Embedded Files
[Rachel Elizabeth Levinson (born 1952)]
https://isearch.asu.edu/profile/837335
Date unknown
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Wikipedia 🌐 NONE
Wikipedia 🌐 NONE
Whitepages Directory info for Rachel E Levinson
Whitepages Directory info for Rachel E Levinson
Born April 16 1952
Resident : Potomac, Maryland
Married to - Dr. Randall Lawrence Kincaid (born 1951) ( see [HD003M][GDrive] )
Basic Resume
Basic Resume
https://www.nsf.gov/oirm/bocomm/bios/rlevinson.pdf
Ms. Rachel Elizabeth Levinson Executive Director, National Research Initiatives Arizona State University A twenty five-year veteran of science policy at the national level, Rachel Levinson is the Executive Director of National Research Initiatives for Arizona State University, operating in the university’s Washington, D.C. office. She came to ASU in 2005 as the director of the Government and Industry Liaison Office for the Biodesign Institute at Arizona State University. Levinson heads an office responsible for developing policies and strategies that advance the University’s research agenda. Prior to coming to ASU, Levinson was with the Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President of the United States, where she was the assistant director for life sciences, while on detail from the Office of the Director of the National Institutes of Health. In this capacity, she identified science and technology priorities, developed and advocated Administration objectives, and resolved policy issues in life sciences focusing on laboratory biosecurity, bioterrorism preparedness, biotechnology, biomedical research and technology development and transfer. Levinson began her career as a biologist for the National Cancer Institute within the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and later moved into the policy arena. She advanced to positions at NIH including deputy director of the NIH Office of Recombinant DNA and senior policy advisor in the Office of Technology Transfer. Levinson earned her B.S in Zoology from the University of Maryland at College Park, and her M.A in Science, Technology and Public Policy from George Washington University, School of Public and International Affairs.
BioDefenseCommission.org : Rachel Levinson, MA - Director, National Research Initiatives, Arizona State University
BioDefenseCommission.org : Rachel Levinson, MA - Director, National Research Initiatives, Arizona State University
https://biodefensecommission.org/teams/rachel-levinson-ma/
2021-10-biodefensecommission-org-teams-rachel-levinson-ma.pdf
2021-10-biodefensecommission-org-teams-rachel-levinson-ma-img-1.jpg
A twenty five-year veteran of science policy at the national level, Rachel Levinson is the Executive Director of National Research Initiatives for Arizona State University, operating in the University’s Washington D.C. center and reporting to the Vice President for Research Development. Levinson is responsible for development of relationships, intelligence and strategies that advance the University’s research agenda and connect faculty with appropriate federal agencies. Prior to coming to ASU, she served as the assistant director for life sciences, Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Executive Office of the President of the United States, while on detail from the Office of the Director of the National Institutes of Health. Levinson earned her BS (Zoology) from the University of Maryland at College Park, and her MA (Science, Technology and Public Policy) from George Washington University, School of Public and International Affairs.
Experience
Experience
Arizona State University
Executive Director, National Research Initiatives, Office of Knowledge Enterprise Development ( May 2005 – Present / 16 yrs 6 mos )
Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Assistant Director for Life Sciences ( 1993 – 2005 / 12 yrs )
Office of the Director, National Institutes of Health. Office of Technology Transfer
Senior Policy Advisor ( 1992 – 1993 / 1 yr )
Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
Assistant Director for Life Sciences ( 1989 – 1992 / 3 yrs )
EVIDENCE TIMELINE
EVIDENCE TIMELINE
1985 - BOOK REVIEW
1985 - BOOK REVIEW
1985-03-bioscience-vol35-no3-science-and-policy-time-for-dialogue-levinson-fudenberg.pdf
https://sci-hub.se/10.2307/1309870
Science and Policy: Time for DialogueBiomedical Institutions, Biomedical Funding, and Public Policy by H. H. FudenbergReview by: Rachel E. Levinson and Michael A. StotoBioScience, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Mar., 1985), pp. 185-186Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Institute of Biological SciencesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1309870 .
