19.6 The Paris Peace Settlement

The "Big Four" Lloyd George, Orlando, Clemenceau, Wilson

Between January 1919 and August 1920, representatives of the Allied governments met in Paris and negotiated the terms of the peace treaties to be presented to the defeated Central Powers. Although all the Allied nations sent delegations of diplomats, specialists, and experts, most of the work of the peace-making was done by the "Big Four:" Premier Georges Clemenceau of France, Prime Minister David Lloyd George of Britain, Premier Vittorio Orlando of Italy, and President Woodrow Wilson of the United States. (Brief overviews of each of the Big Four follows this section.) The delegates to the conference began their meetings in January at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Quay d'Orsay in Paris. A draft of the treaty with Germany had been completed by May and would be signed at the Palace of Versailles in June. Treaties with the other Central Powers (Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) would be signed at other sites once negotiations were completed, 1919 - 1920.

The victorious Allies, especially the British and French, viewed the Central Powers as aggressor states who had forfeit any claimed right to be part of the peace negotiations. Wilson protested that this decision was not in the spirit of the Fourteen Points, but agreed to it when the British and French made it clear that they would not make a peace except under this condition. Thus, Germany and the other Central Powers would not be party to the treaty-making.

It was decided that the Allies would negotiate among themselves and agree on a peace settlement that would then be presented for the acceptance of Germany and the other Central Powers. Germany and its allies would not be allowed to negotiate for changes in the final treaties.

Expectations of the Peace

With the German acceptance of the Allied armistice and the collapse of the Central Powers, the major Allied nations anticipated a peace settlement that would recognize their respective expectations.

France wanted a harsh peace that would severely punish Germany and result in a weak Germany that economically and militarily could represent no future threat to European peace. France also sought international guarantees of French security.

Britain also wanted a harsh peace severely punishing Germany and resulting in the destruction of German military (especially naval) but not economic capabilities.

The United States wanted a just "peace without victory" based on the principles of Wilson's Fourteen Points and containing the League of Nations.

Italy wanted a peace that would honor the territorial promises made by the Allies in the 1915 Treaty of London and other secret treaties.

Japan wanted a peace that would transfer to Japan all German territories in China and the Pacific. Japan also sought international guarantee of a "special position" in China.

The government of the new German Republic and the other defeated Central Powers expected a just peace based on Wilson's Fourteen Points.

Problems Confronting the Peacemakers

The drawing up of a peace settlement ending the war would prove no easy matter. There were many issues to be clarified and resolved, but the major questions challenging the peacemakers centered on territorial demands, reparations, nationalism, and the League of Nations.

The reconciliation of territorial demands was one of the most significant problems to be resolved. Many of the Allied countries had territorial expectations, sometimes conflicting, that they wanted the final treaties to confirm. The process was difficult. Italy would temporarily withdraw from the conference when her demands for territory were not fully met and Japan threatened to do so as well. The major territorial concerns are considered as follows.

France demanded restoration of Alsace and Lorraine to French sovereignty. She also demanded the Rhineland and the coal-rich Saar Valley, both of which were German territories. These latter demands were justified as guarantees of French security.

Italy claimed the Tyrol and Trieste in accordance with the Treaty of London. She also demanded the Adriatic port city of Fiume. When the other Allied leaders rejected the demand for Fiume, Orlando withdrew from the conference.

Britain claimed all of Germany's African colonies.

Belgium demanded some small pieces of German territory (Malmedy) along its border.

Greece wanted Greek-populated Thrace (Bulgaria) and Smyrna (Turkey).

Japan during the war had occupied Germany's Pacific island territories (the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas) and demanded permanent sovereignty over these island groups. Japan also demanded control of the city of Qingtao (pronounced Ching-dow) and the Shandong Peninsula, two Chinese territories held by Germany since 1898. When Wilson opposed the Japanese demands for Chinese territory, the Japanese threatened to withdraw from the conference. Wilson reluctantly conceded in order to keep the Japanese in Paris.

China (which had entered the war on the Allied side in 1917) demanded restoration of Qingtao and Shandong to Chinese sovereignty. When word arrived (May 1919) in China that the settlement granted these territories to Japan, violent anti-Japanese demonstrations broke out. Feeling betrayed, China withdrew from the Conference.

The issue of reparations made the negotiation of the peace settlement difficult. All Allied powers agreed that Germany and the Central Powers should be compelled to pay for damages. They disagreed over the question: on what the reparations should be based? Should payment be for damage to property only or for the entire expense (including war pensions to wounded veterans, widows and orphans) incurred by a government in the war against the Central Powers? All Allied governments submitted reparations bills.

The question of nationalism was also an issue. Many nationalities in central Europe wanted independence, self-government, and unity within the borders of their own nation-state. The Czechs and Yugoslavs had already (1918) declared their independence from Austria-Hungary. The German-imposed Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) had required Russia to grant independence to Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, and Finland. Would the final peace settlement recognize these and other nationalist demands for self-determination?

Non-European nationalism was a related issue. Many colonial peoples such as the Arabs, Egyptians, and Indians all desired self-rule or independence. Representatives of these peoples sought conferences with the Allied leaders (particularly Wilson) to press their concerns. Point Five of Wilson's Fourteen Points had implied a greater role for colonial peoples in the administration of their native lands.

Finally, the formation of a League of Nations was perhaps the most critical issue to be faced by the peace conference. Wilson saw a League of Nations as vital to future world peace and insisted that its Covenant (charter of organization) be written into each of the final treaties. Because Wilson had never insisted that the Allies make the Fourteen Points their statement of war aims, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and others exploited Wilson's almost fanatic commitment to the League, winning Wilson's agreement to conditions they wanted by threatening to oppose the League.

The League proved controversial as the diplomats in Paris attempted to resolve such questions as: how would the membership and organization of the League be determined? What machinery would it have to solve future disputes between nations and enforce its decisions? Would League membership threaten a nation's sovereignty? No nation would begin to consider League membership were it to mean the loss of national sovereignty.

Other Issues

The difficulties of negotiations for each of the treaties were further complicated by the nature of the delegations themselves. Each delegation had massive staffs made up of advisors and experts in the various aspects of treaty considerations, not to mention secretarial personnel and translators. Often the experts and advisors disagreed on matters, slowing down progress towards making recommendations on terms for the treaties. In other words, the treaties would not be the work of solely the Big Four simply sitting down with each other and coming to a consensus. Each was dependent upon their advisors.

Beyond these complications were the political realities within which each of the Big Four were also dependent. The US, France, Britain, and Italy were all constitutional democracies wherein government was respresentative of the people. In each, the "people" were represented through political parties. The US and Britain had basically two-party systems. France and Italy, as did most of the other Allied states, had multi-party systems wherein government consensus was dependent on fragile coalitions of parties. Every party in each of the Allied states had its own vision of what the Paris negotiations should be working to achieve. Woodrow Wilson was the only one of the Big Four lacking a political majority at home. He was a Democrat and Republicans had the majority in both houses of Congress. He hoped his work at Paris would receive Repbublican support.

In all countries the press (newspapers) had a very loud "voice". Newspaper coverage of the conference and investigation into the workings of each delegation was rampant and distracting. All major newspapers had investigative reporters in Paris, constantly probing for stories, despite efforts to keep negotiations secret. Through transoceanic and transcontiental telegraph systems, news stories from Paris were published at home within hours. Wilson, Lloyd George, Clememceau, and Orlando faced the very difficult and exasperating challenge of managing statesmanship with politics and media opinion.

The Treaty of Versailles

The first treaty to be completed for submission to the Central Powers was the treaty with Germany. The final draft of the Treaty was presented in French to a German delegation called to Paris on May 7, 1919. Leading the delegation was Baron Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, foreign minister of the new German government. The Germans were given two weeks in which to respond in writing. (The deadline was later extended to June 23.) They were not permitted to change the text nor negotiate with the Allies on any of the Treaty's provisions. The Allies would "consider" any comments made by the Germans.

The Germans protested that the Treaty was not in the spirit of the Fourteen Points and objected specifically to several parts of the Treaty text. They found particularly offensive the article that stated that Germany alone was fully responsible for the war. They saw as an affront to German national honor the provision calling for the trial by an international court of Allied judges of the former Kaiser and his generals as "war criminals." They also objected that the amount of total reparations to be paid by Germany was not specified.

When the delegation returned home in June, the German cabinet divided in bitter debate over what options Germany might have. No one wanted to accept the Treaty as it was written. The alternative to acceptance of the Treaty was renewal of the war, a war that Germany could not win. French armies, waiting only Clemenceau's order, were ready to invade. The German chancellor (prime minister) Philippe Scheidemann resigned in outraged protest and humiliation. Friedrich Ebert, the German president, appointed a new chancellor and ordered Germany’s acceptance of the Treaty. The Treaty was signed at a formal ceremony in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles on June 28, 1919.

General Terms of the Treaty

War Guilt: Germany was to acknowledge and accept full responsibility for causing the war.

Reparations: Germany would pay $5 billion within two years and agree to pay an unspecified amount to be determined in the future. In 1921 the Allied Reparations Commission set the total sum at $33 billion. Economic experts estimated that Germany had the resources to pay no more than $10 billion. The reparations were to be paid in installments over a period of years. The French were delighted as the reparations were expected to cripple the German economy for decades.

Territorial Adjustments: The former German Empire lost the following territory. Through these territorial adjustments Germany lost ...

10% of her former population

13% of her former imperial territory

33% of her coal production

75% of her iron production

48% of her steel producing capabilities

Alsace and Lorraine were restored to France.

The Rhineland was demilitarized but remained under German civil administration. Allied (largely French) military forces would occupy the region. (The Allied occupation forces would not be withdrawn until 1925.)

The Saar Valley was to be administered by the League of Nations for 15 years after which a plebiscite would be held to determine whether the Saar would be under German or French sovereignty. All coal mined in the Saar between 1920 and 1935 would go to France.

Malmedy was ceded to Belgium.

Schleswig was restored to Denmark.

Memel was ceded to Lithuania.

Danzig was established as a free city under League of Nations administration.

The Polish Corridor and Posen were ceded to Poland.

Upper Silesia was ceded to Poland.

Germany lost all of her overseas colonial possessions. Those possessions in Africa and the Pacific were ceded to other powers as League of Nations mandates.

Africa: Cameroons and Togo to Britain and France

Tanganyika to Britain

Southwest Africa to South Africa

Pacific: The Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana island groups to Japan

New Guinea, Bismarck Islands, Samoa to Australia and New Zealand

Qingtao and Shandong in China were ceded to Japan.

Military Provisions: Germany was to abolish military conscription and limit its army to 100,000 troops. The military general staff (high command) was abolished. The German navy was restricted to 12 ships of each class and no vessel was to exceed 10,000 tons. The manufacture of submarines and military aircraft was forbidden as was the manufacture of heavy weapons (tanks, long-range artillery). The training and maintaining of a reserve army was also forbidden. These provisions effectively reduced Germany's military potential and made her incapable of launching an attack against another country.

Other Provisions: Germany had to surrender to the Allies all merchant ships over 1600 tons, half of those between 1600 and 800 tons, and a quarter of her fishing fleet. This virtually meant the loss of Germany's merchant fleet and future dependence upon foreign ships for Germany's overseas commerce.

- German shipyards were to build for the Allies ships (totaling 200,000 tons annually) for five years.

- Large quantities of German coal and livestock were to be delivered to France, Belgium, and Italy for ten years.

- Germany was to pay the costs of the Allied armies’ occupation in the Rhineland.

- All German rivers and canals were recognized as international waterways freely open to the shipping of all nations.

- Germany was to sell all German-owned property in other nations.

- Germany was to repudiate the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk (with Russia) and Bucharest (with Romania). This meant that the conditions of these treaties were no longer binding on the countries with which they had been made.

Keynes

Not all those involved in the making of the Treaty were pleased with it. John Maynard Keynes (1883 – 1946) was a mathematician and economist who served in the British Treasury during World War One and was a member of the British delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. He resigned from the delegation in protest to the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles. He gave public voice to his protest in his work The Economic Consequences of the Peace, published in Nov, 1919. Keynes argued that the reparations burden imposed on Germany by the Treaty would prove ruinous to the German economy. A humiliated and crippled Germany, he predicted, would prove destabilizing to the peace of Europe. It would be unable to pay the reparations. It would be unable to participate in international commerce as a strong trading partner. German resentment of the Treaty would be manifested politically through a desire for revenge. In all of these consequences, Keynes proved correct.

The League of Nations

The Covenant of the League was drawn up by a special commission headed by President Wilson and was included in the texts (Articles 1- 26) of the Versailles Treaty and the other treaties made at Paris in 1919. The aims of the League were to promote international cooperation between nations and maintain peace by providing a forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations. The League would also provide its members collective security

The organization of the League consisted of three bodies: the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat. All member nations made up the Assembly in which each state held one vote. The Assembly met once a year or more frequently if necessary. The function of the Assembly was to "deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world."

The Council was to serve as an executive body with five permanent members (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and United States) and ten other nations on a rotating basis. Its function was the same as that of the Assembly.

The Secretariat was a permanent staff of expert advisors and clerical workers who managed the routine business of the League. The League's headquarters were established in Geneva, Switzerland.

On joining the League member nations accepted an obligation not to resort to war and promised to submit any disputes to arbitration (settlement by a third party). Arbitration could be conducted by the Permanent Court of International Justice (the "World Court") or through special boards or commissions established by the Assembly or Council.

The Covenant also provided that if a member nation broke its pledge to submit a dispute to arbitration or went to war, the League, through the Assembly or Council, could impose penalties upon that member. Such penalties included the breaking of diplomatic relations, economic sanctions (such as trade embargoes), blockade, or, as a last resort, use of military force against the offending state.

The League adopted the policy of collective security in order to protect its members and deter war. According to Article 10, by joining the League, all member nations were committed to guarantee the security of all other member states against external aggression. This was the major point to which the US Senate objected when the Treaty of Versailles was submitted for ratification. In spite of Wilson's assurances that League membership would not mean the loss of US sovereignty, the Senate rejected the Treaty and the US never joined the League.

The League of Nations Mandate System

At the end of the war Britain, France, and Japan all coveted colonial territories formerly held by Germany and Turkey. In order to resolve the question of sovereignty over former colonies of the Central Powers, the League Covenant established a mandate system. Rather than grant the region outright to the control of another country, the League assigned the area as a mandate to the government of an "advanced nation" to administer. The mandatory power was pledged not to fortify the region and to prepare the native people for self-government and independence.

