The nature of meaning and definition has been a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry and logical analysis since antiquity. Every major philosophical tradition has developed distinct conceptions of what it means to define, reflecting diverse assumptions about their philosophical methodologies. 

This workshop aims to explore the theory of definition across historical and contemporary perspectives, examining its role in logic, metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of science. Contributions may address the topic from formal, historical, linguistic, or applied perspectives, including the implications of definability in AI and computational reasoning.

• Definitions in non-Aristotelian logics (e.g., Islamic, Buddhist, or modern symbolic systems)

• The definitional regress problem: can definitions ever terminate?

• The role of definitions in conceptual engineering and revisionary metaphysics

• Definability and conservativity: what can (and cannot) be introduced by definition in a formal system?

• Definitional equivalence and intertranslatability of theories

• The role of definition in the formation and revision of scientific concepts

• The interplay between definition and measurement in the natural and social sciences

• Symbol grounding and the definitional problem in machine learning

• Can LLMs define? On definitional reasoning and language models

• Are definitions essential for explainable AI?

Submit a one page  abstract by November 15,  2025 to   to  gamalsalem.sherif@gmail.com

Notifications of acceptance and rejection within days of submission.

Duration of contributing talks is 30mn including discussion. There will be a round table at the end of the workshop with the participation of all the speakers.

Accepted contributors will be invited to submit a full paper for inclusion in a special issue of a journal  on Definition edited by the organizer following the workshop.