19.4 The Outbreak of World War One, 1914

“The next major war will be caused by some damn fool thing in the Balkans.”

- German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, 1878

“The lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime”

- British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey, August 3, 1914

It is important to understand the sequence of events explaining the outbreak of World War I. What follows is a chronological narrative of the events of the summer of 1914.

Assassination in Sarajevo

On June 28, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife were shot to death by a young Bosnian Serb named Gavrilo Princip. Princip was a member of the “Black Hand,” a Serb nationalist group seeking to unite Bosnia with Serbia. The assassination prompted a crisis between Austria and Serbia. Austria blamed Serbia for the assassination as Serbia had long been encouraging anti-Austrian Serb nationalist activities in Bosnia. Austria was opposed to Serbia’s ambition to create an expanded Yugoslav state under Serbian leadership. Using the assassination as justification for strong action against Serbia, including war, Austria sought to isolate Serbia by seeking diplomatic support from Germany.

The July Crisis and the “blank check”

Throughout most of July the world watched in nervous anticipation hoping the crisis might be resolved peacefully. Austria prepared an ultimatum for delivery to Serbia. The conditions of the ultimatum were such that Serbia was expected to reject them. This would enable Austria to wage war against Serbia. The major problem would be Russia. Russia, long-time defender of Slavic nationalism, did not want to see Austrian influence expanded in the Balkans. Russia was angry that Austria had unilaterally annexed Bosnia in 1908 in betrayal of a secret “understanding” in which the two powers had agreed to call an international conference whereby Austria might have Bosnia in return for Russia’s being allowed naval access through the Turkish Straits. Russia, consequently, became more supportive of Serbia’s ambitions. As Austria did not want war with Russia, Austria sought support from its alliance partner, Germany.

Austria appealed for a statement of German support should a war between Serbia and Austria involve Russia. Believing that Russia would not risk war with both Austria and Germany over Serbia, Germany, on July 5, assured Austria that it would have Germany’s support. This assurance became known as the “blank check” in that it was believed to guarantee that Germany would defend Austria at any cost, even if it meant war with Russia. Austria, now believing that Russia would not risk war with both Austria and Germany, issued its ultimatum to Serbia on July 23. If Serbia did not respond favorably to all of the Austrian demands within 48 hours, then it would mean war.

Austria purposely delayed sending the ultimatum to Serbia until July 23^rd because until that day the French President, Raymond Poincaré, had been on a state visit to Russia. It will be remembered that France and Russia had been formal military allies since 1894. France was concerned that an Austrian-Serb conflict could involve Russia and needed assurance that Russia would not be distracted from the French alliance. France anticipated a future war with Germany and needed to keep Russia firmly committed to the alliance. France encouraged Russia to stand firm in relation to the Austrian-Serb crisis, believing that Germany would not risk war against Russia knowing it would mean war with France at the same time. On July 23^rd Poincaré sailed from St. Petersburg to return to France. Austria then issued the ultimatum to Serbia.

War begins: Austria vs. Serbia

Serbia’s response to the Austrian ultimatum was unsatisfactory to Austria. Serbia agreed to most of Austria’s demands but rejected two conditions, one of which called for the collaboration of Austrian and Serbian officials in an investigation regarding responsibility for the assassination, on the grounds that they would violate Serbia’s sovereignty. However, Serbia indicated that it was willing to accept international arbitration on those conditions. This was unacceptable to Austria. On July 28 Austria declared war on Serbia.

The War Expands

In response to the Austrian war against Serbia, Czar Nicholas II ordered the mobilization of Russia’s military forces. Mobilization did not mean war itself, but the intent to be ready should war come. It required the calling up of troops and deployment of armies along Russia’s boundaries with Austria and Germany in anticipation of a declaration of war. Russia’s strategy was to invade both countries once war was declared. Although Russia’s armies were massive, the logistical operation of supplying and moving them was cumbersome and slow. Mobilization could take weeks before Russia would be ready to begin combat. Nonetheless, Russian mobilization was alarming to Germany.

Germany vs. Russia (August 1)

Acting on its “blank check” assurance to Austria, German diplomats in St. Petersburg began intensive discussions with Russia urging Russia to cease mobilization and avoid a wider war. Russia refused. In response, Germany issued a 12-hour ultimatum to Russia: cease mobilization immediately or Germany will declare war on Russia. The ultimatum expired without a Russian response on August 1. Germany declared war on Russia.

