関係的契約の経済学：

長期継続的関係が支える自己規律のメカニズム

『経済セミナー』2021年4・5月号掲載

このウェブサイトは、『経済セミナー』（日本評論社刊）2020年8・9月号からスタートした連載＝石原章史・伊藤秀史「関係的契約の経済学：長期継続的関係が支える自己規律のメカニズム」のサポートページです。
ここでは、連載第５回の補足説明と、参考文献等を紹介します。

第５回ウェブ付録では、第２節「1回限りの関係での主観的業績評価」と、第3節「継続的関係での主観的業績評価」で紹介したモデルの一般化、拡張などの詳細を解説します。

【2節＝1回限りの関係での主観的業績評価：主観的評価の問題】

Kambe, S. (2006) "Subjective Evaluation in Agency Contracts," Japanese Economic Review, 57(1): 121-140.
MacLeod, W. B. (2003) "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation," American Economic Review, 93(1): 216-240.

【2節＝1回限りの関係での主観的業績評価：複数エージェントの場合】

Baiman, S. and Rajan, M. V. (1995) "The Informational Advantages of Discretionary Bonus Schemes," Accounting Review, 70(4): 557-579.
Rajan, M. V. and Reichelstein, S. (2006) "Subjective Performance Indicators and Discretionary Bonus Pools," Journal of Accounting Research, 44(3): 585-618.
Rajan, M. V. and Reichelstein, S. (2009) "Objective versus Subjective Indicators of Managerial Performance," Accounting Review, 84(1): 209-237.
Ishiguro, S. and Yasuda, Y. (2020) "Moral Hazard and Subjective Evaluation," mimeo.

【3節＝継続的関係での主観的業績評価】

Levin, J. (2003) "Relational Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, 93(3): 835-857.

【4節＝2期間の主観的業績評価】

Abreu, D., Milgrom, P. and Pearce, D. (1991) "Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships," Econometrica, 59 (6): 1713-1733.
Fuchs, W. (2007) "Contracting with Repeated Moral Hazard and Private Evaluations," American Economic Review, 97(4): 1432-1448.
Chan, J. and Zheng, B. (2011) "Rewarding Improvements: Optimal Dynamic Contracts with Subjective Evaluation," RAND Journal of Economics, 42(4): 758-775.
Maestri, L. (2012) "Bonus Payments versus Efficiency Wages in the Repeated Principal-Agent Model with Subjective Evaluations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4(3): 34-56.
Maestri, L. (2014) "The Efficiency of Bonus-or-Terminate Incentive Schemes under Subjective Evaluations," Games and Economic Behavior, 87: 412-418.