A Colombian View of the Panama Canal Question

Much misapprehension prevails in the United States as to the  reasons why Colombia hesitates with regard to the ratification of  the Panama Canal treaty. ...

 The most important matter to be settled with regard to opening the canal is that of exactly defining the status of the party that will carry on the enterprise. It is evident at a glance that there is a wide difference between a private corporation, such as the Compagnie Universelle du Canal de Panama, and the powerful  government of the United States of America. ...

If the substitution of the United States government for the Compagnie Universelle were once effected, and the consequent transference of rights carried out...Colombians would have plausible reasons for misgivings...particularly in a case where a World Power is to be the builder. ...

Let it be well understood that the Colombians–that is, the large majority of those who think and have true patriotic feeling are decidedly favorable to the opening of the canal by the United States, should the negotiations be concluded in a manner that would result in real and lasting good to their country.  ...

Only a constitutional convention, whose members should be expressly elected by the people for that purpose, would be expressly elected by the people for that purpose, would be  empowered to cede territory to another country; but it may be safely stated that in no nation of the world would it be possible to find a set of men to assume such responsibility. The proof of this is that, after the Colombian dictator has himself chosen his own unconditional supporters as members of the Congress about to meet, the feeling exists that these "picked men" will not dare approve the cession of the Panama territory.

It may be cited that France sold Louisiana, and Russia the Alaskan Peninsula, to the United States, but the conditions were very dissimilar. Neither Louisiana nor Alaska was truly an integral part of the actual national territory of France or Russia. Both were distant colonies. Panama is bone of the bone and blood of the blood of Colombia, and has always been her cherished hope. ...

The enlightened classes of Colombia believe that in the Isthmus of Panama their country holds something of value for all time, and they feel that such property is not exclusively their own, but that it is the patrimony of all future generations of Colombians, who will execrate their memory should they squander the national birthright.

The ten millions of dollars that Colombia would receive as the only compensation is considered inadequate, and the same would be the case if the sum were increased to fifty millions. This may sound preposterous on first consideration, but not to those who know that the money would be distributed among the dictator's clique and the religious orders, that it would thus serve but to strengthen the fetters that already cut the Colombian flesh to the bone, and that posterity would only contemplate its heritage turned into deeper ignorance and more ignominious slavery in proportion to the larger amount received.

There is also a very erroneous impression to the effect that the canal when completed will have a great beneficial influence on our country. The conditions as they exist to-day place Colombia in the position of the owner of a bridge, over which an immense traffic is constantly passing. There are many steamship lines converging on the ports of Panama and Colon that load and un load there enormous quantities of merchandise in transit, while large numbers of passengers are compelled to stop at both ends of the trans-Isthmian railroad. All such patronage is very valuable to the Isthmus; and, being terminals, both ports have naturally considerable importance. Such will not be the case when the canal is opened. Steamers will go through as rapidly as possible, the passengers dreading the unhealthy climate. There will be no loading and unloading of cargoes; the ports will no longer be terminals nor perhaps even coaling stations, and they will not have anything else to place on board but the scanty products of their own immediate neighborhood. 

It must be borne in mind that the Isthmus is a strip of land utterly detached from the remainder of Colombia, separated by an immense tract of low, marshy land, which is covered with virgin forests, where not a single road exists, and into which but few explorers have penetrated under the greatest hardships and at the extreme peril of life.

Neither Panama, Colon, nor any other port on the Isthmus leads to any part of the settled regions of Colombia. The country has many ports on both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans which are much nearer the interior and are comparatively easy of access. The only gain with regard to trade and even that is problematical - might be for a strip of land some three hundred miles long and fifty miles wide, situated on the Pacific coast. The productions of that region, entirely tropical and chiefly consisting of chocolate, have already good markets in Chile and on the western coast of the United States, and it remains to be demonstrated that the freight rates through the canal would be low enough to enable the chocolate planters of the Colombian Pacific coast to compete with the Venezuelan product on the Atlantic side. In any case, that narrow Pacific region is the only portion of Colombian territory that could derive advantage from the canal. Every country in the world would be a gainer rather than Colombia.

The facts stated are perfectly well known to Colombians, who from the time of Bolivar have imagined that within the narrow strip linking the two American continents, Colombia held her great trump card. It would be an unspeakable disappointment to them to see that advantage fall into other hands, with no re turn but a few millions of dollars to be employed not for but against their welfare and prosperity. Indeed, so strong is this sentiment that it seems more patriotic to feel that no compensation at all would be preferable. There are many who maintain that a seizure of the Isthmus by a World Power would be more satisfactory, inasmuch as Colombians would be in a position to repeat in all coming years the phrase: "Tout est perdu, fors l'honneur." The rights of Colombia in that case would hold good forever, and the day might come when they would be revindicated ; but no such hope could be entertained if the dishonest band of clericals, who act as the government of Colombia, give a seemingly legal consent to the transaction.

The members of that band are in favor of the canal, not be cause they believe it to be of practical good to their country, and not because they have any love or admiration for the United States, but simply because they see the possibility of securing ten millions of dollars to be applied to their own purposes. ...

What the Colombians would like to do about the canal would be to have their country hold a permanent interest in the enterprise as a partner of the United States, deriving an income that would benefit not a few officials and one political party but all the people for generations to come. ...