Liquefied gases - Safety measures By Govind V Nori

Introduction

• This paper deals with basic safety while Liquid Anhydrous Ammonia and LPG (Butane & Propane) cargoes are being discharged in Visakhapatnam port. Danger can always be present in a Liquefied Gas Carrier and at the terminal whether loading or discharging. Risks can be avoided by taking care and by strictly adhering to the rules laid by IMO and local administration. To be able to avoid risks you must know what they are. The intention in presenting the paper is to create public awareness of the dangers and risks involved with liquefied gas cargoes in general. Hazard – is the potential to cause harm. Risk – is the chance of harm.

Liquefied gas production:

·Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is the general expression for propane, butane and mixtures of the two, which are produced from two distinct sources. Firstly, it is obtained from the crude oil processing in refineries or as a by-product from chemical plants. This LPG is normally only available in pressurised form and may be marketed locally in pressure cylinders or small pressure tanks. Secondly, LPG is produced from natural gas streams or from crude oil at or close to the point of production. Natural gas from wells consists largely of methane, smaller quantities of heavier hydrocarbons which are collectively known as natural gas liquids (NGL), and varying amounts of water, carbon dioxide, nitrogen and other non-hydrocarbon substances. The relationship between natural gas, NGL and LPG is shown in the figure below.

Given below is a typical flow diagram for a large natural gas liquefaction plant. If the raw feed gas contains condensates (pentanes and higher hydrocarbons) these will first be removed followed by acid gases (CO₂ and H₂S). The acid gas removal process will have saturated the gas stream with water vapour which is then removed by the dehydration unit. The gas then passes to the fractionating unit where the NGLs are removed and fractionated usually into their substantially propane and butane components. The gas, now very predominantly methane, must be liquefied to produce the main product, liquefied natural gas (LNG).

A flow diagram which illustrates the production of propane and butane from oil and gas reservoirs is given below. In this example the methane and ethane abstracted are used by the terminal power station, where as propane and butane, after gas fractionation and chill down are passed on to storage tanks prior to cargo transfer over jetty.

A simple flow chart showing production of ammonia & other chemical gases is given below. Vinyl chloride monomer, ethylene & ammonia can be produced indirectly from propane. The propane is first catalytically cracked to methane and ethylene which can be synthesised to vinyl chloride monomer with chlorine. The methane from catayltic cracker is first steam reformed to hydrogen and then treated with nitrogen to produce ammonia. The important production inter-relationships between chlorine, propane, vinyl chlorine monomer, ethylene and ammonia can be clearly seen.

Properties:

*2000ppm- fatal in 30 mins, 6000ppm- fatal in mins, 10000ppm fatal & intolerable to unprotected skin.

** dissolves rapidly & exothermically to produce ammonium hydroxide.

***may form solid hydrates, insoluble.

****may be stenched to assist detection

‘A’ depends on the composition; shipper’s advice will have full cargo information.

Threshold Limit Value: Maximum concentration of gas, to which it is believed that nearly all persons involved in working with the gas, may be repeatedly exposed, day after day, without adverse effect assuming 8 hours per day, 40 hours per week exposure.

Safe jetty design

·The ship shore interface is a vital area for consideration in the safety of the liquefied gas trade. Considering jetty design (and the equipment which may be needed), safety in this area requires a good understanding of ship parameters before construction begins. In this context the following points are often addressed by the terminal designers:-

Ø The berth’s safe position regarding other marine traffic.

Ø The berth’s safe position in relation to adjacent industry.

Ø Elimination of nearby ignition sources.

Ø Safety distances between adjacent ships

Ø The range of acceptable ship sizes.

Ø Ship’s parallel body length – for breasting dolphin positioning.

Ø Properly positioned shore mooring points of suitable strength.

Ø Tension monitoring equipment for mooring line loads.

Ø Suitable water depth at the jetty.

Ø The use of hard arm and their safe operating envelops.

Ø Nitrogen supply to the jetty.

Ø Emergency shut-down systems – including inter-linked ship/shore control.

Ø A powered emergency release coupling on the hard arm.

Ø Systems for gas leak detection.

Ø A safe position for a ship to shore gangway.

Ø Design to limit surge pressures in cargo pipelines.

Ø Verbal communication systems

Ø The development to Jetty information and regulations.

Ø Jetty life saving and fire-fighting equipment.

Ø Systems for the warning of onset of bad weather.