The regions assigned to mandatory powers were the Arab states (Lebanon and Syria to France; Palestine, Transjordan, Mesopotamia – today Iraq – to Britain), Central and Southwest Africa (Cameroon and Togo divided between Britain and France; Tanganyika to Britain; Southwest Africa to South Africa), and the Pacific islands (the Marshalls, Carolines, and Marianas to Japan; New Guinea, the Bismarcks, and Samoa to Australia and New Zealand).

Despite its seemingly noble motive – to prepare less advanced cultures for nationhood and independence – the mandate system was simply imperialism under a new label. The mandatory powers controlled and used in their own interests the economic resources of their new subjects. The British saw the value of controlling Middle Eastern oil production. The Arabs saw the mandate system as a deliberate big power betrayal of promises of independence made by the Allies during the war. Anti-Western Arab nationalism was the natural result of this new anger and frustration. The Japanese, believing themselves threatened by US interests in the Pacific, began to fortify their island mandates. The League, although impressive in theory, did not have the enforcement power to compel individual mandatory nations to honor the principles of the mandate system.


Treaties with the other Central Powers, 1919 - 1920

In addition to the Treaty of Versailles with Germany, the Paris Peace Conference drafted treaties with Germany's former allies. With the breakup of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in 1918, separate treaties were created for both Austria and Hungary. All were signed (thus their names) at locations near Paris.

Treaty of St. Germain with Austria, September 1919

Austria recognized as an independent republic.

Austria was to accept the loss of her former empire and recognize the independence of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Poland.

Territorial adjustments:

Galicia was ceded to Poland.

Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia were ceded to Yugoslavia.

Tyrol and Trieste were ceded to Italy.

Fiume became a free city under League of Nations administration.

Austria was forbidden to seek political unity with Germany.

Austria was to limit its army to 30,000 troops and pay reparations.

Treaty of Neuilly with Bulgaria, November 1919

Bulgaria was to limit its army to 20,000 troops and pay reparations.

Bulgaria was to recognize the independence of Yugoslavia.

Bulgaria ceded Thrace to Greece.

Treaty of Trianon with Hungary, June 1920

Hungary recognized as an independent republic.

Hungary was to recognize the independence of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Hungary was to limit its army to 35,000 troops and pay reparations.

Hungary ceded Transylvania to Rumania and other territory along its borders to Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Treaty of Sèvres with the Ottoman Empire, August, 1920

The future of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East proved a baffling challenge of conflicting Great Power interests. Britain and France, in particular, had ecouraged Arab resisitance to Turkish rule during the war. Promises of Arab independence had been made but were now under discussion as to how such "independence" might be given without losing Anglo-French dominance in the region. The future status of Constantinope and the Turkish Straits was also in question, especially as Turkish nationalists were rising in rebellion against the Sultan. In the spring of 1920 representatives of the major Allied powers met in San Remo in Italy in an attempt somehow to resolve these issues. They came up with an agreement of sorts that satisfied no one. A few months later a new agreement, incorporating much of San Remo, was made at Sèvres, a suburb of Paris.

The Turkish government renounced all claims to sovereignty over non-Turkish territory.

Cyprus became a British colony. (Britain had administered Cyprus since 1878.)

The Dodecanese Islands were ceded to Italy.

Eastern Thrace, some Aegean islands, and Smyrna (Izmir) on the Turkish coast were ceded to Greece.

The Kingdom of Hedjaz (what is today Saudi Arabia) was granted independence.

Palestine (today Israel), Transjordan (Jordan), and Mesopotamia (Iraq) were ceded to Britain as mandates of the League of Nations.

Syria and Lebanon were ceded to France as mandates of the League of Nations.

Armenia was recognized as independent.

The Dardanelles (Turkish Straits) were demilitarized and internationalized and placed under control of an international commission.

The Ottoman Empire was to pay reparations and limit her armed forces.

The Treaty of Lausanne with Turkey, July 1923

The end of the war found the Ottoman Empire in the throes of a nationalist revolution led by Mustapha Kemal against the government of the Sultan Mohammed VI (1918 - 1923). The Allies imposed the Treaty of Sèvres on the Ottoman Empire, but the conditions of the Treaty were rejected by Kemal's nationalists. In 1923 Kemal's forces prevailed and the Ottoman Sultanate was abolished. Kemal then reorganized the Turkish state as the Republic of Turkey and negotiated a new treaty which was signed in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1923. The Turkish capital was moved from Constantinople to Ankara.

Turkey gave up all claims to all non-Turkish territory once part of the old Ottoman Empire.

Turkey would pay no reparations.

The Straits were to be demilitarized and open to all nations in time of peace and in time of war if Turkey remained neutral.

(In 1934, the Turkish National Assemby awarded Kemal with the title and surname "Ataturk", Father of the Turks, in recognition of his modernization policies. It is by this name that he is most commonly remembered and identified today. )


Issues left Unresolved by the Paris Peace Settlement

Two areas of problems left unresolved by the Paris Peace Settlement would undermine the effectiveness of the peace established in 1919. First, two of the world's major powers, Russia and the United States, would not play a part in the new world order: one was purposely excluded from it; the other purposely removed itself from it. Without them, the peace would lack universal substance. The other problem area was the unfulfilled promise of national self-determination as national minorities, particularly German, smarted under the rule of newly created nations in Eastern Europe.

