The Black and Blue Retort Report

Police of my generation, including Ed Freeman were not allowed to transport either criminals or injured civilians in their patrol vehicles. We could only transport people if “Paddy Wagon number 99” was not available or would be long in arriving. The reason we were not allowed to transport anyone in our vehicles had to do with the city not wanting to be legally liable for any form of insurance if the suspect were injured in a car accident while in transit in one of the police patrol cars to a hospital. But occasionally there were exceptions to this rule. To be able to transport a suspect or injured person in our vehicle we had to radio in to our district Sergeant and ask for “Permission to transport.” The Sergeant either said yes or no, but we were not allowed to transport unless we got that specific permission. However, in nearly all cases we had to wait for Paddy Wagon number 99, (which for a long while serviced the entire city and was the only Paddy Wagon PPB had to transport prisoners). Or we had to wait for an ambulance to arrive to provide hospital transportation for the injured person if the situation were dire enough.(DuPay, 2015). Police in Portland did not begin transporting criminals in their patrol cars until many years later, and certainly not during my time as a street cop, or Ed Freeman's time during 1964. 

If we got permission from our sergeant, we would call dispatch on the car radio and ask “What’s the city hospital of the day?” and dispatch would tell us the name of the rotating “hospital of the day.” For example, some days it was Emanuel Hospital, some days it was St. Vincent’s Hospital, some days it was Providence Hospital on NE Glisan Street, and some days it was the Portland Sanitarium Hospital, located on sixtieth and Belmont Street, later renamed Portland Adventist Hospital.

If we had injured criminals, or anyone else we might come across who needed emergency medical assistance, such as a civilian who had been robbed and assaulted, they were taken to the designated “hospital of the day.” If there had not been this policy, then all people in the Albina district would have gone straight to Emanuel Hospital each day and the hospital would have become quickly over loaded, as the Albina district had the most number of violent crime calls, with injuries. The Albina district also had the largest numbers of shootings and stabbings of any other portion of the city. Having the rotating “hospital of the day” was designed to make sure that Emanuel Hospital did not become overloaded, which would have placed greater risk for the nurses and doctors working there, and the patients. 

It is for this reason that Officer Edwin Freeman drove Mr. Cleotis Rhodes to the Portland Sanitarium Hospital across town rather than drive to Emanuel Hospital which was only a few short blocks away or wait for an ambulance.

Ed Freeman was not an evil man. He did not deny Cleotis Rhodes medical care because he wanted him to bleed to death in the back of his patrol car. He was simply taking him to the “hospital of the day” and in his own vehicle which was not standard and highly unusual. This tells me that Freeman was worried enough for Rhodes, being that he'd just shot him, to drive him in his own police vehicle and that he had called in a request for “permission to transport.” If Freeman had waited five minutes for an ambulance, Rhodes would surely have died and the ambulance would have taken Rhodes to the “hospital of the day” anyway. So, to save time and get Rhodes to the hospital as soon as he could, Freeman took him there himself. This may seem like an unreasonable example of police procedure and bureaucratic red tape, but it was police procedure that the common patrolman, like Ed Freeman and myself had absolutely no control over. People often forget that patrolmen do not create the rules; they are only tasked with making certain those rules and or policies are upheld and observed.

In the hierarchy of the command structure, patrolmen are always on the bottom of the food chain, as they always have been, and always will be. Whenever city commissioner's talk about budget cuts, they never discuss getting rid of the highly paid commanders or command staff, they always talk about getting rid of patrolman first. (DuPay, 2015).

The reality is, none of us were there to observe Cleotis Rhodes violently resisting arrest on the front porch of his home, after eluding and driving “erratically” while putting other Portlanders at risk. None of us were there to observe the significant action of Rhodes wife retrieving and then returning Freeman's service revolver to him after it “fell out” of his holster.

I think we can all agree that Ed Freeman did not make the best or wisest decision by shooting Rhodes. He already knew where Rhodes lived; he had his address and could have simply issued a warrant for his arrest, or gone back to his home to wait for him to arrive later. But none of us were there that night. None of us know the exact circumstances of what happened, or why Freeman decided to do what he did.

I do believe that Donald McNamara, the new police chief, following the 1964 death of Rhodes, was wise in revising the bureaus Manuel of Procedures on the use of weapons, as detailed in the Black and Blue report. That change was a positive step in the right direction. To make it clear that a gun should only be used “as a last resort” was a very good change to make for the entire community in Portland. It was a good change for offenders who resist and put themselves in danger by resisting, and for police officers who are daily placed in harm’s way when fighting violent offenders who make it clear they want to do them harm, or worse yet kill them. More police departments today should focus on using lethal weapons only “as a last resort.”

Technology - Call Boxes: When I was signed on as a recruit in 1961 there were still remnants at PPB of a bygone era with regard to technology and police communications. This impacted how officers communicated with the precinct and submitted reports to the secretarial pool. For example, I was issued the very last PPB “call box” key while on probation after being accepted as a recruit in 1961. I know I was issued the last call box key because my sergeant told me.

When I was sworn in, in April of 1961, I hadn't yet attended academy training. In the academy, I would be shown how to fight, which included some Karate and Judo moves. I would learn how to use a sap, how to safely use and handle my weapon, and I would learn about law, policy and acceptable use of force, as opposed to the criminal assault of a suspect. After I was hired, I spent almost eight months receiving good old fashioned On the Job Training, (OJT). I was instructed on the finer points of being a police officer and got to see up-close and personal how police officers operated and reacted to dangerous situations.

No agency today would ever hire a police officer who hadn't gone through a complete academy training first, but that's how it was done in the old days of 1961.

Call boxes were used all during the early part of the century, in New York, Chicago, California and most other major cities, including of course, Portland's small community. They were used all through the 1940s, 1950s and early 1960s, which includes when I worked as a street cop in Albina. All recruits were issued a handbook that listed all the call box locations, hospital locations and street numbers. These were listed in the “100 block” descriptions, so we could learn and know our way around town. Call boxes were originally used to contact the police precinct, and later on became a useful tool in the dictation of reports. As soon as I lifted up the receiver of the call box, an operator would answer, “Central Precinct?” I would then say, “This is Officer DuPay, number 354, I have an arrest report to dictate.” Then the operator, generally a man, would respond by saying, “Okay, go ahead when you hear the beep.” I would wait for the sound of an electronic beep and then I would begin dictating the report, as it was being audio taped for later dictation by the secretarial pool. Prior to this, all reports were written long hand by the officer, which took far too much time. Creating this method improved efficiency and overall productivity. This method of police report dictation is another example of how the Portland Police Bureau sought to make report writing more effective and efficient by consistently upgrading existing police procedure to something newer and better.

When my sergeant gave me the last call box key, about three weeks into April of 1961, after I had also gotten my uniform, sap and gun-belt, he told me that eventually we wouldn't need call boxes anymore because we would be adopting “a new system” in a few short months. He explained that very soon we would be able to use “any public phone booth” as we had used the call boxes in the past. He seemed excited about this new method and said it was “about time they figured out a better way to submit reports and contact the precincts” without having to “hunt down a call box.” All we would have to do, he told me, is simply dial a special number at any phone booth and we could contact the precinct to dictate our reports or speak with a commander. It seemed a cutting edge upgrade to both of us at the time.

Several months later right before the new system would come into effect, I ran into the same sergeant working “second night,” which is the graveyard shift. We chatted for a few minutes on a street corner near the Lotus Hotel on SW Third Street. I mentioned I'd had to use the call box directly across the street only a few minutes before to dictate an arrest report. We started chatting about the new system that was soon to be adopted. That's when he laughed and said, “You know you got the last call box key! Did you know that, DuPay?” I chuckled and said, “Is that right?” He nodded his head saying, “Yep, you sure did. Keep it as a souvenir, maybe one day it'll be valuable.” I still have my bronze colored call box key, the last to be issued to any PPB officer.

The “Quick-Call” Alert System: In the early 1960s, we didn’t have Pac Set radios to contact the precinct. That technology was not available until about the late 1960s. However, in one of the bureaus many efforts to improve efficiency, and productivity, PPB administrators, in connection with communications specialists, created a way to contact police officers if they were away from their cars and could not hear the car radio crackling. They called this alert system the “Quick-Call.” The Quick-Call was created to improve the way crime was dealt with and much like the “hospital of the day” procedure that existed during this time, the Quick-Call was developed as a way to facilitate communications, making officers more readily available for the next call, quicker to respond, and more productive, responding to citizens calls for help faster.

When I was first signed on as a police officer in 1961, we had to walk or run out to our cars and use the in-car radio exclusively to communicate with the precinct. It limited our mobility and in some cases, it limited our efficiency, not to mention our response times and our personal safety. If we were in a residence or having coffee or the rare meal break, we might not be able to hear the distinctive crackling sound of the car radio as dispatch called asking for assistance with a new call, or asking for our location. So, the administrators developed the Quick-Call as a form of cutting edge technology that assisted in getting the police officer out of the residence or restaurant to let him know he was needed on an emergency call. The Quick-Call was inventive and actually worked well for its intended purpose.

It worked like this: Each police car had a Quick-Call electronic device, which was a radio receiver installed next to the radio microphone on the dashboard. Each Quick-Call device was programmed with a specific number for each individual car and in many respects it was the earliest form of a pager. When leaving the car, we would advise radio, saying, for instance, “Car 43 will be on “quick” 22 at the Sun Sang Cafe.” Later, if we were needed for an emergency, radio dispatchers would push a button at the station and we would be alerted. The button they pushed would send a radio signal to the device in the car, and the car horn would then sound, honking loudly, notifying us that dispatch was calling. The horn would continue sounding until we ran outside and answered the radio call, at which time the horn would stop sounding automatically. The Quick-Call alert system was used for several years prior to the purchase of individual Pac Set radios for all PPB officers. With the advent of that newer and more efficient form of two-way communication, the Quick-Call alert system was discontinued and made obsolete in the middle 1960s.

Though this form of police communication may seem prehistoric to some, at the time it was a clever use of simple radio frequencies. Its intended purpose was to improve communication between officers and dispatch, all in order that we could be better at fighting crime and keeping the citizens safe, and it worked.