Germany vs. France (August 3)

Germany, now committed to war with Russia, anticipated that France would honor its treaty obligations with Russia and declare war on Germany. Kaiser William II’s military high command ordered immediate implementation of the Schlieffen Plan. The Schlieffen Plan, it will be remembered, called for a massive invasion of France. German armies began deployment to the west. Within days (by August 4) they would cross into Belgium and France.

France, however, had not yet declared war on Germany. The German foreign ministry thought that it might be possible to avoid war with France. In London frantic efforts were being made by German diplomats seeking British intervention to persuade France to remain neutral. It was evident that Britain did not want an expanded war, and France was not going to declare war on Germany unless she was assured Britain would join the fight. Back in Berlin, the Kaiser, meeting with his Chief of Staff General Helmuth von Moltke, suggested that the movement of German armies towards France be halted, pending France’s action.

Von Moltke was horrified. To interfere with the Schlieffen Plan’s timetable once operational, as it then was, would be disastrous. There would be chaos as the system broke down. The French could take advantage of the confusion of German forces and attack. The trains must keep rolling. The Kaiser, who had the power to order the invasion stopped, then went to bed, telling Moltke to do what he saw fit. The troop trains continued to roll to the west. On August 3 Germany declared war on France.

Belgium

The Schlieffen Plan called for invasion of France through Belgium. Belgium was neutral. Belgium, independence since 1839, was dependent upon its being neutral. Belgium’s neutrality was guaranteed by the Netherlands, France, Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia through the 1839 Treaty of London. (In other words, these powers pledged to respect Belgian independence and neutrality.)

On August 2 Germany issued a 12-hour ultimatum demanding that Belgium allow free passage of German armies through its territory. The government of Belgium’s King Albert I rejected the ultimatum. A few years earlier when Albert was on a state visit to Germany, the Kaiser alluded to Belgium’s role in a future war between Germany and France. The King responded, “Belgium is not a road.”

To accept the German ultimatum would have violated Belgium’s neutrality. Early on August 4, some 700,000 German soldiers began the invasion of Belgium. The Belgian army (some 118,000 poorly equipped troops) would valiantly but futilely resist. Still, the unexpectedly stubborn Belgian resistance would slow the German invasion. Part of Belgium’s “punishment” for opposing the German advance was the purposeful destruction of the ancient university at Louvain.

Britain vs. Germany (August 4)

On the background of the German declarations of war against Russia and France, Britain took what last-minute diplomatic actions it could to prevent the further widening of the war. As the Triple Entente was not a formal defensive alliance, Britain was not under treaty obligation to join the war on the side of France and Russia. It was obvious, however, that Britain would eventually become an active belligerent. It was the German action towards Belgium that brought Britain into the war. Ever since the late 1500s Britain had seen its security tied to the status of the Low Countries. Britain could not allow a powerful potential enemy to have a presence in the Low Countries. Such was the case with Spain in the 1580s, France in the 18^th and 19th centuries, and now Germany. On August 3 Britain issued a 12-hour ultimatum to Germany: do not invade Belgium or it will mean war. In Berlin the German Chancellor, Theodore von Bethmann-Hollwegg, angrily chided the British ambassador, expressing incredulity that Britain would go to war over a “scrap of paper” (the 1839 Treaty of Belgian neutrality). Germany did not respond to the ultimatum. On August 4, Britain declared war on Germany.

And otherwise in 1914?

On August 4 Italy declared its neutrality.

(On August 4 the United States declared its neutrality.)

On August 6 Austria declared war on Russia.

On August 12 France and Britain declared war on Austria.

On August 23 Japan declared war on Germany. Japan wanted Germany’s concessions in

China (Shandong and Qintao) and Germany’s Pacific islands.

On Nov 4 Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire

On Nov 5 Britain and France declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

Sources for the Outbreak of World War One

Keegan, John. The First World War. New York: Knopf, 1999.

Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994.

Knapton, Ernest and Thomas Derry. Europe 1815 – 1914. New York: Scribners, 1965.

Langer, William, ed. An Encyclopedia of World History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968.

MacMillan, Margaret. The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. New York: Random House, 2013.

Merriman, John. A History of Modern Europe. New York: Norton, 1996.

Palmer, Robert et al. A History of the Modern World. New York: McGraw Hill, 2002.

Tuchman, Barbara. The Guns of August. New York: Macmillan, 1962.