1988 HIV workshop
1988 HIV workshop
1988 (Dec 09) - Human Gene Therapy Subcomittee
1988 (Dec 09) - Human Gene Therapy Subcomittee
https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/hum.1993.4.5-653?journalCode=hum
To cite this article:
Human Gene Therapy.Oct 1993.653-658.http://doi.org/10.1089/hum.1993.4.5-653
Published in Volume: 4 Issue 5: March 19, 2008
1989 (April)
1989 (April)
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-1989-04-26/pdf/FR-1989-04-26.pdf
1991
1991
https://books.google.com/books?id=SncTAAAAIAAJ&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
John Zebulon Levinson, 76, a professor emeritus at the University of Maryland who applied the principles of physics to the study of the brain and visual perception, died of a stroke Aug. 16 at the Washington Adventist Hospital in Takoma Park.
Dr. Levinson, a resident of College Park, was born in the Ukraine. He grew up in Toronto and graduated from the University of Toronto, where he later earned a doctorate in physics and spectroscopy. During World War II, he served in the Canadian Army.
In 1948, Dr. Levinson moved to the United States. He did research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and taught at Alfred University in Alfred, N.Y. In 1956, he settled in Morristown, N.J., and went to work at Bell Laboratories.
His work there included the use of linear systems theory to analyze the way the brain perceives flickering lights such as television screens, movies, fluorescents and other complex displays.
In 1971, Dr. Levinson joined the faculty of the University of Maryland. He taught in the psychology department until he retired in 1986.
Dr. Levinson was a member of the Optical Society of America and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
His first wife, Esther Levinson, died in 1975. His second wife, Rita Levinson, also died.
Survivors include his wife, Ruth Sherman Levinson of College Park; three children by his first marriage, Valerie Frankfeldt of New York City, Rachel Levinson of Potomac and Karen Gaughan of Arlington; two stepdaughters, Elizabeth Sherman of Washington and Judith Sherman of Baltimore, and two grandchildren.
1996 (Jan/Feb)
1996 (Jan/Feb)
https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/abs/10.1089/blr.1996.15.17?journalCode=blr
https://sci-hub.se/10.1089/blr.1996.15.17
blr-2171-bioethicsbill-clintongene-patenting-1996.pdf
1999 - Assisting with nominations for a new "bioethics branch" in the USA Executive Branch
1999 - Assisting with nominations for a new "bioethics branch" in the USA Executive Branch
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/textonly/WH/EOP/OSTP/html/0014_9.html
National Bioethics Advisory Commission Membership
AGENCY: Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP).
ACTION: Request for Nominations.
SUMMARY: The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) is requesting nominations of candidates for consideration for membership on the National Bioethics Advisory Commission within the Executive Branch. The Commission considers issues of bioethics arising from research on human biology and behavior, and the applications of that research
DATES: Nominations must be received on or before December 10, 1999.
ADDRESSES: All nominations should be sent by mail to: Bioethics Docket, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Room 436, OEOB, Washington, D.C. 20502, or by FAX to:
202-456-6027.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
By mail: Rachel E. Levinson, Assistant Director for Life Sciences, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Room 436, OEOB, Washington, D.C. 20502. Office telephone number:
202-456-6130.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On October 3, 1995, the President signed Executive Order 12975, establishing the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), to consider bioethical issues arising from research on human biology and behavior, including clinical research, and the applications of such research. The Commission, a panel of non-government experts in the relevant scientific disciplines, law, philosophy and theology, as well as community representatives, provides advice and recommendations to the Federal government. The Commission reports to the President's National Science and Technology Council and operates under the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act. The Commission's purview includes the appropriateness of departmental, agency, or other governmental programs, policies, assignments, missions, guidelines, and regulations as they relate to bioethical issues arising from research on human biology and behavior, and applications of that research. The Commission is not responsible for the review and approval of individual projects.
The charter for NBAC charges the Commission to consider issues in the protection of the rights and welfare of human research subjects, and issues in the management and use of genetic information, including but not limited to, human gene patenting. The Commission is also charged with the responsibility to consider current and prospective issues pertinent to the conduct of research on human biology and behavior, identifying broad, overarching principles to govern the ethical conduct of such research. The Commission has the authority to establish its own priorities and agenda, in accordance with four criteria described in the charter, and subject to the approval of the National Science and Technology Council.