The quick-call demonstrates that to improve public safety, PPB was continually looking for newer, more modern methods of improving police efficiency, via modernizing communication methods between the individual officers and dispatch. These aspects of police science and police procedure demonstrate that public safety was valued not only by the officers I worked with all during the 1960s, but also by PPB administrators. In many respects Portland was a leader in making these innovative improvements in police procedure nationwide.

During the early 1960s I worked Albina both as a district patrol officer and for a short year, as a member of the Vice Squad. I was able to closely observe the activities of many of the businesses in those areas. (DuPay, 2015).

Seven)There is a photo in the Black and Blue report that shows North Williams Avenue in 1967 and is captioned, “local newspapers referred to the area as crime-ridden, despite its thriving businesses and active neighborhood associations.” (Serbulo, Pg. 11). A November 2, 1967 newspaper clipping attached to the photo reads: “By day, even Portland's old town streets look innocent enough; but at night, SW 1st to 3rd and 'the avenue' at North Williams come to life with activity city vice squad members do not consider healthy.” (Serbulo and Gibson, Pg. 11). During the early 1960's I worked Albina both as a district patrol officer and for a short year, as a member of the Vice Squad. I was able to closely observe the activities of many of the businesses in those areas. (DuPay, 2015).

The Cotton Club on North Williams and Paul's Paradise on North Russell and Williams were both operated by Mr. Paul Knauls. Though a good-looking, smooth talking and well-liked businessman, Knauls allowed a 15-year-old teenager (Ron Steen) to play drums in his establishment. To have an underage teen boy play drums at The Cotton Club was not only illegal but also immoral. (Belasco, 2015). (https://vimeo.com/127320728).

Additionally, Knauls allowed underage drinking to occur in both establishments as well as prostitution. Miss Pam Owens, age 19, and a heroin-addicted prostitute was allowed to prostitute herself and drink alcohol at the Cotton Club on a regular basis, despite being underage. I know this because I witnessed this activity on several occasions personally on nights I visited the Cotton Club, working undercover for vice. (DuPay, 2015).

Both establishments allowed or ignored blatant heroin dealing and prostitution by well-known local pimps, such as Buck Owens, LeRoy Clarke, Jaynolen Moody, and Sherman Jackson. Jackson drove a blue Rolls Royce around Albina, and the equally flamboyant Henry Johnson, (who dressed like a television cliché of a pimp) and painted his Beaverton house bright purple with the sole intention of upsetting his more conservative neighbors, drove around town in a pink Cadillac. Neither man had any compunction about addicting their family member’s children to heroin, or introducing the daughters of family and friends to a life of addiction and prostitution. Another of Jaynolen Moody's prostitutes who was a frequent visitor to the Cotton Club was a young heroin addict named Thelma Zena Moody. She was a young woman I arrested several times, along with Buck Owens and her pimp Jaynolen Moody for various vice offenses. (DuPay, 2015).

Van's Olympic Room at North Vancouver and Fremont was operated by Mr. Elwin Van Riper and his manager LeRoy Clarke. I learned years later that both men allowed the same activity at Van's Olympic Room as occurred at The Cotton Club and Paul's Paradise. LeRoy Clarke was an active heroin dealer, and pimp who came to a sad end. He was shot and killed in the club by the PPB SERT team in 1977. During this shootout a police sergeant named Hill was also shot and severely injured. (Oregonian, 1977).

Convicted prostitute Thelma Moody ended up shot there in 1974 on the dance floor during an argument over a cheap ten-dollar wig with another woman, dying later at Emanuel hospital. (DuPay, 2015).

King's Tavern on North Williams near Skidmore Street, a black owned tavern, similarly operated without regard for any rules or regulations of any kind, and allowed blatant heroin dealing to go on unchecked. I personally arrested Benny Villarreal while at “King's” dealing heroin wrapped in small rubber balloons in the middle 1960s for which he received a long prison sentence. Many altercations occurred there, resulting in stabbings and shootings both inside King's and on the street in front of King's. King's Tavern was at times shut down by both the health department and the OLCC for liquor and health violations and was a constant source of vice problems for the Portland Police. (DuPay, 2015).

The Red Sands night club operated on Northeast Skidmore and Union Avenue and was the location of many drunken fights and stabbings that usually spilled out onto the street, occasionally blocking traffic. After a number of liquor and nuisance violations and arrests of patrons for disorderly conduct by me and other officers, the Red Sands was permanently closed by the OLCC in the late 1960s due to their constant criminal and vice activity. (DuPay, 2015).

The Paragon Club on North Killingsworth and Albina also operated without regard for rule or law. In the middle 1960s I was assaulted by a man with a knife who had become intoxicated in the Paragon. This man stabbed another patron, seriously injuring him before he tried to stab me with the knife. I disarmed him without killing him by striking him with my nightstick on his forearm. He was then carted off to jail to begin a lengthy sentence for assaulting a police officer. The Paragon Club was also closed down several times by the OLCC for liquor violations all during the 1960s. (DuPay, 2015).

These nightclubs and bars were hardly wholesome, law abiding businesses with respect for or concern for observing the laws of the land. The men who frequented many of these businesses engaged in drug distribution, sexual trafficking, and various forms of sexual and physical assault that occurred against young black women on a regular basis. I witnessed this pattern of chronic crime and vice personally while I worked the district more times than I can possibly recall. (DuPay, 2015.)

