The argument on the anticommons is the inverse of the one on the commons. The semicommons problem leads to focuse on the multi-dimensionality of problems attached to a certain types of the commons.
Michael A. Heller (1998) distinguishes the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and the overuse or overconsumption problem, on the one hand, from the ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ and the underuse or underconsumption problem, on the other:
More generally, one can understand anticommons property as the mirror image of commons property. In a commons, by definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the privilege to use a given resource, and no one has the right to exclude another. When too many owners have such privileges of use, the resource is prone to overuse—a tragedy of the commons. Canonical examples include depleted fisheries, overgrazed fields, and polluted air.
In an anticommons, by my definition, multiple owners are each endowed with the right to exclude others from a scarce resource, and no one has an effective privilege of use. When there are too many owners holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse—a tragedy of the anticommons.
(pp. 623-4, original emphases.)
And,
A tragedy of the commons can occur when too many individuals have privileges of use in a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting separately, may collectively overconsume scarce resources. Each individual finds that she benefits by consumption, even though she imposes larger costs on the community. Using my definition, the anticommons is prone to the inverse tragedy. A tragedy of the anticommons can occur when too many individuals have rights of exclusion in a scarce resource. The tragedy is that rational individuals, acting separately, may collectively waste the resource by underconsuming it compared with a social optimum.
(p. 677, original emphases.)
Henry E. Smith (2000) illustrates the semicoommons with the land which was used as a common pasture during some seasons, and whose parts ware cultivated privately by individual farmers during other seasons, under the open-filed system:
In what I am calling a semicommons, both common and private uses are important and impact significantly on each other.
The archetypal example of a semicommons is the open-field system of medieval and early modern northern Europe. In the open-field system, peasants had private property rights to the grain they grew on their individual strips of under 1 acre, which were scattered in two or three large fields around the central village. However, during certain seasons, peasants would be obligated to throw the land open to all the landowners for grazing their animals (especially sheep) in common, under a common herdsman. This enabled them to take advantage of economies of scale in grazing and private incentives in grain growing (with no important scale economies). The semicommons allowed operation on two scales simultaneously. To address the incentives to overuse the common-pool resource (the potential “tragedy of the commons”), many aspects of the operation such as the numbers of animals and times for grazing were strictly regulated on a communal basis. But a semicommons such as the open fields (here with private ownership for grain growing of pieces of the same land as used communally for grazing) presents further potential costs. In particular, if peasant holdings had been consolidated, there would have been, as I will show, an incentive for strategic behavior as a commons user to favor one’s own plot with extra “goods” like manure and to injure others’ private plots with excess “bads” like trampling by sheep (p. 132).
And,
The primary example of this semicommons structure is the open fields of medieval England. There land was owned as a commons for grazing where there were significant economies of scale but was privately owned for grain growing where the need for private incentives dominated. Stinting alone could abate the familiar common-pool incentives to overgraze, but something more was needed to abate the strategic incentives characteristic of a semicommons. (…) Scattering is consistent with efficiency as a device to impose a sanction on this strategic behavior: a herd of animals would stand on the plot of most owners at any time, and with animals on the move it would be prohibitively difficult to direct them with reference to private boundaries that are hard to discern quickly (p. 168).
Thus, he interprets scattering strips as a device to repress strategic behavior favoring one’s own strips, rejecting a risk-based explanation mainly of Donald (Deirdre) N. McCloskey.
Relevant short notes:
the Comedy or Drama of the Anticommons to come?
the First appearance of the word “Anticommons”?
REFERENCES
- Heller, Michael A. 1998 “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,” Harvard Law Review 111(3): 621-688.
- Smith, Henry E. 2000 “Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields,” Journal of Legal Studies 29(1): 131-169.