Contact:
Department of Economics
Box B, Brown University
Providence, RI 02912
Tel: (401) 863-2764
Fax: (401) 863-1970
E-mail: roberto_serrano@brown.edu
Google Scholar: Roberto Serrano
Office Hours:
Tuesdays, 9:00-11:00 in Robinson Hall 201B
Editorial Role:
Editor at Games and Economic Behavior
News: All seven GEB editors resign. The following message was sent to all AEs of the journal on August 16, 2026:
Dear Advisory Editor of GEB
We are very sorry to be the bearers of bad news for GEB.
I learned from Elsevier on Wednesday July 28 that, contrary to my expressed willingness to continue, my 3-year contract will not be renewed.
"Moving towards a closer alignment with Elsevier strategic priorities and publishing policies" was offered as the motive for this decision. Requests for explanations, first by me, then in a collective letter by the other six Editors, were dismissed by Elsevier which simply reaffirmed its legal power to make such decisions.
Elsevier then started precipitously its own search for new Editors without input of the Editorial Board.
By Friday August 14 all seven Editors have sent their resignation, requiring a 3-month advance notice.
Therefore, we will continue to manage as before the papers currently under review and the new submissions until Saturday November 14. After this date we will only complete the evaluation of papers still waiting an editorial decision.
We realize this is a major crisis for the journal. To fulfill our professional obligations to authors ideally it would be important for each of you to stay onboard with similar short term commitments, whatever you decide for the future.
Feel free to approach any of us with questions and concerns. We will keep all of you informed of new plans and developments.
Hervé Moulin
Sushil Bikhchandani
Aisleen Bohren
Nicole Immorlica
Roberto Serrano
Emanuel Vespa
Nicolas Vieille
About this book
Allan Feldman and I have completed a textbook on intermediate micro. Its main features are well expressed in the title. It is “short” in that it concentrates on the topics that we view as essential for a good course in intermediate micro. And it is “with calculus” in that it incorporates calculus to the text with no apologies. We still hope that this will not interfere with a reader-friendly writing style. If you need more information about the book, do not hesitate to contact me.
Reference
R. Serrano and A. M. Feldman, A Short Course in Intermediate Microeconomics with Calculus (2nd edition), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (2018).
Available from Cambridge University Press
Short Answers to Exercises, Solutions: Graphs
The purpose of this set of (mostly) short answers is to provide a way for students to check on their work. Our answers here leave out a lot of intermediate steps; we hope this will encourage students to work out the intermediate steps for themselves. We also have a set of longer and more detailed answers, which is available to instructors only from Cambridge University Press.
Reviews
"The book, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, 2nd Edition, by Allan M. Feldman and Roberto Serrano, is an admirable compact distillation of these subjects. What is remarkable is the full and careful presentation of the major results in these areas in a very elementary way, using only very simple mathematical tools with no loss of rigor in the results."
- Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University
"You've done a beautiful job of covering the modern territory in the new version of WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, 2nd Edition. Congratulations!"
- Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study
About this book
This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un certainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting, Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones.
Reference
A. M. Feldman and R. Serrano, Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory (2nd edition), Springer, New York, (2006).