The study of logic in relation to empirical science has long been central to understanding scientific reasoning, theory formation, and knowledge projection. This workshop aims to explore the intersection of formal and philosophical approaches to the sciences, focusing on the principles, methods, and conceptual foundations that guide empirical inquiry. Topics such as induction, continuity, natural classes, projectability, scientific realism, pessimistic induction, and structural realism illustrate the deep connections between logical analysis and the philosophy of science.
This workshop seeks to foster dialogue across disciplines by examining both formal tools and conceptual frameworks that clarify the structure, limits, and justification of scientific knowledge.
Topics may include, but are not restricted to, the following questions:
•Logical and philosophical foundations of scientific reasoning
•Classical and non-classical approaches to (the theory of) science
•Formal methods in the analysis of scientific theories and models
•Induction, projectability, and continuity in scientific inference
•Natural kinds, classification, and the structure of scientific knowledge
•Scientific realism, structural realism, and their implications for theory assessment
•Pessimistic induction and the problem of theory reliability
•Theory change, theory choice, and the dynamics of scientific confirmation
•Abstraction, modelling, and generalisation in scientific practice
•Interdisciplinary perspectives on logic and the empirical sciences
Submit a one page abstract by October 15, 2025 to ddiaz.filo@gmail.com
Notifications of acceptance and rejection within days of submission.
Duration of contributing talks is 30mn including discussion. There will be a round table at the end of the workshop with the participation of all the speakers.
Accepted contributors will be invited to submit a full paper for inclusion in a volume on Logic and the Empirical Sciences edited by the organizers following the workshop.