscious.