A paper presented at the Mindanao Philosophy Symposium, 20-22 October 2011, Ateneo de Zamboanga University, Zamboanga City, Philippines.
Some months back, I volunteered to read a paper for this symposium on “Engaged Citizenship.” I had no ready paper for the symposium. I only have a vague idea about the topic. I had to ask what “engaged citizenship” is all about. This paper reflects and shares the result of that search.
The paper will expound on a definition of engaged citizenship offered by Russell J. Dalton of the University of California, Irvine. It will begin by contextualizing the definition amid dominant concepts and current researches on citizenship. Next, it will settle the issue of multiplying concepts of citizenship that engaged citizenship raises. Thirdly, the definition will be constructed within the structure of four elements of citizenship. I will conclude with a more elaborate definition of engaged citizenship than with what I have started.
In “Citizenship and the Transformation of American Society,” Russell J. Dalton (2007) offers a definition of engaged citizenship. “Engaged citizenship,” he tells us, “emphasizes a more assertive role for the citizen, and a broader definition of the elements of citizenship to include social concerns and the welfare of others.” What is immediately noticeable in this definition is that this can never stand alone. It is a definition that can only be developed in reference to another.
Often, Dalton discusses engaged citizenship in relation to the more established “duties-based citizenship.” He did it first in “What’s the Matter with Kids Today?” (2006a). He did it also in “The Two Faces of Citizenship” (2006b). He did it again in “Citizenship Norms and Political Participation in America: The Good News is . . . the Bad News is Wrong” (2006c). He did it a fourth time in “Citizenship and the Transformation of American Society” (2007). He did it, finally, in “Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation” (2008).
Understandably, the discussion of engaged citizenship has to be through duties-based citizenship. Duties-based citizenship, on the one hand, is said to be the traditional notion and understanding of citizenship. In Multicultural Citizenship, Will Kymlicka (1995) distinguishes between duties-based and rights-based citizenship. According to him, the notion of duties-based citizenship traces its ancestry to Aristotle who viewed citizenship “primarily in terms of duties—citizens were legally obliged to take their turn in public office, and sacrificed part of their private life to do so.” Rights-based citizenship, meanwhile, has its roots in “the modern world, influenced by liberalism,” where “citizenship is increasingly viewed as a matter of rights—citizens have the right to participate in public life, but also the right to place private commitments ahead of political involvement.”
The notion of engaged citizenship, on the other hand, as far as I can determine, was developed by Russell Dalton, among others, to describe the notion of citizenship appropriate for the current generation. This was a response to published surveys that the young are less and less concerned with meeting citizenship norms.
These surveys have profiled the American and European youth’s declining political participation and civic engagement. Most often cited is Putnam’s (2000) Bowling Alone and Brookings Institute’s Democracy at Risk (Macedo 2005): “citizens no longer feel it is their duty to actively participate in politics through voting or serving on a jury” (McBeth et al. 2010). According to Dalton (2008), Craig (1996), Dionne (1991), Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002), and Wattenberg (2002) have been proclaiming that “too few of us are voting, we are disconnected from our fellow citizens, we lack social capital, and we are losing faith in our government.” Dalton (2006a) also mentions a “recent study by the American Political Science Association” that “claims that ‘Democracy is at Risk,’ and the young are the source of this angst.”
Against these surveys and proclamations, Dalton (2008) pushes for a different conclusion. He agrees that the public “has undergone profound changes in the past half-century, and this has altered participation patterns and citizens’ relationship with government.” He argues, however, that the prior researches have only “misdiagnosed the process by focusing on only a portion of the political activity, and by mistaking the sources of these changes.” In another work, Dalton (2006a) points out that when there are generational changes, there are also corresponding changes in the norms of citizenship across generations, “producing different patterns of participation and other behavioral consequences.” What is wrong with the studies that decry the seeming lack of political apathy among the young is the “fact that the young may not think of citizenship in the same terms as their elders is presented as evidence that they lack desirable citizenship norms.”
To facilitate the definition of engaged citizenship in relation to duties-based citizenship, the discussion will first settle the issue of whether it would be possible to accommodate a concept of citizenship other than the traditional concept.
Dalton (2008) prefaces his definition of engaged citizenship with the admission that “the exact meaning of citizenship is open to multiple interpretations.” He recognizes that the concept of citizenship has a long history replete with competing voices whose definitions substantially differ from each other: “republicans, liberals, neo-liberals, communitarians, social democrats.” He would not be alone in that recognition, of course.