Of course there were some good businesses in Albina, notably Senn's Dairy located at North Williams and Fremont, along with a very large local bakery situated on Fremont Street which employed a large number of black men and women. The bakery took up an entire city block and provided the area with wholesome bread and pastries. The other businesses that were “thriving” and which the police had no issues with were the several Ma and Pop grocery stores that dotted Williams Avenue, which were primarily black-owned, along with Lew’s Men Shop.

Another business in the area was Carl Opperman's Grocery Store at North Mississippi and Skidmore — it is now a Thai food restaurant. Opperman’s was one of the last white owned Ma and Pop corner stores in the area, before it was forced out of business. The Opperman’s were shot in a robbery at the store by two black male repeat offenders in their early twenties in late 1967. Mr. Opperman, 75-years-old, died instantly, shot in the chest and face, and Mrs. Alice Opperman survived a through-and-through torso wound. As she was in her late sixties and her husband had been murdered, she was unable to continue running the store and it was closed down. (DuPay, 2015).

Eight) Mention is made, in the Black and Blue report, of the Portland Police Bureau's Intelligence Division. Historically, Portland city government has always had some version of its own secret police at one time or another, whether they were called The Red Squad or the Intelligence Division. While not personally involved in intelligence activities during my time with PPB, I knew the officers working that detail. To me they seemed to have a superiority complex, as if they knew something other detectives didn't know, or were in on some big secret. The common attitude of police competitiveness, which is inherent in most specialized police units and in police culture was alive and well in the Intelligence Division. 

I am sure that this unit, as described in the Black and Blue report did use, “... information they gathered to spread rumors about their targets, foster dissension within and among activist organizations, and accuse targeted individuals of illegal subversive activity regardless of whether the information supported their charges,” and is correct. I would agree with that assertion. (Serbulo, Pg. 12). In retrospect, the above quotation and all that it suggests rings true. I well knew that the activities and methods used by the Intelligence Division during this time were not only counterproductive but also illegal. If people break the law, it is the job of police to arrest them, but not to harass them, spread falsehoods, or foster dissension based on political, social or religious beliefs, which many in the Intelligence Division did all too regularly.

Nine) I worked the 1967 riot that began in Irving Park. I was stationed at Northeast Union and Fremont, and it was a miserably hot summer day. With the frustration of the black “vocal minority” Albina residents thick in the air, regarding widespread accusations of harassment by police, I dodged countless rocks and bottles thrown at me and other officers by the irate black protesters. The protesters represented less than half the entire Albina population and seemed to consist of the younger population. Despite the urge to go after those people throwing things at us, we were instructed instead to ignore the assaults and ignore any possible injury we might sustain as a result of any airborne objects. During the tumult, we did what we could to stop the looting and smashing of windows and assisted the Fire Bureau in putting out fires started by rioters and looters. (DuPay, 2015).

We had been prepared for riot duty by practicing tactics at Kelly Butte range. In perhaps what was the first bureau funded training effort at “less than lethal tactics” we learned how to fire 12 gauge. 00 buck shot at a crowd by “skip bouncing” the rounds so the slugs would ricochet at the crowd knee-high level instead of the more lethal chest high level. During training, we became proficient at bouncing slugs off the asphalt by firing at the pavement about thirty feet in front of a simulated crowd. However, absolutely no officer I worked with at that time wanted to fire a shotgun directly into a crowd of people and we talked about it among ourselves. (DuPay, 2015).

I know the Portland police exercised great restraint that day, and under extremely difficult circumstances. We didn't kill anyone, and only one rioter was shot by police. That rioter was shot as he was setting fire to a furniture store and refusing to obey commands. For myself, I prayed I could go home that day without injuring anyone or being injured myself. I had a wife and young son at home waiting for me and depending on me to return in one piece.

Not one of us officers wanted to kill a rioter. Not one of us would have enjoyed the idea of killing or taking another human life.

Ten) In 1969 during the time of the Albina riots, Robert Probasco and “thirteen other complainants filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of more than twenty thousand black Portlanders in U.S. District Court against Mayor Schrunk, the entire city council, Chief McNamara and thirty-eight Portland police officers.” The suit claimed police harassment caused “an atmosphere of fear and persecution,” and that it had a “chilling effect upon the exercise of their federally protected rights.” The Probasco case was settled in 1971 by a consent decree in which the city admitted no wrongdoing but agreed to cease specific activities.” (Serbulo and Gibson, Pg. 17). Specifically forbidden by police was the continued use of “lead weighted saps and sap-gloves.” The decree also stated that “all officers needed to have a search warrant before entering an Albina resident's home.” Officers have under most circumstances always needed a warrant before entering a resident’s home. In my time working Albina, inappropriate warrant-less searches by patrolman were virtually unknown.

Allegations that illegal searches of homes in Albina were done without proper warrants by patrolman does not coincide with either my personal experiences or memories of what other officers did at that time. I worked with many men from (1961-1967) when I worked the streets of Albina, and myself and the patrolmen I worked with were never in a position to write up illegal search warrants. Patrolman had to obtain a search warrant from a detective. At no time during my time on the streets do I recall the patrolman I worked with illegally entering the homes of Albina residents, and I never personally did either. Though it may have occurred by other officers with less integrity, to suggest that there were rampant warrant-less searches of Albina residents by patrolmen is inaccurate revisionist history making. (DuPay, 2015).

