The Term

An oral term is an articulate sound that serves as a conventional or arbitrary sign of a concept.

We saw in Chapter 2 that a term consists either of one word or of an entire group of words that signify a concept when they are taken together as a unit. We shall now explain each part of the definition given above.

a. “An Articulate Sound”

Only an articulate sound can be a term; that is, a sound formed in the mouth and consisting of one or more distinct syllables. A fire siren, a shriek, and a groan are not articulate sounds and therefore are not terms. (There are other reasons, too, why these are not terms.)

b. A “Sign”

A sign is anything that leads to the knowledge of something distinct from itself. A red traffic light at a street corner is a sign leading me to the knowledge that I must stop; the sound of a horn is a sign leading me to the knowledge of an approaching automobile; a certain arrangement of ink on a page, “m-a-n,” leads me to the knowledge of man; smoke is a sign of fire; and a groan is a sign of pain.

c. “A Conventional or Arbitrary Sign”

What is the source of the connection between a sign and what it signifies? The answer to this question is the basis of the division of signs into natural, on the one hand, and conventional or arbitrary, on the other.

A NATURAL SIGN is one whose connection with what it signifies is from nature, independently of human conventions and the arbitrary will of man. Smoke is a natural sign of fire; the connection between smoke and fire does not arise from the arbitrary will of man, but is determined by nature itself. A groan is a natural sign of pain; a blush, of emotion; a scream, of fright; thunder, of lightning; and a low barometer, of unsettled weather.

A CONVENTIONAL OR ARBITRARY SIGN is one whose connection with what it signifies arises either from convention or custom or from the arbitrary will of man. Except for a few onomatopoeic words that are formed in imitation of certain sounds (“bow-wow, moo, meow, ping-pong, crash, slap, pop ), there is nothing in the make-up of a given word that requires it to have a particular meaning. At least ultimately, all words (with the exceptions noted above) get their meaning solely from convention. Even imitative words like “bow-wow,” and so on, are conventional more than natural. Their resemblance to the sound they signify is so slight that you would not know their meanings from the words alone. The words for animal cries vary considerably, too, in different languages; but if they were purely natural signs, they would have to be the same in all languages. A dog, for instance, says “bow-wow” in English, “guau guau” in Spanish, “wauwau” in German, and “bau bau” in Italian.

Terms are conventional or arbitrary signs. It does not follow from this, however, that we are free to give them any meaning we want to without any limitation. We cannot, for instance, use “wolf” to signify the animal commonly called “sheep,” or “nitwit” to signify “beloved.” The meanings of these words are already fixed by usage. In order to communicate our thoughts to others we must use words in accordance with their commonly accepted meanings. Otherwise, our words will stand for one set of concepts for us, and for a different set of concepts for our hearers.

To some extent, of course, we must coin words to signify concepts for which there is no suitable word. To some extent, too, we can give words the meanings that we want to. We shall recur to this point when we take up nominal definition.

d. “Sign of a Concept”

Terms signify concepts directly and immediately; indirectly and through the intermediacy of concepts they also signify things.

The classifications given in Chapter 11, pp. 209-220, are primarily classifications of concepts; but the same names are applied in a secondary sense to the terms by which the concepts are signified. A term signifying a first intention is called a term of first intention; a term signifying an abstract concept is called an abstract term; terms signifying contrary concepts are called contrary terms; and so on. To enumerate all of them again would involve needless repetition.

The classification of terms into singular, particular, and universal (given in Chapter 2) and the following classification into univocal, equivocal, and analogous are primarily classifications of terms.

Is a term applied to at least two of its inferiors in exactly the same sense, in an entirely different sense, or in a sense that is partly the same and partly different? The answer to this question is the basis of the division of terms into univocal, equivocal, and analogous. Note that before you can tell whether a term is univocal, equivocal, or analogous, you must consider it (at least implicitly) in relation to more than one inferior. The question “Is man univocal, equivocal, or analogous?” does not make sense unless at least two uses of the word “man” are referred to. You must compare the meaning of “man” in one use with its meaning in another. If it has the same meaning in both uses, it is univocal; if it has an entirely different meaning, it is equivocal; if it has a meaning that is partly the same and partly different, it is analogous.

