In this seminar, our graduate students and sometimes faculty members present their own work. We also read the papers together, regardless of whether they are published or unpublished.
(1) Satoshi Nakada, ``Robustness of Bayesian Implementation to Ambiguous Information''
(2) Kota Murayama, ``A Strategic Implication of Maxmin Thinking''
(3) Takashi Ui: ``The Social Value of Public Information with Convex Costs of Information Acquisition'' and ``Welfare Effects of Information Acquisition Costs''
(4) Takashi Kunimoto: ``Interim Equilibrium Implementation''
(5) Satoshi Tanaka: ``Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and Asymmetric Information,'' by Franklin Allen, Stephen Morris, and Andrew Postlewaite, Journal of Economic Theory, 61, (1993), 206-229.
(6) Satoshi Tanaka: ``Simple Finite Horizon Bubbles Robust to Higher Order Knowledge,'' by John Conlon, Econometrica, 72, (2004), 927-936.
(7) Kohei Sashida: ``Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks,'' by Georgy-Marios Angeletos, Christian Hellwig, and Alessandro Pavan, Econometrica, 75, (2007), 711-756.
(8) Yusuke Mizumoto: ``Information Acquisition Interactions in Two-Player Quadratic Games,'' by Antonio Jiménez-Martínez, International Journal of Game Theory, 43, (2014), 455-485.
(9) Kota Murayama: ``The Social Value of Communication Platform.''
(10) Satoshi Nakada: ``Stable Matching under Irrational Behavior.''
(11) Kohei Sashida: ``Strategic Complementarities and the Twin Crises,'' by Itay Goldstein, Economic Journal, 115, (2005), 368-390.
(12) Yusuke Mizumoto: ``The Social Value of Communication Platform''
(13) Satoshi Nakada: ``Robustness of Bayesian Implementation to Small Perturbation''
(14) Satoshi Tanaka: ``Behavioral Aspects of Arbitrageurs in Timing Games of Bubbles and Crashes,'' by Hitoshi Matsushima, Journal of Economic Theory, 148, (2013), 858-870.
(15) Kohei Sashida: ``Ambiguity and Perceived Coordination in a Global Game,'' by Daniel Laskar, Economics Letters, 122, (2014), 317-320.