A paper presented at the Philosophers League of Ateneo (PLATO) Faculty Lecture Series, Ateneo de Davao University, 5 September 2018.
This forum asks the question “Where do beliefs come from?” Contrary to the common expectation that I will offer an answer, I will elaborate on the question instead. First, I will raise the problem with an uncritical approach to this question. Second, I will pose the question as it may be addressed in sociological, historical, and psychological ways. Third, I will offer an intermediate reflection on the implications of the other approaches to the philosophical approach. Lastly, I will pose the question in philosophical ways.
The question is asked in a philosophical forum. The common assumption is that this question is a philosophical question. It was asked by the forum organizer who is a philosophy student. It is answered by the speakers who are philosophy teachers. It is shared to an audience of philosophy students. Thus, it must be philosophical. But is it really so?
If the question is asked of a person on the street, the question would be interpreted initially as a question concerning location. “Where from?” is ordinarily a question of place of origin. “Where do you come from?”, for example, asks whether you are from Davao City or from some place else. Is that question, then, a philosophical question? In other words, is a philosophical question a question of fact in terms of location? Is the forum’s question, then, a question regarding the place of origin of beliefs? Obviously, a question of place of origin is not a philosophical question; thus, the forum’s question must not be understood that way.
On second thought, realizing that place of origin may not be what it asks about, the question would be interpreted--even by a person on the street--as concerning the source of the belief. But what does that mean? She may, perhaps, be perplexed that anybody would even trouble themselves asking about it, but--because she is game--may identify who taught her about her beliefs. She may point to her parents, her teachers, and her religious leaders as the source of her beliefs. We would have to admit that her answers are correct, but that would mean taking issue with the idea of having to ask the question in a philosophical forum. Every person would have different sources for their beliefs; wouldn’t a survey be a more appropriate venue for the question to be answered, with the forum perhaps used only for the presentation of survey results?
What I am driving at here is that the way the question has been asked has not been helpful for an audience in need of guidance on the ways of philosophy. In a forum with an audience of people already competent in philosophy, then we can assume that everyone will be able to judge whether the question and its answers are philosophical or not. But, in a forum where the audience has little idea about what philosophy is yet, and who hope to learn from the forum what philosophy is, then we have a problem.
The problem will be that they will think that a “where from” question--whether it is about beliefs or something else--is necessarily a philosophical question. And when those who offer answers themselves do not clarify the characteristics that make their answers philosophical, then the audience will leave the forum with no clearer idea about what philosophy is or, worse, with the mistaken idea that philosophy is necessarily answering a “where from” question.
To emphasize the problem that the question really opens up, let us see whether this question about sources of beliefs is exclusive to philosophy or not. Perhaps, we can even try to see whether this question is even philosophical or not.
In a Sociology forum, the question “Where do beliefs come from?” may be asked. Let us go through the process sociologists undertake to arrive at their answers to this question.
Sociologists begin with certain assumptions. One, individuals who are possessors of certain beliefs (i.e., believers) are never born believers. That is, these individuals at birth are innocent of any belief and only came to acquire the beliefs later in life. But, two, these individuals are born into societies made up of social institutions. Three, beliefs pre-date the individuals which acquire them, because such beliefs repose in social institutions. These social institutions are objective reflections of beliefs. Four, individuals acquire beliefs through their interaction with social institutions, a process often called socialization.
Given these assumptions, sociologists will profile believers. They will determine the social background of these believers to locate where each individual is in the social map. They will inventory the beliefs held by these believers, perhaps even to the extent of determining how much belief is attached to these beliefs.
After the profiling, sociologists will determine the amount of interaction that believers have with the social institutions surrounding them. The amount of interaction will specify the social institutions which are dominant or significant sources of beliefs.
Such specifications will lead to a conclusion that validates the assumption that beliefs of individuals come from social institutions. I was born and raised in a Roman Catholic family and neighborhood. I was educated by the Presentation of Mary Sisters and the Jesuit Fathers. That I am a liberal Roman Catholic, therefore, comes as no surprise. My childhood was lived during the Martial Law years and my adolescence was shaped by the Yellow Revolution. As a student of philosophy in two Ateneos, I was oriented into Marxist philosophy and Catholic liberation theology. That I am a democratic socialist also comes as no surprise. The same pattern can be established for everybody else. Though which social institution is dominant as source of belief may not be generalizable; that the sources of belief are social institutions surely is generalizable.