The same word is sometimes univocal in one context, equivocal in another, and analogous in still another. For instance, “pen” is univocal in “Parkers and Shaeffers are pens,” but equivocal in “Pens are instruments for writing and enclosures for pigs.” “Pens” has exactly the same sense when it is predicated of Parkers and Shaeffers, but a sense that is completely different when it is predicated of instruments for writing and enclosures for pigs.

a. Univocal Terms

Univocal terms are applied to their inferiors in exactly the same sense. In other words, a term is univocal if it signifies exactly the same concept, or essence, in (at least) two occurrences of the term. When I say “James, John, and Peter are men,” I use “men” univocally because I apply it to three subjects in exactly the same sense; “man” stands for the same concept, or essence, with reference to each of them. When I say “Napoleon was a man; a scarecrow is a man,” “man” is not univocal because it has a different meaning in each occurrence.

b. Equivocal Terms

Equivocal terms are applied to their inferiors in a completely different sense. They stand for different concepts, or essences, in each of (at least) two occurrences of the term; it is a pure accident that the same term is applied to different kinds of inferiors (or else we have lost sight of, or no longer advert to, an original similarity of meaning). Equivocal terms signify as many concepts as they have completely different meanings. There are no equivocal concepts.

“Pen” is equivocal when applied to the enclosure for animals and the instrument for writing; “pitch,” when applied to the black, tenacious substance and the delivery of a ball to a batter; “page,” to the page in court and the page of a book; “bark,” when applied to the bark of a dog and the bark of a tree.

Some terms are equivocal both when they are spoken and when they are written; for instance, the examples given in the preceding paragraph. Some terms are equivocal only when spoken; for instance, “yolk,” signifying the yellow of an egg, and “yoke,” signifying the frame that joins two oxen. Some terms are equivocal only when they are written; for instance, “incense,” signifying to make angry, and “incense,” signifying the aromatic substance.

c. Analogous Terms

Analogous terms are applied to their inferiors in a sense that is partly the same and partly different.

The inferiors of an analogous term are called analogues, or analogates. A primary analogue is one to which a term is applied primarily and absolutely. A secondary analogue is one to which a term is applied secondarily and relatively. Thus “health” is applied primarily and absolutely to a living organism; secondarily and relatively to food, climate, exercise, work, complexion, and so on. These latter are called healthy (or healthful) only secondarily and because of their relationship to health in living organisms—they are either a cause, an occasion, or a sign of health in a living organism.

Analogy is divided into (1) intrinsic and extrinsic analogy, and (2) analogy of proportionality and attribution.

1) INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC ANALOGY. Is the concept that is signified by an analogous term realized in each of its analogues, or is it extrinsic to one of them? The answer to this question is the basis of the division of analogy into intrinsic and extrinsic.

a) Intrinsic Analogy. Analogy is intrinsic if the concept that is signified by an analogous term is realized in each of the analogues of the term. “Being,” for instance, is analogous by intrinsic analogy with reference to all its analogues. The perfection signified by “being” is actually in everything that we call a being. We do not call things beings merely because of some similarity we fancy them to have towards other beings or because they stand in certain relationships towards other beings. We call things beings because they are beings intrinsically and in their own right.

b) Extrinsic Analogy. Analogy is extrinsic if the concept signified by an analogous term is realized only in its primary analogues. The term is applied to the other analogues on account of their relationship to the primary analogue; but the perfection signified by the term is not actually in them. “Healthy,” for instance, is predicated of a living organism and, as well, of food, climate, exercise, work, complexion, and so on. But notice that only a living organism is the subject of health; it is the only thing that has health intrinsically and the only thing of which health is predicated primarily and abso¬ lutely. Food, climate, and so on, are not healthy intrinsically. Health is attributed to them as being merely causes, occasions, or signs of health in some other being. They do not have health within themselves, but are called healthy because of the relationship that each of them has towards health in a living organism. They are healthy by extrinsic denomination; that is, because of their relationship to health in something outside of, or extrinsic to, themselves.