Russia

Russia, under the new Soviet regime of Vladimir Lenin, was purposely excluded from the peace conference. The ruling Communist Party had come to power in late 1917 through a violent revolution pledging to end Russia's involvement in the war and denouncing all association with the warring sides. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk (1918) ended Russia's war with Germany and enabled the Germans to mount a devastating offensive in France. The Communists had nationalized all foreign investments in Russia and repudiated all debts owed the Allies. As a Marxist, Lenin proclaimed the revolution in Russia to be only the start of a massive world-wide proletarian revolution that would sweep across Europe and destroy the bourgeois capitalist imperialist regimes that had caused the war. The Allies, angered by Lenin having pulled Russia from the war and alarmed by Communism's threat of international revolution, rejected Soviet Russia's desire to participate at Paris.

The Allied position regarding Russia was to isolate Russia behind what Clemenceau referred to as a "cordon sanitaire," a ring of independent buffer states along Russia's western boundaries. Russia was, therefore, seen as if she were a political disease to be quarantined. This position served further to arouse Russian suspicion of and hostility toward the Allies.

The Allies formally extended diplomatic recognition as independent nations to those former Russian imperial territories granted independence by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland. The Allies, therefore, gave their formal approval to the dismemberment of the Russian Empire

Allied relations with the new Soviet regime were further strained when in late 1918 Britain, France, Japan, and the United States sent troops to several Russian port cities to prevent the large stores of weapons and munitions sent to Russia earlier in the war from falling into the hands of the Communists. When anti-Communist resistance broke out in Russia, units of these Allied forces actively fought alongside the "Whites" (as the anti-Communist forces were called) against the Soviet Red army. All foreign troops had withdrawn by 1920.

Poland

Poland had declared itself an independent republic on the collapse of Russian and German imperial power in 1918. The Paris peace recognized that independence particularly as France was interested in the isolation of Soviet Russia. The boundaries of Poland, however, posed potential problems. The Treaty of Versailles granted the former German territories of the Polish Corridor and Posen to Poland and these territories contained large German minorities. Eastern Poland was formerly part of the Russian Empire and had a sizeable Russian population. Galicia in southern Poland had been part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and contained Czech and Slovak minorities. All of the non-Polish minorities resented being under Polish sovereignty.

National and Ethnic Minorities

The territorial adjustments made at Paris created (as in the case of Poland) problems in regard to national minorities. The peacemakers sought to restructure Europe in such a way to avoid problems arising from conflict of interests of nationalities with the overall interests of the national government. (Such conflict had been the case with the Serb - Austrian problem that started the war in 1914.) This policy had been partly realized in the recognition of independence for Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. The peace settlement had even attempted to transfer areas dominated by one national group to other states wherein that nationality was dominant (as with Romanian-dominated Transylvania being transferred from Hungary to Romania).

But this was not the case for German minorities. A quarter of a million Germans (formerly Austrians) lived in the Tyrol ceded to Italy. Three million Germans (formerly Austrian) dominated the Sudetenland, which had become part of Czechoslovakia. Over a million Germans lived in the Polish Corridor and Posen regions granted to Poland. To these Germans the principle of the right to national self-determination had been denied. They wanted their lands restored to a German state and were initially resentful and restless.

The status of ethnic minorities was of great frustration in resolving territorial issues in the former Ottoman Empire. The boundaries of the new mandates in the Middle East (Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq) were all artificial, drawn by the British and French with little attention to ethnic groups living in those areas. For example, the new boundaries divided the areas inhabited by Kurds among Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Persia. During the war the Kurds had believed Alled assurances that, once the Turks were defeated, they would have their own autonomous Kurdistan.

Such was also true of Armenia, a Russian provincial territory in the Caucasus region. Most Armenians were Christian. Because Armenia had once been a much larger state, many Armenians lived in Anatolia, the greater Turkish part of the Ottoman Empire. Being Christians, Armenians often experienced discrimination and abuse by their Muslim masters. With the Ottoman Empire at war, Armenian sympathies were with the Allies. In 1915-1916 the Ottoman leadership sanctioned the deportation and massacre of well over a million Armenians (the Armeinan genocide). Outraged, the Allies condemned the Turks and, hinting future recognition of independence, promised aid and assistance to the Armenians. Encouraged, Armenian nationalists took up arms agains the Turks. With the collapse of the czarist government in Russia in 1917, Armenia declared its independence and joined the Allies. But Armenia's enemies also now included Lenin's Bolshevik regime seeking to reestablish Soviet control of the Caucasus. In early March 1918 Russia made peace with Germany, enabling Germany to move its armies to the Western Front. Facing a new German offensive in the West, Allied assurances of armed support for Armenia became no more than lipservice. At Paris in 1919 Armenia's representatives were politiely ignored. There was even talk of Armenia being made a mandate of the United States, but Wilson rejected that as incompatable with his 14 Points. The Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne confirmed Turkish sovereignty over Anatolia, leaving its Armenian population under Turkish rule. However, in the Caucasus, Soviet forces defeated Armenian resistance in 1920, ending Armenian independence and bringing the territory back under Russian control as a Soviet republic. (Armenia became a fully independent country in 1991 with the dissolution of the Soviet Union,)

In an effort to meet the problem of national and ethnic minorities, all five treaties contained clauses through which each government pledged to treat fairly any such group within its borders. Each minority was guaranteed certain rights to be upheld and protected by the League of Nations. The League would prove to be powerless.

