Towards a Definition
Describing the past often implies a redefinition of what has occurred before because new stages involve changes in perspective, especially when we undergo transformative experiences.
Aware that defining primarily corresponds to limiting, we will attempt to gather some information about Oreste M. G. Debernardi to establish the context of his reflection. We hope he does not perceive our efforts as an attempt to categorize someone who has always resisted categorization.
His cognitive journey was decidedly unorthodox. Although the Symposium on Information Theory held at MIT in Boston in September 1956 had already grouped heterogeneous disciplines like philosophy, linguistics, psychology, anthropology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence under the definition of Cognitive Sciences, it was only much later that he realized this grouping could fit his disciplinary inquiries. The interdisciplinarity among these diverse fields compelled him to develop a personal interpretative path that transcended the specificity of each discipline's theoretical approach, competencies, tools, and research subjects, focusing instead on the relationships between various fields of study.
Oreste's reflection progresses through different approaches, alternating perspectives and practices, eventually intertwining into an original form of thought, which we will try to elucidate its presuppositions.
His interest is directed towards humanity, the mind, human behavior, phenomena that, by definition, cannot be reproduced. Staying within the positivist paradigm would have limited the scope of reflection, creating a clear separation between science and philosophy. The simulation of phenomena proposed by artificial intelligence overcomes this disciplinary barrier, providing empirical reflection with a metatheoretical approach and philosophical reflection with a rigorous and powerful tool.
Defining the object of inquiry influences the results of subsequent research. Practices also influence acquired cognitive forms. From cognitive sciences, Oreste assumes the objective of explaining human behavior. Analyzing it solely based on what is empirically observable, a characteristic of the behaviorist approach, decidedly denies intentionality, representation, consciousness, and mental states. These elements are fundamental in an approach that interprets phenomena by referring to subjective inner states.
The mental dimension is not as detached from the organic as once believed. Biological and evolutionary factors are essential in cognitive processes. Sensory representation influences affective and cognitive areas. Interaction models through cognitive feedback processes manifest at all levels of systemic organization. Oreste addresses all of this from an evolutionary perspective, adopting a transient view and occasionally focusing on the system's homeostasis.
Symbolic thought remains in the realm of the unconscious language. The mythological dimension employs a language not governed by reason, with rigid structures lacking foundation. The continuous repetition of associative connections, often without logical consequence, guides behavior.
At times, Oreste remained trapped in emotional and mental patterns and delved deeper into them. This generated a number of texts inspired by the autonarrative paradigm, used as material to elucidate his personal analytical approach.
One of the presuppositions is that the unconscious manifests through narratives, not through speculations.
Losing control of oneself and existence generates anxiety. Seeking a guarantee of freedom presupposes the inability to manage and monitor it. Finding a causal connection between one's life events alleviates anxiety, whether it involves cause-and-effect relationships or blame and punishment. Attempting to represent one's life raises questions of meaning, and behind the question of meaning almost always lies the question of the meaning of suffering.
Education cannot be limited to replicating subjectivity. Subjectivity is a limitation, and Oreste thoroughly questioned it, but it is also a resource, and he protected its unique form. He paid attention to the impact on individuals, to practices that impose connected cerebral adaptation, to environmental conditions, and subjective conditions.
Dedicating time to the certification of knowledge has deleterious consequences on creativity. If we have to pass through the filter of someone who already knows something, and to overcome it, we must demonstrate that we are like them, that is, that we know something, our path is set. What we experience is studying what is already known and visible. If we are sincerely involved in the process, an "habitus mentis" will remain within us, imprisoning us and making us slaves of the dead metaphor of the already known.
Oreste avoided passive involvement in frontal lessons, where it would have been taken for granted to participate without the possibility of actual replication or confrontation. Being in contact with brilliant minds was essential, as was having the opportunity to pursue a cognitive path without predefining its goal.
The time dedicated to exploring different disciplinary areas was not solely dependent on personal abilities. Large portions of knowledge are born to support homeostasis that does not generate changes in knowledge but rather consolidates previous knowledge and rigidifies the mind.
Deepening a topic sometimes captures us in a pre-organized closed space. A defined semiotic horizon imprisons within a structure of meaning. Every role ties the individual to a categorical baggage from which they cannot free themselves.
Oreste sought to be free from roles to avoid ideological vices that would have blinded him. He did not devote himself to an efficientist, productive, instrumental reason capable of achieving purposes, but not great ends.
Normally, we tend to reproduce the conditions in which we were educated. Being driven to seek what is not yet known involves interacting in contexts where confrontation does not occur in an artificial and conventional dimension, but where the limit is the individual's ability to confront a natural limit. Competition inexorably wears away the ability to confront the true frontier, that of the unintelligible.
Oreste did not expend energy on creating outlets for his reflections because it generated continuous questions rather than tangible and clear results. He focused on the preliminary "pars destruens" necessary to free the field from outdated cognitive baggage, then sought interlocutors with whom to build the next phase.
For a discourse to be understood, it cannot disregard the interlocutor and the respective context. Each argument is inserted into a worldview and derives its presuppositions, reference values, argumentative criteria, and inferential principles from it. Sharing these with the interlocutor gives the discourse the appearance of meaning. This sharing is generated through exposure to a sufficient number of arguments considered valid within the cultural tradition of belonging or through daily communication regulated by the same norms.
When knowledge does not rely on the search for objectivity, personal testimony becomes essential. This is why Oreste M. G. needed a direct relationship with his interlocutors, preferring personal distribution of his texts before disseminating them through the internet.
Having often advocated something conflicting with the interlocutor's belief system, Oreste clashed with the resigned assumption that nothing changes under the sun. Therefore, his interlocutors were not convinced because persuasion implies an action denied from the outset. It is not uncommon for an argument to be judged based on its origin, neglecting to verify its coherence.
In the name of his cognitive and relational objectives, Oreste relinquished the cultivation of his image, experimenting with different methods and situations. He notes:
"Being everyone in being no one could have been my slogan, as I was keen on maximizing possibilities rather than articulating them. To avoid being swept away by the fanaticism of every role, by the respective perceptual, ideological, and communicative conditioning, I chose not to be in order to be fully. Inhabiting even the space on the margins of roles allowed me not to remain trapped there." from "Ultimo" by O. M. G. Debernardi.
[Steering committee of the CEC project]
Note
Section cited from Debernardi O., "Comunicazione Empatia Conoscenza," s. l., 2006 (original edition 2003).