The base of a mountain, to take another example, is not a foot intrinsically; it is merely called a foot because of a similarity that we conceive it as having. All metaphors exemplify extrinsic analogy. Thus, we say that a meadow smiles (although it does not really smile), bread is a staff (although it is really not a staff), the sky glowers, and the sea is angry.

For all practical purposes, terms that are analogous only by extrinsic analogy are equivalent to equivocal terms. In fact, some authors (including Aristotle) call them equivocal.

2) ANALOGY OF PROPORTIONALITY AND ATTRIBUTION. Is the application of the term to various analogues based on a similarity of two relationships, or is it based on a relationship of a secondary analogue to a primary analogue? The answer to this question is the basis of the division of analogy into analogy of proportionality and analogy of attribution.

a) Analogy of Proportionality. Analogy of proportionality is based on a similarity of two relationships. Two examples will make this clear.

A pen is good in proportion to its fitness to fulfill its function of writing; ink eradicator is good in proportion to its fitness to fulfill its function of removing ink. To write and to remove ink are very different functions, and for a thing to be good for writing is very different from a thing’s being good for removing ink. Yet the two uses of “good” are partially alike in meaning in one respect at least: both a pen and an ink eradicator are called good in proportion to the fitness of each to do its job well. The proportion of the one to its function is similar to the proportion of the other to its function. Hence, “good” is predicated by analogy of proportionality. In other words, the relationship of a good pen to the proper fulfillment of its function is similar to the relationship of good ink eradicator to the proper fulfillment of its function. This similarity of two relationships, or proportions, accounts for the partial likeness in the meaning of “good” when it is predicated of a good pen and of good ink eradicator. The diversity of functions accounts for the difference in meaning. Hence, the meaning of “good” in each case is partly alike and partly different.

To take a second example, “foot” is predicated of what a man stands on and of the base of a mountain by analogy of proportionality. The base of a mountain has no direct resemblance whatsoever to the foot of a man. But the relationship of a mountain to its base is similar to the relationship of a man to his feet. On the basis of this similarity of relationships, the term foot, which is applied in its primary sense to the foot of a man, is applied in a secondary sense to the base of a mountain. Except for this similarity of relationships, the sense of “foot” is completely different in each occurrence. But the meaning is partly alike in at least this one respect.

b) Analogy of Attribution. Analogy of attribution (or proportion) is based on a relationship of a secondary analogue to a primary analogue. “Healthy,” for instance, is predicated of a living organism and, as well, of food, climate, exercise, work, complexion, and so on, because of the relationship in which each of the latter stands toward health in the living organism: healthy food, climate, exercise, and work are related to health in the human organism as its cause or occasion; a healthy complexion is related to health in the human organism as its sign; and so on.

Again, when we read “Macbeth” or “Hamlet" we say that we are reading Shakespeare. We are using the name of an author for his works because of the relation of authorship in which he stands towards them. We call a stay in the country a “rest” because it is an occasion of rest. We call a legislative body a “house” because it meets in a house.

Notice that the same term can sometimes be predicated by both analogy of proportionality and by analogy of attribution. “Being,” for instance, is predicated by analogy of proportionality in some contexts and by analogy of attribution in others.

We shall now consider supposition of terms (suppositio terminorum), which is the most important of the properties that terms acquire from their use in propositions. First, we shall define supposition; then we shall explain and illustrate its principal kinds.

a. Notion of Supposition

Supposition is the property (that terms acquire from their use in a proposition) by which a term stands for a definite one of the various things that it can stand for.

We must carefully distinguish between the meaning, or definition, of a term and its supposition. Terms have meaning by themselves, outside of a proposition (for instance, the words that are defined in a dictionary); but terms have supposition only from their function in discourse. Notice that a term can have the same meaning (signification or definition) in various occurrences and still stand for very different things. The term “man,” for instance, has exactly the same meaning in each of the following examples—in each case it signifies “rational animal”; yet in each example “man” stands for something very different. What “man” stands for is determined in each instance by the nature of the predicate attributed to it.

• 1. Man has three letters.