Ø The development of Emergency Procedures.

Ø Vapour return facilities.

·Visitors who could either knowingly or unknowingly introduce a source of ignition, therefore, control of the access to the gas carrier is vital. Persons who have no legitimate business on board, or who do not have master’s permission, should be refused access to the tanker. The terminal, in agreement with the master, should restrict access to the jetty or berth.

·Lighting during darkness, the means of access to the tanker to be well lit & adequate lighting should be arranged to cover the area of the ship to shore cargo connection and any hose handling equipment so that the need for any adjustment can be seen in good time and any leakage or spillage of cargo detected.

·Ship to shore bonding cable: A ship/shore bonding cable is not effective as a safety device and may even be dangerous. A ship/shore bonding cable should not therefore be used. Due to local regulations if the ship/shore bonding cable is to be used then the bonding cable is to be visually inspected that the cable is electrically and mechanically sound and a switch of type suitable for use in Zone 1 hazardous area should be provided on the jetty well away from shore manifold area. The switch is to be switched off and then only the bonding cable is to be connected to the ship well away from the ship’s manifold area. The connection of the bonding cable should be carried out before connection of the hose/hard-arm and similarly the disconnection has to be carried out after disconnection of the hose/hard-arm and the switch should be in off position. It is much safer to use an insulated flange.

·Terminals should issue appropriate instructions to the operators of authorised craft on the use of engines and other apparatus & equipment so as to avoid sources of ignition when going alongside a tanker or jetty. These will include advice on spark arresters and proper fenders. Crafts should not normally be permitted alongside during cargo transfer.

·While discharging liquefied gas cargoes, critical periods are when commencing discharging and stopping discharge, as the systems may be subjected to pressure surges. The potential hazards of pressure surges (shock pressures or liquid hammer) resulting from rapid operation of valves should be emphasized to all personnel engaged in cargo operations. Pressure surges can be created when the flow in a liquid line is stopped too quickly. Pressure surges are most likely to occur during cargo transfer as a result of the following occurrences:

Ø Closure of quick closing shut off valve

Ø Rapid closing of or opening of manually or power operated valve

Ø Slamming shut of non-return valve

Ø Starting or stopping of a pump.

The hazard is greatest when the cargo is being transferred over a long distance and at high velocity. If the valve is shut too quickly under these conditions the deceleration of the large column of liquid in the line sets up shock waves which can travel down the line causing extremely high surge pressures. The cargo hose/hard arm is most vulnerable to failure in these circumstances.

In 1987 the risk analysis of LPG discharge at Visakhapatnam port carried out by LRS for HPCL, issued a recommendation to stop discharge operations while a ship is passing the LGC either to berth or to sail. In 1992, the author brought the abovementioned problem to the notice of the LRS surveyor, who has specially come to carry out the risk analysis for 12500MT discharge at Visakhapatnam Port. It was verbally agreed that the above recommendation be deleted. However, this was not done in the ensuing report. It is very important to make correct rules. It is equally important that the rules are not broken, but amended if deemed necessary. If the rule is found to be redundant, or needs to be amended for any reason whatsoever, then it is imperative that the rule be changed with the consent of the all the parties concerned. An example: Some ships due to their size or type of cargo they carry are categorized as daylight movement in many ports. Here, it is very important that the correct meaning of daylight movement be specified so that there is no doubt whatsoever what the term daylight movement means and there will be no scope to interpret the meaning of daylight movement differently to suit commercial requirement.

·Bunkering: In most American, Australian, Canadian, European, British, Japanese, Singapore & Korean ports (in Visakhapatnam till the year 2001) bunkering activity is not carried out when the LPG HARDARM/Hose is connected. Barges coming alongside are prohibited for safety reasons. While bunkering scuppers should be properly plugged, but this is in contrast to the code for liquefied gas carrier norm which states that the scuppers should be left open, because, if scuppers are plugged, the spillage of liquefied gas accumulates on the deck, consequently the deck plating will become brittle and subject to failure. In case of cargo leakage open scuppers on gas carriers are an important feature to allow cold liquids to escape quickly so reducing the risk of metal embrittlement and the possibility of small pool-fires on a ship’s deck. In general, on gas carriers, bunkering operations by barge will not take place during cargo operations as this is usually disallowed by terminal regulations. This prevents a bunker craft with possible ignition sources being allowed alongside a gas carrier. This problem needs to be addressed as ship’s safety & port’s oil pollution are involved.

