PUBLICATION
(Let me know if you cannot download the published papers from the links below. I can send you the copy of the paper.)
``Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions,'' coauthored with Rene Saran and Roberto Serrano, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 49(3), (2024), 1791-1824. ``Corrigendum to Lemma 3''
``Continuous Implementation with Payoff Knowledge,'' coauthored with Yi-Chun Chen and Yifei Sun, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 209, (2023), 105624. The working paper version of this can be found here.
``Getting Dynamic Implementation to Work,'' coauthored with Yi-Chun Chen, Richard Holden, Yifei Sun, and Tom Wilkening, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 131, (2023), 285-387. The Working paper version of this can be found here.
``Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima,'' coauthored with Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun, and Siyang Xiong, Theoretical Economics, vol. 17, (2022), 1683-1717.
``Efficient Bilateral Trade via Two-Stage Mechanisms: Comparison between One-Sided and Two-Sided Asymmetric Information Environments,'' coauthored with Cuiling Zhang, Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 101, (2022), 102714. The Working Paper version of this can be found here.
``Rationalizable Implementation in Finite Mechanisms,'' coauthored with Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun, and Siyang Xiong, Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 129, (2021), 181-197. The Working Paper version of this can be found here.
``On Incentive Compatible, Individually Rational Public Good Provision Mechanisms,'' coauthored with Cuiling Zhang, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57, (2021), 431-468. The Working Paper version of this can be found here.
``Robust Virtual Implementation with Almost Complete Information,'' Â Mathematical Social Sciences, vol. 108, (2020), 62-73. The Working Paper version of this can be found here.
``Order on Types based on Monotone Comparative Statics,'' coauthored with Takuro Yamashita, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 189, (2020), 105082. See also ONLINE APPENDIX that contains all discussions and proofs omitted from the paper. The Working Paper version of this can be found here.
``Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences,'' coauthored with Roberto Serrano, Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 44, (2019), 1326-1344. See also ONLINE APPENDIX that contains all discussions and proofs omitted from the paper. The Working Paper version of this can be found here.
``Mixed Bayesian Implementation in General Environments,'' Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 82, (2019), 247-263. The Working Paper version of this can be found here.
``Robust Virtual Implementation: Toward a Reinterpretation of the Wilson Doctrine,'' coauthored with Georgy Artemov and Roberto Serrano, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 148, (2013), 424-447. The Working Paper version of this paper can be found here. See also ONLINE APPENDIX that contains all omitted arguments and proofs of the paper.
``Subgame Perfect Implementation under Information Perturbations,'' coauthored with Phlippe Aghion, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden, and Olivier Tercieux, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 127(4), (2012), 1843-1881. See also ONLINE APPENDIX that contains all omitted arguments and proofs of the paper. Please check ``Implementation with Near-Complete Information: The Case of Subgame Perfection,'' coauthored with Olivier Tercieux if you are interested in extending Theorem 3 of this paper to more general preferences under uncertainty.
``A New Necessary Condition for Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies,'' coauthored with Roberto Serrano, Journal of Economic Theory, vol 146, (2011), 2583-2595. The Working Paper version of this can be found here.
``Indescribability and Its Irrelevance for Contractual Incompleteness,'' Review of Economic Design, vol. 14, (2010), 271-289. The Working Paper version of this can be found here.
``Indescribability and Asymmetric Information at the Contracting Stage,'' Economics Letters, vol. 99, (2008), 367-370. The Working Paper version of this can be found here.
``Bargaining and Competition Revisited,'' coauthored with Roberto Serrano, Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 115, (2004), 78-88. The extended version of this paper can be found here.
WORKING PAPERS
``Rationalizable Incentives; Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences,'' coauthored with Rene Saran and Roberto Serrano, July 2025. This paper subsumes ``Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies,'' coauthored with Roberto Serrano, January 2020.
``Efficient Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: The Use of Two-Stage Mechanisms,'' coauthored with Cuiling Zhang, June 2025. See also ONLINE APPENDIX that contains all discussions and proofs omitted from the paper.
``Compellingness in Nash Implementation,'' coauthored with Shurojit Chatterji and Paulo Ramos, March 2025. See also ONLINE APPENDIX that contains all discussions and proofs omitted from the paper.
``The Interplay of Interdependence and Correlation in Bilateral Trade,'' coauthored with Cuiling Zhang, March 2024.
``Robust Implementation in Rationalizable Strategies in General Mechanisms,'' coauthored with Rene Saran, March 2024.
``Implementation with Transfers,'' coauthored with Yi-Chun Chen and Yifei Sun, March 2016.
OLDER WORKING PAPERS
``Implementation with Near-Complete Information: The Case of Subgame Perfection,'' coauthored with Olivier Tercieux, July 2009 (the substantial part of this paper is now incorporated into ``Subgame Perfect Implementation under Information Perturbations.'' This paper extends one of the main results of Aghion, Fudenberg, Holden, Kunimoto, and Tercieux (2012) to more general preferences under uncertainty.).
``How Robust is Undominated Nash Implementation?,'' June 2010
``An Extended Version of ``Bargaining and Competition Revisited,'' coauthored with Roberto Serrano, May 2005. (This is an extended version of the published paper. In the appendix, we discuss the implications of the assumption we made in the proof of the main theorem.)
PUBLICATION IN JAPANESE
``The Theory of Bayesian Implementation,'' mimeo, January 2015. (This textbook-like manuscript is written for those who are interested in Bayesiam implementation and most importantly, can read Japanese. This constitutes a chapter of ``The Microeconomics of Organisations and Institutions'' published in March 2015 by Kyoto University Press. I co-edited this book together with Kazumi Hori and Naoki Watanabe. If you cannot read Japanese, you are referred to my paper ``Mixed Bayesian Implementation in General Environments'' in Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 82, (2019), 247-263.)
``How to Design a Better Society: The Case of Kidney Exchange,'' November 2012. (This is an essay (written in Japanese) I wrote for those who have little knowledge on economics and/or are wondering what economists are thinking. It discusses some developments on how to design a market for kidney exchange. This is contained in the book published in February 2013 by Yuhikaku Press.)
``Strategy-Proof Cost Sharing Schemes in an Economy with an Excludable Public Good,'' Kyoto University Keizai Ronso (which literary means ``Economic Journal''), vol. 165 (2000), 81-101.
``Axiomatizations of Strategy-Proof Cost Sharing Schemes,'' Master Thesis, submitted to Kyoto University, January 1999. (This thesis contains all the omitted proofs in ``Strategy-Proof Cost Sharing Scheme in an Economy with an Excludable Public Good'' in Kyoto University Keizai Ronso (2000).)
MISCELLANEOUS STUFF