Criteria for members
The National Bioethics Advisory Commission consists of 18 members, including the Chairperson. Its members are appointed by the President, who shall select from knowledgeable non-Government experts and community representatives with special qualifications and competence to deal effectively with bioethical issues of concern to the participating departments and agencies. With the exception of community representatives, nominees should have expertise in at least one of the following areas: (i) bioethics/theology; (ii) social/ behavioral science; (iii) law; (iv) medicine/allied health professions; and (v) biological research. Members shall be appointed for two-year terms. Members may be compensated at a rate not to exceed the maximum pay authorized by 5 U.S.C. 3109, plus per diem and travel expenses as in accordance with standard government travel regulations.
Nomination Procedures
Interested persons may nominate one or more qualified individuals for consideration for membership on the Commission. The nominee's mailing address, telephone number, and curriculum vitae must accompany the nomination.
Barbara Ann Ferguson
Administrative Officer
Office of Science and Technology Policy
3170-01 OSTP
October 4, 1999
2000 (March 15)
2000 (March 15)
Full newspaper page : [HN01QQ][GDrive]
Also in https://www.newspapers.com/image/740772788/ - https://www.newspapers.com/image/740772950/?terms=%22rachel%20levinson%22&match=1
2002 (Dec 27) - NYTimes : "THREATS AND RESPONSES: LABORATORIES; After 9/11, Universities Are Destroying Biological Agents"
2002 (Dec 27) - NYTimes : "THREATS AND RESPONSES: LABORATORIES; After 9/11, Universities Are Destroying Biological Agents"
By Diana Jean Schemo (NOTE : Author was wife of Dr. Roger Gerrard Breeze (born 1946) , director of Plum Island Animal Disease Center )
As federal officials search for more powerful tools to investigate biological terrorism, universities across the country are destroying collections of laboratory agents crucial for understanding how biological weapons work and tracing their sources.
New federal laws require only that such biological materials be registered, but many universities are pressing researchers to clean out their freezers and destroy materials they are not currently working on.
While there is no official count of how many biological specimens have been destroyed, concern that laboratories have gone overboard prompted the White House to ask institutions, through the American Society of Microbiologists, to reconsider their haste in doing away with specimens that could prove ''difficult or impossible to replace,'' said [Rachel Elizabeth Levinson (born 1952)], of the White House Office on Science and Technology Policy.
''Obviously, these materials are valuable as research tools, and in terms of developing countermeasures should these agents be used as weapons, or if there's an unintentional natural outbreak,'' Dr. Levinson said. ''They're valuable research tools, and we would not like to see them destroyed.''
Under laws enacted since last year's anthrax mailings, which killed five people, research institutions, clinical and diagnostic laboratories must inventory and register the presence of 61 select agents that could be used to make biological weapons, including ebola, herpes B, smallpox and a variety of toxins. The materials must be kept under lock and key, with access to them restricted to people cleared by government background checks. Scientists must also demonstrate a ''bona fide research purpose'' for working with a given material.
The problem appears to lie in conflicting messages from Washington and in overly zealous compliance with the new laws on select agents, said Ronald Atlas, president of the American Society of Microbiologists. The prosecution of Tomas Foral, a University of Connecticut scientist arrested after he pocketed an anthrax specimen in cleaning out a laboratory freezer, caused many researchers to think twice, Dr. Atlas recalled.
''Many say Tomas Foral at Connecticut was a clear message from the Justice Department to the scientific community: If you can't justify having it, clear it out,'' Dr. Atlas said. ''When you have these criminal penalties hanging over your head, you ask, 'Why should I be the one to bear that legal risk?' ''
The most spectacular example of the wholesale destruction of specimens came last year, when Iowa State University at Ames destroyed its entire collection of anthrax specimens. The university acted after an Ames strain was tied to the fatal anthrax letters, and with the criminal investigation in full swing.
John McCarroll, a spokesman for Iowa State, said copies of the anthrax strains that were destroyed existed elsewhere, but other scientists disagree. They maintain that recent advances in genetic engineering have shown that families of strains that appeared the same were, on closer inspection, quite different. Mr. McCarroll said that more recently, Iowa State had asked researchers to destroy select agents that they were not ''currently working on.''
