19.3 Militarism and the Schlieffen Plan

Militarism can be defined as excessive emphasis on military power. The decade before 1914 saw all the major European powers (Germany, France, Russia, Britain, Austria, Italy) become increasingly militaristic. This militarism was characterized by an underlying psychology and was evident in all countries in numerous ways.

The Psychology of Militarism: Social Darwinism and Chauvinism

Social Darwinism was a concept with great appeal in the late C 19 early C 20. The idea here was that competition among nations was part of the natural order. War, therefore, was virtuous as it was the highest manifestation of that competition. Among nations, it was reasoned, victory in war would assure the continued survival of the strongest and the best.

Chauvinism - extremist nationalism; the idea that might makes right. Much as did the ancient Spartans and Athenians on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, the militarists and nationalist politicians of the great powers looked forward to testing their nations' power against that of their rivals. An example of this attitude was the officers of the prewar German navy making a daily noontime toast to "Der Tag" - the Day when the German fleet would go into battle against the British navy.

Manifestations of Militarism

1. Strong military influence in civilian and government decision-making. This was especially evident in increased budgeting and expenditures for armaments. Increasing amounts of tax revenues were being used for military purposes rather than for other social needs.

2. Increased attention to military development and strategic planning

A. Development of military science: "war colleges" for the training of officers.

B. Forming of general staffs of commanding officers to formulate strategy and coordinate and direct military operations.

C. Conscription (drafting) and training of reserve armies. Thus, beyond the regular, standing armies, thousands of additional men would receive military training and then be returned to civilian life. They could readily be called back into active service should war break out.

D. Mobilization All states developed the means whereby their respective militaries could be quickly and efficiently mobilized. Mobilization did not mean war itself, but the intent to be ready should war come. It required the calling up of troops and deployment of armies according to predetermined strategies. Because the militaries of the great powers were so massive, mobilization became in itself a strategy. The state that mobilized first would have a military advantage over its opponents. Once a state began to mobilize, other states dared not delay their own mobilization. Mobilization was the responsibility of a state’s military command and, as such, had a life of its own outside the direct control of the state’s political and diplomatic systems. Once mobilization was begun, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to stop it while pursuing diplomatic means to diffuse or resolve a crisis.

When Austria declared war on Serbia in late July 1914, Czar Nicholas ordered Russian mobilization against Austria. The Czar was surprised to learn that the Russian mobilization plan was based on an anticipated war with both Germany and Austria and would position Russian armies along Germany’s borders, poised for invasion. Alarmed, Germany demanded that Russia stop its mobilization. The Czar refused, not believing Germany would risk war with Russia over Serbia. On August 1, Germany declared war on Russia. Diplomatic efforts to try and resolve the crisis were too little and came too late. The mobilization momentum swept the two powers into war over an issue that did not directly involve either.

E. Development of offensive strategies

1. Britain organized and trained a special army (the British Expeditionary Force) to fight on the Continent in the event of a future European war.

2. Germany perfected its Schlieffen Plan for the future invasion of France. This was a highly precise strategy involving the movement of German troops on some 11,000 railroad trains followed by the invasion of France through Belgium and capture of Paris within 40 days. (See below.)

3. Arms Race All powers sought to increase their strength through ...

A. building of professional standing armies to include hundreds of thousands of troops.

B. building of military fortifications along national boundaries.

C. applying industrial technology to strategic planning and weapons development.

Some examples: the gas combustion engine (automobile and truck); telegraph, telephone and wireless (radio) communications; the machine gun; long-range (10, 20, 40 mile ranges) artillery; the submarine and self-propelled torpedo; the land mine; the magnetic (sea) mine; the depth charge; the airplane; the aerial bomb, poison gas; the tank - all were new in 1914 and all would be used with frightful consequences in the war.

D. The Anglo-German Naval Race - Both powers sought to augment their navies by building high technology super warships. In 1906 Britain launched a new type of battleship (the Dreadnought) the firepower, speed, and cruising range of which made all other existing battleships obsolete. Germany, alarmed, began a massive spending program to build up its fleet with similar vessels and surpass British strength. The British resolved to produce two new battleships for every one launched by Germany! By 1914 both countries had massive fleets of battleships and armored cruisers far larger and more powerful than the original Dreadnought.

The Schlieffen Plan "Let the last man on the right brush the Channel with his sleeve."

Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff from 1891 to 1906, developed a strategic plan for a future two-front war with France and Russia. "The whole of Germany," he wrote, "must throw itself upon one enemy, the strongest, most powerful, most dangerous enemy, and that can only be France."

The Plan was completed in 1905. It called for a six-week campaign in which 7/8ths of Germany's forces would smash into northern France through Belgium and Luxembourg, encircle the French armies and whatever British troops might be in France, defeat them before France could fully mobilize, and capture Paris. The remaining 1/8th of Germany's forces, together with Austria's armies, would hold the eastern frontiers. Russia, it was estimated, could not possibly fully mobilize within six weeks, and by then France would be defeated. With France defeated, the bulk of the German army could be transported to the east to confront and defeat Russia.

The Plan called for 700,000 troops to invade through Belgium; 400,000 to invade through eastern Belgium and Luxembourg; and 320,000 troops to attack France along the border of Alsace and Lorraine.

The Plan was set up to work on a precise schedule that anticipated every possible obstacle. Staff officers were trained on maneuvers and at war college desks to supply the correct solution for any given set of circumstances. Eleven thousand railroad trains were precisely scheduled to transport troops and supplies to the necessary staging areas. The entire German railway system was under military command with staff officers assigned to every line. Annual mobilization war games kept railway officials in constant practice and tested their ability to improvise and divert traffic in response to reports of lines cut and bridges destroyed. German spies secured detailed information on Belgian and French transportation (roads, railroads, bridges, etc.) and communications systems. The strategists in Berlin, consequently, felt they could confidently predict the path and schedule for every German soldier in the invasion force.

The Plan was annually reviewed by the German General Staff and revised according to new intelligence from Belgium and France, new developments in weaponry, transportation and potential manpower.

The most significant shortcoming of the Schlieffen Plan was that it became sacrosanct to the General Staff. Any major change in the mobilization time-table once the Plan was made operative was unthinkable. In fact, on the day (August 1, 1914) that Germany declared war on Russia and the Plan was made operative, Kaiser William II ordered General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, to halt the mobilization against France pending the outcome of last-minute negotiations in London. There, the German ambassador was meeting with the British Foreign Minister to secure a British promise to persuade France to remain neutral in Germany's war with Russia. Von Moltke, horrified, explained to the Kaiser that, once started, the mobilization could not be halted without disrupting the entire operation. The whole German military would be thrown into terrible confusion from which it might not be able to recover. German victory, therefore, was entirely dependent upon the successful completion of the Schlieffen Plan. The Kaiser bowed to von Moltke's recommendation. The trains continued to run and the German armies remained underway to Belgium and France.

Source of text and quotations: Tuchman, Barbara. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962.