The loss of the use of saps and sap gloves was of no particular consequence to most police officers I knew as they were rarely used. I kept my sap gloves in my back right hand pocket. They were uncomfortable to run with and bounced hard against my buttock. They were as annoying as having a large rock in your pocket that you wished you could get rid of, but couldn't. I hardly ever used them. When I was a young officer, we were taught to be “hands-on” in our dealings with resisters. This meant putting your hands on the suspect and using certain manual control tactics in order to get a suspect to comply and submit to arrest. During my six years as a street cop I only used my leather covered sap on two occasions. The first occasion was to protect an older sergeant who was being viciously attacked by a white burglar late at night, outside a darkened service station. The second occasion the sap was used to break into a window as we searched for an assailant during the investigation of a “trick call” assault and robbery by prostitute Thelma Moody. (DuPay, 2015).

Eleven) As part of the Probasco Decree, the Portland Police Bureau was directed to adopt “an affirmative action policy to increase the number of minority officers.” As part of this hiring push, Sgt. Norm Simmons visited ten colleges in the south. Criticized for traveling to the south to recruit employees, bureau recruiter Marilyn Snowden observed that “for some reason minorities are not attracted to police work in their own communities.” (Serbulo, Pg. 17). Ms. Snowden was correct in the belief that people of color, in Portland, did not want to work in the communities in which they’d been raised. This is as I remember it and this was the core issue with hiring people of color in Portland, Oregon. They simply did not apply. Apparently, this was not only a trend in Portland but also nationwide. I recall many stories of officers of color leaving their native communities to apply for work outside the communities they had been raised in. They did this in an effort to pursue a career in law enforcement, which they wanted, and also to avoid the demonization and stigma that would accompany policing the communities in which they had been raised.

As elaborated upon in the Black and Blue report, Portland police officer Tony Newman recounted his experiences as one of the few blacks on the force: “I got the feeling after being on the bureau for a few months that I was being watched.” (Serbulo, Pg. 20). As a probationary officer, Newman certainly was being watched and evaluated as we all were while probationary officers, including myself. This would not have been unusual in any respect.

During that period when you were on probation, you could be fired for any reason, for any kind of mistake, error in judgment or failure to perform police procedure correctly — or simply because you didn’t have the right “attitude.” PPB did not discriminate in this regard based upon color if an officer did not take the job seriously enough. To illustrate this point, when I was a seasoned patrolman and working as a coach in 1966, there was a young probationary cop who had just been sworn in. He was white, blond and good-looking, but he was also arrogant and didn’t take police work seriously. When he was having coffee with me at a drive-in on Interstate he wanted to flirt with the car hop more than talk with me about police work, training and procedure. When he said to one of the young car hops, “Hey honey! How’d ya like to fall into the arms of the law?” I knew he would not make it and I wrote a poor evaluation on him for that shift. He was consequently not retained with PPB.

The supervisors made sure you understood that you had to have the right attitude. This was not something that did not occur with white officers, while impacting only black officers. All recruits were subject to the same scrutiny and I too can vividly recall the feeling of “being watched” for the simple reason that I was in fact being watched, as all probationary recruits were.

“Every black officer has to listen to “nigger jokes” and doesn’t feel he can object,” Newman also stated. (Serbulo, Pg. 20). I suspect Newman’s statement here is true although I never personally heard any white officers calling other black officers the N word in all seventeen years I was employed with PPB. But I did hear from other officers that Newman got hassled by some of the white “old timers” after he signed on in 1968 when I was working as a detective. The "old timers" would be the ones who had signed on with the bureau during the 1940s and 1950s. Most of them were conservative WW II veterans, and clearly not a part of the New Breed of police officer as I and my cohorts were. It would be easy to see some of those guys making racist comments to black officers, and to their face, as many of those white officers were simply not educated or enlightened men.

The reality is that there were numerous social cliques in the bureau when I worked for PPB. These were generally small groups of like-minded men who associated and socialized together. Some of those officers held certain values and beliefs that I did not share. I only socialized with the men I'd been assigned to as partners, and with a select few I had gotten to know who I knew had integrity and took the job seriously. I did hear about other officers not only being racist but also behaving in sexist and woman hating ways to the residents of Albina, as well. I steered clear of those officers at all times during my early career and later when I was a veteran detective because I didn’t respect them.

Later on in my career, I worked with Tony Newman in the burglary detail after he was promoted to detective in the 1970s and I got to know and like him. He was an exemplary police officer and detective who always got excellent marks on his twice yearly evaluation forms. Newman was an active, friendly and popular community volunteer and regularly received appreciation letters from citizens and community leaders thanking him for his volunteer hours. Newman was extremely well-liked and respected by all who knew him. (Portland City Archives).

Newman, aged 48, was subsequently fired from the police bureau in 1991 for stalking and then stabbing and nearly killing his girlfriend, Teresa Renee Sproul, aged 32 in 1990. After Newman stabbed Sproul four times with a four-inch butcher knife, December 16, 1990, he then tried to elude police and was later arrested for attempted murder. None of these gruesome details are mentioned in the Black and Blue report. Newman's main purpose being mentioned in the report is to promote Serbulo and Gibson’s bias against the Portland Police Bureau, incorrectly suggesting that during the decades mentioned, all white officers were racists and killer thugs and all black officers were victims of oppression by upper command staff and constantly harassed.(Portland City Archives).