Few universities have gone so far as to order the elimination of specimens outright. Rather, in conducting inventories of biological agents, most have urged researchers to consider seriously, and justify, their need for sensitive materials. Some describe the procedure as good ''housekeeping,'' saying as a matter of principle, dangerous materials not immediately needed should be discarded.
At the University of Pennsylvania, the new laws on select agents has prompted not just housekeeping, but also soul searching, said Matthew Finucane, director of environmental health and radiation safety.
''If they don't have a mission for the material, people are disposing of it,'' Mr. Finucane said.
At Duke University, the discovery of a select agent was grounds for an ''internal audit,'' said Wayne Thomann, the university's director of occupational and environmental health. If they were ''historical stocks'' and researchers could not come up with a current need for the agents, Mr. Thomann said, ''we went through a process of controlled destruction.''
''I can't give any exact numbers,'' he said, ''but it was a fair number that decided there wasn't a real research benefit in maintaining this stuff.''
Harvard University did not suggest researchers destroy agents, but R. John Collier, a biochemist who works on anthrax there, said he had taken it upon himself last year to destroy the only strain he had on hand ''to avoid attracting terrorists and more of the press than I wanted.''
But policies that make sense in other contexts, like discarding old samples, are madness when it comes to scientific research, said Steven Block, a physics and biology professor at Stanford University.
Dr. Block said past strains of anthrax were essential for understanding how quickly an organism altered itself in nature.
''So much you can learn by knowing the evolutionary biology of bacteria,'' he said, ''but you can't research that evolutionary biology if you can't look at the past versions of it. It's the connectedness of all this that's so important.''
[Dr. Walter Ian Lipkin (born 1952], director of the Center for Immunopathogenesis and Infectious Diseases at Columbia University, said, ''What you're discarding is access to materials and intellectual property you may need downstream.''
Dr. Lipkin is investigating what causes diseases like autism and cancer, and relies on comparing genetic sequences in as many specimens as possible. ''This will definitely interfere with our work,'' he said.
He noted that in the 1990's accusations arose that American scientists had introduced the AIDS virus, H.I.V., to Africa through earlier research infecting monkeys with polio. The scientific community was only able to disprove the theory conclusively by turning over the 40-year-old cells for independent scrutiny.
Dr. [Rachel Elizabeth Levinson (born 1952)], at the White House, said that if institutions really felt intimidated by the new rules, they should transfer the materials to a laboratory willing to accept them.
Others have said the administration should have created such a repository to accept materials that laboratories felt compelled to discard. And many fear that it may take time to repair the harm that is being done.
''I would hope that we could recover from any deleterious effect in the long run,'' said Barbara Johnson, president of the American Society of Biological Safety. ''But if you had a unique sample that no one had replicates of, that sample's gone.''
2003 (Feb 16) - NYTimes : "THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE SCIENTISTS : THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE SCIENTISTS; Journal Editors to Consider U.S. Security in Publishing"
2003 (Feb 16) - NYTimes : "THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE SCIENTISTS : THREATS AND RESPONSES: THE SCIENTISTS; Journal Editors to Consider U.S. Security in Publishing"
By Amy Harmon / Feb. 16, 2003 / Source : [HN01QX][GDrive]
More than 20 leading scientific journals have made a pact to censor articles that they believe could compromise national security, regardless of their scientific merit.
The policy, announced yesterday at a scientific meeting in Denver, is one of the first concrete steps to emerge from a fierce debate over how to balance the ethic of openness that has long been the foundation of American science with calls from some government officials for greater secrecy after the anthrax attacks in 2001.
''We recognize that on occasion an editor may conclude that the potential harm of publication outweighs the potential societal benefits,'' reads a statement endorsed by the journals' editors, as well as some scientists and Bush administration officials. ''Under such circumstances, the paper should be modified or not be published.''
The journals Science, Nature, The Proceedings of the National Academy of Science and several others -- which together constitute a primary vehicle for spreading scientific research around the world -- plan to publish editorials supporting and explaining the policy this week.
