2016年度
日時: 2016年7月30日(土)
場所: 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B
14:00-15:50
講演者: 石原章史氏 (政策研究大学院大学)
題目: On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts
概要: We investigate the optimal job design in a repeated principal-agent relationship with multiple tasks where the performance measurement is distorted, aggregated, and nonverifiable. We compare task bundling, where all the tasks are assigned to a single agent, with task separation, where the tasks are split and assigned to two agents. Compared to task bundling, task separation mitigates misallocation of effort among the tasks but requires more commitment due to dispersion of informal bonuses to multiple agents. Consequently, task separation is better than task bundling if and only if the discount factor of the parties is high. We also consider an extended model in which the principal combines explicit incentive pays based on a verifiable and distorted signal. In such cases, task separation is optimal if the discount factor is sufficiently high or sufficiently low.
16:10-18:00
講演者: 若森直樹氏 (東京大学)
題目: The Welfare Consequences of Free Entry in Vertical Relationships: The Case of the MRI Market
概要: This paper quantifies the welfare consequences of the medical arms race in the context of MRI adoption. Our data suggest that the vertical structure of the industry and the endogeneous product choice are the key determinants to understand the MRI adoption behavior of medical institutions. Thus, the paper builds and estimates a model of the vertical structure of the industry where MRI manufacturers sell high- and low-quality MRIs to hospitals in the upstream market, whereas medical institutions provide medical services to patients in the downstream market. Simulation results suggest that the current free-entry policy in Japan leads to excess MRI adoption, even distorting the composition of high- and low-quality MRIs. Furthermore, softening competition among the MRI manufacturers or regulating medical institutions' MRI adoption would increase social welfare substantially by mitigating the business-stealing effect in the downstream market. These findings shed light on the mechanism behind the social inefficiency of medical arms races.
日時: 2016年10月1日(土)
場所: 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B
14:00-15:50
講演者: 中川万理子氏 (東京大学)
題目: Linguistic Distance and Economic Development: Costs of Accessing Domestic and International Centers
概要: We investigate the impacts of access to domestic and international communication on the economic development of a nation by constructing two indexes of linguistic distance, domestic and international, capturing language acquisition costs which would be higher in the case of acquiring linguistically distant languages. While the domestic linguistic distance index captures the constraint of nationwide communication among speakers of different mother tongues, the international linguistic distance index captures the constraints of the global communication via English. The domestic linguistic distance has a negative impact on the economic development of poor countries, while only rich countries enjoy a positive impact on the national income if the international linguistic distance is smaller. Particularly, we show that the capability to use English as the first language is highly advantageous for economic development.
16:10-18:00
講演者: 高久玲音氏 (医療経済研究機構)
題目: How Do Providers Respond to Health Insurance Expansion? Evidence from Pediatric Clinics in Japan
概要: Although recent studies argue that the large scale expansion of public health insurance, such as introduction of the Affordable Care Act, results in increasing adoption of costly medical technologies, our knowledge on the supply-side responses to health insurance expansion is still limited. Using the rapid and dramatic expansion of the subsidization program for children’s health care utilization in Japan, known as Medical Subsidy on Children and Infants (MSCI), I investigate how pediatricians respond to this policy change. Data of all pediatric clinics from 1999 to 2011 (N=63,072) are matched with municipality-level eligibility criteria of the MSCI, which are obtained from author’s original survey (Takaku 2016, Social Science & Medicine). Double differences technique is used to estimate the effects of the MSCI expansion. The results show the MSCI expansion increases number of patients in pediatric clinics greatly. In addition, the MSCI expansion increases the number of pediatric clinics in a municipality, suggesting health insurance expansion induces greater market entry. However, as a results of increased profitability due to the MSCI expansion, I find pediatric clinics generally reduce their labor supply and increase no-consultation days.