Sources of ignition: Match boxes, Lighters, Studded shoes, Shavers, radios, Electric cooking appliances, Chipping on deck, Tools(dropping of),Torches, Walkie-Talkies which are not intrinsically safe, Mobile phones ( cell phones are known to be capable of igniting flammable vapours. If dropped they may break open, exposing the battery and electrical circuit.), Sparks arising from crafts, Hot exhaust pipes of vehicles etc.

The gases produced by combustion are heated by reaction. In open spaces, gas expansion is unrestricted and combustion may proceed without undue over-pressures developing. If the expansion of the hot gases is restricted in any way, pressures will rise and the speed of the flame travel increase. This depends on the degree of the confinement encountered. Increased flame speed gives rise to more rapid increase in pressure with the result that damaging over-pressures may be produced. Even in the open, if the confinement resulting from the surrounding pipe-work, plant and buildings is sufficient, the combustion can take on the nature of explosion. In severely confined conditions, such as within a building or a ship’s tank, where the expanding gases cannot escape, the internal pressure and its rate of increase may be sufficient to burst the containment. Here, the explosion is not due to high combustion rates and flame speed: it results more from the surge of high pressure upon containment rupture.

Flammable cargo hazards:

¨ It is not the liquid that catches fire, but the vapour given off by the process of evaporation.

¨ The liquids, which do evaporate at low temperatures, are the most dangerous.

¨ For fire you require oxygen (from atmosphere), vapours and a source of ignition.

¨ The vapours will burn only if they are between LEL (lower explosive limit) and UEL (Upper explosive limit).

¨ Flameless explosion: An explosion like-event as ‘flameless explosion’ or ‘rapid phase transition’ (RPT) may occur if very cold liquefied gas strikes water. This is not considered a major hazard as the energy release is limited and there is no evidence that fire would result. The possibility of large quantity of gas reaching the critical condition is remote.

¨ Pool fire: This takes place with pool of liquid at the leak source and the pool getting ignited.

¨ Jet fire: When the leak catches fire.

¨ Flash fire: This happens when there is a leak and does not ignite immediately but after the vapours travel some distance downwind and getting ignited and is dangerous.

¨ VCE: Vapour cloud explosion happens some time after leakage of liquid and vapour cloud has formed is very dangerous.

¨ BLEVE: Boiling liquid/expanding vapour explosion is the most dangerous. BLEVE, is an explosion resulting from the catastrophic failure of a vessel containing a liquid significantly above its boiling point at normal atmospheric pressure. The container may fail for any of the following reasons: mechanical damage, corrosion, excessive internal pressure, flame impingement or metallurgical failure. The most common cause of a BLEVE is probably when fire increases the internal tank pressure of the vessel’s contents and the flame impingement reduces its mechanical strength; particularly at that part of the vessel not cooled by the internal liquid. As a result, the tank suddenly splits and the pieces of the vessel’s shell can be thrown a considerable distance with concave sections, such as end caps, being propelled like rockets if they contain liquid. Upon rupture, the sudden decompression produces a blast and the pressure immediately drops. At this time the liquid temperature is well above its atmospheric boiling point and, accordingly, it spontaneously boils off, creating large quantities of vapour which are thrown upwards along with liquid droplets. Where the gas/air mixture is within its flammable limits, it will ignite from the rending metal or the surrounding fire to create a fire ball reaching gigantic proportions and the sudden release of gas provides further fuel for the rising fireball. The rapidly expanding vapour produces a further blast and intense heat radiation. Such BLEVE incidents have occurred with rail tank cars, road vehicles and in a number of terminal incidents. There have been no instances of this kind on liquefied gas carriers. Under the Gas Code, pressure relief valves are sized to cope with the surrounding fire and, as for shore tanks, this helps to limit the risk. It must be said that the chance of a fire occurring in the enclosed space beneath the pressurized ship’s tank is much smaller than on an equivalent tank situated on shore. This minimizes the possibility of a surrounding fire occurring on a ship and almost excludes the possibility of a BLEVE on a gas carrier.

In case of LPG leaks:

éStop cargo operation & shut the valves on cargo line.

ð No mechanised floating craft to come in the vicinity of the vessel & no vehicles are permitted to be near scene as a potential fire hazard.

é All superfluous persons to clear the area as fast as possible.

ð Do not use cell phones & VHF sets which are not intrinsically safe.