An individual not familiar with Portland history might presume Tony Newman was some sort of hero, during all the time he served with the Portland Police Bureau, when the fact is, he experienced a sudden turnaround in his personality. This resulted in him nearly killing a young woman who was a mother to two small children, whereby he single handedly destroyed his own long and once distinguished career. (Portland City Archives).

Newman had been recorded as officially stalking his former girlfriend for over three months, (and probably longer than that). He had been threatening to kill Sproul repeatedly and on October 21, 1990, while threatening to kill her, he pointed a gun at her. He had already assaulted her several times previously, and even forced “unwanted sexual contact with her.” What is commonly not known is that November 11, 1990, Newman forcibly cut off several locks of hair from her head, once more against her will and as she feared for her life. This criminal action called into question his mental health and is indicative of obsessive behavior. (Portland City Archives).

What most people outside of law enforcement didn’t know is that several months before Newman stabbed Sproul, he was rumored to have begun using steroids. This was something many officers did during that time in an effort to bulk up and gain musculature. Newman was a well-known body builder and reputed to be competitive with his adult son, an athlete of whom he was extremely proud. If Newman had begun abusing steroids it might explain the sudden shift in his personality, from the calm, intelligent and professional man we all knew, trusted, and liked, to a man who stalked and then stabbed a former lover, and young mother. (Anonymous, 2015).

Twelve) The Black and Blue report mentions the rise of the police union in Portland and how it abused its power. I would agree with that. The Portland Police Association, (PPA) became a powerful political force and has had mixed reactions by citizens over the decades. I was a detective in 1970 when wage negotiations with the city “stalled.” As a result, the PPA solicited the support of the Longshoreman's Unions by organizing an information picket of the ports along the Willamette River effectively shutting down the ports as unionized dockworkers refused to cross picket lines. (Serbulo, pg. 20). I believed the aforementioned action to be no more than strong-arm tactics and not something our police union should have done. Officer’s efforts at getting better pay and benefits should have revolved around solely their merits and not involved work stoppage and loss of income for others. What they engaged in, in my opinion represented “conduct unbecoming a police officer” by using strong-arm tactics which I consider to be unprofessional, bullying behavior, and demeaning to the Portland Police Bureau and its reputation.

Thirteen) In 1976, Stan Peters was elected president of the PPA and involved the union more politically. “In response to the complaint, Peters went to the press proclaiming in the papers and on the KATU News Town Hall television program that the police were not racist. Black people just committed more crimes per capita, he explained, using statistics about rape — historically, a racially charged crime—to support his claim.” (Serbulo and Gibson, Pg. 21). In retrospect, Stan Peter’s statements did nothing to improve racial relations in Portland, though he was correct when he brought up various statistics on crimes committed by black, as opposed to white persons. The fact is that all during the 1960s and 1970s black persons in the Albina district were responsible for most of the city’s violent crime, which included stabbings, shootings, robberies, burglaries and of course, rape and murder. I was there arresting these criminals, and this is how I remember it.

Fourteen) One of the more outrageous claims the Black and Blue report makes is the claim that in 1985 black Portlander Lloyd “Tony” Stevenson was killed “at the hands of the Police.” (Serbulo and Gibson, Pg 9).

In April of 1985, Stevenson, a black man aged thirty one attempted to prevent a shop lifter from leaving a 7-Eleven store located on NE Weidler where Stevenson had gone to play video games. An altercation began after the man was accused of shoplifting and Stevenson attempted to help. The clerks began to confront the shoplifter and Stevenson with the aid of the clerks chased the man into the parking lot. Stevenson was then approached by a man named Greg Cavic who began arguing with him. The argument became so heated that when the police arrived, Officer Bruce Pantley stepped in between Stevenson and Cavic. Perhaps Cavic accused Stevenson of being too aggressive in stopping the shoplifter? What happened next is still something of a mystery but some sources claim that Stevenson would not calm down, and continued to behave aggressively towards Cavic and Officer Pantley. At some point, Officer Barbour, placed Stevenson in a carotid hold for a short fifteen seconds and Stevenson collapsed and stopped breathing.(Dawdy, 2005).

Stevenson worked as a security guard for Fred Meyer and may have had aspirations of becoming a police officer. Stevenson would not be the first security guard who had tried and failed to become a police officer, or who assumed the authoritative role of “cop wanna be.” When a crowd gathered, and before the police arrived it was Stevenson who had “...tried to contain the melee.” Where the officers were at fault occurred when they did not assist with CPR or any manner of resuscitation efforts. 

The Stevenson death was ultimately ruled a “homicide” by the medical examiner. I contend that the death was a clear example of accidental death and not a homicide. Neither Officer Pantley nor Officer Barbour intended to kill Stevenson and there was absolutely no premeditation involved in what happened. The two officers were wrong however in not attempting to perform CPR and resuscitate Stevenson. Their reluctance may have been because of the hysteria surrounding the spread of AIDS, which was still prevalent, and quite misunderstood at that time. The death, in my opinion and others working in law enforcement at the time was that it was a form of accidental death. Not murder. The altercation between Stevenson and Greg Cavic, leading up to the carotid hold speaks volumes to me and other retired or former law enforcement officers about Stevenson’s frame of mind and level of possible aggression. Is it possible that Stevenson was trying to assume the role of a cop? In my career as a Portland police officer, I encountered numerous security guards who were later arrested for assault. This occurred when they decided to go overboard and put hands on a person, or otherwise become combative when they had no legal cause or right to be. It was not unusual and happened many times during my career.

