April 2013 - March 2014
When: 14:40 - 16:10 on Mondays
Where: Room 1309 at East Lecture Building 1 (Higashi-Ichigo-Kan)
What to do: We study game theory through reading ``A Course in Microeconomic Theory'' by David Kreps (1990)
Who participates: Undral Byambadalai (ウンドラル ビャンブダライ), Akihiro Hayashi (林 諒洋), Yoshimasa Katayama (片山 由将), Mamoru Kinoshita (木下 衛), Hirona Kimura (木村 紘奈), Yusuke Mizumoto (水本 祐輔), Ryo Sato (佐藤 亮), and Ryota Takekawa (竹川 遼太)
I provide below the tentative schedule of our weekly meeting. Of course, the schedule is always subject to change, as we go along.
Apr 8, 2013: Kunimoto summarizes Chapter 1: An Overview.
Apr 15, 2013: Mizumoto discusses Chapter 3.1: von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility
Apr 22, 2013: Kinoshita discusses Chapter 11.1: Games in Extensive Form: An Example
Apr 29, 2013: Katayama discusses Chapter 11.2: Games in Extensive Form: Formalities
May 13, 2013: Katayama continues to discuss Chapter 11.2 from (6) the definition of payoff functions in p.369.
May 20, 2013: Hayashi discusses Chapter 11.3: Games in Normal or Strategic Form
May 27, 2013: Takekawa discusses Chapter 11.4: Mixed Strategies and Kuhn's Theorem
Jun 3, 2013: Sato discusses Chapter 12.1: Opening Remarks
Jun 10, 2013: Sato continues to discuss Chapter 12.1. After this, Kimura takes the next turn to discuss Chapter 12.2: Dominance and Iterated Dominance for Normal Form Games
Jun 17, 2013: Kimura continues the discussion on Chapter 12.2 from ``Now look at the game in figure 12.4(a),...'' in p.397. After this, Mizumoto takes the next turn to discuss Chapter 12.3: Backwards Induction in Games of Complete and Perfect Information
June 24, 2013: Hayashi discusses Chapter 12.4: Nash Equilibrium.
Jul 1, 2013: Kinoshita discusses Chapter 12.5: Equilibria in Mixed Strategies.
Jul 8, 2013: Katayama discusses Chapter 12.6: Why might There be an Obvious Way to Play a Given Game?
Jul 15, 2013: Takekawa discusses Chapter 12.7.1: Weak Dominance and 12.7.2: Subgame Perfection (and Iterated Weak Dominance).
Oct 7, 2013: Kunimoto reviews what we learn so far
Oct 14, 2013: Sato discusses Chapter 12.7.3: Sequential Equilibrium
Oct 21, 2013: Sato continues to discuss Chapter 12.7.3: Sequential Equilibrium
Oct 28, 2013: Kimura discusses Chapter 12.7.4: Restrictions on Out-of-Equilibrium Beliefs
Nov 11, 2013: Undral discusses Chapter 12.7.5: Trembling-Hand Perfection and Kunimoto discusses 12.7.6 Proper Equilibria and Stable Sets of Equilibria.
Nov 18, 2013: Kinoshita discusses Chapter 12.8: Reprise: Classic Duopoly
Nov 25, 2013: Hayashi discusses Chapter 13.1: Games of Incomplete Information
Dec 2, 2013: Mizumoto and Undral discuss Chapter 13.2: An Application: Entry Deterrence
Dec 9, 2013: Kimura discusses Chapter 13.3: Modeling Irrationality
Dec 23, 2013: Sato and Takekawa discuss Chapter 14.1: The Prisoner's Dilemma and Chapter 14.2: Repeating Games can Yield Cooperation: The Folk Theorem
Jan 6, 2013: Takekawa continues to discuss (1) Too many equilibrium outcomes in Chapter 14.2 (p. 508 -).
Jan 20, 2013: Kinoshita discusses Chapter 14.3: Noisy Observations.
Feb 17, 2013: Kinoshita continues to discuss Chapter 14.3 and after this Katayama discusses Chapter 13.4: More on Refinements: Complete Theories.(Note that we have 3 hours from 14:00 to 17:00. The location for this session is announced in the classroom)