Different senses of phenomenology in Wittgenstein’s philosophy in 1929

Different senses of phenomenology in Wittgenstein’s philosophy in 1929

David Charles Madureira do Nascimento (UFMG)

The present text analyses the different senses attributed to the phenomenological project developed by Wittgenstein in 1929, seeking to articulate it with the limitations of the Tractatus. A first step in examining these distinct views is to establish sufficient criteria to form a correct interpretation, or to correctly structure the debate on the subject. 

Among the main criteria for determining the most appropriate view is the explanation of the function and nature of the phenomenological language. These elements give rise to Wittgenstein’s internal motivations for constructing the project and the way in which it fits into a dialogue with Tractatus and his Philosophical Remarks. A correct reading is expected to show the role of symbolism and how it excludes nonsense (I follow Engelmann, M.L., What does a Phenomenological Language Do?, 2017). Among the views highlighted below, symbolic minimalism stands out for capturing this compatibility between periods and for adhering to these criteria – this is what gives the reading its prominence.

It is therefore hypothesized that the issues concerning visual space played a pivotal role during Wittgenstein’s transition period. On the one hand, they erected insurmountable obstacles to the Tractarian symbolism; on the other hand, they provided the foundation for Wittgenstein’s initial forays into phenomenological investigation. These inquiries manifest themselves in the phenomenological language project, which initially emerged as a complement to the symbolism of the Tractatus.

At the onset, Wittgenstein’s position was that the elimination of nonsense from language necessitated a symbolism capable of completely determining the analysis. However, this will not be the case at the end of 1929, as Wittgenstein will abandon the project and the need for a complete symbolism. 

The objective of the phenomenological language is twofold. The first one is to present the rules that justify and explain the exclusion of some nonsense structures, and second is to show more precisely how its sense can be determined. In that case, the construction of a symbolism that logically determines the nature of incompatible propositions – namely, propositions of color – will be employed (ibid.). This construction is predicated on an analysis of phenomena, and the symbolism that emerges from this scenario is, in principle, no different from that of the Tractatus. In this case, the logic must also take care of itself (Cf: Tractatus, 5,473). This interpretation disregards the perspective that the use of phenomenological language would pose a threat to logic.

Despite the ongoing discourse surrounding the scope and particularities of symbolic devices, their fundamental nature is widely acknowledged. It is not difficult to find out in the literature an answer to the question for the nature of the Tractatus’ symbolism. But in the case of the phenomenological or primary language, there is no univocal answer about the nature of this notation, except for those views that take the project as specific notations for colors.

In reality, a plurality of definitions of the phenomenological language is evident: a project for maintaining Tractatus; an implicit project operating within the Tractatus logical point of view; or a project born from the dissatisfaction with the Tractatus' alternative to color problems.

Besides the plurality, the phenomenological language, despite its preoccupation with phenomena, should not be construed as anything other than a genuinely logical interest characterized by notations formulated to address issues with colors. I follow Engelmann (ibid.) in arguing that the notations in question correspond to the octahedron and the system of coordinates. These devices fulfill the role of eliminating nonsense from language by demonstrating what is possible to say with sense (MS 105, 36). Both of them make explicit the rules of logic that underlies the structure of ordinary language.