April 2013 - March 2014

So far, we have read (or, at least tried to understand) the papers listed below:

(1) Aumann, R.J. and A. Brandenburger, ``Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,'' Econometrica, vol. 63, 1995, 1161-1180

(2) Yildiz, M., ``Wishful Thinking in Strategic Environments,'' Review of Economic Studies, vol. 74, 2007, 319-344.

(3) Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel, ``Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge,'' Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 59, 1993, 189-198.

(4) Heifetz, A. and D. Samet, ``Topology-Free Typology of Beliefs,'' Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 82, 1998, 324-341.

(5) Ahn, D., ``Hierarchies of Ambiguous Beliefs,'' Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 136, 2007, 286-301.

(6) Weinstein, J. and M. Yildiz, ``A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements,'' Econometrica, vol. 75, 2007, 365-400.

(7) Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel, ``Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria,'' Econometrica, vol. 55, 1987, 1391-1402.

(8) Heifetz, A. and W. Kets, ``All Types Naive and Canny,'' 2012, mimeo.

(9) Oury, M. and O. Tercieux, ``Continuous Implementation,'' Econometrica, vol. 80, 2012, 1605-1637

(10) Stauber, R., ``Knightian Games and Robustness to Ambiguity,'' Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 146, (2011), 248-274

(11) Kets, W., ``Finite Depth of Reasoning and Equilibrium Play in Games with Incomplete Information,'' mimeo, July 22, 2013

(12) Aumann, R.J., ``Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality,'' Econometrica, vol. 55, (1987), 1-18.

(13) Gul, F., ``A Comment on Aumann's Baysian View,'' Econometrica, vol. 66, (1998), 923-927.

(14) Aumann, R.J., ``Common Priors: A Reply To Gul,'' Econometrica, vol. 66, (1998), 829-938.

(15) Tan, T.C-C, and S.R.C Werlang: ``The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games,'' Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 45, (1988), 370-391.

(16) Epstein, L: ``Preference, Rationalizability and Equilibrium,'' Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 73, (1997), 1-29.