ð Do not use torch lights which are not approved for use on gas carriers.

é Do not panic.

Leak on a ship:

éEnquire and inform necessary authorities as prescribed by VPT and the receivers.

éLet the Ship’s crew handle the situation and do not interfere.

é Ship board personnel are trained personnel and they know the drill.

é They will give the necessary alarms if the situation demands it.

é From shore the sprinklers on jetty to be turned on.

Leak on Jetty:

éUse spray nozzles near the leak to enable personnel to rectify the leak.

éIf required, assist in disconnecting the hoses to enable to the vessel to be cleared from the jetty.

In case of fire on board ship: Action by ship:

As a general guide, when liquefied gas fire occurs, the correct procedure to adopt as follows:-

Raise alarm (a continuous group of three long blasts)/ (.......--------) on ship’s whistle

Ø Cease all cargo operations & then close all valves.

Ø Contact terminal

Ø Assess the fire’s source and extent, and if personnel are at risk

Ø Implement the emergency plan

Ø Stop the spread of fire by isolating the source of fire

Ø Cool surface under radiation or flame impingement with water

Ø Extinguish the fire with appropriate equipment or, if this is not

possible or desirable, control the spread of fire.

Ø Standby for disconnecting hoses/hard-arm

Ø Prepare engines and crew to cast off.

Action by terminal:

Ø Inform necessary authorities as prescribed by VPT & receivers.

Ø Close all valves.

Ø Turn the sprinklers on

Ø Give any assistance to ship as required by them

Ø Stand-by to disconnect hoses/ hard-arm

Ø Stand-by to assist in fire fighting

Ø Inform all ships

Ø Implement terminal/port emergency plan.

Fire on another ship or ashore: Action by ship:

Ø Cease all cargo operations and then close all valves

Ø Disconnect hoses/hard-arm

Ø Bring engines and crew to stand-by, ready to cast off.

Action by terminal:

Ø Raise the alarm.

Ø Contact the ship.

Ø Cease all cargo operations and then close all the valves.

Ø Fight fire and prevent fire from spreading.

Ø If required, stand-by to disconnect hoses/hard-arm

Ø Inform all ships.

Ø Implement terminal/port emergency plan.

Fire protection:

Appropriate terminal fire protection includes not only an adequate fire fighting system, but appropriate prevention measures as well. At terminals handling liquefied gas products, a permanently fixed gas detection system should be installed. The standard response to an oil terminal fire is to stop flow of fuel, and to maintain cooling water on the terminal structures until the fire burns out. In some cases, particularly for small fires, the fire can be extinguished before all the available fuel is burned. It is critical to this philosophy that an adequate isolation system is in place to quickly close off all sources of fuel (terminal pipelines, tanks, etc.,) and that an adequate number of monitors strategically placed about the terminal are available to put cooling water in the fire area. Fire water must be carefully thought out to ensure there is an adequate supply, including back-up, in the event of a problem with the main source. Special care must be taken when fighting a liquefied gas fire as extinguishing the flame with foam or water before the source of the liquefied gas is isolated can lead to formation of vapour cloud with the potential for a significant explosion. The practical use of water sprays in diverting a gas release or gas fire and the surface cooling should be thoroughly understood.

Emergency preparedness:

Contingency plans for emergencies arising from all eventualities together with reports on past full scale exercises should be readily available. Emergencies covered by contingency plans should include fire or explosion on the vessel or berth, serious physical damage to shore and terminal facilities, ammonia gas releases, and problems associated with cyclones, earthquakes, etc., as appropriate to the area. It is essential that terminal personnel be prepared for these emergencies. Plans should have been well rehearsed, not only by terminal but also by supporting organisations, in order to ensure the necessary prompt co-ordinated response and mobilisation of emergency equipment. Co-ordinated ship/shore exercises should also be arranged from time to time.

Fundamental emergency procedures are, about how to report and how the alarm should be given to all concerned. These procedures should be developed independently for the terminal, the ship and the ship/shore system. Procedures should warn that a seemingly minor incident may quickly escalate to one of a more serious nature. Much is gained by immediately reporting any abnormal occurrence, thereby permitting early consideration of whether a general alarm is desirable.

Toxic cargo hazard:

If the vapour from toxic cargo is inhaled, it may:

¨ dull your sense of smell;

¨ Make you dizzy; ;

¨ irritate your eyes;

¨ cause staggering and confusion ( appearance of drunkenness);

¨ cause loss of consciousness;

¨ cause internal damage;

¨ cause death.