  2. Man is a species.

  3. Man is mortal.

  4. A man is running down the street.

In Example 1, “man” stands for the mere material make-up of the word “man” without any regard for its meaning. Only in the material make-up of the word, does “man” have three letters. In Example 2, “man” stands for the essence “man” as it exists only in the mind; for man cannot exist as a species except in the mind. In Example 3, “man” also stands for the essence “man.” But here we prescind from his actual existence in the real order, neither affirming nor denying it. In Example 4, however, “man” stands for an actually existing man. Yet in all four examples ‘man” has exactly the same meaning, signification, or definition. Its comprehension does not vary, in spite of the fact that in each instance it stands for a different thing.

The notion of supposition is not entirely new to us. We have alluded to it several times in previous chapters. For instance, when we spoke of the collective use, of a term, as opposed to its distributive, or divisive, use, we were actually treating of supposition. (In the proposition ‘All the ducks cover the entire pond,” “all the ducks” is used collectively, since all of them are taken together as a unit. How¬ ever, in the proposition “All the ducks are flying,” “all the ducks” is used distributively, or divisively, since each individual duck is flying) The division of terms into singular, particular, and universal is also a division of supposition, since it is based on the application of terms to their inferiors. We also alluded to supposition in connection with the fallacy of equivocation. For instance, the syllogism “Man is a species; but you are a man; therefore you are a species” is invalid because of an illegitimate change in the supposition of “man.”

The meaning of supposition will be clearer after we have studied its various kinds.

b. Kinds of Supposition

We shall explain only a few of the many kinds of supposition. First, we shall treat of an important classification of the supposition of terms insofar as they are the subjects of propositions. Much of what we say in this connection will be applicable, as well, to other terms. Then, we shall give a brief account of several other kinds.

I) SUPPOSITION OF SUBJECT TERMS. The supposition of subject terms—indeed, of all terms—is either material or formal, and formal supposition has several subdivisions.

a) Material Supposition. Material supposition is the use of a term for the spoken or written sign itself, but not for what it signifies. In the following example the supposition of “man” is material: “Man rimes with ban,” “Man is the first word of this sentence,” and “Man is nothing but a little ink on a page.” In all these examples “man” actually signifies “rational animal.” Nevertheless, man’s nature as a rational animal has nothing to do with the fact that man rimes with ban, and so on. Man would still rime with ban even if it had a different meaning. In each example, the nature of the predicate attributed to “man” is such that “man” must stand for the spoken or written sign itself, but not for what it signifies.

b) Formal Supposition. Formal supposition is the use of a term for what it signifies. The supposition of “man” is formal in the proposition “Man is a rational animal.” Not the word “man” but what the word “man” signifies is a rational animal. Formal supposition is logical or real.

1— Logical Supposition. Logical supposition is the use of a term for a second intention. The supposition of “man” is logical in the following examples: “Man is a species,” “Man is the middle term of a syllogism,” “Man is a universal concept,” and “Man has less extension but greater comprehension than animal.” Man cannot exist as a species, as the middle term of a syllogism, as a universal concept, and so on, except in the mind. Supposition is logical whenever a term stands merely for the concept that it signifies. Thus, the concept “man” is a species, the concept “man” is the middle term of a syllogism, and so on.

2— Real Supposition. Real supposition is the use of a term for a first intention. The supposition of “man” is real in the following examples: “Man is a rational animal,” “Man is mortal,” and “A man is running down the street.” When we say that man is a rational animal, and so on, we are using the term “man” for the essence “man,” not only as this essence exists in our minds but also as it exists (or can exist) in the real order. Man exists (or can exist) as a rational animal, as something mortal, and as something running down the street, whether we think of him or not. Real supposition is, on the one hand, either absolute or personal and, on the other hand, either essential or accidental. To some extent these divisions overlap.

a—Absolute and Personal Supposition. Does a term stand directly for an essence as such, or does it stand directly for a subject in which an essence is realized and only indirectly for the essence? The answer to this question is the basis for the division of real supposition into absolute and personal.

(1) Absolute supposition is the use of a term for an essence as such, prescinding from, but not excluding, actual existence in the real order. The supposition, for instance, of “man” in “Man is mortal” and of triangle in “A triangle is a plane figure bounded by three straight lines” is absolute.