The United States of America

Despite the major part President Woodrow Wilson played in the making of the peace, especially in the discussions that produced the Covenant of the League of Nations, the United States would not ratify the Treaty of Versailles. The reason? The League of Nations was seen by the US Senate and the majority of the American people as a threat to American sovereignty. The Senate would refuse to approve the Treaty and join the League. The United States, committed in its values to human progress through peace and, in 1919, clearly the world's strongest power, would, therefore, ironically remove itself from a role in the new world forum committed to the same values. It is unknown what that role might have been, but the credibility of the League was considerably weakened by the American absence.

The Paris Peace Settlement: An Evaluation

Prior to leaving Paris following the Versailles signing ceremony, British Prime Minister Lloyd George told a friend that the treaty “was all a great pity. We shall have to do the same thing all over again in twenty-five years at three times the cost” (Watt 11). Woodrow Wilson, on the train taking him to the French coast, remarked to his wife, “Well it is finished, and as no one is satisfied, it makes me hope we have made a just peace; but it is all in the lap of the gods” (Watt 12). The gods, apparently, were not satisfied either. Lloyd George was wrong by only a year. World War Two ended in 1945 – twenty-six years later. The Paris Peace Settlement would prove to be a diplomatic disaster.

The hope of a just peace based on the Fourteen Points was dashed to death by stubborn insistence on national self-interests and a reluctance to make meaningful compromises. Unlike in Vienna in 1815 where the defeated enemy, France, was included in the peace negotiations, Germany and its allies had been excluded. When presented with the texts of the treaties, the former Central Powers were not permitted to discuss them with the Allies. Thus the peace treaties were what the Germans so aptly call Versailles – a “Diktat” – dictation, presented in the same fashion as the ultimatums that flashed back and forth between chancelleries in early August 1914. It was either accept the terms of the treaties, or the war would resume. Defeated and exhausted, they accepted the treaties.

When the Germans did as the Allies demanded and created a new, democratic, and republican government, the Allies assured its future failure by imposing upon it conditions Germany could not meet. Stripped of vital territories and crippled by reparations requirements, Germany experienced severe economic crises that over the next decade ultimately doomed its democratic government and brought the Nazis to power. Humiliated and angry, Germany yearned for revenge.

The new European order created at Paris isolated and angered Russia, now the world’s first Communist state. Communism was, rightfully, feared by the Western leadership. But the mindset at Paris made no effort to seek dialogue, despite Russia’s previous role - and great sacrifice - as an ally in the war against Germany. In response the Soviet Union, pursuing its Marxist revolutionary mandate as well as traditional Russian foreign policy goals, sought to encourage and direct Communist movements in other countries.

The League of Nations, Wilson’s hope for future peace, would prove ineffective and powerless. Germany and its former allies were not permitted to join the League until they had demonstrated significant adherence to the conditions of the peace. Had they been included in the League from the start, their anger and frustration might have been mollified. In contrast, the Vienna Peace in 1815 had treated France as an equal and admitted France to the Concert of Europe in 1818. And, as Britain would withdraw from the Concert of Europe in 1822, the United States would never join the League of Nations. In both cases the two countries viewed their respective participation in the Concert or the League as incompatible with their interests.

The Middle East remains today a harsh legacy of decisions made in Paris. In 1915 the Arab peoples were led to believe that they would have independence if they would join the Allies by rebelling against their Ottoman rulers. They did rebel and the Turks were defeated. Instead of independence, the British and French conspired to implement the 1916 secret Sykes-Picot Agreement, whereby they would divide the Arab Middle East between them. Why did it matter? Oil. The Middle East had oil, a resource now essential to the strategic and economic wellbeing of the industrial states. At Paris it was agreed that the British and French would hold League of Nations Mandates over the Arab regions of Lebanon and Syria (to France), and Palestine, Transjordan, and Mesopotamia – today Iraq (to Britain). To the Arabs this was an unforgivable betrayal.

The 1815 Vienna settlement sought to preserve a new European order based on legitimacy. In so doing it was opposed to expressions of nationalism. In 1919 Wilson hoped to build the future order on recognition of people’s right to national self-determination. Nationalism, after all, had been a major cause of World War One. To this end the peace settlement recognized the independence of many new states: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. However, the new boundaries that were drawn often overlooked territorial national identities, creating significant minorities of Germans, Hungarians, Russians, and other nationalities in the new countries. These minorities were often discriminated against by their new governments and yearned for territorial restoration to their former homelands. Such dissatisfaction among Germans in Poland and Czechoslovakia would later fuel Nazi Germany’s aggressive foreign policy.