There are other citizenship scholars who just assume the absence of univocity regarding the concept. Jensen (2010), for example, writes that the concept of citizenship as an “essentially contested concept”; “the notion and understanding of citizenship has changed in recent years.” There have been traditional notions which are “based on rights,” and “the level of citizen involvement is evaluated based upon formal political participation.” But there are also those who claim that the “cultural and emotional aspects of citizenship” are just as important. He himself admits that much of the source of complication has to do with the increasing difficulty in defining “the borders between the political and the non-political.” Galais-Gonzales (2010) claims that the concept is “under permanent construction.” She recognizes, on the one hand, that citizenship is about “the set of rights and duties that stem from membership in a community,” but also recognizes that scholars’ theoretical perspectives have greatly influenced “whether the rights or the obligations matter the most.” She admits to further complications to the definition, like the level of commitment of the women and the youth to a community, “the combination of economic prosperity and generational replacement,” and “major technological evolutions” which “not only bring new skills, but also new systems of logic and ethics whose contents are concomitant to what we call ‘citizenship norms’.” Quinones reminds us also that the contentiousness of the concept of citizenship is not new: the “issue here, as it was originally in Aristotle’s doctrine of citizenship, is whether civic life constitutes a privileged location for the expression of our proper humanity, or whether it ought merely to furnish a procedural framework for more diverse, privately defined activities in which we express our humanity.” He points out that the issue is even one of the core debates in the history of political philosophy: arrayed on one side are the republicans Aristotle, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Hannah Arendt, John Pocock, Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit, Iris Young, and Will Kymlicka; on the other side are the liberals Hobbes, Locke, Hegel, Montesquieu, Hume, Smith, de Tocqueville, Mill, Rawls and Habermas.
Despite the contestations regarding the concept, however, Dalton (2008) still argues that there are four common elements of citizenship shared by all the contesting parties. These are participation, autonomy, social order, and solidarity. These elements may not be present in equal amounts and weights through the various positions, but they are all present in varying amounts and weights.
In defining engaged citizenship, I will use as structure the four citizenship elements that Dalton identifies. I will show that engaged citizenship, like the traditional duties-based citizenship, contains all four elements. I will also show, however, that engaged citizenship differs from duties-based citizenship in the way they manifest the four elements.
These four elements have been operationalized in earlier citizenship surveys. There were the 1984 and 2004 General Social Survey in the United States; the 1987 Swedish Citizenship Survey; the European “Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy” (CID) Survey in the late 1990s; the European Social Survey (ESS) in 2002; and the 2004 International Social Survey Program (Dalton 2006c, 2). There is also the 2005 “Citizen, Involvement, Democracy” survey of the Center for Democracy and Civil Society (CDACS) based in Georgetown University, which replicated and expanded the battery of citizenship questions from the European Social Survey (Dalton 2006c; 2008). Dalton used the operationalizations formulated and the data generated by the 2005 CID survey.
The Element of Participation
According to Dalton (2006, 2008), participation is “a prime criterion for defining the democratic citizen and his or her role within the political process.” He is not alone, of course, in recognizing this as an element of citizenship, nor alone in recognizing its utmost importance. From the time of Aristotle, citizenship scholars have always emphasized this concept. Citizenship is not just passive membership to a group but requires active involvement. Where there are differences is in the way participation is expected from those who are citizens.
For duties-based citizenship, political participation is often only understood as participation in “the deliberation of public policy,” and in “free and fair elections that select government officials” (Dalton 2008). Public policy deliberation often happens in the form of public hearings, of lobbying, or of referenda. Policy proposals are made public and citizens are allowed to express their views and get to vote on the proposals in a referendum. In elections for government officials, citizens either run for office or vote for their candidates for public office. Other forms of electoral participation are the campaigning in the beginning and the counting of the votes in the end.
In the Philippine context, political participation is indeed understood primarily as electoral participation. The right of suffrage that every citizen is proclaimed to have is actually a duty to participate in the political affairs of the state. That this right is a duty is revealed in the withdrawal of that right when the citizen fails to exercise that right of suffrage in three elections, whether national or local; in other words, one’s registration is deleted. This deletion will create legal problems for that person when he pursues other activities that require the state’s support or permission.