As to the Medical examiner and the apparent decision to rule Stevenson’s death a “homicide” I can only state that medical examiners have a long history of bending to political pressure in their rulings. Any veteran cop knows this. I know of specific medical examiners who would bend to pressure and make a determination about a particular cause of death that was not true to science. This is a practice that happens nationwide. And this was done more than once while I was working as a police detective for PPB. Just because the medical examiner ruled the Stevenson death a “homicide” does not mean it was a homicide. There is no doubt that the Stevenson death was tragic and preventable, but it was also not murder. (DuPay, 2015). 

Fifteen) After the death of Lloyd “Tony” Stevenson and the banning of the carotid hold by Penny Harrington, (the carotid hold that officers had used successfully for decades) there were some unintended consequences. Many officers became angry that the newly appointed chief of police, Penny Harrington, was not defending them and was willing to allow the press and media to demonize them unfairly. (Anonymous, 2015).

At the time before Stevenson's death, Harrington was promoting the carotid hold in an effort to improve the image of police; she was also discouraging the use of another popular police control tactic. She felt that police officers seen using this other method to gain compliance was not a good way to promote community acceptance of police, particularly if that method appeared violent. The control tactic was called the “hair hold.” This method was used after I left the streets, to gain control of a resister but I know that it worked. (Anonymous, 2015).

The officer reached up behind the head of the resister and slide their hand up and into the hair, depending if there was enough hair to do so. At that point, the officer gripped a large quantity of hair, thereby securing the resister and gaining control. This method was used with much success and was a popular method because it ensured that the officer could gain control and there were rarely any injuries from this less than lethal control tactic. The trouble was Harrington didn’t like how it looked. She felt it appeared too violent, so at the expense of a good control tactic, she promoted the carotid hold, at the expense of the hair hold. (Anonymous, 2015).

One PPB officer, during a routine training in early 1985, in which the carotid hold was being pushed at the expense of the hair hold, mentioned to a police trainer that there had been a few deaths from the carotid hold in other states. This officer mentioned deaths that had occurred most commonly in the state of California with LAPD, whose officers were notorious for their unrivaled aggression towards civilians and offenders. The officer asked the trainer if there was “ever a death in Portland” would Harrington and the other command staff defend them and their training against a hostile media and an equally ambivalent public, or would they be on their own? Would the lowly patrolman be protected from the wrath of the biased press, public opinion and the slant of media demonization? The officer wanted to know if Harrington, would “have our backs” and protect them rather than throw them under the proverbial bus. (Anonymous, 2015).

When the officer asked the PPB training coach what might happen, in the event of a death, the trainer informed the patrolman that he had already spoken to Harrington about the possibility. The trainer informed the patrolman that Harrington and the other commanders would indeed protect and defend them, as only having done what they had been “trained” to do. They would indeed “have their backs” he promised him.(Anonymous, 2015). Unfortunately, when that unexpected death did occur in 1985 - when Stevenson died after a promoted carotid hold that Harrington had been pushing, apparently Harrington forgot she’d ever promised she would protect the individual officers involved in the event of a death. To save herself, Harrington “threw officer's Pantley and Barber to the wolves.” She did not have their backs as she had promised and they were “Eaten alive by the press.” (Anonymous, 2015).

This is one of the many dangers patrolman face. They are trained to perform certain functions in order to protect citizens’ lives and in order to protect their own lives, which they do have a right to do. When they follow their training, and a resisting felon dies, as will sometimes happen, the patrolman is blamed entirely for the death, even when they did nothing out of policy. The command staff and others, who create and approved the training then slowly slink away into the corners of their offices and allow the press to demonize the officer, destroy his career, assassinate his character and annihilate his life, his livelihood and his families future.

Ron Still was eventually chosen as chief of police around the time that Chief Bruce Baker was retiring. Mayor Ivancie could not have made a worse choice for Chief of Police when he chose Lt. Ron Still. Had Ivancie properly vetted Lt. Still, by interviewing officers who knew him and had worked with him, and members of the public, he may have chosen a different and more emotionally balanced chief. (Carmon, 1981).

I worked with Officer Ron Still while a probationary officer on graveyard shift at East Precinct. We worked a “beat car,” which meant we parked the car and walked the neighborhood checking bars and rundown hotels, like The Royal Hotel for any criminal activity, most of which was located on the lower east side of Southeast Grand and Union Avenue. 

This was called “walking a beat” and walking a beat was not uncommon for police officers during the 1960s in Portland. “Beat walks” were assigned to officers all over the city, particularly in problem areas like Albina and Old Town, in downtown. This form of police work was considered to be one of the most important examples of “community policing” available and occurred all during the 1960s.(DuPay, 2015).

