This project explores the American motivations and competing interests in carrying out the coup against Iranian Prime Minister Mohamed Mosaddeq in 1953. Mosaddeq's nationalization of the Ango-Iranian Petroleum Corporation triggered a crisis that nearly led to war between the United Kingdom, the company's majority shareholder, and Iran. The U.S. initially acted as a mediator, but as the crisis dragged on, U.S. policymakers fears of an internal communist or Soviet takeover of Iran increased due to the collapsing Iranian economy. Traditionally, scholars have argued that the U.S.'s motivation behind authorizing the CIA coup was either an imperialistic oil-grab for American corporations or an act of Cold War strategy to prevent communist advancement. Using a variety of Iranian and American primary and secondary sources, I argue that oil security and Cold War strategy were inseparable in the minds of U.S. policymakers, particularly at the presidential cabinet level. The fall of China to communism, the ongoing Korean War, and the second Red Scare pressured American policymakers to appear tough on communism and overthrow a democratically-elected leader at the same time that the U.S. claimed to be promoting democracy abroad. In the case of war with the Soviet Union, the U.S. saw Iran's oil as a strategic resource, and it was willing to compromise its stated values to ensure its protection. The coup's legacy has plagued U.S.-Iranian relations since 1979, and in many ways, reflects a shift in the U.S.'s perceived role in the Middle East.

Mikhail Faulconer would like to thank their faculty sponsors Dr. Mark Ruff and Dr. Torrie Hester for support with this project.