While the sociologist may be satisfied with the sociological answer on sources of beliefs, a dissatisfaction may remain for a more critical audience of the sociological forum. A question may be raised still: “Where do beliefs [embodied in social institutions] come from?” Of course, since the sociologist only assumes, but never asks, this question, he has no answer to offer. The question has to be asked of someone else who attends to this question.
In a History forum, the question “Where do beliefs [embodied in social institutions] come from?” may be asked. Let us go through the process historians undertake to arrive at their answers to this question.
Historians also begin with certain assumptions. One, institutions that, at present, are repositories of certain beliefs have not always existed throughout history. Two, these institutions were only brought into being by a combination of certain historical conditions and factors, which the historian must seek to discover.
Given these assumptions, the historian will traverse the historical distance between the present and the past time when the transition between presence and absence of the belief took place. In the case of my Roman Catholic family, for example, it was a product of my parents having been born and raised in Roman Catholic families themselves, and of my grandparents having been born and raised in Roman Catholic families and so on. But this backtracking will not go on indefinitely. The historian will arrive at a point in history when a Roman Catholic family was not born and raised in a Roman Catholic family, but was instead born and raised, perhaps, in a Muslim family. When this point is reached, the historian will have arrived at the center of his questioning: “Where did the (Roman Catholic) belief [of this particular family] come from [when the normal social institutions identified by the sociologist as sources are not yet present]?”
At that transition point in time, the historian establishes the context and the events that happened. Doing so allows him to survey the possible historical factors that brought about the original acquisition of beliefs. In the case of the Roman Catholic belief of Filipino families, the arrival of the Spaniards into Philippine shores was the significant historical factor. Accompanying the colonizers were priests intent in spreading the Roman Catholic faith to non-Europeans. Upon arrival, these priests were able to attract or even to force the natives to be baptized. Whole families became Roman Catholics together. Another historian interested in where the Protestant belief came from for Filipino Protestant families may identify a later historical moment. That moment would be the arrival of the Thomasites after the American soldiers were able to control the Philippines. They taught their language and culture, and evangelized their religion to the natives. A third historian interested in where the Islamic belief came from for Filipino Muslim families may identify an earlier historical moment, earlier even than that of Roman Catholics. That moment would be the arrival of Muslim imams with the Arab traders. These imams would spread their faith to the natives. The answers may even be pursued further back in time to the very moments when these religions came to establish their respective set of beliefs. Everything after follows from these watershed moments in history.
Such histories will lead to the conclusion that beliefs are acquired because of certain historical factors. Without these historical conditions and events, the beliefs wouldn’t have been established and institutionalized. Then, there wouldn’t have been present social institutions that would socialize individuals to become believers.
While the historian will be satisfied with the historical answers to the sources of beliefs, critical members among the audience would not be fully satisfied. They may raise a further specification of the question of sources: “Where do beliefs come from [when historical sources only identify objective sources, but never really explain the subjective element inherent in beliefs]?” The point of this dissatisfaction is that there is a difference between, on the one hand, being initiated into a religion through rites and doctrines, and, on the other hand, believing those rites and doctrines to be real, true and meaningful to oneself. Indeed, historians themselves have pointed out that there were many instances of baptisms and catechisms that have never led to real conversions. Many were just forced to acquire these beliefs on pain of death; others did so to take advantage of the social or economic or political benefits of conversion. But this new interpretation of the question is outside the historian’s competence anymore. Someone else with a different set of competencies has to address the new question.
In a Psychology forum, the question “Where do beliefs come from?” takes a subjective turn. Let us go through the process the psychologists undertake to arrive at their answers to this question.
Psychologists begin with certain assumptions. One, beliefs require objective stimuli coming from outside sources. Rites and doctrines have to become available to the believer. But, two, for as long as they are simply external, objective stimuli which evoke responses, they are not yet beliefs. So, three, for these external objective stimuli to become beliefs, they must be internalized by the subject. There must be acceptance on the part of the subject that these rites are not just motions one goes through and that these doctrines are not just statements one mouths, but are believed to be signs pointing to a far greater reality, truth and meaning.
