At the bottom of the Kremlin’s[1] neurotic [2] view of world affairs is a traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity…Russian rulers have invariably sensed that their rule was relatively archaic [3] in form, fragile and artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of Western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration, feared direct contact between Western world and their own, feared what would happen if Russians learned truth about the world without or if foreigners learned truth about world within.
Wherever [the Soviets]…consider [it] timely and promising, efforts will be made to advance official limits of Soviet power. For the moment, these efforts are restricted to certain neighboring points conceived of here as being of immediate strategic necessity, such as Northern Iran, Turkey, possibly Bornholm [in Denmark]. However, other points may at any time come into question…
Russians will strive energetically to develop Soviet representation in, and official ties with, countries in which they sense strong possibilities of opposition to Western centers of power. … World communism is like a malignant [4] parasite [5] which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meets. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow…
Helpful Definitions
[1] Kremlin – the building that represents the seat of government in Russia; term is often used in reference to the people in charge of Russia/Soviet Union
[2] Neurotic – to have a distorted, warped perception of reality
[3] Archaic – old, out-of-date, antiquated and often obsolete
[4] Malignant – dangerous or deadly
[5] Parasite – an organism that lives off of another organism
[6] Moscow - capital of the Soviet Union; also used in reference to the government
Source: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-1/kennan.htm
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS
Who was Kennan’s intended audience? How might that have affected his statements?
What did Kennan believe the Soviets feared?
How might that fear have affected Soviet action?
Where did Kennan believe the Soviets would develop “representation” and “official ties”?
What advice did Kennan give regarding future American actions?
GROUP RESPONSE: If a Russian read this document, how do you think he/she might respond? Explain.