Dalton (2008) points out that those “who primarily define citizenship in terms of citizen duty have a circumscribed definition of the active citizen: these norms encourage electoral participation but do not carry to other forms of action, and actually discourage participation in protest.” There is, we may say, a certain conservativeness in this notion of citizenship. After one has casted one’s vote, there may arise an attitude of confidence that one has already performed one’s duty as a citizen and has therefore been a good citizen already. What is missing is the element of critique, of protest.
Part of our political experience is that of having been subjected to electoral exercises which were set-ups. Candidates were set-up by dominant political parties to oppose them, ensuring that there is no real choice for the electorate. The choices of policies were not real choices because they were all various expressions of the same position. Duty-based citizenship does not include and may instead “discourage participation in protest” as activities that are subversive to the state. In Republic Act 9131, also known as the Administrative Naturalization Law, opposition to organized government is the first reason offered for disqualification from citizenship.
Dalton (2008), however, argues that “the range of political participation can be, and should be, much broader” than electoral participation alone. This position is not the traditional political position but is more appropriately attributed to the leftist range of the political spectrum.
For engaged citizenship, participation is “broader than electoral politics” as it also counts extra-parliamentary activities as participation (Dalton 2008). Both the 2004 GSS and the 2005 CID survey offered some operational terms for participation: (1) electoral participation; and in terms beyond voting: (2) active involvement in “social and political associations”; and (3) choosing “products for political, ethical, or environmental reasons” (Dalton 2006; 2008). In those surveys, duties-based citizenship consistently scored higher in electoral participation than in the other terms of participation. On the other hand, engaged citizenship consistently scored lower in electoral participation compared to socio-political involvement and consumer activism.
From these survey data, Dalton (2008) declares that the “engaged citizen is more likely to participate in boycotts, buying products for political or ethical reasons, demonstrations and other forms of contentious actions. These effects are even more striking for internet activism, which is unrelated to citizen duty but strongly related to norms of engaged citizenship.” W. Lance Bennett (2007) has also associated with active and engaged citizenship the “impressive signs of youth civic engagement in nongovernmental areas, including increases in community volunteer work, high levels of consumer activism, and strong involvement in social causes from the environment to economic injustice in local and global areas.” In other words, what used to be activities associated with government opposition are being proposed by Dalton and engaged citizen theorists as activities to be counted as still proper if not required for citizens of good standing.
The Element of Autonomy
The element of autonomy is another essential element of citizenship. Dalton (2008) follows “Robert Dahl (1998) and others [who] have discussed how access to information and the free debate of opinions is essential to produce meaningful democratic participation.” He also cites Denters et al. (2007) who “described such items as representing critical and deliberative aspects of citizenship.” In another place, Dalton (2006c) tells us that autonomy “involves the citizen’s role in being sufficiently informed about government to exercise a participatory role. The citizen should participate in democratic deliberation and discuss politics with other citizens, and ideally understand the views of others.”
The inclusion of autonomy as an element of citizenship “implies that good citizens should be sufficiently informed about government to exercise a participatory role” (Dalton 2008). The insistence on information about government is crucial if participation is not to be blind obedience to the dictates of government. A well-informed citizenry contributes intelligent and fruitful political action.
Furthermore, Dalton (2008) adds that the “good citizen should participate in democratic deliberation and discuss politics with other citizens, and ideally understand the views of others.” Political discourse is not something to be left only to the representatives in government nor to the career politicians. Policy proposals should not simply come from researchers. General will-formation should be the result of a much wider deliberation and discourse among the citizens.
The 2004 GSS operationalizes autonomy in terms of (1) “understanding the reasoning of people with other opinions” and (2) “keeping watch on actions of government” (2006c, 3). The 2005 CID survey limits the operationalization only in terms of “forming one’s own opinions, independently of others.”
In both 2004 GSS and 2005 CID surveys, duties-based citizenship does not strongly relate with forming opinions independent of others, though there is a stronger relation with monitoring government actions. Dalton (2006c) explains that this has to do mainly with the concept’s encouragement of “allegiant behaviors, and a deference to political authorities.” Furthermore, its emphasis on “citizen obligations to the state and participation through elections, may be less accepting of dissenting political views.” This less flexible perception of policies by duties-based citizenship is supported by McBeth et al. (2010).
