"Three centuries ago, when the institution of science could claim little independent warrant for social support, natural philosophers were likewise [as in 1973, with science under attack] led to justify science as a means to the culturally validated ends of economic utility and the glorification of God. ... The joining of the issue has led to a clarification and reaffirmation of the ethos of modern science. ... The ethos of science is that effectively toned complex of values and norms which is held to be binding on the man of science. The norms are expressed in the from of prescriptions, proscriptions, preferences, and permissions. They are legitimatized in terms of institutional values. These imperatives, transmitted by precept and example and reenforced by sanctions are in varying degrees internalized by the scientist, thus fashioning his scientific conscience or, if one prefers the latter-day phrase, his super-ego." (pp. 268-69)

"The institutional goal of science is the extension of certified knowledge. The technical methods employed toward this end provide the relevant definition of knowledge: empirically confirmed and logically consistent satements of regularities (which are, in effect, predictions). The institutional imperatives (mores) derive from the goal and the methods. ... The mores of science possess a methodologic rationale but they are binding, not only because they are procedurally efficient, but because they are believed right and good. They are moral as well as technical prescriptions." (p. 270)

The normative structure or ethos of science is comprised of sets of institutional imperatives or norms:

• universalism — "truth-claims, whatever their source, are to be subjected to preestablished impersonal criteria"; "acceptance or rejection ... not to depend on the personal or social attributes of their protagonist"; "Objectivity precludes particularism." (p. 270) "the demand that careers be open to talent" ["competence"] (p. 272)
• communism — "extended sense of common ownership" of intellectual property; the "findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are assigned to the community. They constitute a common heritage in which the equity of the individual producer is severely limited." The "sole property right" left to the individual is "recognition or priority" — desire for which thus become the normal response to this element of the ethos. (p. 273) "Secrecy is the antithesis of this norm; full and open communication its enactment." (p. 274)
• disinterestedness — should not confuse institutional with motivational levels; "a passion for knowledge, idle curiosity, altruistic concern with the benefit to humanity, and a host of other special motives have been attributed to the scientist." This is misdirected; the institution "enjoins disinterested activity" and then it is in the interest of scientists to conform. Thus, too, absence of fraud is not due to special "personal qualities of scientists" but due to the institutional demand. "Involving as it does the verifiability of results, scientific research is under the exacting scrutiny of fellow experts." "...the activities of scientists are subject to rigorous policing, for disinterestedness has a firm basis in the public and testable character of science and this circumstance, it may be supposed, has contributed to the integrity of men of science." (p. 276)
• organized skepticism — "temporary suspension of judgment and the detached scrutiny of beliefs" (p. 277)
• originality — through which "knowledge advances", with the reward of "recognition and esteem", priority. "Recognition for originality becomes socially validated testimony that one has successfully lived up to the most exacting requirements of one's role as a scientist." (p. 293) Also valued because it's the only "property right" left for scientific knowledge, which is public (p. 294)
• humility — counteracting importance of establishing priority, "serving ... to reduce misbehavior", "the practice of acknowledging the heavy indebtedness to the legacy of knowledge bequeathed by prececessors," and even acknowledging the limitations to personal and scientific knowledge (p. 303)

From Robert K. Merton, 1973, The Sociology of Science, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press [Ch. 13, "The normative structure of science," pp. 267-78, reprint of 1942, "Science and technology in a democratic order," Journal of Legal and Political Sociology, 1:115-26]. This is the source of the first 4 norms. The last 2 are from Ch. 14, "Priorities in scientific discovery," pp. 286-324, reprint of 1957, American Sociological Review 22: 635-59.