Post date: Sep 27, 2012 6:22:56 AM
P. Dasgupta & G. Heal wrote:
The problem of the common was brought to the attention of non-economists in a widely cited article by Hardin (1968). The article is vigorously written and is characterized as much by loose analyses as by incorrect conclusions.
(Dasgupta and Heal 1979: 93n)
P. Dasgupta cited Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons”:
Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as many cattle as possible on the commons. …
As a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain. Explicitly or implicitly, more or less consciously, he asks,“What is the utility to me of adding one more animal to my herd?” …
Adding together the component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another.... But this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
(Hardin 1968: 1244)
Then, he also wrote:
It would be difficult to locate another passage of comparable length and fame containing as many errors as the one above.
(Dasgupta 1982: 13)
Furthermore, he added:
[I]t would be wrong to suppose that each herdsman in Professor Hardin’s example will add cattle without limit. Animals are not costless, even to the herdsmen who own them. And such private costs set limits on the number of animals each herdsman find most profitable to introduce into the common pasture. But the point remains that in the absence of a binding mutual agreement each herdsman will typically ignore the cost he impose on the other when introducing another animal into the common. One suppose then that the system will entertain too many animals in the pasture, in the sense that it would be in the herdsmen’s collective interest to curtail the number of animals. However, an excessive number of cattle in the common does not necessarily mean that it will be ruined. For we cannot know without further information just how excessive the numbers will be. Whether or not the common will be ruined depends on a number of factors, an important one of which is the price of output (i.e. beef or milk) relative to the private cost of rearing cattle (see especially chapter 6). Freedom in the commons does not necessarily bring ruin to all; in fact it may ruin none. Moreover, we shall note that if the resource ceases to remain as a common property and if rent is charged by the usurper for access to the resource, each of the users could well be worse off. The users may even become impoverished, The distributional consequences of an alternation in property rights always bear close scrutiny. What is implied by Professor Hardin’s example is that each of the herdsmen could benefit if they jointly were to exercise some control over the common and if nobody were to enter the scene to collect rents for its use.
(Dasgupta 1982: 14)
Relevant short notes:
G. Hardin’s “Commons’ papers & book
日本語で読めるG. ハーディン G. Hardin’s work translated into Japanese
REFERENCES
- Dasgupta, Partha. 1982 The Control of Resources, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Dasgupta, P. S., and Heal, G. 1979 Economic Theory of Exhaustible Resources, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hardin, Garrett. 1968. “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 [13 December 1968]: 1243-1248.