27.3 The Soviet Interregnum: Andropov and Chernenko

When Leonid Brezhnev died in November 1982, the Soviet Union could be likened to an aging ship that continued to drift on its own momentum even though its engines had broken down. On its bridge were the same old men who had commanded it under the late captain, Brezhnev. Rather than steer for a port in which the vessel might be refitted with new engines, they elected to stay on course and to try to repair the machinery themselves. For two and a half years the ship would move in fits and starts as its engines briefly responded to the repairs then faltered. Two more captains would die at the helm as the ship lost its momentum and went dead in the water.

The years of Yuri Andropov (1982 - 1984) and his successor Konstantin Chernenko (1984 - 1985) might be regarded as a rather nondescript interregnum between Brezhnev and the reformer Gorbachev. Both men had served on Brezhnev's Politburo and endorsed and implemented his policies. Neither represented a threat to their aging colleagues in other leadership positions. Both kept the Soviet Union on course.

Andropov, 1982 - 1984

Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov was born in 1914, the son of a Russian railroad worker. As a student he studied water transportation and later worked as a telegraph operator and Volga boatman before becoming active in Komsomol (the Communist Youth League). As a young Party member he demonstrated talent for political organization. The Stalinist purges of the 1930s cleared the way for advancement, and in 1940 he was assigned leadership responsibilities in the territories newly won in the brief war with Finland. During the Second World War he served with distinction as a political commissar with the armies on the northern front. After the war he was assigned to diplomatic service and was appointed Ambassador to Hungary in 1954. In that post he presided over the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. He was appointed to the Central Committee in 1961. Wanting to increase Party control over the KGB (state security police), Brezhnev appointed him KGB chief and made him a member of the Politburo in 1967. As KGB chief he worked to silence and suppress dissent and made the KGB a sophisticated instrument of Soviet espionage abroad. He was 68 years old when in November 1982, his colleagues in the Politburo recommended him to the Central Committee as the new Party Secretary.

Yuri Andropov 1983

On assuming power Andropov, as a personality, was relatively unknown to both the West and the Soviet people. In contrast to the ebullient Brezhnev, Andropov was an extremely private individual who lived modestly in a five-room Kremlin apartment and was believed to like jazz and trashy American novels. His wife, Tatyana, was thought to have died - until she appeared at his funeral (her first and only public appearance)! The Andropovs' two grown children lived their lives quietly outside of the public spotlight. There was neither public excitement over nor interest in Andropov as a human being. To most Soviets, he was a distant and enigmatic figure who directed the nation from somewhere behind the Kremlin walls.

Andropov consolidated his power in the traditional Soviet fashion. He assumed the position of President of the Supreme Soviet and later that of Chairman of the Defense Council, an ex-officio group of military and civilian personnel that oversaw national defense. Following Brezhnev's example, he did not become Premier, head of government. That office remained the possession of Nikolai Tikhonov. Andropov's Politburo remained relatively unchanged in the same men who had served Brezhnev. Most were in their sixties. The youngest men in the Politburo were in their fifties.

Known for the preciseness of his mind and a good working command of facts and concepts, there was some anticipation among Western observers that Andropov might indeed revitalize the Soviet economy. The massively sluggish centralized system of bureaucratic planning and operation upon which the economy had been dependent since the days of Stalin, was not able to solve the problems of shortages, worker indifference, and management corruption. Early in his administration, Andropov announced a campaign to attack and remedy economic malaise. Resulting from a brief flurry of official crackdowns on corruption, drunkenness, and absenteeism, industrial productivity began to show encouraging growth. Andropov even expressed an interest in permitting greater managerial autonomy in certain industries, but he was reluctant to make the necessary decentralization that would permit such autonomy to succeed. With the onset of his debilitating illness, he was unable to press for any further reform and productivity slipped back into its characteristic lethargy. Agriculture, likewise, experienced no significant changes.

The Soviet military remained a priority for Andropov. Soviet forces were becoming increasingly mired in the war in Afghanistan, and the United States more outspoken in its hostility toward the Soviet Union. Arms development concentrated on the improvement of strategic nuclear weapons and production of new and better conventional weapons (e.g., tanks and fighter planes).