日時: 2016年11月12日(土)
場所: 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B
14:00-15:50
講演者: 肥前洋一氏 (高知工科大学)
題目: 選挙権の拡大と投票行動の反転
概要: 選挙権が拡大されるとき（たとえば選挙権年齢の引き下げや子のぶんまで親に票を与えるドメイン投票の導入など）、新たに選挙権を得た有権者たちがどのような投票行動を示すかが注目されるが、同時に、すでに選挙権を持っていた有権者たちがどのような投票行動を示すかにも注意が必要である。本報告の実験室実験では、選挙権の拡大前は選挙権を持たない人たちの利得も考慮する投票行動を示していた有権者たちの一部が、投票権の拡大後は自分たちの利得を守るための投票行動に転じること、そのため選挙結果に対する選挙権拡大の効果が弱められてしまうことが観察された。
16:10-18:00
講演者: 石田潤一郎氏 (大阪大学)
題目: Rewarding Mediocrity? Optimal Regulation of R&D Markets with Reputation Concerns
概要: In this paper, we consider a dynamic signaling model of an R&D market in which a researcher can choose either a safe project (exploitation) or a risky project (exploration) at each instance. We argue that there are substantial efficiency gains from rewarding minor innovations above their social value and further that it is indeed superior to rewarding major innovations directly, even when those minor innovations are intrinsically valueless. When only major innovations are rewarded, the R&D market eventually shuts down due to a version of the "lemons" problem. Rewarding minor innovations is actually conducive to major innovations as it induces self-sorting among researchers, which is essential in providing time and resources necessary for more productive ones to take riskier but more ambitious approaches. This result draws clear contrast to the static counterpart where such a scheme is never optimal. Our model also exhibits reputation dynamics which capture a pervasive view in academia that "no publications are better than a few mediocre publications" at an early stage of one's career.
日時: 2016年12月3日(土)
場所: 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B
14:00-15:50
講演者: 近藤絢子氏 (東京大学)
題目: How did workers adjust to indirect employment shocks caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake?
概要: The Great East Japan Earthquake affected workers not only in the establishment that were directly damaged, but also those in trading partners through the disruption of supply chain. I estimate the effect of such indirect shocks to workers on their job separation, inter industry mobility, geographical relocation, as well as employment status in the following few months. Although the self-reported indicator of being affected by the earthquake are significantly correlated with negative outcomes such as high incidence of job separation, when the self-reported indicator is instrumented with proxy for the decline in production at the prefecture-industry level, the effects on labor market outcomes become weaker and mostly insignificant. The result imply that people who faced a negative employment shock may attribute it to the exogenous event, and this may cause non-negligible bias in the self-reported data on the effect of disasters.
16:10-18:00
講演者: 宮崎浩一氏 (香川大学)
題目: Optimal pay-as-you-go social security with endogenous retirement
概要: This paper considers an overlapping-generations model with pay-as-you- go social security and retirement decision making by an old agent. In additi on, this paper assumes that labor productivity depreciates. Under this setti ng, socially optimal allocations are examined. The first-best allocation is an allocation that maximizes welfare when a social planner distributes resou rces and forces an old agent to work and retire as she wants. The second-bes t allocation is one that maximizes welfare when a social planner can use onl y pay-as-you-go social security in a decentralized economy. This paper finds a range of an old agent's labor productivity such that the first-best alloc ation is achieved in a decentralized economy. This finding differs from that in Michel and Pestieau (2013), which notes that the first-best allocation c annot be achieved in a decentralized economy.
日時: 2017年1月28日(土)
場所: 政策研究大学院大学 4階 会議室4B
14:00-15:50
講演者: 小川光氏 (東京大学)
題目: Ad Valorem Capital Tax Competition
概要: Studies of tax competition have found that using a unit tax is commitment-robust for governments, while we observe ad valorem taxes on capital in practice. This study presents a model that explains the emergence of ad valorem capital tax competition, incorporating an elastic supply of capital in the standard tax competition model. Specifically, it shows that if the elasticity of capital supply is positive, governments adopt the ad valorem tax method and thereby ad valorem tax competition prevails. On the other hand, under a fixed capital supply (i.e., zero elasticity of capital supply), countries compete in unit taxes.