Some prominent scientists called the policy a significant step in the wrong direction. Journal editors, critics argue, have no reliable way to evaluate what information would do more harm than good. Research viewed as dangerous, they say, may be the most likely to stimulate new defenses against biological threats and natural diseases.
''I've studied these things for 50 years, and I couldn't make that judgment, and I don't see how editors of journals can either,'' said Dr. Stanley Falkow, a microbiologist at Stanford University. ''The job of journals is to judge the scientific quality of things, not to act as people who censor or make these kind of decisions, which are more political than they are scientific.''
Dr. Falkow called bioterrorism a serious threat, but added that agreeing to some restrictions could lead to demands for more. ''I'm waiting for someone to say, 'Let's not release any genomic information' '' on potentially dangerous infectious agents, he said, ''because that might help bioterrorists.''
''Ignorance is not a good defense,'' he said. ''Knowledge is.''
But journal editors, in announcing the new policy at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, said scientists had to hold themselves accountable for the dissemination of powerful information that can be used for good and evil.
Unlike nuclear physics, where research that is viewed as dangerous is classified, biological research is largely unclassified, the editors point out, so the logical place to restrict information is at the point of publication.
''I don't want to be responsible for the deaths of Americans or anyone else,'' said Dr. Ronald M. Atlas, president of the American Society of Microbiology and one of the strongest proponents of the policy. ''I don't want to be the one that publishes 'Here's how to weaponize anthrax' and find someone tomorrow used that and killed hundreds of thousands of people. I want responsibility on the part of the scientific community.''
There is little consensus on the practical effects of the new policy. Some scientists said a paper showing how to weaponize anthrax would probably not be published regardless, since it would not be seen as groundbreaking science.
And even editors who advocate the new policy said the paper that prompted much of the discussion that led to it -- one that showed how to synthesize the polio virus from ordinary chemicals -- would not have been withheld, because the benefits of the research far outweighed any risk that it might aid terrorists.
Participants said part of the motivation to act even in the absence of a solid example was encouragement from Bush administration officials who attended a Jan. 9 meeting convened by the National Academy of Science and the Center for Strategic and International Studies to discuss ''Scientific Openness and National Security.''
At the meeting, the White House science adviser, John H. Marburger, endorsed openness, but warned that ''society expects its government to take reasonable steps against bioterrorism.'' Others cautioned that in the absence of a self-monitoring plan, Congress could try to legislate one. Several administration officials, including Rachel Levinson from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, attended a private meeting of journal editors the next day, when the policy was first drafted.
''We were warned at the conference that if we don't watch out the government could misunderstand our work and put the screws on,'' said Dr. Eckard Wimmer, a microbiologist of the State University of New York at Stony Brook, who signed the statement. ''For this reason I think it is very important that we do something to avoid such damaging action by the government.''
It was Dr. Wimmer's paper showing how to synthesize the polio virus, published by Science online last July, that prompted criticism in the news media and Congress, helping to catalyze the debate over publishing and censorship.
Editors said that while Dr. Wimmer's article theoretically suggested strategies for making biological weapons -- along with a few other similarly controversial ones -- they offered valuable insights into how these pathogens work and how the immune systems respond to them, and describe methods that will help scientists understand infectious diseases and develop new treatments for them.
The statement from the coalition of editors stresses the importance of open communication in science. Many said they expected withholding a paper from publication would happen only in extremely rare circumstances. The American Society for Microbiology, whose 11 journals have already instituted such a policy, said only 2 papers out of 14,000 had been flagged since December 2001, and both were likely to be published in modified form.
But critics of the policy say even a hint of censorship could have a chilling effect on researchers whose progress depends on open communication and the ability to test and replicate each other's work. Scientists, they say, are far less likely to start important research on dangerous pathogens if they worry that journal editors might refuse to publish it.
''Encouraging editors to bar publications will do nothing to protect us from the real threats of bioterrorism,'' said Michael B. Eisen, a biologist at Lawrence Berkeley National Lab and co-founder of Public Library of Science, a new venture devoted to open scientific publishing. ''Instead, this could stifle exactly the kinds of research and ideas that are most likely to yield new defenses.''