In assessing the Paris Peace Settlement one is reminded of the story of the cowboy who took off his clothes and jumped into a clump of cactus. When asked why, he replied, “It seemed like a good idea at the time.” If one is looking for the causes of World War Two, a good place to start is with the settlement that ended World War One.

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The Big Four

The Big Four who directed the Paris Peace Conference were men of distinctive political experience and talents. Each came to Paris with his own agenda representative of both his nation’s interests and his own personal perception of how those interests should be realized. Each in his own way was a “character.” Clemenceau was “The Tiger,” feisty and outspoken. Lloyd George was seemingly an easy-going pragmatist with a reputation (not undeserved) of being a womanizer. Orlando would often become hysterical and cry in negotiating sessions. Wilson was stubborn and idealistic to the point of being naïve. What should have been his triumph became his tragedy.


Georges Clemenceau (1841 - 1929)

Clemenceau was 78 years old at the time of the Paris Peace Conference, the oldest of his colleagues. Although trained as a doctor, he never practiced medicine, preferring to immerse himself in the turbulence of French politics. A radical republican in his political thinking, he championed the values of the Jacobin Revolution: democracy and constitutional government. His politics were active as well as intellectual. He was an effective orator, wrote political articles, and involved himself in reformist causes. When in his twenties he traveled to the US where he spent several years during which he taught French at a girls’ school in Connecticut and married an American woman. The humiliation of France by Germany in the Franco-Prussian War made Clemenceau an ardent nationalist, committed to the revival of French power and greatness, a position that would sometimes compel him to compromise his principles as a republican. In 1874 he was elected to the French National Assembly where he became an outspoken voice for the values of the republic. He was ardently opposed, however, to socialism. He mixed his politics with journalism and was the founder, editor, and contributor to several newspapers. In the 1890s his paper “L’Aurore” published Zola’s controversial article J’Accuse, attacking those seeking to condemn Dreyfus. In 1906 he was appointed to the cabinet and from then on held leadership roles in the French government. He became Premier in 1917 (he also held the post of Minister for War) and assumed the leadership of France’s war effort against the Germans. He was popularly known as “The Tiger” because of his stubborn insistence that the war should be fought to a complete victory. He had the respect of the French high command and convinced Britain and the US to accept the French Marshal Ferdinand Foch as the supreme commander of Allied forces. In early 1918 he expressed his suspicion of and hostility to Wilson’s Fourteen Points, seeing Wilson as too idealistic.

In general elections held in early 1919 Clemenceau’s government received a popular mandate for securing a harsh peace. Clemenceau was named chairman of the peace conference. Guided by the need for French security, he would insist on creating a peace that would weaken, if not break up Germany altogether. He never fully trusted Wilson or Lloyd George whom he saw as either too idealistic or too soft on Germany. In February 1919 he survived an assassination attempt by an anarchist with alleged communist ties. The surgeons were unable to remove a bullet and this wound would cause him great discomfort for the rest of his life, but he was able to return to the work of the peace conference after only eight days of hospitalization. His greatest triumph was presiding at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles.

In late 1919 Clemenceau would be compelled to resign as premier as new elections expressed French popular dissatisfaction with the peace. He spent the rest of his life in retirement, traveling, writing, and enjoying the company of his neighbor, the Impressionist artist Monet. Clemenceau died in late November 1929.

While he did not get all that he wanted for France in the Treaty, he did not see it as a bad peace. It would work, he later wrote, if France maintained the will to enforce it. If France lost that will, then disaster would follow. A vengeful Germany would rise and again ravage Europe. When? In 1940 he wrote. (How perceptive! In June of 1940 following the devastating defeat of its armies, France surrendered to Germany. It was ten months after the start of the Second World War.)

David Lloyd George (1863 - 1945)

The Welsh-born British Prime Minister was 56 at the time of the peace conference, the youngest of his colleagues. Yet he came to Paris a well-experienced veteran of British politics. Leader of the Liberal Party, Lloyd George was known as a reformer. He had been a major proponent of significant welfare legislation passed by Parliament in the prewar years. He was appointed Prime Minister in 1916, and, although not experienced with military matters, demonstrated the ability to learn and understand Britain’s military and political position in the last two critical years of the War. He personally participated in the negotiations that led to the November 1918 armistice, being sure that Germany would surrender her High Seas Fleet to Britain as part of the agreement.

In late 1918 parliamentary elections were held. (This election was known as the “Khaki Election” as many of the voters were soldiers recently returned from the Continent.) The Liberal victory meant that Lloyd George had a popular mandate from the British people to exact a harsh peace that would guarantee Britain’s security, control of the seas, and make Germany pay. The Liberals’ political rhetoric called for Germany to be squeezed like a lemon “until the pips squeak.” While this was popular with the British masses, Lloyd George realized that a Germany devastated by reparations would not be in British commercial interests. The recovery and well being of the British economy would be very much dependent upon trade with an economically strong Germany.