Soviet foreign policy suffered some setbacks. In 1981 a new round of low-level Soviet-US arms negotiations had begun in Geneva. Having limited long-range strategic missiles in the SALT agreements, both sides hoped to reach an accommodation on intermediate-range missiles as well. These were missiles with a range of from 300 to 2000 miles. There were other areas of armaments being negotiated at the same time. Talks aimed at reducing conventional forces in Europe had been going on for several years, and a new round of negotiations to reduce the number of strategic weapons (START – Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) had begun in late 1982. In November 1983, the USSR broke off all rounds of talks.

The reason for the Soviet walkout was the US decision to deploy new weapons systems in Europe. The United States had developed two new types of intermediate range missiles, the Pershing II and Cruise missiles, and intended to base them with several of its Western European NATO allies. These highly sophisticated weapons were capable of striking targets within the USSR with unprecedented accuracy and virtually no warning time. The Soviets saw the new missiles as clearly tipping the European military balance in favor of the US. The US justified the basing of the weapons in Europe as necessary to bolster the NATO deterrent to the already massive superiority of Soviet conventional forces in Eastern Europe. Andropov dispatched Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to West Germany to try to convince both the German government and people to prevent the US from putting the missiles in their country. Gromyko's mission failed, forcing Andropov to more drastic steps. The Soviets threatened to break off the arms talks if the US persisted in deploying the new missiles. President Reagan ordered the missiles installed, and the Soviets walked out.

The deterioration of relations with the US was also exacerbated by "Star Wars." Earlier in March 1983, Reagan, already having committed the US to the greatest peacetime military buildup in history, announced that the US would pursue development of an unprecedented Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Popularly called "Star Wars," the SDI was envisioned as a space-based defensive system that would enable the US to defend itself against a nuclear missile attack. In theory, SDI would create a high-tech defensive shield of orbiting ABM laser weapons that could destroy a Soviet first strike. The US, therefore, would be invulnerable to nuclear attack. The Soviets, justifiably alarmed, claimed that any future attempts by the US to develop SDI would be a violation of the 1972 SALT I Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The US position was that research and development of such a system was not a treaty violation. Besides, Reagan argued, the USSR had itself violated ABM by developing new radar systems in Siberia. SDI, consequently, became a major stumbling block hindering US - Soviet relations. Were the US to go ahead with "Star Wars," the Soviet Union would be likewise committed to developing a similar system. The financial implications were staggering.

The continuing crisis in the Middle East provided an opportunity for the expansion of Soviet interests. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon intending to destroy the Palestinian Liberation Organization's ability to use Lebanon for its attacks against Israel. Syria considered Lebanon to be under its hegemony and sent its forces into Lebanon. Lebanon, consequently, became a major battleground of conflicting factions and interests. As Brezhnev had established a close Soviet military relationship with Syria, the Lebanese conflict fell within Soviet interests. In the ensuing fighting, Israel destroyed hundreds of Soviet-made Syrian tanks and aircraft. Embarrassed and angry over the poor showing of Soviet military technology, Andropov replaced the Syrian losses with improved equipment, including sophisticated anti-aircraft missiles capable of striking enemy planes while still in Israeli airspace. Some 5000 additional Soviet advisors and technicians were also sent to Syria. The Soviet support for Syria, therefore, made Syria much more obstinate in its willingness to enter into negotiations to resolve the crisis of Lebanon.

In early September 1983, Soviet air defense fighter planes shot down a South Korean airliner that had inadvertently strayed into Soviet airspace over the Kamchatka Peninsula. The Korean Air Lines 747 was attacked without warning, and all 269 passengers, including 61 Americans, were killed when the plane exploded and crashed in the sea. The Soviets justified the attack by claiming that the plane was carrying out aerial espionage over the USSR. The United States vehemently denounced the Soviet attack as a "crime against humanity" reflective of insensitive barbarism. The USSR's world image could not have been more blackened.

With economic policy at a standstill and foreign relations at a new low, the Soviet Union suffered a serious consequence of an aging leadership that would not let go, the lack of meaningful decision-making. In August 1983, Andropov's fragile health collapsed. His absence from public view was officially explained as caused by a "bad cold." It would last 175 days and end with his death. Suffering from diabetes, a weak heart, and kidney failure, Andropov continued to direct the government from his sickbed. Although he remained sharp of mind and attentive to details, his inability to participate actively virtually removed him from any kind of effective leadership. In his absence the USSR continued to move on its own bureaucratic momentum.