According to Serbulo and Gibson, they claim community policing never occurred in Portland and that it is only since 1985 that “…the Portland Police Bureau has adopted Community Policing…” (Serbulo, pg 30). They are mistaken in that assertion. I was there, walking those beats. Walking a beat and getting to know the actual citizens of the city is the essence of what community policing is, and we were doing it then, long before 1985.

While walking a beat with Still, I found him to be a gruff, insensitive bully to those unable to answer his demands quickly and to his immediate satisfaction. As I was a probationary officer then and not entitled to an opinion, and Still had five years on the job, I did nothing to stop his violent mistreatment of the people we arrested. There was nothing I could do without risk of immediate termination. I had to get through my probationary period without any complaints about my conduct or attitude, and though it went against my sense if morality to do nothing in those kinds of situations, I had no choice if I wanted to be retained. 

I next encountered Officer Ron Still while I was still on probation several months later and working as a jailer in the City jail at 209 SW Oak street in the old Headquarters building. I operated the jail elevator and had occasion one late afternoon to transport Officer Still and a handcuffed prisoner from the Oak street entrance to the fifth floor jail. The prisoner was a thin young white male dressed in scruffy clothing. He looked poor, depressed and slightly drunk.

After the elevator began its assent, Officer Still stopped the elevator between the third and fourth floors and for no apparent reason turned to the prisoner and began beating on him and cussing him out through gritted teeth. Officer Still repeatedly punched the prisoner in the ribs, kidneys and shoulders, slamming him hard against the metal walls of the jail elevator until the young man almost passed out. As I was a new cop, the experience was alarming. I felt angry, disgusted and disappointed in Still, but if I had gone against him, I would have been fired immediately. When Still was finished with this unprovoked assault of a helpless handcuffed prisoner, he restarted the elevator, ignoring me, and we all exited into the enclosed booking area. After the man had been softened up by Still, we both assisted him as he exited the elevator, as he could barely stand. I did not report the beating of this handcuffed prisoner as I was on probation and knew if I did, I’d be fired on the spot. I regret I did not stand up to Still but if I had, I would have been fired and as I’d already gotten into some minor trouble for talking back to a Sergeant a couple of months earlier, and reprimanded for it formally, I knew I was skating on thin ice, already.

After Ron Still was appointed Chief of Police by Mayor Ivancie “Black community leaders called Ivancie’s choice for a new chief “frightening.”" The black community members must have known what I knew, that Still was a cruel brute who enjoyed hurting people. The collective efforts of Union president Stan Peters and the appointment of Ron Still as Chief of Police seriously set back race relations once again in Portland during that time. (Serbulo and Gibson, pg. 24).

When Bud Clark became mayor in 1985, in an attempt to improve the image of the Portland Police Bureau, Clark replaced Ron Still with Penny Harrington, the first female police chief in the nation. Harrington, as it turned out would be police chief when Lloyd Stevenson died in police custody in April of 1985. (Serbulo and Gibson, pg 25).

In response to the Stevenson death Harrington banned the use, temporarily, of the long used and highly effective carotid “sleeper hold” that had been used safely for decades. After the ban was announced and on the very day of Lloyd Stevenson's funeral, two officers, Richard Montee and Paul Wickersham began selling t-shirts, which read: “Don’t choke ‘Em. Smoke ‘Em,” out of the parking lot of East Precinct. Although the officers claimed the t-shirts were a “harmless prank that was blown out of proportion by the media,” the black community was again outraged and insulted. The flippant “prank” conveys a terrible lack of concern for human life, but I’m not convinced it was directed at black people specifically but at the criminal element in general. It was not acceptable under any circumstances though for the officers to have done what they did. Bud Clark fired both officers, who were then reinstated by a federal arbitrator, but with a loss of six months’ pay. (Serbulo and Gibson, pg 26).

With less than two years on the job (and never a popular leader within the rank and file) Harrington became involved in a drug scandal with her husband, Officer Gary Harrington, also employed by PPB. In March of 1986, Harrington, after a lengthy meeting with Mayor Bud Clark decided to resign rather than be demoted and endure the shame of not being the chief anymore. Although the Harrington’s both denied any involvement in drug dealing or wrong doing, a three member panel concluded that Officer Gary Harrington had indeed “tipped off” a known drug dealer before a scheduled drug raid was to take place by the Portland Police. The panel decision was a clear indicator of corruption on Gary Harrington’s part as the panel's conclusion was based on testimony and other solid evidence. The panel released a written report that “ripped” Harrington for many of her poor management decisions and abrasive demeanor, and her career with PPB was over. (Walth, 2014.)Once again, relations with the black community suffered a serious setback as they saw Chief Harrington involved in a drug scandal and other forms of inexcusable hypocrisy and blatant police corruption. (Turner, 1986).

A year after Harrington was forced to resign, in 1986, she was stripped of the nearly $4,000 per month she was getting for a so-called “…stress related disability pension” that she had been getting on the city’s dime. In retrospect, the community and race relations in Portland suffered a serious blow by the appointment of two consecutive police chiefs with leadership and morality issues, as Still and Harrington were both deplorable choices for such an important and complex leadership position.

Photo below shows Portland Police Officer Phil Todd on the left, and Don Kagy on the right, breaking up a fistfight between two black youths on the corner of northeast Union and Fremont, circa 1969.