Cold War in the Congo - Primary Documents

CONTEXT: Patrice Lumumba was born at Onalua, in the Belgian Congo, on July 2, 1925. He failed to complete his schooling before settling in Léopoldville, now Kinshasa, and becoming a postal clerk. While there he became active in the trade union movement and in the Belgian Liberal party. In 1956 he was convicted of embezzlement from the post office and jailed for 12 months. Released, he became a beer salesman, but he was caught up in the nationalist movements that were burgeoning in Africa. In 1958 he founded the Congolese National Movement. When Belgium granted the Congo its independence on June 30, 1960, his party received the largest number of seats in the legislature, and he became prime minister under President Joseph Kasavubu, a political rival.

In the first year of independence, the new nation was in constant turmoil. The army was rebellious, Belgian expatriates were being attacked, and resource-rich province of Katanga province seceded.

Document #1: Notes from Soviet Ambassador to Guinea, P.I. Gerasimov on his discussion with Patrice Lumumba on April 18, 1959

Lumumba…came to the Embassy today….At this time they are preparing to form the future national government of the Congo. “As soon as we come to power,” he said, “we will immediately exchange diplomatic representation with the USSR.”… Lumumba is preparing to establish in the Congo a purely African trade union, independent from European influence.

Lumumba expressed a desire to visit the Soviet Union so that…he would be able to expose anti-Soviet propaganda which is being vigorously spread by the colonial powers. … He hopes that his trip…would not be found out by the Belgian officials.

Further, Lumumba inquired about the question of Soviet institutions of higher education accepting some students from the Congo, who…could compose a nucleus of leading personnel in an independent Congo. … Lumumba also alluded to the desirability of giving financial aid to his party…

I also mentioned that…the African people have a true friend in the Soviet people…

Document #2: U.S. National Security Council* Briefing Notes on various situations in Africa, April 13, 1960

III. Confusion in the Congo may facilitate Communist penetration

A. Roundtable conference in Brussels last January was occasion for Congo politicians to seek outside financial aid for elections. Some delegates visited European satellites and several are believed to have been promised Communist support.

B. Although no known Communists among Congo leaders, [Soviet] Bloc help to persons such as Lumumba may enable Communists to influence policies of independent Congo.

The National Security Council during the Eisenhower Administration

*The U.S. National Security Council is made up of key American leaders such as the U.S. President, Vice President, a number of cabinet secretaries, the Director of National Intelligence, and military staff

Document #3: Telegram from the Embassy in the Congo to the U.S. Department of State, John Tomlinson, July 4, 1960

Lumumba's quick switch from neutrality [between the U.S. and Soviet Union] to expression of seemingly pro-U.S., pro-Western sentiments is typical of this character in suiting his words to his audience. We do not consider that his bid for U.S. and Western aid in any way implies he would not accept aid from Communist countries. Implication in our view is that if we are not here soon with enough aid the Communist will be. Same implication applies to suggestion concerning President's visit in view press reports of Khrushchev's proposed visit to Guinea and Ghana.

Document #4: Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, comment on Soviet attitudes to the Congo’s problems to Soviet TASS news agency while in Washington D.C. July 1960

Patrice Lumumba in London enroute to Washington on June 23, 1960

The Soviet Union has been the only great power which supported the Congolese people in their struggle from the beginning. I express the deepest gratitude of all our people to the Soviet Union and personally to Nikita Khrushchev for the moral support given by your country when we most needed it against the imperialists and the colonialists.

Document #5: United States Government Correspondence, July-August 1960

William Burden, U.S. Ambassador to Belgium; Reply (via telegram) to U.S. State Dept., July 19, 1960

Only prudent, therefore, to plan on basis that Lumumba threatens our vital interests in Congo and African generally. A principal objective of our political and diplomatic action must therefore be to destroy Lumumba government as now constituted, but at same time we must find or develop another horse to back which would be acceptable in rest of Africa and defensible against Soviet attack.

Cable from CIA Station Chief Larry Devlin, Leopoldville, Congo to HQ in Washington D.C., August 18, 1960

Embassy and station believe Congo experiencing classic Communist effort takeover government, many forces at work here: Soviets…Communist Party, ETC. Although difficult determine major influencing factors to predict outcome struggle for power, decisive period not far off. Whether or not Lumumba actually Commie or just playing Commie game to assist his solidifying power, anti-West forces rapidly increasing power Congo and there may be little time left in which to take action to avoid another Cuba.

Lawrence R. Devlin in the early 1960s when he was station chief in Congo.

Document #6: Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency to the U.S. CIA Station in the Congo, August 27, 1960.

In high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if [garble—Lumumba?] continues to hold high office, the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way to Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of U.N. and for the interests of the free world generally. Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of our covert action.

Document #7: Excerpt from USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov and Congolese official Pierre Mulele of the Gizenga government, March 8, 1961.

On behalf of the Soviet Government…[we] present our condolences for the brutal murder of the Congolese people’s hero Patrice Lumumba and his faithful comrades. …

Due to recent events…our Government declared its position on Congolese issues and outlined measures of granting aid to the Republic of Congo…This assistance is comprehensive (arms, technical equipment, medicines, foodstuffs, finances, etc.). The Soviet Government works every day to mobilize international public opinion both through the U.N. and diplomatic channels.

Document #8: Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, December 7, 1962.

To determine the advisability of the U.S. Government’s furnishing additional personnel and logistical support to the CAF (Congolese Air Force).

... In early November 1962 the Katanga Air Force began bombing Congolese National Army troops in North Katanga.

General Mobutu has requested that his five Harvard trainer aircraft now being flown by [less than 1 line not declassified] pilots supplied by CIA, be augmented by more pilots and ground crews, plus spare parts and armament for planes.

The total cost of this undertaking for the recommended three months is [dollar amount not declassified]. CIA can provide [dollar amount not declassified] from programmed funds. The remaining sum of [dollar amount not declassified] has not been programmed within CIA.

General Joseph Mobutu in Léopoldville, September 1960. Mobutu seized power during a power struggle between Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu.

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