Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada
"Reasoning with Conditionals: Cognitive Abduction and Normative Deduction"
Human reasoning relies much on conditional connectives. They are at work in causal cognition to explain posterior events by anterior ones and to predict future events by present ones. Many experiments have shown that, in these contexts, spontaneous reasoners tend not to respect the laws of logic, committing many fallacies1 . Even if these fallacies are not logically valid, we will show that they are cognitively relevant. We will hold that they put at work an abductive conditional that has its specific properties and which behaves in a way that is different from the logical conditional. The abductive conditional is symmetric contrary to the logical conditional that is antisymmetric. This abductive conditional is used because we tend to rely in these cognitive situations on our long-term memory rather than on logic. We will analyse four types of such abductive structures of reasoning. Trying to understand how the world works causally, these abductive contexts are contexts of discovery.
Conditional connectives are also much used in normative contexts in which we judge human actions as being fair or unfair. In these cases, as many other experiments show, the conditionals used are spontaneously exactly the ones of classical propositional logic2 . Judgments of appraisal are logically deduced from norms that are expressed as conditionals. In such situations, the context is one of justification.
Causal conditionals are usually open to learning. This occurs in two different learning situations: the learning of a disjunction of causes in the discovery of alternative causes and the learning of a conjunction of causes in the discovery of inferential disablers. On the contrary, normative conditionals are much less prone to change and learning. We will then take into consideration the theory of the dual processes of reasoning, the S1 processes that are rapid and spontaneous versus the S2 processes that are slow and reflective3 .
We will hold that, in S1 processes, abductive conditionals are strictly treated as discovery devices and normative conditionals as strictly justification devices. S2 reflective processes allow the injection of justification in cognitive conditionals and the injection of discovery in normative conditionals. This thesis helps to understand how science, philosophy and logic occurred as S2 processes in human evolution.
1. Evans, J. St B. T., Newstead, S. E. and Byrne, R. M. J. (1993). Human Reasoning: The Psychology of Deduction. Hove UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Chapter 2.
2. Cosmides, L. (1989). The logic of social exchange: Has natural selection shaped how humans reason? Studies with the Wason Selection Task. Cognition, 31, p. 187–286.
3. Robert, S. & Brisson, J. (2016) The Klein Group, Squares of Opposition and the Explanation of Fallacies in Reasoning. Logica Universalis, Springer Birkhäuser, volume 10, issue 2-3, p. 377-392.