25.4 The Kennan Thesis and Containment

The Kennan Thesis: A Simple Summary

Kennan wrote that the expansionist nature of Soviet foreign policy was the product of the "ideology and circumstances" of the Soviet Union. The inevitable victory of international Communism over the hostile forces of capitalism had necessitated a dictatorial regime perceived by the Soviet leadership as infallible and fully committed to the correctness of its ideology. Soviet foreign policy was as a "fluid stream" kept in motion by "increasing constant pressure" toward its desired goal. Like a child's windup toy, it was diverted from its purpose only when obstructed by another immovable presence acting upon it. Otherwise it was insensitive to persuasion (negotiation) and could not be easily defeated or discouraged by the occasional interruption of its progress. In response to this relentless Soviet pressure, the policy of the United States should be "a long term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies."

Were Soviet expansionism to be effectively contained for a period of ten to fifteen years, deficiencies inherent within the Soviet system would undermine its power and weaken its drive to expand. Kennan saw these deficiencies as a population whose collective morale and energy had been severely strained through the consolidation of Soviet power, the demands of forced industrialization, and the devastation of war; an overall weak economy that was founded on an underdeveloped consumer base; and an aging leadership (Stalin in 1947 was 68 years old) isolated and distant from its successor generation.

The challenge of Soviet power was such that the US must, through its actions, influence Soviet internal developments both in the USSR and in the international Communist movement. To this end, Kennan concluded, the US must show unity of purpose and moral strength and make a commitment to the overall improvement of the human condition.

The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of Containment: A Summary

By 1947 it was clear that the Soviet Union was expanding its interests and influence in Europe. In its victory over the Germans, the Soviet army had "liberated" and occupied Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the eastern parts of Germany. In those countries the Soviets oversaw the establishment of Communist regimes dependent upon Moscow for leadership and direction. In Western Europe, Communist parties had made significant gains in the parliaments of Italy and France. In Greece the royal government was losing in a civil war against Communist insurgents. Yugoslavia and Albania had already emerged from the war with their own indigenous Communist parties in control. Soviet demands upon Turkey threatened that nation's control of the strategic Turkish Straits. From the perspective of policy-makers in the US, it appeared as if the Soviet Union were seeking hegemony if not outright control over Europe, a situation clearly unacceptable to American interests.

In response to the situation in Greece and Turkey, President Harry Truman inaugurated the policy that became known as the Truman Doctrine. In March 1947, he called upon Congress to authorize the funds whereby the US might provide financial and military assistance to support "free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." Although he never mentioned the USSR by name, Truman's message was clear. The armed minorities? Communist-led and/or supported insurgencies. The outside pressures? The Soviet Union. Truman's speech to Congress was broadcast to the American public. Having just fought a world war caused in part because of the failure to stand up to Fascist ambition and aggression, Congress and the American public were indeed alarmed. There would be no appeasement, no more Munichs. The president's request was approved: the precedent was set - the US would act to contain Communism.

What had happened in Eastern Europe and what was threatening to happen then in Greece and Turkey and what would happen later in other regions of the world in the 1950s and 1960s, would be seen by American policy-makers as evidence of an aggressive and expansive Soviet Union seeking to dominate the world. The Truman Doctrine – containment of Soviet expansionism – would become the operating principle of US foreign policy for the next forty years.

Couched in ideological altruism, the containment doctrine would defend free peoples from the scourge of Communist tyranny. Great alliance systems (the OAS, NATO, SEATO, CENTO) and numerous bilateral mutual defense treaties would be established. Billions of dollars would be spent on conventional and nuclear armaments and weapons systems to defend the free world from Communism. But containment would also come to be applied anywhere American interests were threatened by social revolution, especially in the Third World of newly independent and developing nations. The list of locations where containment was applied is extensive and global: in Korea, Iran, Guatemala, and the Middle East in the 1950s; in the Congo, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Laos, and Vietnam in the 1960s; in Chile and east Africa in the 1970s; in Afghanistan, Grenada, and Nicaragua in the 1980s.

In a spectacular acceleration of events Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989. In 1991 the Soviet Union, unable to resist internal forces largely exacerbated by the demands of the Cold War, imploded and itself collapsed. In a sense, containment, as presented by Kennan back in 1947, had worked.

Sources for the Kennan Thesis and Containment

Ambrose, Stephen. Rise to Globalism. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.

Gaddis, John Lewis, The Cold War. New York: Penguin, 2005.

Ganley, Albert et al. After Hiroshima: America since 1945. New York: Longman, 1985.

Kennan, George F. American Diplomacy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.

---. Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin. Boston: Little Brown, 1961.

Langer, William L. et al. An Encyclopedia of World History. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1968.

Merriman, John. A History of Modern Europe. New York: Norton, 1996.

Palmer, Robert R. et al. A History of the Modern World. Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002.

Paterson, Thomas et al. American Foreign Policy: A History since 1900. Boston: D. C. Heath, 1991.

Taubman, William. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton, 2003.