Given these assumptions, psychologists seek the subjective (i.e., psychological) conditions that allow for the internalization of the external, objective rites and doctrines into beliefs. Some psychologists seek only for those subjective conditions that transform stimuli into cognitive elements; those conditions that make rituals and statements into beliefs. But for other psychologists, following the Protestant tradition, beliefs are not just known; but must also be felt. Thus, for them, the conditions that transform these cognitive elements into affective elements must also be sought. Finally, there is a group of psychologists, following the Roman Catholic tradition, who seek those conditions that transform both cognitive and affective elements into actionable elements. For them, beliefs are not just known and/or felt, but must be lived.
What these subjective conditions and traits are depend on the psychologist’s school of thought. Freudians, for example, explain the sources of beliefs in terms of the interplay of id, ego and superego. Existential psychologists explain the sources of beliefs differently, that is, as products of the interaction of one’s traits with the givens of human existence. Abnormal interplays generate neurotic beliefs.
Such psychological discoveries will lead to the conclusion that confirms the assumption that institutionalized beliefs become personal beliefs because of subjective conditions. Without these conditions institutionalized beliefs remain external to persons and are not properly beliefs yet.
Let us reflect momentarily on what we have accomplished so far. We have started with the question “Where do beliefs come from?” From the sociological forum, we have learned that beliefs come from social-institutional sources. We have seen, however, that these sociological sources do not fully explain why institutions are repositories of beliefs. From the sociological forum, we have learned that beliefs also come from historical sources. We have seen, however, that these historical sources also do not fully explain why persons become believers. From the psychological forum, we have learned that beliefs also come from psychological sources. From the survey of various fora, we have established three different ways of interpreting the original question.
Is there an interpretation of the question that is left for a philosophical forum to address? In other words, in a philosophical forum on sources of beliefs, what can competence in philosophy contribute to the inventory of answers already offered by sociology, history and psychology?
In failing to be critical in addressing this question, philosophers may just be rehashing--but in an incompetent way--the answers offered in the various fora. They will be repeating the ideas without the benefit of empirical validations that the social scientists are competent to offer. Or philosophers may just be offering an multidisciplinary forum, presenting all the different answers together. There is the danger of a philosophical forum ending up like a sari-sari store, retailing all brands of ideas purchased wholesale from the scientists who produce them, and leaving to customers’ fancy the burden of choice. If a philosophical forum is only a multidisciplinary forum, wouldn’t bringing together sociologists, historians, and psychologists be a better collection than just bringing together philosophers? With that, at least, we get to hear the ideas from the producers of ideas, who can offer evidences and arguments for the ideas they offer; not from sales agents who only rehearsed pitches made by script writers and who have no proof to substantiate their empty words.
If a philosophical forum is not simply an incompetent repetition of other fora, does the philosopher have a unique perspective on the question? What does the philosopher mean by the question about sources of beliefs? Consequently, what kind of answers can the philosopher offer beyond those of other scholars? Answering these questions positively is crucial, otherwise the philosopher may end up as nothing more than a peddler of opinions, never of truth.
At this point, let me assure you that there is a philosophical way of looking at the question on sources of beliefs. There is a philosophical way different from the other ways. That way will be developed in the next section.
Where do beliefs come from? Let me develop three philosophical approaches to this question: the critical, the logico-metaphysical, and the epistemological approaches.
A philosophical approach to this question could take the form of articulating the assumptions of the question. This approach may be called the critical approach. With this question, three assumptions can be articulated. One, such a question can only arise because beliefs are present in the first place. When there are no beliefs, no question about them can arise. Even at the off chance that questions about them may arise, there is no sense in asking questions about what is absent or non-existing anyway. Two, these beliefs are not just present as matters of fact. When they are considered as matters of fact--as always already there--they are just accepted and taken-for-granted. They become questionable when they are more than just matters of fact. Their presence may be questionable because they are scandalous, that is, they should not be present; so we ask about their source to know how to do away with the scandalous presence. If their presence is desired, this presence may be questionable because it cannot be guaranteed; so we ask about their source to ensure that when lost later, we can re-acquire them. Three, these beliefs as not always already present, only became present. That is, before they were present, these beliefs were absent. The absent beliefs became present because they were acquired.
