When: 16:20 - 17:50 on Mondays
Where: Room 206 at Lecture Building 1 (第1講義棟)
What to do: We study game theory through reading ``Game Theory: An Introduction'' by Steven Tadelis (2013), Princeton University Press.
Who participates: Taku Ando(安藤 拓), Masahiro Dokei(洞雞 将大), Hidekazu Niwa(二羽 秀和), Kei Okabe(岡部 圭), Goki Sato(佐藤 豪紀), Kenji Watanabe(渡部 謙志)
I provide below the schedule of our weekly meeting. Of course, the schedule is always subject to change, as we go along.
Apr 14, 2014: Guidance
Apr 21, 2014: Dokei discusses Chapter 1: The Single-Person Decision Problem.
Apr 28, 2014: Ando discusses Chapter 2: Introducing Uncertainty and Time from the beginning to 2.1: Risk, Nature, and Random Outcomes to 2.2: Evaluating Random Outcomes.
May 12, 2014: Ando continues to discuss Chapter 2.2.2: Expected Payoff: The Continuous Case till the end of 2.2.
Thereafter, Niwa takes the next turn to discuss Chapter 2.3: Rational Decision Making with Uncertainty and 2.4 Decisions over Time.
May 26, 2017: Niwa continues to discuss Chapter 2.5: Applications, and 2.6: Theory versus Practice. Thereafter Okabe discusses Chapter 3: Preliminaries from the beginning to 3.1: Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies.
Jun 2, 2014: Okabe continues to discuss Chapter 3: Preliminaries from the beginning to 3.1: Normal-Form Games with Pure Strategies.
Jun 9, 2014: Watanabe discusses Chapter 3.2: Matrix Representation: Two-Player Finite Game.
Jun 16, 2014: Watanabe discusses Chapter 3.3: Solution Concepts.
June 30, 2014: Sato discusses Chapter 4.1: Dominance in Pure Strategies
July 7, 2014: Sato continues to discuss Chapter 4.1.1: Dominant Strategy Equilibrium; 4.1.3: Evaluating Dominant Strategy Equilibrium and 4.2: Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Pure Strategies
July 14, 2014: Sato discusses Chapter 4.2.2: Example Cournot Duopoly and Chapter 4.2.3: Evaluating IESDS and after this Ando takes the next turn to discuss Chapter 4.3: Beliefs, Best Response, and Rationalizability up to the end of 4.3.1: The Best Response.
July 21, 2014: Ando continues to discusses Chapter 4.3: Beliefs, Best Response, and Rationalizability from 4.3.2: Beliefs and Best-Response Correspondences.
Sep 29, 2014: Niwa discusses Chapter 5: Pinning Down Beliefs: Nash Equilibrium from the beginning to 5.1: Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies to 5.2: Nash Equilibrium: Some Classic Applications.
Oct 6, 2014: Cancelled due to Typhoon
Oct 13, 2014: Niwa continues to discuss Chapter 5.2: Nash Equilibrium: Some Classic Applications.
Oct 20, 2014: Niwa discusses Chapter 5.2.5: Political Ideology and Electoral Competition and after this, Okabe discusses Chapter 6: Mixed Strategies.
Nov 10, 2014: Okabe starts from ``6.1.4: Expected Payoffs'' in Chapter 6: Mixed Strategies.
Nov 17, 2014: Okabe starts from ``6.2.1: Example: Matching Pennies'' in Chapter 6: Mixed Strategies.
Nov 24, 2014: Okabe starts from ``6.3: IESDS adn Rationalizability Revisited.''
Dec 1, 2014: Watanabe discusses Chapter 7: Preliminaries.
Dec 8, 2014: Watanabe continues to discuss Chapter 7: Preliminaries from ``7.2.2: Mixed versus Behavioral Strategies.''
Dec 15, 2014: Sato Goki discusses Chapter 8: Credibility and Sequential Rationality.
Dec 22, 2014: Sato Goki continues to discuss Chapter 8: Credibility and Sequential Rationality from after the definition 8.3 (p. 157).
Jan 5, 2015: Ando discusses Chapter 9: Multistage Games.
Jan 19, 2015: Ando continues to discuss Chapter 9: Multistage Games from p.182. After this, Dokei discusses Chapter 10: Repeated Games.
Jan 26, 2015: Dokei continues to discuss Chapter 10: Repeated Games from 10.2.2: Strategies.