第４回
公式契約と関係的契約の相互作用

【2節＝1990年代ベトナム、法的強制力が欠如するなかでの継続的関係に基づく信用取引の機能】

• McMillan, J. and Woodruff, C. (1999a) "Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 15(3): 637-658.

• McMillan, J. and Woodruff, C. (1999b) "Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4): 1285-1320.

【3節＝公式契約の関係的契約に対する補完的機能】

• 伊藤秀史 (2011) 「関係的ガバナンス──契約設計の視点からの理論的展望」【DP版のPDF】一橋大学日本企業研究センター編『日本企業研究のフロンティア第7号（一橋大学日本企業研究センター研究年報2011）』有斐閣、第3章：23-37。

• Schmidt, K. M. and Schnitzer, M. (1995) "The Interaction of Explicit and Implicit Contracts," Economics Letters, 48(2): 193-199.

• Johnson, S., McMillan, J. and Woodruff, C. (2002) "Courts and Relational Contracts," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18(1): 221-277.

【3節＝マルチタスク・モデルの解説】

• 伊藤秀史 (2003) 『契約の経済理論』有斐閣、5章。

• Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. (2005) Contract Theory, MIT Press, 6章.

【4章＝法的強制力が機能する状況下での関係的契約の重要性】

• Macaulay, S. (1963) "Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study," American Sociological Review, 28(1): 55-67.

• Williamson, O. E. (2005) "The Economics of Governance," American Economic Review Paper and Proceedings, 95(2): 1-18.

• Kreps, D. M. (2004) Microeconomics for Managers, W. W. Norton., 24章 （中泉真樹他訳『MBAのためのミクロ経済学入門I、II』東洋経済新報社、2008、2009年、第II巻の10章）

【4節＝モラルハザードと業績指標の歪み】

• Baker, G., Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K. J. (1994) "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4):1125-1156.

• Dixit, A. K. (2004) Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, Princeton University Press.

【5節＝関係的契約が公式契約にもたらす影響】

• Battigalli, P. and Maggi, G. (2008) "Costly Contracting in a Long-Term Relationship," Rand Journal of Economics, 39(2): 352-377.

• Kvaløy, O. and Olsen, T. E. (2009) "Endogenous Verifiability and Relational Contracting," American Economic Review, 99(5): 2193-2208.

• Tirole, J. (2009) "Cognition and Incomplete Contracts," American Economic Review, 99(1): 265-294.

【5節＝業績連動報酬以外の公式契約や関係的契約との相互作用】

• Baker, G., Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K. J. (2001) "Bringing the Market Inside the Firm?" American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 91(5): 212-218.

• Baker, G., Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K. J. (2002) "Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(1): 39-84.

• Halonen, M. (2002) "Reputation and the Allocation of Ownership," Economic Journal, 112(481): 539-558.

• Hart, O. (1995) Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, Oxford University Press.（鳥居昭夫訳『企業 契約 金融構造』慶應義塾大学出版会、2010年）

• Itoh, H. and Morita, H. (2015) "Formal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 7(3): 318-346.

• Kvaløy, O. (2007) "Asset Specificity and Vertical Integration," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 109(3): 551-572.

• Kostadinov, R. (2020) "Renegotiation of Long-Term Contracts as Part of an Implicit Agreement," mimeo., October.

• Watson, J., Miller, D. A. and Olsen, T. E. (2020) "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," American Economic Review, 110(7): 2153-2197.

【5節＝ジョブ・デザイン】

• Ishihara, A. (2019) "On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts," forthcoming in Journal of Industrial Economics.

• Mukherjee, A. and Vasconcelos, L. (2011) "Optimal Job Design in the Presence of Implicit Contracts," Rand Journal of Economics, 42(1): 44-69.

• Schöttner, A. (2008) "Relational Contracts, Multitasking, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 24(1): 138-162.

【5節＝実証研究を解説した展望論文】

• Gil, R. and Zanarone, G. (2017) "Formal and Informal Contracting: Theory and Evidence," Annual Review of Law and Social Science, 13: 141-159.

• Gil, R. and Zanarone, G. (2018) "On the Determinants and Consequences of Informal Contracting," Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 27(4): 726-741.