2010
2010
https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/617148
SLIDES ARE AVAILABLE !!! https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/Eddy-Sequence-based_classification_of_Select_Agents.pdf
2010-usa-national-acadfemies-eddy-sequence-based-classification-of-select-agents.pdf
NEWS RELEASE 3-AUG-2010
Select agents should be defined by DNA sequence in today's era of synthetic biology
Select agents should be defined by DNA sequence in today's era of synthetic biology
NATIONAL ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE
WASHINGTON -- A DNA sequence-based system to better define when a pathogen or toxin is subject to Select Agent regulations could be developed, says a new report from the National Research Council, which adds that this could be coupled with a "yellow flag" system that would recognize requests to synthesize suspicious sequences and serve as a reference to anyone with relevant questions, allowing for appropriate follow-up.
Select Agents are defined in regulations through a list of names of particularly dangerous known bacteria, viruses, toxins, and fungi. However, natural variation and intentional genetic modification blur the boundaries of any discrete Select Agent list based on names. Access to technologies that can generate or "synthesize" any DNA sequence is expanding, making it easier and less expensive for researchers, industry scientists, and amateur users to create organisms without needing to obtain samples of existing stocks or cultures. This has led to growing concerns that these DNA synthesis technologies might be used to synthesize Select Agents, modify such agents by introducing small changes to the genetic sequence, or create entirely new pathogens. Amid these concerns, the National Institutes of Health requested that the Research Council investigate the science and technology needed to replace the current Select Agent list with an oversight system that predicts if a DNA sequence could be used to produce an organism that should be regulated as a Select Agent.
The committee that wrote the report found that replacing the current list of Select Agents with a system that could predict if fragments of DNA sequences could be used to produce novel pathogens with Select Agent characteristics is not feasible. However, it emphasized that for the foreseeable future, any threat from synthetic biology and synthetic genomics is far more likely to come from assembling known Select Agents, or modifications of them, rather than construction of previously unknown agents. Therefore, the committee recommended modernizing the regulations to define Select Agents in terms of their gene sequences, not by their names, and called this "sequence-based classification."
The committee was concerned that a dedicated research agenda to improve prediction of Select Agent properties from gene sequence could actually empower those set on misusing synthetic biology, and therefore argued against such security-driven research.
A sequence-based classification system could be used to determine if a DNA sequence might be hazardous and close enough to that of a listed Select Agent -- although not falling within the criteria -- to raise a cautionary alert or "yellow flag," the report says. This could help address biosafety goals in addition to biosecurity. For instance, a DNA synthesis company might use the system's database to screen their orders and investigate who placed a questionable order and why. The committee emphasized that the system would not be regulatory in nature but intended to serve as a resource for information sharing that would not restrict access to the sequence.
Although the sequence-based classification system could be developed and may improve the current practice, the committee noted that such a system does have limitations and potential negative consequences. Therefore, the committee did not specifically recommend that either the classification or yellow flag system be implemented, nor did it address whether the additional administrative structure needed to maintain such a classification system would be justified. Rather, it provided information about what is technologically feasible and emphasized that the potential benefits of such a system should be considered and weighed against the cost and complexity of implementation.
###
The report was sponsored by the National Institutes of Health. The National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, and National Research Council make up the National Academies. They are independent, nonprofit institutions that provide science, technology, and health policy advice under an 1863 congressional charter. Committee members, who serve pro bono as volunteers, are chosen by the Academies for each study based on their expertise and experience and must satisfy the Academies' conflict-of-interest standards. The resulting consensus reports undergo external peer review before completion. For more information, visit http://national-academies.org/studycommitteprocess.pdf. A committee roster follows.
Copies of SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION OF SELECT AGENTS: A BRIGHTER LINE are available from the National Academies Press; tel. 202-334-3313 or 1-800-624-6242 or on the Internet at HTTP://WWW.NAP.EDU. Reporters may obtain a copy from the Office of News and Public Information (contacts listed above).