In contrast, engaged citizenship strongly relates with forming independent opinions. Dalton (2006c) explains that this may have to do with the encouragement of “elite-challenging orientations.” Furthermore, its emphasis on “participation and social responsibilities, may evoke more sensitivity toward challenging political groups and thereby encourage feelings of tolerance.” As McBeth et al. (2010) puts it after their validation research on Dalton’s claims, “engaged citizens are more likely to be open to understanding other views.” They also present “the possibility that if polarization is generally moved forward by those who fall on the extreme ends of the citizenship spectrum, that it may be moved forward more by the duty-based citizens than by engaged citizens.” This last point by McBeth et al. may have to do with duties-based citizens strong adherence to the electoral form of participation, which tends to divide the house and let the majority rule, instead of aiming for more discourse to hear each other out.
The Element of Social Order
The element of “commitment to social order and the acceptance of state authority” are essential elements of citizenship (Dalton 2008; 2006c). He laments that contemporary political theorists sometimes overlook this element. He points out that “democratic governments emphasize the role of the loyal law-abiding individual as a prime criterion of citizenship.” He even argues that “acceptance of the legitimacy of the state and rule of law is often the implied first principle of citizenship, since without the rule of law meaningful political discourse and discussion cannot exist. Finally, he appeals to the authority of political philosophers “who stress the acceptance of state sovereignty—from Bodin to Hobbes to Hamilton—even before the participatory elements of democracy” (Dalton 2008).
Following the 2004 GSS and the 2005 CID survey, Dalton (2006c, 2008) operationalizes social order in terms of (1) not evading taxes, (2) “always obeying the laws and regulations,” (3) “willingness to serve on a jury,” (4) “reporting a crime witnessed,” and (5) “willingness to serve in the military.”
Duties-based citizenship, according to Dalton (2008), “primarily involves norms of social order.” The 2005 CID survey have most strongly related this type of citizenship to social order the following activities: the willingness to report a crime (.84), obedience to the law (.77), military service (.64), and even voting in elections (.56). He justifies the inclusion of “voting in elections” as related to social order by referring to the long tradition of citizenship discussion since Tocqueville.
In the Philippine setting, for example, “obedience to the law” and “military service” are explicitly articulated as duties of the citizen. In the Oath of Allegiance, which is the final act that confers naturalized Filipino citizenship, the applicant swears “to support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and local orders promulgated” and imposes this obligation upon himself voluntarily and without mental resignation. Supporting and defending the Constitution includes serving in the military in times of war, which requires military training for all able-bodied citizens to become a reserve force. There was a time when every high school student and every male college student cannot graduate without undergoing military training. After passing the training, one is immediately enlisted into the reservist force.
In contrast, engaged citizenship does not give much importance to this element. The 2005 CID survey showed that for social order activities, engaged citizenship scored lower by comparison: the willingness to report a crime (.12), obedience to the law (.09), military service (.15), and even voting in elections (.32). This does not mean that there is no appreciation for social order within engaged citizenship; there is only less appreciation of its importance, as may have been anticipated when the protest activities were considered as important.
The Element of Solidarity
Solidarity is the fourth element of citizenship. For Dalton (2008) this “involves our relation to others in the polity.” Proponents of this element, according to Dalton (2008) have been “T.H. Marshall (1992 [1950]) [who] described this as social citizenship”; and Shklar (1991) and Walzer (1983), who both represent liberal interests in America. Dalton (2006) follows Marshall (1992) in recognizing that the inclusion of solidarity as citizenship element allows “a long tradition in European social democracy or Christian socialism that includes a concern for others” to be represented.
The inclusion of solidarity as an element of citizenship is tied up with “the expansion of civil and political rights,” which “led to new categories of social rights, such as social services, providing for those in need and taking heed of the general welfare of others” (Dalton 2008). With more and more of the socially marginalized groups being allowed to participate in the political arena, more and more political support is being introduced into the legal and administrative framework of government. Many governments have also started to recognize the truth of Aristotle’s declaration about the connection between politics and economics. As Dalton (2008) puts it: “Unless individuals have sufficient resources to meet their basic social needs, democratic principles of political equality and participation lack meaning.” But unlike Aristotle, who excluded the economically challenged from political membership on the grounds that they cannot afford, today’s governments have instead opted to shoulder the burden, when they can afford it, of improving their citizens’ welfare. This is true of the welfare states of Europe and the Americas. But how much of this obligation is made part of citizenship norms?
