Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction 

Robin Attfield (2018)

For centuries, humans have transformed the natural world through various activities like hunting, farming, building, and trading. Despite our tendency to view Earth as unchanging, the environment our grandchildren will inherit will differ drastically from that of our ancestors and even from what we were born into (1). We can no longer take it for granted. Indeed, the scale of human impact on nature has led to the coining of the term "Anthropocene," highlighting that human influences have become dominant across the entire planet's surface (2).

The Birth of Environmental Ethics

The 1960s saw new issues emerge in medicine, such as experimentation on human subjects and requirements for informed consent, while the spread of nuclear weapons rekindled reflection on the ethics of war. These developments contributed to the emergence of environmental philosophy and ethics in the early 1970s, along with related attempts to apply philosophical thinking to environmental concepts and problems (3).

A pivotal moment came when Richard Routley (later Sylvan), an Australian philosopher, delivered an address titled "Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?" at a World Congress of Philosophy in Bulgaria in 1973 (4). Routley challenged the traditional Western view that only human interests matter and that humans may treat nature as they please. Instead, he advocated for a position where other living creatures matter as well (4-5). His argument against anthropocentrism and in support of a new environmental ethic was widely found to be persuasive (5).

Shortly after, John Passmore published his book Man's Responsibility for Nature (1974), acknowledging that while the majority view was human-centered with no ethical restrictions on treating nature, there were two minority traditions worth noting. In one of these traditions, humans are viewed as stewards or trustees of the natural world, responsible for its care—and in religious versions of this tradition, answerable to God for their stewardship (6).

Around the same time, Arne Naess, a Norwegian philosopher, published "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement. A Summary" in the philosophical journal Inquiry in 1974. Naess's Deep Ecology movement advocated for various stances, including biological diversity—preserving the fullest possible range of species, sub-species, and habitats. For Naess, the true self isn't confined to the physical body (because everything connects to everything else) but extends to the whole of nature. It is this extended or greater Self that we are supposedly obliged to defend (7-8).

Building on these foundations, American philosopher Holmes Rolston III (considered the father of environmental philosophy) explained in his 1975 essay "Is There an Ecological Ethic?" why we ought to recycle: because recycling promotes ecosystem integrity, which has intrinsic value. The concept of ecosystem integrity involves healthy, functioning ecosystems that both incorporate and support interacting living organisms and their life cycles, echoing Leopold's advocacy for maintaining the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biosphere (9-10). Rolston also emphasized the need for environmental ethics to adopt an understanding of value that goes beyond instrumental value (like money and resources) to recognize what is valuable for its own sake (intrinsically), such as health (9-10). He argued that things of this kind give moral "oughts" their point (12).

Rolston's distinctive contribution was suggesting that an ecological ethic might distinguish itself from other ethical approaches by finding fundamental value not only in human fulfillment but also in non-human lives or well-being, or perhaps in the biological systems they belong to (10). This perspective led to the ecocentric stance, which holds that species and ecosystems themselves must have intrinsic value (12).

Conceptions of Nature

When discussing nature, we must consider different meanings of the term. Our having or not having a "nature" relates to either being non-supernatural or to being non-artificial (where what is natural hasn't been significantly affected by human choices or culture). Our nature constitutes our make-up or what makes us what we are, and what is natural consists of the characteristics that this involves (14).

One perspective suggests that what is valuable and worth pursuing is simply what is natural in the sense of non-artificial. This view has the merit of finding value in non-human nature, thus avoiding anthropocentrism (15).

Historically, Ancient Stoicism was an influential ethical system advising humanity to "follow Nature." The Stoics concluded that "following Nature" practically meant ceasing to try controlling life events and instead focusing on controlling our feelings about them. They believed the events in our lives were determined by nature and beyond our control, unlike our feelings about these events (17).

In contemporary discourse, the concept of "environment" has come to describe the objective system or systems of nature, including mountains, valleys, islands, oceans, and continents, and the natural cycles and processes that shape and reshape them (18). Importantly, the environment continues to make possible much of what is valuable in our lives, and our descendants' lives will almost certainly depend on it. These are central reasons why we should care for our shared surroundings, the natural environment of our planet (19).

