Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory (2nd edition)

Reviews
"The book, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, 2nd Edition, by Allan M. Feldman and Roberto Serrano, is an admirable compact distillation of these subjects. What is remarkable is the full and careful presentation of the major results in these areas in a very elementary way, using only very simple mathematical tools with no loss of rigor in the results."
- Kenneth J. Arrow, Stanford University

"You've done a beautiful job of covering the modern territory in the new version of WELFARE ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY, 2nd Edition. Congratulations!"
- Eric Maskin, Institute for Advanced Study

About this book
This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, un­ certainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting, Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones.

Reference
A. M. Feldman and R. Serrano, Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory (2nd edition) Springer, New York, (2006).

Available from Springer Science+Business Media

Table of Contents

Welfare Properties of "Jungle Exchange" (Chapter 4)

Life and Death Choices (Chapter 11)

Errata