In the tenth chapter of the first volume of Mystery of Being (1951), Gabriel Marcel tells us that "philosophical reflection is articulated in mystery." It is not a problem that seeks for a solution, but is a mystery that is lived. This paper explores the meaning of this claim by means of Marcellian phenomenological reflection. Through three common experiences of the predicate "mystery," this paper develops the possible meaning of Marcel's point about philosophical reflection.

The word "mystery" is not strange to us. For example, we use the adjective "mysterious" for magical acts. This is an event that amazes us because it seemingly defies the laws of reality and of logic. It refuses to be grasped by our mind. "Mystery," in this experience, is that which we do not understand. Is this how philosophical experience is articulated in mystery?

On the one hand, we can see in this example something in common with philosophical research. We cannot seem to understand what philosophy looks for. Even when we are already staring at the result of our research, our minds still have difficulty grasping the fullness of this truth. The greater the philosopher who generates the idea, the more unfathomable the idea becomes. Is philosophical research, therefore, simply hocus-pocus? Let's not be rash with our conclusions here.

If we reflect on this example, we will notice that our failure to understand magic is not because of the inability of the mind to understand. We cannot fully understand a magical event only because we have not yet studied the process involved. We discover that we can learn the ways of magic, thereby taking away its power to surprise us. In retrospect, we can see that magic is not really mysterious. Even if there is a lack of understanding at the start, this lack is finally seen as a problem that wasn't immediately perceived as soluble. On the other hand, therefore, we cannot liken philosophical research to magic. The history of philosophy is a history of questions that outlasted those who have asked; a history of inconclusive answers despite the greatness of the minds that conceived them; a history of "postponed syntheses" (Ricoeur) despite attempts to establish systems of thought. We, therefore, have to go beyond this magical understanding of mystery if we are to do justice to Marcel's point.

There is a second example that seems more appropriate in clarifying the meaning of mystery. We also use the adjective "mysterious" for events that God willed. In this use of the word, the meaning of mysteriousness as not fully understandable remains; but more than that, the example points out that our failure to understand the event is because of the greatness of the event itself. The lack of complete understanding is not temporary. Even if one contemplates forever, one cannot fully understand because God's will is far greater than what the mind can conceive or comprehend. We can glean some ideas from this example to understand the mystery of philosophical research.

Philosophical research is articulated in mystery because the truth searched for cannot be grasped completely, which is why the research is endless. The history of philosophy has not been a record of answers but of questions, for just this reason. Philosophical truths cannot just be comprehended exhaustively in the meantime, not even for a lifetime. The ideas of such philosophers as Lao Tzu and Confucius, Plato and Aristotle, St. Augustine and St. Thomas, Kant and Hegel, and many others continue to be a source of new interpretations centuries beyond their conception. However, we should again be careful in picking up insights from this example.

The adjective "mysterious" suggests other ideas here. The use of the adjective "mysterious" to describe God's will also serves as a warning that we should not try to understand the event completely. We cannot fully conceive the event because it is willed by one far greater than the ability of human minds to understand, and to try to understand that which was not meant to be understood is to defy God's will. To accept this conclusion--that we should not try to understand the transcendent--is to avoid the research itself. If the whole meaning of mystery is like a notice that says "No Entry!" then Marcel's point that philosophical research is articulated in mystery becomes an absurdity. We can only hope to understand Marcel's point as a meaningful event when we find a meaning to the term "mystery" that goes beyond the two previous meanings.

There is one more use of the adjective "mysterious" that may really come close to Marcel's meaning. In a religious song are the lines: "Mahiwaga ang buhay ng tao/Ang bukas ay di natin piho." Here human life is deemed mysterious, because it includes the future that eludes our grasp. In this example, we can see the two meanings pointed out by the first two examples of mystery. In this example, the meaning of "mystery" as not fully understandable is present. Human life cannot be fully understood. Present here, too, is the meaning of mystery as not only a temporary lack of understanding, because the truth goes beyond the mind's ability to comprehend. The future is part of human life, but it is not yet here. Because it is not yet here, there is nothing to understand yet. In other words, human life can never be understood in a lifetime, because it is more than just the past and the present that the mind can grasp. But, this does not mean that this transcendence is already a signal to stop trying to understand. The future comes and becomes a present that can be understood. Thus, understanding persists because every future carries with it a present. But this presencing of every future does not result in a complete understanding of human life still, because every future that becomes present is replaced by a new future that goes beyond our minds' grasp. This is perhaps the kind of mystery that Marcel referred to when he said that "philosophical research is articulated in mystery."

Philosophical research will never fully find its subject matter, but this failure to comprehend is not an absurdity. This limitation in understanding is not simply the result of a limited mental faculty that respects the truth, but is also the result of the transcendental character of truth itself that cannot be fully encompassed. This truth which philosophy seeks is far greater than the sum of finite perspectives of which the collective human mind is only capable. This truth also involves the human mind which seeks it, which makes the human mind a participant in the very truth it tries to comprehend. The human mind does not have an absolute, privileged position with which to encompass the whole of truth itself.

This paper began as a reflection on the meaning of Marcel's claim that "philosophical research is articulated in mystery." We have seen how the predicate "mystery" can be understood differently within the contexts of magic, of God's will, and of human life. From the different contexts within which we explored the experience of mystery, we have derived some meanings of mystery. Mystery is that which is not easily understood because it does not seem to follow the laws of logic and of reality; as that which continually transcends our ability to comprehend because of its greatness and of the human mind's finitude; and that which does not stand apart from the very mind that seeks it, but instead involves the seeker itself. In these various meanings of the predicate "mystery" derived from our experiences, we have come to an understanding of Marcel's point about philosophical research in a concrete way without forcing ourselves to be confined simply to the meaning Marcel may have intended. Ω

Reference:

Marcel, Gabriel (1951). The mystery of being, vol. 1: Reflection and mystery. The Gifford Lectures. 1949-1950. The University of Aberdeen Press.