Yuri Andropov died in February 1984, fifteen months after succeeding to power. Four days after his death his colleagues in the Politburo announced their choice for Party Secretary, the 72-year-old Konstantin Chernenko. Once again, the old men had decided to postpone passing the mantle of leadership on to the younger generation of party leaders. The question being asked by both Soviets and the world was: would Chernenko only be a caretaker or would he mean significant change?

Chernenko, 1984 - 1985

Konstantin Chernenko would rule the Soviet Union for only eleven months before his own death in March 1985. His brief tenure of leadership would also be characterized by ill-health and public absences. His speech faltered and he was short of breath. At public functions he often had to be helped to stand. It was clear his role was that of an interim caretaker as the old men who were his Politburo colleagues finally endeavored to bring the younger men to power.

Konstantin Chernenko

Chernenko was born the son of Russian peasants in Siberia in 1911. As was the case of many of his colleagues, his opportunity for a meaningful career came through his membership in the Komsomol. His advancement in the Party bureaucracy was relatively slow and would not begin to accelerate until the late 1940s when, as a Party propagandist, he came to the attention of Leonid Brezhnev. Working together to Sovietize the newly-acquired region of Moldavia, the two became close friends. As Brezhnev's career followed that of Khrushchev, Chernenko's benefitted from that of Brezhnev. When Brezhnev came to power in 1964, he made Chernenko his personal chief of staff and head of the Party's General Department responsible for setting the agenda of the Central Committee. Chernenko was appointed to the Central Committee in 1971 and to the Politburo in 1979. Both his rise to the top of the Party hierarchy and his influence within the Politburo came from his service as a valued and trusted advisor to Brezhnev. Responsible for briefing Brezhnev on important matters, Chernenko developed a strong understanding of all facets of Soviet government and policy-making. He accompanied Brezhnev on state visits abroad but remained very much a behind-the-scenes figure, attracting little attention from foreign observers. On Brezhnev's death, the more influential members of the Politburo (Gromyko, Defense Minister Ustinov, and Premier Tikhonov) threw their considerable influence behind Andropov, seeing the KGB chief as more qualified for the top party spot. In 1984 they made Chernenko Party Secretary. As had Andropov, he assumed the additional titles of President and Chairman of the Defense Council.

As a personality, Chernenko was somewhat of a mystery. Reserved, quiet, and, at times, seemingly dull in meetings with foreign dignitaries, he was reputed to have a sharp mind with an impressive memory for even the least important details. He was somewhat of a Communist purist and railed against the corruption of Western materialist influences on Soviet youth. As with Andropov, his personal and family life was very private. Married with grown children and grandchildren, Anna and Konstantin Chernenko enjoyed relaxing with movies and spending time in the country. This, the Soviet people did not see. What they did see was a frail and infirm old man who they hoped would lead their nation to better times.

Chernenko did not come to power with a mandate nor agenda to effect reform. The Soviet economic system remained untouched and continued entrenched in bureaucratic structure and operation. The military remained the Party's prized achievement, even though the shooting down of the South Korean airliner had embarrassingly revealed the poor quality of the Soviet radar and defense warning systems. The ugly war in Afghanistan continued to drain both military resources and morale.

The single most productive accomplishment of Chernenko's rule was to bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table for arms-control talks with the United States. The Reagan administration, hoping to take advantage of the change in leadership, began to soften its anti-Soviet rhetoric. Secretary of State George Shultz met with Chernenko in January 1985, and the Geneva talks were resumed in March. Chernenko died a week later.

On March 10, 1985, Chernenko succumbed to heart failure brought on by chronic emphysema. This time the old men in the Kremlin broke with the precedent of recent years and speedily named a younger man to head the Party. The 54-year-old Mikhail Gorbachev was proclaimed Party Secretary within five hours of the announcement of Chernenko's death.

The legacy that Gorbachev inherited was not simply the economic stagnation that was itself the legacy of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. It was the legacy of Stalinist centralization under the Marxist-Leninist concept of Communist state power. Time would show Gorbachev willing to challenge the whole philosophical and operational basis of the Soviet system in order to change and revitalize it. The keys to that change were policies Gorbachev called glasnost, perestroika, and demokratizatsiya. To affect reform, the Soviet Union must, he felt, allow "openness," experience economic "restructuring," and "democratization."

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Images are from Wikipedia articles on Andropov and Chernenko.

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Sources for Andropov and Chernenko

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