Some toxic cargoes will harm if absorbed through skin, leading to:

¨ irritation of skin;

¨ dermatitis;

¨ skin cancer;

¨ blood poisoning;

¨ damage to vital organs;

¨ death.

Toxic cargoes if swallowed will lead to damage to parts of the body and possibly death.

· Leaks: If you smell ammonia during discharge operations you must try and get away by moving in perpendicular to the wind direction and never go in the direction of the wind or towards the direction of the wind.

·Anhydrous Ammonia is not dangerous when handled properly, but if not handled carefully it can be extremely dangerous. It is not as combustible as many other products that we use and handle every day. However, concentrations of gas burn and require precautions to avoid fires.

·Anhydrous ammonia (NH3) is dry, undiluted ammonia that is widely used as nitrogen fertiliser. However, it is the water-absorbing nature of anhydrous ammonia that causes the greatest injury (especially to the eyes, nose, throat or lungs), and which can cause permanent damage. It is a colourless gas at atmospheric pressure and normal temperature, but under pressure readily changes into a liquid. Only when it is released into the soil or atmosphere does it change to an icy vapour. Anhydrous ammonia has a high affinity for water. Thirteen hundred volumes of ammonia vapour will dissolve in one volume of water. Anhydrous ammonia is a hygroscopic compound, which means that it seeks water from the nearest source, including the most available source of moisture. Unfortunately, this moisture source may be the body of the operator, which is composed of 90 percent water. When a human body is exposed to anhydrous ammonia the chemical freeze burns its way into the skin, eyes or lungs.

This attraction places the eyes, lungs, and skin at greatest risk because of their high moisture content. Caustic burns result when the anhydrous ammonia dissolves into body tissue. Most deaths from anhydrous ammonia are caused by severe damage to the throat and lungs from a direct blast to the face. When large amounts are inhaled, the throat swells shut and victims suffocate. Exposure to vapours or liquid also can cause blindness. An additional concern is the low boiling point of anhydrous ammonia. The chemical freezes on contact at room temperature. It will cause burns similar to, but more severe than, those caused by dry ice. If exposed to severe cold flesh will become frozen. At first, the skin will become red (but turn subsequently white); the affected area is painless, but hard to touch, if left untreated the flesh will die and may become gangrenous. Anhydrous ammonia has a distinct odour, which humans can detect in concentrations as small as 5 ppm. When used in fertiliser, anhydrous ammonia has a concentration of about 1,000,000 ppm. Brief exposure to concentrations of 2,500 to 6,500 ppm can result in death. The best ways to reduce risk of serious injury from anhydrous ammonia exposure are to wear protective equipment and to know what to do in an emergency. Exposure to anhydrous ammonia can happen suddenly and is almost always unexpected.

·Mild exposure can cause irritation to eye, nose and lung tissues. When NH3, is mixed with moisture in the lungs, it causes severe irritation. Prolonged breathing can cause suffocation.

·The best first aid treatment for anhydrous ammonia exposure is water -- large amounts of it. Flush all exposed areas with water for at least 15 minutes.

·The human eye is a complex organ made up of nerves, veins and cells. The front of the eye is covered by membranes that resist dust and dirt. None of these can resist anhydrous ammonia, because the entire eye is about 80 percent water. A shot of ammonia under pressure can cause extensive, almost immediate damage to the eye. The ammonia extracts the fluid and destroys eye cells and tissue in minutes. Always begin flushing immediately. If you get a shot of anhydrous ammonia in your eye, the first few seconds are crucial. Use your eye-wash immediately to flush the eyes. If wearing contact lenses, remove them and obtain a larger water supply immediately. Your eyes will fight to stay closed because of the extreme pain, but they must be held open so the water can flush out the ammonia from the entire eye surface and inner lining of the eyelids. Continue to flush the eyes for at least 15 minutes.

·Never wear contact lenses around anhydrous ammonia because the lenses collect the chemical and intensify caustic effects.

· If vapour or liquid ammonia contacts you then remove the contaminated clothing and get under shower/eye wash immediately. Remember that ammonia is highly soluble in water. In case direct contact with liquefied gas can cause cold burns or frostbite & also probable permanent damage to organs (e.g. lungs). In case this does happen then remove the clothing which may restrict circulation to the frozen area and immediately immerse the affected area in a water bath with a temperature between 40⁰C and 46⁰C for about 60 minutes. Do not consume alcohol or smoke in this condition.