Another philosophical approach arises from this articulation of assumptions. This approach we may label as a logico-metaphysical approach. In this approach, we question the reality of sources of belief. Let me elaborate on this. When a previously absent belief becomes present, we may ask “Where did that belief come from?” A metaphysician entertains three possibilities, two more than what the social scientists entertain. One possibility entertained is that the belief emerged out of nothing. Such a possibility is seldom entertained as it contradicts the logical principle that “out of nothing, nothing comes.” Another possibility entertained is that the belief was generated out of the institution or person. A different way of putting it is that the belief is already there though only as a potential which can develop or grow over time. This possibility is also seldom entertained, because the development of potential still requires external conditions for actualization. The third, more commonly entertained, possibility is that the belief comes from an external source. This possibility is what is assumed by sociology, history and psychology and prompts their search for what this external source is.
A third philosophical approach arises from out of the problem left behind by the psychological approach. Let us call this approach the epistemological approach. In this approach, we question why certain beliefs are accepted while others are not, even when similar sociological, historical and psychological conditions are present. The epistemological approach transforms the question of sources of belief into a question regarding structures of justification. Let me elaborate on that. When belief statements are presented to a subject, they really have the status of claims requiring arguments or reasons or evidences for them to be accepted. Without these justifications, claims have no claim on the subject. Without these justifications, the subject can readily doubt the claims. An example may be that of the claim that one has to be a member of a particular religion to be saved. When confronted with such a claim, the immediate response is not belief but questioning: “Why?” Justifications are answers to the question why. The epistemological concern is that of determining the structure of justifications that strengthen a claim. Does the structure require an infinite set of justifications or a finite set? Infinitists would argue that only an infinite set of justifications will lead to belief. Finitists argue, however, that that set is finite, although they debate whether that finite set is made up of a linear-foundationalist set of justifications or of a nonfoundalist-but-coherent (that is, webbed) set of justifications. Among linear-foundationalists, there is also a debate on whether the fundamental justification is rational (that is, self-evident reasons) or empirical (sensory-evidence). The social scientists are finitists, but are either coherentists or empirical foundationalists.
What we have achieved here is to articulate three ways in which the question about sources of beliefs can be understood philosophically. We saw the critical approach articulate the assumptions of the question. We saw the logico-metaphysical approach entertain whether beliefs come from nothingness, from within, or from an external source. We finally saw the epistemological approach explore whether beliefs are established by an infinite set of reasons, by a finite-contextual set of reasons, by a finite-linear-self-evident reason, or by a finite-linear- sensory evidence.
From these articulations, what may be noticed is that philosophical approaches do not unnecessarily repeat nor compete with the various social-scientific approaches. Instead, they focus their questions on the aspects of the question that the social-sciences only assume. With such focus, philosophy is able to maintain its specific domain even when the sciences have broken away from it and have developed their own domains.
We began with the question “Where do beliefs come from?” We raised the problem that an uncritical and, eventually, superficial approach to the question either ends with an unphilosophical answer or else ends with the mistake that anything is philosophical. To push the problem to a critical juncture, we explored how sociology, history, and psychology would have answered the question. An intermediate reflection forced us to ask whether these social-scientific disciplines have already exhausted the possibilities of the question leaving philosophy to become an unnecessary repetition of any one of these sciences or to become nothing more than an empty organizer of a multidisciplinary forum for these scientific disciplines. The final section, however, allowed us to define once more the unique philosophical approaches to the question about sources of belief. One philosophical approach may be that of looking behind the question to reveal and question the taken-for-granted assumptions. A second philosophical approach may be that of looking at the ultimate, not the immediate nor intermediate, causes. A third philosophical approach may be that of articulating the arguments justifying the acceptance of these beliefs. One last point, in case you missed it, understanding the question, instead of answering it, is itself a fourth philosophical approach. Thus, I close this talk with the hope that I have fulfilled what was promised in the beginning: not to offer an answer to, but only to elaborate on the question. [END]