16:10-18:00
講演者: 古沢泰治氏 (一橋大学)
題目: Global Sourcing and Production Networks (with Keiko Ito, Tomohiko Inui, and Heiwai Tang)
概要: This paper studies the spatial and sectoral patterns of firms' global sourcing, and how offshoring changes firms' domestic production networks. We develop a variant of the global sourcing model by Antras, Fort, and Tintelnot (2016) to consider multiple input sectors that differ in relationship-specificity to buyers' production and endogenously-determined communication costs as part of the trade costs. The model predicts that firms tend to outsource generic inputs with low input specificity. In addition to the direct effect of offshoring that causes less productive domestic sellers substituted with more productive ones, there is indirect productivity effect that induces firms to restructure their domestic supplier networks. We then use production network data for 4.5 million buyer-seller links in Japan and a firm-level instrument for offshoring to examine the main theoretical predictions. We find that while experiencing an increase in sales, import starters drop their larger and more distant domestic suppliers on the net. They are also more likely to add suppliers from relationship-specific sectors. As a result, the average distance between import starters and their domestic suppliers declines after offshoring, suggesting that offshoring can be a cause of industry agglomeration.
日時: 2017年3月6日(月)
場所: 政策研究大学院大学 5階 講義室I
14:00-15:50
講演者: 河端瑞貴氏 (慶應義塾大学)
題目: Spatial Dimensions of Intra-metropolitan Disparities in Female Labor Force Participation and Commute Times in Tokyo
概要: We explore intra-metropolitan spatial patterns of female labor force participation and examine their associations with commute times in the Tokyo metropolitan area. Our municipal-level analysis reveals considerable intra-metropolitan disparities in female labor force participation, regular employment, and part-time employment rates. The Global Moran’s I and Getis-Ord Gi* statistics show that the spatial patterns of labor force participation and regular employment rates differ markedly by marital status and the presence of children. Compared with unmarried women and married women without children, married women with children exhibit more significant spatial clustering of high and low values of the participation and regular employment rates. For married mothers, the spatial clusters of low participation and regular employment rates are largely located in the inner suburbs, many of which overlap with the spatial clusters of long male commute times. The non-spatial and spatial regression results indicate that for married mothers, a longer commute time is significantly associated with lower participation and regular employment rates, while for unmarried and childless married women, these associations are mostly insignificant. These results are robust to different model specifications and spatial weights. Our findings suggest that policies that alleviate commuting constraints could help women with children participate more actively in the labor market.
16:10-18:00
講演者: 牛島光一氏 (筑波大学)
題目: 大気環境の改善はどれくらいの便益をもたらすか：東京大都市圏におけるディーゼル車規制を用いた検証
概要: 本研究の目的は、1991年から2010までの20年間の公示地価のデータを用いて、2000年に日本の首都圏1都3県に対して行われたディーゼル車規制がSPMおよび地価に与えた影響を調べることである。大気環境が悪いところほど地価が高くなるような傾向があるといった内生性の問題は、ディーゼル車規制の特徴を利用することで回避する。1都3県では、一定基準を満たさないディーゼル車に対して、域内の走行及び登録を禁止とする規制を行った。そのため、土地周辺を通るディーゼル車数によって、規制の影響度合いにバリエーションが発生してする。分析ではこれを利用し、規制の効果が大きい地点と小さい地点の地価の変化を比較する。地価への影響の評価はヘドニックアプローチを採用する。分析の結果、ディーゼル車規制の制定以前には、周辺を通るディーゼル車数とSPM及び地価との間に一貫した強い関係が見られなかったが、規制の制定以降より周辺を通るディーゼル車数が多い地点(規制の影響を強く受ける地点)ほど、SPMが有意に大きく減少し、それに伴い、地価は有意に大きく上昇したことが分かった。また、SPMの1単位減少による限界支払意思額は、5.9~6.2%であった。この結果は、アメリカ全域を対象とした既存研究の結果より、2倍以上大きい値である。以上の結果は、大都市圏の居住者は郊外の居住者より大気環境により大きな経済的価値を感じていることを示唆する。