Moral Standing and Value

A fundamental question in environmental ethics concerns moral standing. The question of moral standing addresses which beings matter in ethical considerations and should be taken into account when making decisions (20). Recognizing the moral standing of living creatures enriches our understanding of the context of action and moral decision-making, directing us to include in our deliberations our impacts on living creatures of other species as well as on humans (22).

Different perspectives exist regarding which entities have moral standing. Biocentrism is a life-centered ethic holding that all individual living creatures—though not including species or ecosystems—have moral standing (22). In contrast, the view that species and/or ecosystems have moral standing alongside individual living creatures is called "ecocentrism" (23).

Closely related to moral standing is the concept of value. Things are valuable when there are reasons to promote, preserve, protect, or respect them. Thus, discovering something has value means we have reasons for positive attitudes and actions regarding it (23-4). Importantly, things can be valuable without being valued; there will be reasons for valuing them, though these reasons aren't always noticed or heeded (24).

There are different types of value. Money is useful because of its exchange value; it has instrumental value but doesn't itself make life worthwhile (24). Forms of environmental ethics based on value focus not on quantifiable kinds like money, but on the value found in the well-being and flourishing of living creatures—for example, the kind belonging to a panorama, a sunset, health, or happiness (24).

Happiness is widely agreed to have intrinsic value (25). Things with non-derivative value are valuable because of their own nature; we value them for their own sakes. They may have additional kinds of values too; education, for instance, can be both valuable in itself and valuable because it leads to gainful employment (25).

Besides instrumental value, there are other kinds of derivative value. Aesthetic value, as in the examples of panoramas and sunsets, depends on appreciation by human or other perceivers (25).

The connection between moral standing and value is crucial: Even if their flourishing has less moral significance, perhaps due to different capacities, creatures with moral standing strongly suggest that their well-being or flourishing is intrinsically valuable. Where a creature has moral standing, there must be something about it that counts as a reason for action, and a non-derivative one at that (26).

Therefore, the biocentric stance that recognizes moral standing in living creatures also recognizes intrinsic value in their well-being or flourishing (26-7). Meanwhile, ecocentrism holds that an ecosystem, as a whole, or a species, as a whole, has an identity and a good that is not reducible to the good of its members. Whole forests, for example, are held to have value of this kind, not just individual trees or their flourishing (27).

In summary, value supplies ethics with its grounding and motivation, which is equally valid for environmental ethics (28).

Future Generations and Environmental Ethics

An important consideration in environmental ethics is our responsibility to future generations. Future generations stand to be affected by current decisions but remain unrepresented in almost all current decision-making bodies (41). Article 1 of the 1997 UNESCO Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations towards Future Generations declares that "The present generations have the responsibility of ensuring that the needs and interests of present and future generations are properly safeguarded" (41). Ways of safeguarding these needs and interests must be found.

Diverse Perspectives in Environmental Ethics

Environmental ethics encompasses various perspectives rather than a single stance. J. Baird Callicott suggests that an environmental ethic contrasts with traditional (anthropocentric) humanism and also with (sentientist) animal welfarism, forming an equilateral triangle of mutually opposing positions. However, both anthropocentrists and sentientists contribute worthily to environmental ethics. Moreover, as we've seen, there are different kinds of ecocentrism and biocentrism. We should therefore move beyond viewing the debate as triangular. Environmental ethics is rather a dialogue between many stances and voices, not a single stance (59).

The Green Movement and Related Perspectives

Environmental ethics has inspired various political movements. Green political movements have prioritized themes such as sustainability policies, climate change mitigation and adaptation, and resistance to pollution and polluting processes (89).

Different movements complement each other. Social Ecology and the Environmental Justice Movement serve as correctives to Deep Ecology by highlighting the social structures in which environmental problems often occur (90). Conversely, Deep Ecology and many ecofeminists correct these movements with their concern for non-human creatures, their species, habitats, and ecosystems (90).

Ecofeminists emphasize the importance of avoiding polarized thinking and contesting oppression in all forms. They understand human agents as embedded in relationships and as responding to nature and society through emotional ties as well as reasoned principles (90).

The Environmental Justice Movement emphasizes environmental injustices both within and between societies. It reminds us not only of people's right to be recognized and consulted about their environment but also of the importance of present compensation for past inequities and future compensation for present ones. Green movements, including Deep Ecology, emphasize our obligations to future generations and the non-human world (90).

Work Cited:

Attfield, Robin. Environmental Ethics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2018.