We, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past, in this, the Capital of our Ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.
We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow. As to war—our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted[1] our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.
The common understanding which we have reached guarantees that victory will be ours. And to peace—we are sure that our concord[2] will win an enduring Peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations.
Helpful Definitions
[1] Concerted – to act together in harmony
[2] Concord – agreement
Source: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/tehran.htm
Source: British Newspaper, The Daily Mail, illustrated by Leslie Illingworth
For four days…the most important statesmen of our time got together, exchanged views, and took decisions. They achieved complete agreement on the questions relating to the conduct of the war and on the most important problems of the postwar world order. All the peace loving peoples awaited this meeting with hope. Our enemies were terrified of such a meeting…The conference adopted a declaration on the joint conduct of the war against Germany and on the postwar collaboration between the three powers…The common understanding which has been attained between the leaders of the Three powers in the words of the declaration, “guarantees that victory will be ours.”
Source: http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/coldwar/G2/cs1/s4_t.htm
I come from the Crimean (Yalta) Conference with a firm belief that we have made a good start on the road to a world of peace. … There have been instances of political confusion and unrest in these liberated areas—that is not unexpected—as in Greece or in Poland or in Yugoslavia, and maybe more. Worse than that, there actually began to grow in some of these places queer ideas of “spheres of influence”[1] which were incompatible with the basic principles of international collaboration. If allowed to go on unchecked these developments might have had tragic results, in time. …
One outstanding example of joint action by the three major powers was the solution reached on Poland…. We came to the conference determined to find a common ground for its solution, and we did…The new Polish provisional government of national unity will be pledged to hold a free election as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage[2] and a secret ballot.
Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which attacks on Russia have been made. … To insure European security and world peace a strong and independent Poland is necessary to prevent that from happening again. The decision with respect to the boundaries of Poland was quite a compromise…
Helpful Definitions
[1] Sphere of Influence – an area where a stronger power exerts influences and shapes policy
[2] Suffrage – to right to vote in elections
Source: http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16591
On July 24, I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special interest. All he said was he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make “good use of it against the Japanese.”
Source: Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions, 1955.
I do not recall the exact date, but after the close of one of the formal meetings Truman informed Stalin that the United States now possessed a bomb of exceptional power, without, however, naming it the atomic bomb.
As was later written abroad, at that moment Churchill fixed his gaze on Stalin’s face, closely observing his reaction. However, Stalin did not betray his feelings and pretended that he saw nothing special in what Truman had imparted to him. Both Churchill and many other Anglo-American authors subsequently assumed that Stalin had really failed to fathom the significance of what he had heard.
In actual fact, on returning to his quarters after this meeting Stalin, in my presence, told [Foreign Minister] Molotov about his conversation with Truman. The latter reacted almost immediately. “Let them. We’ll have to talk it over with Kurchatov [head of the Soviet atomic bomb project] and get him to speed things up.”
I realized that they were talking about research on the atomic bomb.
It was clear already then that the U.S. Government intended to use the atomic weapon for the purpose of achieving its Imperialist goals from a position of strength in “the cold war.” This was amply corroborated on August 6 and 8. Without any military need whatsoever, the Americans dropped two atomic bombs on the peaceful and densely-populated Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov, The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971) pp. 674-675.