[ This news release and report are available at HTTP://NATIONAL-ACADEMIES.ORG ]
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
Division on Earth and Life Studies
Board on Life Sciences
COMMITTEE ON SCIENTIFIC MILESTONES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GENE SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM FOR OVERSIGHT OF SELECT AGENTS
JAMES W. LEDUC (CHAIR)
Professor of Microbiology and Immunology,
Chair in Global Health, and
Associate Director
Galveston National Laboratory
Medical Branch
University of Texas
Galveston
RALPH BARIC
Professor
Department of Epidemiology and Department of Microbiology and Immunology
University of North Carolina
Chapel Hill
ROGER G. BREEZE
Chief Executive Officer
Centaur Science Group
Washington, D.C.
R. MARK BULLER
Professor
Molecular Microbiology and Immunology Department
School of Medicine
Saint Louis University
St. Louis
SEAN EDDY
Group Leader
Janelia Farm Research Campus
Howard Hughes Medical Institute
Ashburn, Va.
STANLEY FALKOW 1,2
Professor
Department of Microbiology and Immunology
Stanford University
Stanford, Calif.
RACHEL E. LEVINSON
Director of Special Projects and Research Initiatives
Office of Vice President for Research and Economic Affairs
Arizona State University
Washington, D.C.
JOHN MULLIGAN
Chairman and Chief Scientific Officer
Blue Heron Biotechnology
Bothell, Wash.
ALISON D. O'BRIEN
Professor
Microbiology Department
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences
Bethesda, Md.
FRANCISCO OCHOA-CORONA
Assistant Professor
Entomology and Plant Pathology
Oklahoma State University
Stillwater
JANE S. RICHARDSON 1,2
James B. Duke Professor
Department of Biochemistry
Medical Center
Duke University
Durham, N.C.
MARGARET RILEY
Professor
Department of Biology
University of Massachusetts
Amherst
TOM SLEZAK
Program Leader
Global Security Program
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Livermore, Calif.
RESEARCH COUNCIL STAFF
INDIA HOOK-BARNARD
Study Director
1 Member, National Academy of Sciences
2 Member, Institute of Medicine
2013 -
https://www.aau.edu/sites/default/files/AAAS-APLU-AAU-FBI%20_report-personnel-security_020413.pdf
Bridging Science and Security for Biological Research
2105
Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop.
Potential Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of a Workshop.
Board on Life Sciences; Division on Earth and Life Studies; Committee on Science, Technology, and Law; Policy and Global Affairs; Board on Health Sciences Policy; National Research Council; Institute of Medicine.
Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US); 2015 Apr 13.
Search term
Appendix EList of Attendees
Appendix EList of Attendees
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK285585/
2016 : Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of the Second Symposium, March 10-11, 2016.
2016 : Gain-of-Function Research: Summary of the Second Symposium, March 10-11, 2016.
Attending (and presenting? ) - Rachel Levinson
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK373320/
2017 (Sep) - Attendee
https://www.genome.gov/Pages/About/NACHGR/NACHGRMeetingSummaries/Sept2017CouncilMinutes.pdf
NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH MEETING SUMMARY
September 11-12, 2017
The Open Session of the 81st meeting of the National Advisory Council for Human Genome Research (NACHGR) was convened at 10:00 AM on Monday, September 11, 2017, at the Fishers Lane Terrace Level Conference Center in Rockville, Maryland. Dr. Eric Green, Director of the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI), called the meeting to order.
The meeting was open to the public from 10:00 AM until 5:15 PM on September 11, 2017. In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 92-463, the meeting was closed to the public from 8:00 AM to 10:00 AM and 5:15 PM to 6:30 PM on September 11, 2017, and from 8:30 AM until adjournment on September 12, 2017, for the review, discussion, and evaluation of grant applications.
Council Members Present: Eric Boerwinkle
Carol Bult
Wendy Chung
Patricia Deverka Brenton Graveley Jonathan Haines Gail Henderson Trey Ideker Raphael Irizarry Mark Johnston Sharon Plon
Aviv Regev Dan Roden Val Sheffield Jay Shendure
2018 (Oct) - Attending BARDA Day
https://www.medicalcountermeasures.gov/BARDA/documents/BID2018_ParticipantList.pdf
Appendix B: Committee Member and Staff Biographies - The ...
https://www.nap.edu › read › chapter
He then served for 23 years as an officer in the U.S. Army Medical Research and Development Command. He joined CDC in 1992, was assigned to the World Health ...
https://www.nap.edu/download/12970
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