The 2004 GSS and the 2005 CID surveys showed that duties-based citizenship scored very low on the helping others category (16). This definition of citizenship does not see charitable action as a citizen’s duty, even when the recipient of such help are fellow citizens. Of course, this does not mean that individually they are not generous with themselves and their resources. What it means, though, is that they cannot imagine welfare activities as political obligations one can demand from every citizen. Duties-based citizens can possibly imagine that welfare activities are individual acts of charity that are more associated with one’s social life or one’s spiritual life. They can also possibly imagine that welfare activities are more the obligation of the state, which dispenses the help through governmental agencies.
On the other hand, for engaged citizenship, the same surveys showed very high scores (.65) on the helping others category. This definition of citizenship places much emphasis on involvement in improving the lives of others more than involvement in the affairs of the state. Where engaged citizenship differs greatly from duties-based citizenship, however, is in the assertion that such concern for others’ welfare is not just a private choice of action but is really a public form of action.
In the Philippines, we have seen this influence of engaged citizenship in the inclusion of solidarity as a citizenship element in the National Service Training Program (NSTP). The NSTP coopted the Reserved Officers Training Course (ROTC) as the citizenship course for college students. In coopting the ROTC, the NSTP was able to make ROTC as only one of possible citizenship training courses for college students. Aside from ROTC, two other citizenship courses are offered as alternatives. These are the Civic Welfare Training Service (CWTS) and the Literacy-Numeracy Program (LNP). What these two alternative citizenship courses were able to do was to broaden the range of citizenship actions that can be required from citizens: not just the military defense of the nation, but also helping those who have welfare needs or educational needs. Of course, there were some circumventions necessary to justify the CWTS and the LNP as alternative citizenship courses to ROTC. When the government decided to wage war on poverty and on ignorance, then citizens have to prepare themselves for enlistment into such warfare. CWTS is a training program for citizens to be ready to serve the nation in its war against poverty. LNP is a training program for citizens to be ready to serve the nation in its war against ignorance.
We started off with the definition of engaged citizenship as that which “emphasizes a more assertive role for the citizen, and a broader definition of the elements of citizenship to include social concerns and the welfare of others” (Dalton 2007). We developed this definition by contrasting engaged citizenship from duties-based citizenship within the structure of four citizenship elements.
We have seen that this greater assertion required of the citizen has to do with the participation and autonomy of the citizen in relation to the state. Engaged citizenship insists on a more assertive participation for the citizen. In duties-based citizenship, participation is only limited to electoral participation, though the range of activities included here is still wide. Electoral participation may be accomplished from the side of either the ones who run for public office or the ones who vote for those who run. In this definition of citizenship, protest actions and volunteerism are not considered as citizenship activities. They may be welcomed, but they are considered more as private activities. The social impact of these activities does not qualify them to be required action for all citizens. In engaged citizenship, participation is extended beyond electoral participation to include protest actions when the electoral system is deemed defective or, worse, unjust; voluntary involvement in social action and cause-oriented groups; and other forms of nontraditional political action, such as consumer boycotts for political or ethical reasons. Activism and volunteerism are elevated into norms that define a citizen.
Engaged citizenship also insists on a more assertive autonomy for the citizen. In duties-based citizenship, autonomy is limited to being able to form one’s opinion in the midst of competing voices and translate this into a free vote. Engaged citizenship demands, however, that the citizen’s autonomy should even extend to the point of being able to maintain one’s autonomy even while accommodating a plurality of voices. This tolerant accommodation should not weaken the possibility of a principled stand on contentious issues but should only open the possibility of broadening one’s horizons and arriving at consensus.
We have also seen that engaged citizenship, indeed, broadens the definition of citizenship in its extension of citizenship activities to “include social concerns and the welfare of others.” In duty-based citizenship, we have seen that citizenship activities have mainly been limited to electoral participation and to the maintenance of social order. It is a definition of citizenship that exempts citizens from the duty of contributing to social welfare. This does not mean that there is no concern for the society’s welfare within such a definition. It only means, one, that the state does not assume for itself the task of social welfare but leaves it to the individual. It means, two, that the state assumes for itself the task of social welfare but does not extend such a duty to its citizens. In engaged citizenship, however, there is the demand to involve the citizen in the challenge of addressing social welfare, not just leaving the task either to the individuals or to the state alone. Engaged citizenship demands greater and more active involvement in addressing the challenges that the state faces. Ω
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