·If you find someone in a continuous stream of anhydrous ammonia, do not attempt rescue without proper equipment. Rescuers must wear a self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) and protective clothing. Always take care in removing a victim's clothing. Clothes could be frozen to the skin and removal could cause additional injury.

·About 80 percent of anhydrous ammonia accidents are the result of using improper procedures, lack of training in equipment operation or failure to follow prescribed practices.

·The three most important points to remember in handling anhydrous ammonia safely are:

1. Use proper equipment;

2. Take good care of equipment;

and

3. Follow safe practices.

IN CASE OF AN ACCIDENT

Work fast!

·Immediate action is important when anhydrous ammonia is involved in an accident.

Water is the best and only emergency first-aid treatment for ammonia burns.

·Get professional medical help as soon as possible to prevent permanent damage.

·Remove contaminated clothing and thoroughly wash the skin. Clothing frozen to skin by ammonia can be loosened with liberal application of water. Wet clothing and body thoroughly and then remove the clothing. Leave burns exposed to the air and do not cover with clothing or dressings. This reduces injuries, caused as soon as anhydrous ammonia contacts skin or clothes. If water is not immediately available, use any non-toxic liquid such as cold coffee. Orange juice and other mildly acidic liquids will help neutralise the chemical. Even with proper first aid, seek medical help as soon as possible. Explain the source of the injury so that medical providers will not apply oils or ointments.

·Immediately after first-aid treatment with water, get the burn victim to a physician.

·Do not apply salves, ointments or oils - these cause ammonia to burn deeper. Let a physician determine the proper medical treatment.

·Remove the victim to an area free from fumes if an accident occurs. If the patient is overcome by ammonia fumes and stops breathing, get the patient to fresh air and give artificial respiration.

·The patient should be placed in a reclining position with head and shoulders elevated. Basic life support should be administered if needed. Oxygen has been found useful in treating victims who have inhaled ammonia fumes. Administer 100 percent oxygen at atmospheric pressure.

·Any person who has been burned or overcome by ammonia should be placed under a physician's care as soon as possible. Begin irrigation with water immediately. The rescuer should use fresh water if possible. Open water in the vicinity of an anhydrous ammonia leak may have picked up enough NH3, to be an aqua ammonia solution. This could aggravate the damage if used in the eyes or for washing burns.

·The victim should be kept warm, especially to minimise shock. If the nose and throat are affected, irrigate them with water continuously for at least 15 minutes. Take care not to cause the victim to choke. If the patient can swallow, encourage drinking lots of some type of citrus drink such as lemonade or fruit juice. The acidity will counteract some of the affect of the anhydrous ammonia.

·Draining of Ammonia into sea while pre-cooling of the hard-arm or during disconnection operations is not an eco-friendly operation. This ammonia could be collected in a container and carried back to the plant, which is eco-friendly and also recovery of a small quantity of ammonia instead of throwing it into the sea. Even a small quantity of Ammonia as low as 0.45mg/L (LC50) (is hazardous to Salmon as per ICSC, USA) could be dangerous if not fatal to sea born creatures and such contaminated fish/prawns etc., consumed by humans could even prove to be dangerous.

·Reminder: It is a good idea to post safe work practice and first aid measure information on bulletin boards.

In summary, anhydrous ammonia can be used safely if:

· all equipment is sound and properly designed for the intended use;

· all equipment is maintained in good working order and regularly inspected;

and

· workers know the properties of anhydrous ammonia and follow, safe work practices and procedures.

SAFETY IS NO ACCIDENT.

REMEMBER: SAFETY DOES NOT JUST HAPPEN

IT IS THE REWARD OF CARE, THOUGHT AND GOOD ORGANISATION.

ACCIDENTS JUST DO NOT HAPPEN BUT ARE MADE TO HAPPEN.

YOU CAN ENSURE THAT ACCIDENTS DO NOT HAPPEN BY NOT COMPROMISING SAFE PRACTICES.

LIFE STARTED AT SEA – DO NOT LET IT END THERE

DO NOT BECOME THE NEXT CASUALITY YOURSELF

Source: SIGTTO, ISGOT, IMO, OCIMF publications & from the internet

Acknowledgements: The author thanks Gas Carrier Masters & Officers for their help in preparation of this paper.