Absolute supposition does not directly set before the mind the individual subjects in which an essence is realized; but it does do this indirectly, because what is true of an essence as such must be true of every individual subject having the essence. Hence, absolute supposition is virtually universal. For instance, if man as such is mortal, then every man is mortal. We considered this use of the subject term when we studied the indeterminate proposition.

Absolute supposition is always also essential supposition, but not vice versa.

(2) Personal supposition is the use of a term, not for an essence as such, but for the subject in which the essence signified by a term is realized. The supposition, for instance, of “the brown horse” in the proposition “The brown horse is more valuable” is personal. It is not the essence “brown horse” that is more valuable but the subject having this essence.

The subjects of all quantified propositions have personal supposition; and personal supposition is singular, particular, or universal, depending on what portion of the extension of a term it sets before the mind and on whether or not this portion is designated definitely.

b—Essential and Accidental Supposition. Does a term stand for a subject inasmuch as it is the subject of essential attributes—that is, of attributes that cannot be absent from it—or does it stand for a subject only inasmuch as it is the subject of nonessential, or accidental, attributes? The answer to this question is the basis for the division of real supposition into essential and accidental.

(1) Essential supposition is the use of a term for a subject inasmuch as this subject is the subject of essential, or necessary, attributes. The supposition of “man” in each of the following propositions is essential: “Man is mortal” and “Every man is mortal.” Notice, however, that the supposition of the first “man” is absolute; of the second, personal. Notice, however, that the supposition of the first "man" is absolute; of the second, personal.

(2) Accidental supposition is the use of a term for a subject inasmuch as this subject is the subject of accidental, or unnecessary, attributes. For instance, the supposition of “the man” in “The man has a dirty face” is accidental (and also personal). To have a dirty face does not belong to the nature of man as such, as it is possible for the man not to have a dirty face.

A Note on Existence. Supposition, as we have seen, is a property that terms acquire from their use in a proposition. In a proposition, the existence of the subject is always asserted: sometimes this existence is only in the mind; sometimes it is also in the real order. A proposition asserting the existence of something in the real order is an existential proposition.

Now when we consider a term by itself and outside of a proposition, we prescind entirely from the actual existence of what it signifies. But when we consider a term in the context of a proposition, we do not prescind from actual existence, since we are using the term as actually standing for an existent thing—it always stands for a thing as having at least mental existence and sometimes for a thing as also having real existence. Hence, in treating of the supposition of terms, we must make at least a few remarks on the relationship to existence of absolute and personal, and of essentia] and accidental, supposition.

Absolute supposition is never existential, since (as the very name “absolute” suggests) it prescinds from all orders of existence. Accidental supposition, on the other hand, is always existential (at least conditionally). The reason for this is that the copula directly affirms or denies an accidental attribute in a subject whose existence is presupposed. For instance, when we say “He is seated,” we presuppose that he is; but when we. say “A mammoth is an elephant¬ like animal,” we do not presuppose that a mammoth is. In regard to both essential and personal supposition, we must determine from the context whether or not they are existential.

2) SOME OTHER KINDS OF SUPPOSITION. We have already called attention to the fact that some of the classifications of terms and concepts are in reality classifications of supposition. We shall now briefly indicate and illustrate a few other kinds of supposition.

The supposition of “dog” is proper in the proposition “A dog is an animal,” but improper or metaphorical in the proposition “The dog! He ought to be locked up in jail.”

The supposition of “a horse” is determinate in “Lost: a horse.” In this example, “a horse” stands for a definite horse, although it indicates this horse indefinitely. However, in the example “Wanted: a horse,” the supposition of the term “a horse” is indeterminate. In this proposition, “a horse” does not stand for a definite horse, but for any horse that will suit the man who advertises for a horse.

The supposition of the term “five men” is distributive or divisive in the proposition “Five men are walking,” since each individual man is walking. But in the proposition “Five men make up a basketball team,” the supposition of “five men” is collective; the predicate “making up a basketball team” is not applicable to each of the five men taken alone, but only to all five of them taken together as a unit.

There are innumerable other kinds of supposition, but we have studied enough of them to realize the necessity of examining a context very closely in order to tell exactly what a term stands for.