The basic unit of society, for Confucius, is the family, not the individual, as modern Western philosophers basically extol. Typically Oriental, Confucius sees society as the family grown large, extended. The leaders of society are the parents of the people. They are responsible for their people, as parents are responsible for their children. In return, the people are to be obedient to their leaders, as children are obedient to their parents.

As such, what keeps society together is that which keeps a family together, with some necessary adjustments appropriate for the enlargement. What keeps a family together is a natural affinity for the other. The Chinese term jen captures this affinity better than the English term love. The latter has acquired connotations along the course of human history that do not necessarily promote social unity. There is no exact English translation that fully captures the meaning of jen. It has been translated as reciprocity, love, generosity, humanity, human-heartedness. Many scholars agree that the last translation is closest in meaning to the Chinese jen. To have jen, according to Confucius’ greatest disciple, Mencius, is “to have a heart that cannot bear to see others suffer,” “to have the feeling of commiseration.” Confucius described jen negatively as “not doing unto others what you do not want others to do unto you,” and positively as “doing unto others what you want others to do unto you.” The condition for the possibility of society, therefore, lies on the fundamental other-centeredness of the members of society. As Creel (1971) puts it, “Confucius believed that men are essentially social beings.”

But, the fundamental presence of jen in every person does not automatically guarantee the realization of social harmony. Even discounting the intentional breaking up of society that some members may strive for—crime, revolution, civil war, etc.—social harmony may still not be present, if the possibility of society rests solely on personal initiatives without structural support. A person with the right intention may still unintentionally bring about social chaos, because of ignorance or myopia or short-sightedness. We only have to call to mind the atrocious acts done in the name of love. Creel (1971) pointed out how difficult it would be to live in a world where what happens depends on the intentions of different people alone. There would only be chaos, no society can be maintained.

Human-heartedness, for Confucius, should not be understood in the sense of an unstructured community exercising free love for humanity. He is not promoting a hippie community. Jen should be understood as exercised within the context of a social structure where each member has a necessary part to play, has a proper role. Jen, therefore, must be understood as reciprocity, in the sense that it involves being concerned for the other by ascertaining that one plays one’s part well that the other may play his part well. For the farmer, for example, it means producing food well so that the soldier won’t have to be a farmer to have something to eat, and can thus defend the farmer well for the latter to be able to produce food without interference from enemies. How does one know how to express his jen well?

If society is to be maintained as a reality, the feeling of commiseration has to be complemented, therefore, with li or rules of propriety. Creel (1971) tells us that “Confucius used the term li to stand for the whole complex of conventional and social usage, which he endowed with a moral connotation.” It refers to a list of do’s and don’ts on every area of social interaction. These do’s and don’ts are not simply the written laws, but include unwritten and unarticulated, though practiced, norms. They are codes that cover the whole range from etiquette to ethics, from good manners to right conduct.

Li is the expression of that inner feeling of human-heartedness. To really empathize with others, one’s feeling must overflow from oneself and reach the other through an action that must not be misinterpreted. The possibility of correct interpretation, which assures harmony, can only take place if there is a commonly agreed upon system of actions for corresponding intentions; in other words, only if there are already conventions that every member of society adheres to.

Jen must be accompanied by li, and li must also be accompanied by jen. In the course of handing down conventions, the possibility of li being practiced devoid of jen arises. Customary rituals may be fulfilled without the corresponding intention or meaning present. As such, their performance is simply for the sake of going through the motions required, nothing more. Confucius, according to Creel (1971), rejects such absurd ritualizing mainly “by reasons of common sense and good taste.” Indeed, what’s the point of being correct if one doesn’t understand the basis for their correctness, if one simply does it because one was told to do so? Taken as a whole, the exercise of the rules of propriety that are not founded on a genuine concern for humanity results in society’s loss of meaning, in what the French sociologist Emile Durkheim calls anomie.

This doesn’t mean though that Confucius is willing to settle for the anarchic over empty ritualizing. For Confucius, when faced with the possibility of anarchy, common sense dictates that the rules be followed. As Creel (1971) puts it, for Confucius, it is equally wrong either to withdraw from society or to surrender his moral judgment to it, either to become a recluse or to “follow the crowd.” Durkheim (1951) later pointed out in his magnum opus, On Suicide, how anomie can still lead to anarchy, to a breakdown of social structures, ultimately leading to suicide—individual and social.

As jen is completed by li, so is li founded and made meaningful by jen. Jen naturally moves a person to be concerned for the other; li expresses that concern appropriately, substantiating it, concretizing it. Together, they make up the cardinal virtues upon which social harmony and, therefore, society, is founded. Ω

References:

Creel, Herrlee (1971). Chinese thought from Confucius to Mao Tse-tung. University of Chicago Press.

Durkheim, Emile. (1951). On suicide: A study in sociology. The Free Press.

Wing Tsit Chan (1963). The analects of Confucius. A source book in Chinese philosophy. Princeton University Press.