Vittorio Orlando (1860 - 1952)

Of the Big Four, the 59-year-old Orlando was the “junior partner” among his colleagues. His role at Paris would be minimal, primarily asserting that Italy be awarded all it had been promised in the wartime secret treaties. Later the Italian demands were expanded to include the Adriatic port city of Fiume, for which Orlando would bargain Italy’s support for the League of Nations. Sicilian-born, Orlando, like Wilson, had been an educator as well as a politician. He had been appointed Premier in 1917. As leader of the parliamentary coalition that governed Italy, Orlando, as did Clemenceau and Lloyd George, had a popular mandate to pursue his country’s interests. Orlando’s coalition lost its parliamentary majority in June 1919.

Woodrow Wilson (1856 - 1924)

President Wilson went to Paris expecting to be the dominant personality in the making of the peace. After all, the United States had won the war for the Allies. Virginia-born and of devout Presbyterian parents, Wilson would become an educator. His professional career saw him as a highly popular professor of history and political science at Princeton University. He was known as an eloquent speaker, not only in his lectures, but also on broader issues of concern. In 1902 he assumed the presidency of Princeton wherein he enacted numerous curricular reforms and became a nationally recognized figure. In 1910 he was invited by New Jersey’s Democratic Party to run for governor. Running as a progressive seeking to reform New Jersey’s political system and make government more responsive to the people, he won the election. In 1912 he was chosen by the Democrats to be their candidate for President. With the Republicans divided between two candidates, Wilson, continuing to run as a reformer, won the presidency. He would be re-elected in 1916. Believing in the moral purpose of democracy, he brought to the White House a high sense of idealism. If Wilson had a political fault, it was that he was uncompromising when his principles were questioned.

When the war ended in November 1918 Wilson was 63-years old. His Fourteen Points, he believed, were incontestable principles upon which the future peace – a “peace without victory” - must be based. So convinced was he of the virtue of his purpose, he would personally go to Paris to oversee the peace process. (He was the first US President ever to travel abroad in the conduct of state affairs.) In December he toured the Allied capitals and was welcomed by massive crowds enthusiastically hailing him as the savior of Europe and the prophet of peace. He visited the battlefields and saw war’s devastation. How could humanity ever want to go to war again? He came, he reasoned, with a moral mandate. Unlike Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando, he did not come with a popular political mandate. In the November 1918 congressional elections Wilson's Democratic Party suffered considerable losses. The Republicans won overwhelming control of both houses of Congress. Throughout the war, there had been a political truce as congressional Democrats and Republicans joined in patriotic bipartisan support for the Administration's policies. In October 1918, however, Wilson broke the truce through his October Appeal calling upon voters to give the Democrats a congressional majority. He believed his negotiating position in Europe would be strengthened with a Democratic Congress behind him. The outcome of the election would weaken him in Paris. Of the Big Four he would be the only head of state who lacked a legislative majority. He had even refused to take any high-ranking Republicans with him as part of the American delegation. This would prove fatal to any peace treaty that he might bring home for Senate ratification. His European colleagues recognized Wilson’s political weakness. Using Wilson’s insistence on the League of Nations as a bargaining point, they would compel him to concede others of his Fourteen Points. In the final Treaty he would get the League, but not the “peace without victory” that he so badly wanted.

Following the signing of the Treaty of Versailles Wilson returned home to present the Treaty to an angry Republican Senate. The Senate objected to the League of Nations fearing it would compromise American sovereignty and commit the US to continuous “policing” of the world. Knowing the Senate would reject ratification, Wilson undertook a cross-country speaking tour to urge the American people to pressure the Senate to accept the Treaty. The strain of the tour proved too much for the President. The tour was abruptly cancelled and Wilson was rushed back to Washington. Physically exhausted, he suffered a stroke that left him partially paralyzed. The Senate Republicans were willing to accept the Treaty with reservations on US League membership, but this was unacceptable to Wilson. The Treaty was rejected. The US would never join the League of Nations. An invalid, frail and ailing, Wilson served out the rest of his second term (which ended in 1921). He died in 1924.

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The "Big Four" photo is from Wikipedia. The Keynes photo is from the Bloomberg Opinion Website, 2017.

The separate photos of the Big Four are from Wikipedia sources.

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Sources for the Paris Peace Settlement

Gilbert, Felix. The End of the European Era: 1890 to the Present. New York: Norton, 1970.

Langer, William, ed. An Encyclopedia of World History. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968.

MacMillan, Margaret. Paris 1919. New York: Random House, 2003.

Mee, Charles L. The End of Order: Versailles 1919. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1980.

Merriman, John. A History of Modern Europe. New York: Norton, 1996.

Palmer, Robert et al. A History of the Modern World. New York: McGraw Hill, 2002.

Watt, Richard M. The Kings Depart. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968.